FO
413
N
008

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. *July* 1906.

CONFIDENTIAL.

(8754.)

F.O.
413

F.O. 413/41

PART 29.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS OF MOROCCO.

41

January to March 1906.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
1	Mr. Lowther ..	300	Dec. 18, 1905	Sale of slaves at Tangier. Some boys and girls have been offered for sale. Private sale in coast towns would be difficult to prevent and has always existed	1
2	„ „ ..	301	20,	French yacht "Aigle." Officers have been continuing their studies with a view to ascertaining whether Sebou would be navigable in winter months as far as Fez for small craft. Some officers attacked by Gharb and Beni Hassan tribes (see No. 105, Part 27)	1
3	„ „ ..	302	20,	Capture of British officers by brigand Valiente and his band. Transmits note from Hadj Mohammed Torres, who suggests release of remainder of escort, and reply, stating that he cannot concur in his Excellency's view (see No. 105, Part 28)	2
4	„ „ ..	304	23,	Murder of Mr. Madden at Mazagan. Transmits correspondence with Sid-ben-Sliman and despatch from Consul at Dar-al-Baida. Prisoners removed from Mazagan and being sent to Marakesh to serve term of imprisonment. Refers to No. 7, Part 28 ..	3
5	Sir E. Egerton ..	214 Confidential	27,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs. Urges special need for continuity and steadiness in international policy. England and Italy bound by engagements to France and Abyssinia. Minister for Foreign Affairs observes that England and Italy are not in same position, as latter is bound by Triple Alliance. His Excellency reminded that His Majesty's Delegate will give full diplomatic support to his French colleague at the Conference ..	4
6	Sir E. Goschen ..	223 Very Conf.	28,	Algeciras Conference. Count Goluchowski's attitude. Austro-Hungarian Delegates have received no special instructions. His Excellency believes that German Emperor has caused German Delegates to be instructed to use utmost circumspection and moderation, and to avoid anything which might in any way offend French susceptibilities. Conversation with French Ambassador ..	5
7	M. de Bernabé ..	..	29,	Algeciras Conference. Spanish Government will do everything possible to facilitate deliberations. Meeting has been fixed for 16th January..	6
8	Sir A. Nicolson ..	241 Secret	27,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation between French Ambassador and Señor Moret. Spanish intention to support France. German efforts to detach Spain from France and Great Britain. Emperor's proposal to King Alfonso to revive Secret Agreement, by which Spain had formerly undertaken to furnish military assistance to Germany in certain eventualities (see No. 122, Part 28)	6
9	„ „ ..	243	29,	Algeciras Conference. Meeting of Delegates to discuss question of accommodation at Algeciras. French, German, and English Delegates withdraw from guarantees given in regard to the hotel (see No. 125, Part 28)	7
10	Sir A. Nicolson ..	244	Dec. 29, 1905	Algeciras Conference. Reports withdrawal of Señor Montero Rios from post of Spanish Delegate in favour of Duke of Almodovar. 16th January decided on for opening of Conference (see No. 7) ..	7
11	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	1 Tel.	Jan. 1, 1906	Algeciras Conference. His Majesty's Government have no objection to date proposed in No. 118, Part 28 (see No. 10)	8
12	Sir R. Rodd ..	222	Dec. 29, 1905	Algeciras Conference. Reports appointment of Swedish Minister at Madrid, M. Sager, as Swedish Delegate	8
13	London Committee of Deputies of British Jews	..	Jan. 2, 1906	Position of non-Mahommedans in Morocco. German Government will support any measures proposed at Conference for purpose of improving their position	8
14	Sir A. Nicolson ..	1 Tel. Confidential	5,	Trade carried on by Pretender in neighbourhood of Melilla. Spanish Government somewhat perturbed at active state of. As vessel is flying French flag, no action can be taken except with French concurrence. Enterprise financed by French adventurers from Hamburg (see No. 104, Part 28) ..	8
15	Sir E. Egerton ..	1 Tel.	5,	Algeciras Conference. Italian Delegate will be Marquis Visconti Venosta (see No. 5) ..	9
16	Signor de Bosdari ..	..	5,	Algeciras Conference. Informs of appointment of Marquis Visconti Venosta as first Italian Delegate. Italian Ambassador at Madrid will remain at his post	9
17	To M. de Bernabé ..	..	5,	Algeciras Conference. Acknowledges No. 7. Has already instructed His Majesty's Representative at Madrid to inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that place and date of meeting will be convenient to His Majesty's Government	9
18	Mr. Lowther ..	305	Dec. 25, 1905	Raisuli. Is making determined effort to increase his jurisdiction. Declines to comply with instructions from Court. Refers to No. 101, Part 28	9
19	„ „ ..	306	25,	Orders sent for capture of brigands known by name of Valiente. Governor of Anghera district received orders to effect capture and applied to Commander of Government troops for assistance. Latter intimidated by Raisuli and cannot act (see No. 3) ..	10
20	„ „ ..	307	26,	Proposals which Moorish Government intend to put forward at the Conference. Conversation with El Menebhi. Makhzen desires that any money obtained for requirements of country shall be in its own hands and uncontrolled. Government will undertake duty of policing the ports, but control must be entirely in hands of Makhzen	10
21	„ „ ..	309	29,	Algeciras Conference. Reports names of Foreign Ministers at Tangier appointed to represent their respective countries ..	11

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
22	Mr. Lowther ..	310	Dec. 29, 1905	Algeciras Conference. Difficulty of ascertaining what instructions have been given to Moorish Delegates. Sultan and Viziers becoming suspicious of sincerity of Germany's action. His Majesty would like the proposed police to form part of the central army. He has received advice from Germany to reduce his pretensions at Conference to the lowest limits (see No. 20) ..	11
23	Mr. Spring-Rice ..	14	Jan. 2, 1906	Algeciras Conference. Russian Government have instructed Russian Ambassador at Madrid to afford his French colleague cordial support at Conference. Conversation with French Minister	12
24	Sir F. Lascelles ..	4 Confidential	3,	Anglo-German relations. Conversation with Baron von Richthofen. His Excellency agrees as to decided improvement in relations. German Government would not ask us to forego our understanding with France. Much will depend on our attitude at Morocco Conference. German demands will be very moderate. His Excellency's satisfaction at change of Government in England (see No. 6)	12
25	Sir C. Phipps ..	2	4,	Algeciras Conference. Discussion in Belgian press as to attitude to be assumed by Belgium. Minister for Foreign Affairs states that his Government will follow traditional policy of being guided solely by its economical interests irrespective of political considerations, and that conclusion of "Indépendance Belge" that she should be on side of France and England is entirely justifiable	13
26	Mr. Lowther ..	1 Tel.	5,	Tobacco and sugar monopolies. Report that Sid Torres, Sultan's Commissioner, has received orders from His Majesty to negotiate with a foreign subject for. Any such Concession contrary to Treaties, and the order has not been carried out	14
26*	To Sir C. Hardinge ..	6 Tel.	8,	Morocco Conference. It is desirable to make it quite clear to the Czar that His Majesty's Government will support France fully (see No. 23)	14
27	Mr. Cartwright ..	2 Tel.	9,	Morocco. French Government will take measures for the suppression of contraband trade with the Pretender. Refers to No. 14	14
28	Mr. Lowther ..	2 Tel.	9,	Monopolies. Applicant for Concession was a French Company, and asked for sugar and candles monopoly (see No. 26)	14
29	To Sir F. Lascelles ..	11	9,	Situation with regard to Morocco. Conversation with German Ambassador. England does not intend to make trouble at the Conference, but, if there is trouble between France and Germany, England will be involved in it. Count Metternich states German point of view. Likelihood of England taking part in war. We do not wish to "egg on" France further than she wishes to go at the Conference. Tone of the press in England and Germany. Details of the Conference. Germany will not content herself simply with guarantees for her economic interests (see No. 24)	14

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
30	To Sir F. Lascelles ..	12	Jan. 9, 1906	Anglo-German relations. Acknowledges No. 24, and approves language. Algeciras Conference. Special position conceded by Great Britain to France by Article 2 of Anglo-French Declaration. His Majesty's Government cannot suggest to France any departure from this position and from support guaranteed in Article 9. Baron von Richthofen can be referred to these two Articles should he again recur to the subject (see No. 29)	16
31	Memorandum communicated by the Spanish Ambassador	..	Dec. 30, 1905	Algeciras Conference. Invitation to His Majesty's Government from Spanish Government to attend (see No. 17)	17
32	To Sir F. Bertie ..	21 Confidential	Jan. 10, 1906	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with French Ambassador. Questions of finance, prevention of trade in contraband of war, and police. Various alternatives for dealing with police question. Suggestion by Russian Minister at Tangier respecting it (see No. 22)	17
33	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	5	10,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with Spanish Ambassador. Everything will depend on nature of German proposals, of which His Majesty's Government is still ignorant. His Majesty's Government's public engagement to France will be kept. Spanish Government determined to keep their engagements (see No. 8)	18
34	" " ..	8	11,	Algeciras Conference. Transmits No. 31. To accept invitation on behalf of His Majesty's Government	19
35	Sir M. Durand ..	1 Tel.	11,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with Secretary of State. United States' Government not much interested in. American Delegates instructed to stand for open door, to use influence for peace, and to avoid any action which could tend to weaken Anglo-French *entente*	19
36	Sir F. Lascelles ..	3 Tel.	12,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with Prince Bülow. Hopes that Conference will pass off peacefully. Police question. Germany could not consent to organization of police being given to France. M. Rouvier has given a verbal promise that France will not put forward such a demand. His Majesty's Government will not "egg on" France to go further than she wishes. Proposed solution of police question (see Nos. 29 and 30)	19
37	Mr. Lowther ..	2	3,	Murder of Mr. Madden. Suspected instigator has been sent to Laraiche *en route* for Fez, where he will be detained pending inquiry into charge against him. Refers to No. 4 .	20
38	" " ..	3	4,	Attitude of French in Morocco. Deputation of French citizens addressed by French Charge d'Affaires at Tangier ..	20
39	" " ..	4 Confidential	4,	Release of Taib, son of Bu-Amama, from prison. Reports. French Chargé d'Affaires hopes to come to some arrangement about him. He should, strictly speaking, be shot for having taken up arms against Sultan. Refers to No. 54, Part 28	20

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
40	Mr. Lowther ..	5	Jan. 4, 1906	Reports of further trouble between French and Moorish Governments. Bu-Mzian Melania, the Algerian, who provoked ultimatum to Sultan on part of French, has been again imprisoned. Refers to No. 48, Part 27 ..	21
41	„ ..	6	5,	Tobacco and sugar monopolies. Extends No. 26. No likelihood of matter going beyond its present stage ..	21
42	„ „ ..	7	6,	Algeciras Conference. Report of appointment of Colonel Ferrara, Chief of Italian Military Mission at Fez, as one of Italian Delegates. Undesirability of appointment (see No. 16). Appointment of interpreter for the Moorish Delegates	21
43	Sir A. Nicolson ..	4	6,	French projects and aspirations in Morocco. Campaign conducted by several Spanish papers against. French Ambassador has drawn attention of Spanish Government to tone of articles in the "Imparcial"	22
44	„ „ ..	5 Confidential	5,	Trade carried on with the Pretender. Conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs. Steps which Spanish Government should take to prevent its continuance. French see no objection to Spanish gun-boat being employed in the service (see No. 17)	22
45	„ „ ..	6 Confidential	5,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs. Proposal to defer to later sittings questions of suppression of contraband trade and of police organization (see No. 36). German Government will propose that German vessels should take part in patrol duties	23
46	„ „ ..	7	9,	Trade carried on with the Pretender. French authorities intend to take steps for preventing its continuance. French gun-boat will be dispatched to arrest vessel carrying on trade. Refers to No. 44	24
47	„ „ ..	9	9,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with Señor Moret. Desire of Spain to act cordially with Great Britain and France. Spain will never consent to allocation of police organization to different Powers by sections (see Nos. 33 and 45)	24
48	Sir E. Egerton ..	8	9,	Algeciras Conference. Circumstances connected with appointment of Marquis Visconti Venosta as Italian Delegate (see No. 15)..	25
49	„ „ ..	10 Secret and Confidential	9,	Algeciras Conference. Conversations with MM. Visconti Venosta and Barrère. Suggestion that exceptional position with regard to Morocco might be claimed by Mediterranean Powers. Remarks on altered tone of German Government	25
50	Sir F. Lascelles ..	13	10,	German White Book on Morocco Conference. Transmits précis of. Transmits article from "Frankfurter Zeitung" respecting ..	26
51	Sir F. Bertie ..	20 Confidential	10,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with M. Rouvier. No indications of change in attitude of German Government. Feeling of all classes of French public becoming more irritated at attitude of German press. Doubt as to line to be taken by Belgium (see No. 25)	28

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
52	Sir F. Bertie ..	21	Jan. 12, 1906	Algeciras Conference. Italian Delegate's arrival in Paris on his way to Algeciras. He is profuse in assurances of desire of Italy to be agreeable to France	29
53	M. Rouvier to M. Révoil (communicated by M. Geoffray)	..	12,	Algeciras Conference. Instructions to French Delegate (see Nos. 74 and 91, Part 28) ..	29
54	Sir F. Lascelles ..	5 Tel.	13,	Algeciras Conference. Herr von Holstein fears French invasion of Morocco. This danger would be averted if His Majesty's Government could give a hint to France that in such a contingency it is doubtful whether English public opinion would admit of support of France by force of arms (see No. 36)	31
55	Señor Bernabé ..	..	13,	Algeciras Conference. Informs of appointment of Duke of Almodovar as Spanish Delegate (see No. 10)	32
56	Sir A. Nicolson ..	2 Tel.	14,	Matters to be discussed at Conference. Conversation with French Delegate. Advises him not to lay Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish Agreements before the Conference. He agrees not to do so, and expresses desire to act in complete harmony with British Delegate	32
57	Sir F. Lascelles ..	14 Confidential	11,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with Prince Bülow. Germany only asks for open door in Morocco. Police question. Great Britain's attitude. German Government would not ask England to abandon France. Reasons which would make it impossible for Germany to consent to a mandate being given to France to organize police. Proposal to settle question by mapping out the country into zones or by intrusting control to some neutral Power. Prince Bülow's desire to get rid of Morocco question (see Nos. 36 and 54)	32
58	„ „ ..	17 Confidential	13,	Algeciras Conference. Police question. Conversation with Herr von Holstein. He fears that France, relying on support of Great Britain, may invade Morocco. Germany could not consent to any provisional arrangement which would give control of police to France. Idea of establishing reforms on a Moroccan rather than on an international basis (see No. 57)	34
59	Sir F. Bertie ..	4 Tel.	14,	Algeciras Conference. French Government's desire to avoid war, and will not provoke it by invading Morocco. Any communication to French Government such as that proposed by Herr von Holstein would shake their confidence and perhaps lead them to make concessions to Germany injurious to England (see No. 54)	35
60	Mr. Lowther ..	3 Tel.	15,	Contraband trade. French cruiser "Lalande" leaving for neighbourhood of Mar Chica, with instructions to seize French boats if detected in any infraction of maritime law. (see No. 46)	36
60A	To Sir F. Lascelles ..	4 Tel.	15,	Algeciras Conference. Hopes result of Conference will prevent contingency feared by Herr von Holstein from arising. Should it be otherwise, His Majesty's Government cannot deprecate any action on part of France which comes within terms of Anglo-French Declarations of April 1904. Refers to No. 54 (see No. 59)	36

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
60B	To Sir F. Bertie ..	32	Jan. 15, 1906	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with French Ambassador. Transmits Memorandum handed to M. Cambon, giving account of Sir A. Nicolson's communications with M. Révoil respecting opening of Conference (see No. 56). Report that M. Visconti Venosta is preparing a proposal in accordance with German idea that police should be organized either in separate "secteurs" controlled by different Powers or that they should be intrusted to a neutral Power (see No. 57). M. Cambon is sure there will be no trouble with Germany if she is convinced that England and France will keep together	36
61	Sir F. Bertie ..	26	15,	State of affairs on Algeria–Morocco frontier. Transmits telegram from "Temps" correspondent at Algiers respecting Governor-General's tour, which has had effect of strengthening French influence in border regions	37
62	Sir A. Nicolson ..	3 Tel.	16,	Police question at the Conference. Report that French Minister for Foreign Affairs had given a verbal promise not to raise question of general mandate for police quite without foundation. Cites proofs of this from Yellow Book (see Nos. 36 and 90)	37
63	Mr. Lowther ..	9	11,	Algeciras Conference. Arabic interpreter for Moorish Delegates has been found ignorant of French, and there is no efficient interpreter available. Refers to No. 42 ..	38
64	Sir F. Bertie ..	29	16,	Algeciras Conference. Transmits notes of conversation between Sir C. Hardinge and M. Rouvier. Alternative solutions of police question. M. Rouvier quite satisfied with attitude of His Majesty's Government	38
65	Mr. Cartwright ..	4 Tel.	17,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with French Ambassador. Has communicated to his Excellency some observations made by Count Tattenbach. Advisability of leaving police question undecided (see No. 62)	39
66	Sir A. Nicolson ..	4 Tel.	17,	Algeciras Conference. Reports first meeting First subject for discussion is to be suppression of contraband	39
67	" " ..	5 Tel.	17,	Suppression of contraband trade. German Representative may suggest that Powers should take measures for preventing exportation to Morocco of arms and ammunition from their ports. Requests information as to similar measures attempted with regard to China. Right of maritime patrol to visit and search sailing-vessels. Proposes that it should be as strictly limited as possible. Requests instructions (see No. 66)	40
68	Mr. Cartwright ..	11 Confidential	15,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with Count Tattenbach. He is most conciliatory towards France. Bigger and more vital questions than that of Morocco call for Emperors attention (see No. 57). Police question. Sultan will probably refuse consent to any proposal to hand over mandate of organization to one Power (see Nos. 62 and 65)	40

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
69	Mr. Spring-Rice ..	14 Tel.	Jan. 18, 1906	Algeciras Conference. Possibility of Germany's proposing that Spain should be intrusted with organization of police, except on French frontier (see No. 68)	41
70	Sir A. Nicolson ..	6 Tel.	18,	Jewish question in Morocco. United States' Representative has instructions to bring this question before the Conference. French Representative and self think it dangerous to enlarge programme of Conference. Suggests that joint representation made by Ministers at Tangier to Moorish Government would have equal effect (see No. 13) ..	41
71	" " ..	7 Tel.	17,	Suppression of contraband. Conversation with French Delegate. Have come to the conclusion that question of maritime patrol had better not be mentioned by either French or British Delegates. Will suggest discussion of some more efficient supervision over vessels in Moorish ports (see No. 67)	42
72	" " ..	8 Tel.	19,	Suppression of contraband trade discussed at Conference. Small Committee appointed to draw up Regulations. Discussion of question of maritime patrol deferred. Attitude and tone of language quite friendly (see No. 71)	42
73	Mr. Lowther ..	4 Tel.	19,	Suppression of contraband trade. French cruiser has returned, but found no boats at Mar Chica, only four tents and small warehouses. Refers to No. 60	42
74	" " ..	11 Confidential	13,	Contraband trade with Pretender. French cruiser "Lalande" about to be sent to Melilla with instructions to the Captain to inquire into and report on circumstances connected with establishment of French warehouses at Mar Chica (see No. 73). Extends No. 60	43
75	Mr. Spring-Rice ..	64	16,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with French Ambassador, M. Bompard. Russian loan will not be sanctioned in France unless German Emperor will make official declaration of his peaceful intentions with regard to Morocco. Anxiety caused in Russia by non-communication of German instructions to their Delegate. Private communications between the two Emperors	43
76	Sir F. Lascelles ..	25 Confidential	17,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with Dr. von Mühlberg. Has communicated substance of No. 60A. Intention of His Majesty's Government to support France. Dr. von Mühlberg believes that it will be possible to bring Conference to peaceful and satisfactory conclusion	44
77	" " ..	26 Confidential	17,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with French and Italian Ambassadors. Both optimistic. Difficulties of police question. Count Lanza convinced that neither Germany nor France intend to go to war (see Nos. 60B and 76)	44
78	British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society	..	19	Sale of slaves in Moorish towns. Says that according to newspaper reports it was public. Urges that the question be brought up at the Morocco Conference (see No. 1) ..	45

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
79	Sir A. Nicolson ..	9 Tel.	Jan. 20, 1906	Algeciras Conference. Police question. Conversations with French and Italian Delegates. It would be unjust to Europeans living in coast towns for Conference to separate without taking some measures for their protection. Hopes that some compromise may be found of a modest and provisional character, and limited solely to coast towns (see No. 69) ..	46
80	„ „ ..	10 Tel.	20,	Jewish question in Morocco. Conversation with United States' Representative, who seems to doubt whether representations to Moorish Government from Tangier would satisfy President of United States. French Delegate is suggesting to his Government that on termination of Conference the Representatives should be asked to address a semi-official note to Moorish Government on the subject. Refers to No. 70	46
81	To Sir M. Durand ..	5 Tel.	20,	Jewish question in Morocco. Has approved Sir A. Nicolson's acting as suggested in No. 70. To represent matter to United States' Government	47
82	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	6 Tel.	20,	Jewish question in Morocco. Approves action suggested in No. 70. Informs of No. 81 ..	47
83	Sir A. Nicolson ..	11 Tel.	21,	Algeciras Conference. Police question. Conversation with United States' Delegate. Germans will under no conditions agree to organization of police being intrusted to France and Spain alone. If France would make concessions in regard to police, Germany would make large concessions in regard to bank and finance questions. French Delegate ready to consider matter, but Germany must first make a definite statement (see No. 79)	47
84	Mr. Cartwright ..	16	15,	Algeciras Conference. Transmits answer addressed to Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of His Majesty's Government to invitation of Spanish Government. Refers to No. 34	48
85	„ „ ..	5 Tel. Secret	22,	Algeciras Conference. Police question. Conversation with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Overtures made by German Government to Spanish Government. Germany may withdraw her claim as to police in favour of Spain in case of west coast (see No. 69). No allusion to policing west coast is made in secret Agreement between France and Spain. His Majesty's Government and France might prefer to see Spain policing west coast to Germany (see No. 83) ..	48
86	„ „ ..	6 Tel. Confidential	22,	Algeciras Conference. Police question. President of Council threw out idea to Italian Delegate that solution might be found to police question by authorizing State Bank to construct a railway from Tetuan along the coast eastwards, administration of which would have powers to recruit from all nations guards who would practically become a gendarmerie (see No. 85)	49
87	„ „ ..	7 Tel. Confidential	23,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with French Ambassador. Rumours that Germany has an idea of proposing neutralization of Morocco. French and Spanish Governments entirely opposed to neutralization ..	49

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
88	Sir M. Durand ..	4 Tel.	Jan. 23, 1906	Jewish question in Morocco. United States' Government had no desire to enlarge scope of programme. They regarded question as part of that of policing. Uncertainty as to views of United States' Government on police question (see No. 82)	49
89	Mr. Lowther .	12 Confidential	15,	Contraband trade in Morocco. Departure of French cruiser "Lalande" for neighbourhood of Mar Chica. Sultan powerless to take measures. French Government cannot well interfere. Conversation with French Chargé d'Affaires (see No. 74)	50
90	„ „ ..	14	17,	Police question at Conference. Conversation with Dr. Rosen. He asserts that M. Rouvier gave a verbal promise not to put forward any claim on part of France to organization of police elsewhere than on frontier. Probability of future change in German policy. Germany becoming less energetic (see No. 62)	50
91	Sir A. Nicolson ..	13 Tel.	24,	Algeciras Conference. Question of French and German Delegates meeting privately to discuss matters. German Government consider that France should take initiative, and are opposed to intervention of any third party. Beyond verbal and indirect statements of German Delegate, no indication has been given by German Government that in return for concessions by France on police question Germany would make large concessions in finance matters. French Delegate will proceed with great caution (see No. 83)	51
92	Mr. A. G. Wise ..	..	24,	State Bank in Morocco. Promises made by Sultan that "Bank of Morocco, Limited," should become the State Bank. Requests representations to His Majesty's Delegate at Algeciras Conference for such action as may be deemed expedient	51
93	Mr. Lister	7 Tel. Secret	25,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with M. Louis. Conference was called by Germany, and it is therefore clearly for her to declare her views and proposals. Trusts that France will maintain her expectant attitude	51
94	Mr. Cartwright ..	8 Tel.	25,	Police question. France objects strongly to possible German proposal that Spain should organize police on west coast. Idea seems to exist in Berlin official circles that question might be settled by dividing Morocco into two zones, one for France and one for Spain. Refers to No. 85	52
95	Sir F. Lascelles ..	10 Tel.	25,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with Prince Bülow. He approves of idea that French and German Delegates should meet and discuss matters. No objection to intervention of third party, and no wish that France should declare her views on police and finance questions before the Conference (see No. 91)	52
96	Sir A. Nicolson ..	14 Tel.	25,	Algeciras Conference. Suppression of contraband trade. Discussion of Regulations concluded. Moorish Government likely to request withdrawal or modification of three of the Articles (see No. 72)	52

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
97	Sir A. Nicolson ..	15 Tel.	Jan. 25, 1906	Police question. Better to say nothing for the moment to Spanish Representative. Proposal to intrust policing of west coast to Spain would be extremely pleasing to her, and German Delegate might put it forward with a view to France and Great Britain being led to oppose it and consequently to separate themselves from Spain. Doubtful whether Germany would make formal proposal undermining thesis she has maintained that police mandate should not be intrusted to one Power alone (see No. 94)	53
98	„ „ ..	16 Tel. Confidential	25,	Police question. German Government have suggested to United States' Government three alternative solutions. In none of solutions is mention made of Spain alone policing west coast ports. Enumerates solutions proposed (see No. 97)	53
99	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	4 Confidential	25,	Sale of slaves in Morocco. Transmits No. 61*, Part 28, and No. 78. Records interview of Mr. Buxton with Lord Fitzmaurice. Requests views as to most practical method of dealing with the matter .. .	54
100	Mr. Cartwright ..	18 Confidential	22,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. No overtures have taken place from Germany to Spain. Herr von Radowitz is in possession of Franco-Spanish Secret Agreement of September 1905. Señor de Ojeda's opinion of that Agreement. Any proposal from Germany that Spain should police the ports on west coast could not be considered by Spain without consent of France. Señor Moret's suggestion as to coast railway (see Nos. 97 and 85)	54
101	„ „ ..	9 Tel. Confidential	26,	Algeciras Conference. Interview between M. Cambon and President of the Council. Verbal assurance that Spanish Government will not allow themselves to be seduced by any offers which Germany may make, and will remain faithful to engagements with France (see No. 100)	56
102	Sir A. Nicolson ..	17 Tel.	26,	Private communications between French and German Representatives. German Representative has proposed and French agreed that French and German expert advisers as well as Count Tattenbach should endeavour to arrive at some understanding as to constitution and attributes of State Bank. No definite statement of German views on police question obtained (see Nos. 91 and 95) ..	56
103	„ „ ..	1 Conference	17,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with French Delegate at Gibraltar. Dissuades M. Révoil from presenting Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish Agreements to Conference (see No. 56). Police question. Strength of France's position with regard to this point ..	56
104	„ „ ..	2 Conference Confidential	17,	Police organization in Morocco. No truth in Prince Bülow's statement that M. Rouvier had promised that France would not ask for a general mandate (see No. 90). France reserves to herself entire liberty on all points not mentioned in the programme of the Conference ..	58
105	„ „ .	3 Conference	18,	Algeciras Conference. Reports first meeting of. Statement by Duke of Almodovar, who was elected President. First question to be discussed is to be suppression of contraband trade. Extends No. 66	58

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
106	Sir A. Nicolson ..	4 Conference	Jan. 19, 1906	Suppression of contraband trade. Transmits draft project of several questions submitted to a General Committee, and proposal made by Belgian Delegates. Small Committee appointed to draw up Regulations specifying mode in which the measures should be carried into effect (see No. 96)	60
107	„ „ ..	5 Conference	19,	Moorish affairs and prospects of the Conference. Conversation with Italian Delegate. Difficulty of finding a solution to police question. Arguments put forward in favour of organization by France and Spain (see No. 104) ..	61
108	„ „ ..	6 Conference	20,	Algeciras Conference. Transmits *procès-verbal* of first meeting (see No. 105)	62
109	„ „ ..	7 Conference	20,	Police question. M. Révoil entirely shares views put before Italian Delegate as reported in No. 107, and agrees as to conditions within which police organization should be restricted	66
110	„ „ ..	8 Conference	21,	Question of Jews in Morocco. Conversation with United States' Delegate. He wishes it brought before Conference. Has tried to dissuade him in concert with French Delegate. Suggests submission of semi-official note to Moorish Government on termination of Conference (see No. 88)	67
111	Mr. Lowther ..	14	19,	Moorish Pretender. Sultan's forces have encountered Bu Amama's forces and been put to flight (see No. 39) . ..	67
112	„ „ ..	15	19,	Mar Chica. Return of French cruiser "Lalande." No boats discovered. French Chargé d'Affaires says it is duty of Sultan's forces to put an end to the illicit traffic (see No. 89)	67
113	Mr. Cartwright ..	19	22,	Neutralization of Morocco. Rumours have reached French Government that German Government had idea of proposing. Quite unacceptable to France and to Spain. Instructions in this sense sent to President of Conference. Conversation with French Ambassador. Extends No. 87	68
114	Sir R. Rodd ..	15	23,	Algeciras Conference. Swedish Government take interest only in commercial aspect of Conference. Their Delegate has general instructions to support policy of open door (see No. 12)	68
115	Mr. Lister	37	26,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with M. Louis. Germany should take initiative in putting forward her views and proposals. M. Louis not in favour of questions being discussed privately between French and German Delegates. Conflicting statements made by German Representatives at European capitals with regard to German views. French Government believe that these statements are made with the object of creating confusion (see Nos. 93 and 102)	69
116	Nil.				
117	Sir F. Lascelles ..	12 Tel.	27,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with Acting Secretary of State. Herr von Radowitz' account of his direct communications with M. Révoil (see No. 102) ..	70

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
118	Sir A. Nicolson ..	19 Tel.	Jan. 27, 1906	Police question. Possible combination would be France, Spain, Italy, and Germany. Suggestion by German Delegate. French Delegate much perplexed by contradictory proposals put forward by German Government (see No. 109)	70
119	„ „ ..	20 Tel.	27,	Question of increasing customs duties. His attitude at discussion in general committee. Will not refer question to His Majesty's Government before being satisfied that revenues derived from any increase would be kept in separate "caisse" and solely devoted to measures which would improve ports and facilitate commerce. Moorish Delegates have handed in series of proposals many of which are quite inadmissible	70
120	„ „ .	21 Tel.	28,	Police question. Correction in No. 118 .	71
121	Mr. Cartwright ..	21 Confidential	27,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with German Chargé d'Affaires. German Government desires to be rid of Morocco question. Emperor anxious for peace. No definite views as to solution of police question (see No. 68)	71
122	Sir A. Nicolson .	22 Tel.	30,	Question of State Bank. Interview between French and German experts and Count Tattenbach. Agreement arrived at in regard to attributes and functions of bank. Germany opposed to (1) Placing bank under French control; (2) France contributing greater portion of capital; (3) French having preferential rights in regard to future loans. French would probably make concessions in regard to (3) if Germany would be ready to make some on (2). Before concluding discussions on bank, French will try to elicit German views as to police (see No. 102) ..	72
123	Mr. A. G. Wise ..	Confidential	30,	State Bank of Morocco. Information furnished by him as to Sultan's autograph in connection with promise that the "Bank of Morocco, Limited" should be State Bank was incorrect. Acknowledges Foreign Office letter stating that matter has been referred to His Majesty's Representative at Tangier (see No. 92) ..	72
124	Mr. Lowther ..	6 Tel.	31,	Mar Chica. French vessel "Eider" wrecked, but another vessel has landed guns, which Pretender has taken over. Moorish steamer "Turk" has left to put a stop to the traffic, and French man-of-war will be sent for same purpose (see No. 112)	73
125	To Sir F. Lascelles ..	52	31,	Police question. Conversation with Count Metternich. Project that police should be organized by Sultan as a Moroccan force, and supported by funds provided by State Bank. His Excellency not sure as to whether the officers would be Moroccans. German Government might accept such a scheme (see No. 118)	73

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
126	Mr. Cartwright ..	10 Tel. Confidential	Jan. 31,	Algeciras Conference. Spanish Government depressed and anticipate a breakdown. Germany seems to desire internationalization of every reform introduced into Morocco, with intention of working towards neutralization of country (see No. 113). It appears from information received that Germany intends to ask Conference to give police mandate to small Power. Spain objects strongly to this. Spanish Delegate seems to think Spain badly treated by proposal to allot her only 20 per cent. of bank capital. Spain would accept police mandate with France if offer were made (see Nos. 122 and 125)	73
127	Sir A. Nicolson ..	23 Tel.	Feb. 1,	Question of increase of customs duties. French Delegate proposes to agree to increase as temporary measure on condition that they do not exceed 2½ per cent. and are paid into special "caisse." Conditions respecting works to be executed in employing them. Project seems reasonable. Requests instructions as to accepting conditions (see No. 119) .	74
128	Board of Trade ..	..	2,	Proposed increase of Moorish customs duties. Observations on conditions on which French Delegate to Conference proposes to agree to an increase as reported in No. 127. His Majesty's Government might reasonably agree to increase of 2½ per cent. on those conditions, and on understanding that any increase is applied equally to all classes of goods. Observations as to works to be undertaken with funds derived from the increase	74
129	Sir A. Nicolson ..	24 Tel.	2,	Fresh sources of revenue for Moorish Government. Conference came to unanimous agreement in regard to internal taxation ..	75
130	„ „ .	25 Tel.	2,	Report that Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs is being sent to take part in Conference. He may bring proposals as to police question	75
131	„ „ ..	26 Tel.	2,	State Bank. Probability of agreement being reached between French and German Delegates. French will not close negotiations until agreement is arrived at on police question (see No. 122)	76
132	Mr. Lowther ..	7 Tel.	2,	Mar Chica. French information to effect that vessel which landed guns was "Ellen," Swedish vessel. Spanish authorities maintain that vessel flew French flag. Refers to No. 124	76
133	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	11 Tel.	2,	Proposed increase of import duties. His Majesty's Government see no objection, subject to conditions stated in No. 127. They reserve right to criticize details on receipt of fuller information (see No. 128)	76
134	Mr. Lowther ..	17	Jan. 25,	Angera Mission to Fez. Reports capture and probable murder by Raisuli of the deputation. Subsequent murder by Duas, Governor of the Angera, of Deylan, a partizan of Raisuli's, his son and nephew (see No. 18) ..	76
135	„ „ ..	18	26,	General news from Dar-al-Baida district. Transmits despatch from Consul at Dar-al-Baida	77

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
136	Sir A. Nicolson ..	10 Conference	Jan. 26, 1906	Regulations to be adopted by Conference. Point raised by Count Tattenbach as to whether eventual Regulations adopted by Conference will supersede provisions of existing Treaties. Requests views on this point. Proposal as to introduction of sporting guns	78
137	„ „ ..	11 Conference Confidential	26,	State Bank and police questions. Former to be discussed by financial experts and Count Tattenbach. Discussion between M. Radowitz and M. Révoil on police question. Former alluded to alleged promise of M. Rouvier that France would not ask for mandate at Conference and declined to state German views (see Nos. 104 and 131) ..	78
138	„ „ ..	12 Conference Confidential	26,	Police question. Three alternative solutions proposed by German Government to United States Government. Conversation with Italian Delegate. Above solutions unacceptable. Possibility of Germany proposing that police organization should be intrusted to France, Spain, and Italy (see Nos. 118 and 125)	80
139	„ „ ..	15 Conference Confidential	27,	State Bank. Its constitution and attributions, as explained by French financial expert. His project as to allotting the capital amongst the Powers. Declaration in favour of France which he wishes His Majesty's Government to authorize their Delegate to sign (see No. 122)	81
140	„ „ .	17 Conference	28,	Regulations for suppression of contraband trade. Transmits copy. Have been forwarded by Moorish Delegates to their Government (see No. 105)	81
141	Mr. Spring-Rice ..	95	30,	Russian attitude towards Morocco question. Is one of comparative indifference. Personal assurances received by Czar from German Emperor as to peaceful settlement of question. Czar's language as regards Emperor. Improvement in situation. In event of war between Germany and France, sympathies of Russian Liberals and of bulk of people would be on side of France (see No. 75) ..	84
142	„ „ ..	102 Confidential	31,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with French Ambassador. Russian optimism as to situation. Germany doing her best to persuade Russia, and with some success, that English Liberal Government intend to seek occasion of leaving France in the lurch. Importance of German policy in this regard and of England's attitude (see No. 141) ..	85
143	Sir A. Nicolson ..	27 Tel.	Feb. 3,	State Bank. French Delegate does not propose to discuss bank question with his German colleague until latter has explained German views as to police. German attitude on question "a negative one." Conversation with German Delegate (see No. 131) ..	86
144	Mr. Lowther ..	8 Tel.	3,	Report that Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs is being sent to take part in Conference. Seems very improbable. No confirmation of it to be obtained (see No. 130)	86
145	Sir A. Nicolson ..	28 Tel.	4,	Proposed increased of customs duties. Question of special "caisse" deferred. Has declined to entertain proposal of raising duties on imports from 10 to 12½ per cent. until acquainted with organization of "caisse" (see No. 133)	86

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
146	Sir A. Nicolson ..	29 Tel.	Feb. 4, 190	German attitude at Conference. Conversation with Count Tattenbach. His object to detach British from French Delegate and induce former to urge latter to make concessions to Germany. States that commercial interests of Germany and England are endangered by predominance of France in Morocco. Reports reply. Intention to stand by French colleague	87
147	„ ..	30 Tel.	4,	Police question. Conversation between M. Révoil and M. de Radowitz. Latter only proposed that Moorish Government might possibly organize a police with European officers. Count Tattenbach has stated that small Powers should undertake organization, but that it would be better to have no police at all (see No. 138) ..	87
148	„ „ ..	18 Conference	Jan. 30,	Proposals for improvement of Moorish revenue. Examination of Moorish proposals for fresh taxation (see No. 129). Proposes to submit that improvement should be looked for mainly from internal taxation, &c. Transmits declaration as to increase of customs duties, destined to be read at next meeting on 1st February (see No. 145) ..	88
149	Mr. Cartwright ..	25 Confidential	Feb. 1,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Spain is being badly treated in being allotted only 20 per cent. of capital of proposed bank. German attitude unfavourable. Spain's objection to police mandate being intrusted to a small Power. Lines on which Spanish Government would like police question to be solved (see No. 126)	89
150	Sir A. Nicolson ..	31 Tel.	6,	Police question. Interview between German and United States' Delegates. Possibility of France accepting a third Power to herself and Spain to take part in police organization. United States' Delegate is under impression that German Delegate is prepared to yield (see No. 147)	90
151	„ „ ..	32 Tel.	6,	Police question. Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs sounded by German Delegates as to whether Spain would not undertake police. They would like to see her at Casablanca and Mogador. Minister for Foreign Affairs gave evasive reply to German Delegates. Spain determined to act in co-operation with France (see No. 150)	90
152	„ „ ..	33 Tel.	7,	Police question. Conversation between German and Italian Delegates. Latter stated opinion that France will claim that police organization should be intrusted to her and Spain. German Delegate did not reject or accept idea. General opinion that German Delegates may be willing to concede French demands, but all depends on what Berlin may decide. Count Tattenbach has greatly modified his opposition to dual organization of police (see Nos. 126 and 151) .	91
152*	Mr. Cartwright ..	11 Tel. Confidential	7,	Police question. Madrid papers have published what purports to be Moorish proposals for organization of police. They suggest employment of Mahommedans from Turkey, Syria, and Egypt. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs without information as to authenticity of above. Spanish Government quite in the dark as to Germany's intentions (see Nos. 125 and 152). Fear of Ministerial crisis before end of Conference	91*

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
153	Mr. Spring-Rice ..	26 Tel.	Feb. 8, 1906	Police question. Count Lamsdorff hears from Russian Delegate that Germany has agreed *ad referendum* to proposal to place police under France and Spain. His Excellency asked views of His Majesty's Government (see No. 152)	91
154	Sir A. Nicolson ..	35 Tel.	8,	Question of increase of customs duties. Plenary sitting yesterday adjourned at suggestion of British Delegate with regard to project of organization of special "caisse." Proposals for lowering export duties on grain refused at first by Moorish Delegates, who will, however, refer them to their Government. Proposed revision of anchorage dues. Not to be entertained until condition of ports has been improved (see No. 148)	91
155	" " ..	36 Tel.	8,	Question of increase of customs duties. Fears it would be impossible to persuade French and German Delegates to consent to increasing duties on wine. Proposes to ask French and Spanish Delegates to agree to surtax of 2½ per cent. being levied on goods imported by land (see No. 154) ..	92
156	" " ..	37 Tel.	8,	Police question. French Delegate has telegraphed to his Government asking for their final views. Suggestions which he has made to his Government as to distribution of police at ports between France and Spain (see No. 154)	92
156*	To Mr. Spring-Rice ..	38	8,	Police question. To inform Count Lamsdorff that His Majesty's Government would agree to any solution acceptable to France. Refers to No. 153	92*
157	Sir A. Nicolson ..	38 Tel.	9,	Police question. No solution yet found. Private *pourparlers* between French and German Delegates will be reopened when latter has received final instructions from Berlin. Russian Delegate has suggested to his Government that they should recommend proposal to intrust organization to France and Spain to German Government, which they have done. Refers to No. 153 (see also No. 156)	93
158	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	14 Tel.	9,	Proposed increase of customs duties. Board of Trade is being consulted. Should not commit himself to acceptance of proposals except subject to conditions already stated. Refers to Nos. 154 and 155	93
159	Sir A. Nicolson ..	20 Conference	1,	Increase of customs duties. Transmits M. Révoil's proposals. Has told him that maximum increase should not exceed 2½ per cent. *ad valorem*, and he will insert this stipulation (see No. 158)	93
160	" " ..	23 Conference Confidential	2,	State Bank. Interview with MM. Révoil and Regnault. Three points to which differences in discussions between M. Regnault and Count Tattenbach have been reduced. Compromise suggested by M. Regnault not actually rejected by Count Tattenbach. Bank and police questions to be treated on parallel lines (see Nos. 143 and 157) ..	94
161	" " ..	24 Conference	4,	State Bank and police questions. Conversation with Count Tattenbach. Relations of British with French Delegate. His Excellency's opinion that former is urging latter to resist, and that British Delegate holds the key of the situation (see Nos. 146 and 160) .	95

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
162	Sir A. Nicolson ..	25 Conference	Feb. 4, 1906	State Bank. Count Tattenbach dissatisfied with constitution proposed by French. He is certain that bank would become an entirely French establishment. Intimate association of all foreign capitalists with French financiers. Bank, though international in appearance, would in reality be under control of latter (see No. 160)	97
163	" " ..	26 Conference	4,	Police question. Conversation with Count Tattenbach. Emperor takes special interest in the question. Germany could never agree to France and Spain being solely intrusted with police organization. Urges on his Excellency necessity of police in view of present condition of Morocco (see No. 157)	97
64	" " ..	27 Conference	4,	Police question. Private conversation between French and German Delegates. Germany cannot accept control of police by France and Spain alone. German proposal that Sultan should undertake organization of police and engage services of foreign officers (see Nos. 125 and 163)	98
165	" " ..	28 Conference	5,	Statistics of foreign trade with Morocco. Transmits compilation made by Financial Adviser to French Delegate, showing. Effect on trade crossing Algerian frontier produced by disturbed state of Eastern Morocco and by Pretender's movements	99
166	Mr. Spring-Rice ..	34 Tel.	10,	Police question. German answer to Russian communication is being sent by messenger. No indication of its nature. Has made communication in sense of No. 156*, and has informed French Ambassador	106
167	Mr. Cartwright ..	13 Tel. Confidential	10,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with German Chargé d'Affaires. Private exchange of views between French and German Representatives has had no result. Failure of Conference anticipated by Spanish Government (see Nos. 125 and 164) ..	106
168	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	15 Tel.	10,	Bank question. His Majesty's Government cannot agree to declaration proposed in No. 139. French Government may rely on British Representative on bank supporting his French colleague. His Majesty's Government would be prepared to give assurance to this effect, and would come to an agreement with France that, in event of other Powers ceasing to be represented on the bank, they would also withdraw (see No. 162) ..	106
169	Sir A. Nicolson ..	40 Tel.	11,	Proposed increase of customs duties. Reports meeting in general committee. Project for establishment of special "caisse" incomplete. Reply of Sultan as to Regulations for contraband trade, &c., received. It suggests one or two slight modifications in proposals of Conference (see No. 158)	107
170	" " ..	41 Tel.	11,	Police question. Has received information that German Government have been trying to induce two important Governments to support proposal by which Sultan would organize police with help of volunteer officers selected by minor Powers (see No. 125). German Representative received instructions to suggest proposal to French Representative and to obtain support of above-mentioned Powers. Their Representatives refused to urge it on French Representative, so German Representative has telegraphed to his Government for instructions (see also No. 164)	107

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
171	Mr. Cartwright ..	14 Tel.	Feb. 12, 1906	Police question. Conversation with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Germany less friendly to Spain than at beginning of Conference. This is perhaps to be attributed to suspicions of German Government that Secret Agreement must have been concluded between France and Spain which would render creation of Spanish police really a French one. German opposition to Spanish police may, however, be withdrawn (see No. 149)..	107
172	Sir A. Nicolson ..	43 Tel.	12,	Police question. Impression prevalent that German Emperor and his Government have some misconceptions as to French demands. United States' Government has telegraphed substance of French demands to Washington, and United States' Government will see that it is communicated to German Emperor. Gives substance of these demands (see No. 170) ..	108
173	Mr. Cartwright ..	29 Confidential	10,	Police question. Conversation with Baron Stumm, German Chargé d'Affaires, who suggested that if Conference should end abortively perhaps intervention by a third Power might help to reopen negotiations between Paris and Berlin. His fears that United States of America might introduce a police scheme independently of France and Germany (see No. 172)	108
174	Mr. Spring-Rice ..	38 Tel.	13,	Police question. German answer to Russian representations at Berlin is that French Minister for Foreign Affairs is bound by a verbal agreement not to ask for control of police by France (see No. 104 and 166) ..	109
175	Sir A. Nicolson ..	44 Tel.	13,	Bank question. Just possible that French and German Delegates may come to an agreement. This would facilitate discussion of police question. German Delegate hopes to be in a position to discuss police question with French Delegate to-morrow. Press report of deadlock incorrect (see No. 168) ..	109
176	„ „ ..	45 Tel.	13,	Police question. Result of Russian suggestions at Berlin. Three ways in any of which Germany would be prepared to settle question. If no agreement is reached, Prince Bülow states that only course will be to revert to *status quo* based on Madrid Convention. Count Lamsdorff has inquired whether Russian suggestion at Berlin could not be supported by similar intervention of Great Britain, United States, and Italy. Has informed French Delegate of difficulty of suggesting such a course to United States' and Italian Delegates. Preferable that question of British intervention should be considered in London (see No. 174) ..	110
177	To Sir F. Bertie ..	99	13,	Bank and police questions. Conversation with French Ambassador, who made a statement denying allegations of German press as to (1) M. Révoil having endeavoured to reverse order of discussion, and (2) M. Rouvier having withdrawn claim to a general police mandate; mandate only referred to coast towns. France prepared to give fresh guarantees as to economic equality and liberty (see Nos. 174 and 177) .. .	110

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
178	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	10	Feb. 13, 1906	Count Tattenbach's conversation with Sir A. Nicolson. Approves language used. Count Tattenbach seems to have desired that France should be urged to yield to German view. His remark tending to throw blame for obstructing the Conference on His Majesty's Government is entirely unwarranted. His Majesty's Government's attitude has been quite within the limits of Anglo-French Agreement (see No. 161) ..	111
179	Sir A. Nicolson ..	46 Tel.	14,	Regulations affecting contraband trade. Amendments proposed by Moorish Government agreed to by Conference. Increase of customs duties on imports. French Delegate will make no objection to all duties being raised by 2½ per cent. Fears this will be the only concession obtainable (see No. 140)	112
180	„ „ ..	47 Tel.	14,	Police question. Proposals communicated by German to French Delegate, which latter is referring to his Government. He has also suggested to them that it would be advisable to take no action on Count Lamsdorff's proposal for the present. He thinks that French Government will not accept German proposal, but hopes it may not be Germany's last word (see No. 156*)	112
181	To Sir F. Lascelles ..	67	14,	Police question. Conversation with German Ambassador. Why cannot Germany be satisfied with French guarantees which satisfy other Powers? General observations on French and German views (see No. 176) ..	113
182	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	11	14,	Regulations to be drawn up at Conference. Provision should be inserted in General Act, which Conference will probably draw up, repealing all contrary stipulations of previous Conventions. To suggest insertion of such a provision when occasion arises. Replies to No. 136	114
183	Board of Trade ..	..	15,	Proposed increase in rate of import duties and revision of anchorage dues at Moorish ports. Observations on telegraphic correspondence with British Delegate at Algeciras Conference. Increase of import duties by 2½ per cent. would not be seriously felt by British trade. Unable to express any definite opinion as to anchorage dues. Unsatisfactory condition of Moorish ports (see No. 169 ..	115
184	Sir A. Nicolson ..	48 Tel.	15,	Project regarding frauds on Customs, &c. Discussion practically concluded. Has requested that some reciprocity should be shown in these matters, and has expressed hope that some guarantee will be given that more order and regularity will be introduced into Customs Administration	116
185	„ „ ..	49 Tel. Most Conf.	15,	Police question. Conversation with French Delegate. Draft reply drawn up for communication to German Delegate. He will agree that Conference should ask Sultan to undertake organization of police in certain specified localities; that State Bank should provide necessary funds, and that scheme should be for a limited period. Sultan should select French and Spanish officers to assist in organization, &c. (see No. 180 ..	116

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
186	To Sir F. Bertie ..	98	Feb. 15, 1906	Police question. Conversation with French Ambassador, who described German proposal. Refusal of M. Rouvier to discuss question with German Ambassador at Paris. M. Cambon thought Italian Delegate might make alternative proposals to Conference which would be acceptable to France. Thus blame for failure of Conference would not rest with France (see No. 185)	117
187	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	16	15,	Stake Bank question. Messrs. Samuel Montagu recommend appointment of Mr. Pariente, their agent, as British Delegate. Intimation that firm would be prepared to find British share of capital (see No. 175) ..	118
188	Mr. Cartwright ..	30	13,	Factory at Mar Chica. Illicit trade between French vessel and Pretender. Spanish cruiser "Extremadura" to proceed to Melilla to patrol coast and factory. Ship will also be ready to proceed from Cadiz (see No. 132)	118
189	Sir A. Nicolson .	50 Tel.	16,	Police question. French Minister for Foreign Affairs desires informal meeting of Representatives of eight Great Powers, with a view to endeavouring to reach an agreement. Proposal seems hardly advisable, and French Delegate will so inform his Government. Suggestion made by German Ambassador at Paris to French Minister for Foreign Affairs, that they should discuss police question, rejected by latter (see No. 186) ..	118
190	„ „ ..	51 Tel.	16,	State Bank and police questions. Their presentation to the Conference can only be deferred to next week. If no agreement can be reached in the meantime, public discussion of these questions will have to be faced	119
191	Mr. Lowther ..	21	6,	High prices paid by Moors for rifle cartridges. Transmits Vice-Consul Madden's (Mogador) No. 4 of 13th January	119
192	„ „ ..	22	9,	Operations of the Compagnie Marocaine at Mogador. Transmits Report by Vice-Consul Madden. The Company is getting as much Makhzen property as possible into its hands. It is considered to be a political venture ..	120
193	„ „ ..	24 Confidential	10,	State Bank of Morocco. Information as to "Bank of Morocco," which appears to have never had any actual existence. Improbable that Sultan or Viziers promised that it should become the State Bank (see No. 123)	121
194	Sir A. Nicolson .	32 Conference	7,	Question of discovering new sources of revenue. Plenary sitting of Conference. Proposed reduction in certain export duties. Article respecting harbour and anchorage dues drawn up. Has accepted it *ad referendum*. Desire of Moorish Delegates to establish a monopoly of tobacco (see No. 183) ..	121
195	„ „ ..	34 Conference	11,	Proposed increase of import duties. Plenary sitting of Conference and General Committee meeting. Discussion of draft project for institution of a special "caisse." Project referred back to Drafting Committee. Articles for suppression of frauds on Customs read, but not discussed. Moorish Government appear to have accepted, with few modifications, Regulations for suppression of contraband trade (see Nos. 183 and 194) ..	122

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
196	Sir A. Nicolson ..	35 Conference Confidential	Feb. 11, 1906	Police question. No possibility of satisfactory solution. German attempt to persuade United States and Italy to support German Delegate. United States refuse to do so. They are ready to undertake that French demands should reach German Emperor in their moderate and practical form (see Nos. 176 and 189)	123
197	Sir F. Bertie ..	71	15,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with M. Rouvier. Prince Radolin's proposal as to negotiations at Paris on police question. German proposal that Sultan should organize a Moorish police force under officers selected from minor Powers cannot be accepted by France. Transmits article from "Temps" corresponding in purport with M. Rouvier's language (see No. 185) ..	124
198	Mr. Cartwright ..	15 Tel.	16,	Mar Chica. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has read him official telegrams. French cruiser will remove French subjects from factory, and Moorish Government vessel will then destroy it (see No. 188)	127
199	„ „ ..	16 Tel.	16,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Germany's desire is only to get out of the Conference with as much dignity as possible (see No. 121). Probable German concessions on police question (see No. 196)	127
200	Sir A. Nicolson ..	52 Tel.	17,	Increase of customs duties. Will probably meet with opposition from Spanish Delegates when proposing that surtax shall be 2½ per cent. *ad valorem* for all imports. President of Conference hard to convince, as he is a large wine-grower (see No. 195) .	128
201	„ „ ..	53 Tel.	17,	Police question. French Government have approved reply which French Delegate proposes to make to German communication (see No. 185 and 196)	128
202	„ „ ..	54 Tel.	17,	Spanish attitude towards Germany at Conference. German Government's dissatisfaction at. Has not personally noticed anything unfriendly in attitude of Spanish towards German Delegates (see No. 171)	128
203	„ „ .	55 Tel.	17,	Increase of customs duties. Plenary sitting held. Opinions divided as to surtax in draft project concerning special "caisse." Moorish Delegates' objections to draft Article allowing expropriation for purposes of public works (see No. 200)	28
204	„ „ ..	56 Tel.	17,	Police question. French Government's reply to German communication handed to German Delegates. Latter are giving others to understand that it may form a basis for discussion. No great confidence felt in their statements (see No. 201)	129
205	To Board of Trade ..	..	17,	Regulations for suppression of contraband trade with Morocco. Transmits Nos. 140 and 169). Proposes to inform Sir A. Nicolson that His Majesty's Government have agreed to them if Board of Trade concur (see No. 179)	129

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
206	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	18 Tel.	Feb. 18, 1906	Increase of customs duties. It would be quite inequitable, when raising duties, to favour particular countries to the exclusion of Great Britain. To insist on increase being applied all round (see No. 203)	129
207	Mr. Spring-Rice ..	112	7,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with Count Lamsdorff. Count Cassini's proposal for intrusting police organization to France and Spain. Russia's desire to work in concert with France and England (see Nos. 156* and 204)	129
208	„ „ .	123 Confidential	13,	Police question. Conversation with Director of First Department of the Foreign Office. His Majesty's Government would agree to any solution of police question acceptable to France. German reply to Russian representations at Berlin. Count Lamsdorff and Count Witte both desirous of a peaceful settlement satisfactory to France (see No. 207)	130
209	„ „ ..	131	14,	Attitude of Germany towards France in connection with Algeciras Conference. Conversations with French Ambassador and Count Benckendorff. Main question in dispute is independence of the several members of the European family. Possibility of French popular opinion losing its self-control and giving impression that France is the aggressor. German assurances to Russian Government. France's position of isolation	132
210	Sir A. Hardinge ..	26 Confidential	12,	Belgium's attitude towards Algeciras Conference. French Minister thinks that German Government held out promises to King Leopold of gratifying share to be assigned to Belgian officials in internationalization of Morocco in return for Belgian assistance at Algeciras. Attitude of Swedish Delegate at Conference. Possibility of war and violation of Belgian territory. Conversation with French Minister (see No. 25)	133
211	Sir N. O'Conor ..	86 Confidential	12,	German attempt to induce Sultan of Turkey to influence Sultan of Morocco in favour of Germany. Former has written to latter saying that German Emperor is the great friend of Islam and that His Shereefian Majesty would do well to follow his advice ..	134
212	Sir F. Lascelles ..	53 Confidential	15,	Police question. Conversation with Dr. von Mühlberg. German Government have instructed their Delegates to propose a new solution. Suggestion that Sultan should organize the force and choose such foreign assistance as he may require. German financial specialist to be sent to Algeciras to assist German Delegates in bank negotiations (see Nos. 187 and 201)	135
213	Mr. Cartwright ..	17 Tel.	19,	Police question. French Ambassador anxious for Sir A. Nicolson's opinion as to tactics likely to be pursued by Germany to secure majority of votes at Conference (see No. 212)	135
214	„ „ ..	18 Tel.	19,	Offence taken by German Government at alleged unfriendly attitude of Spanish Delegates on Conference. Conversation with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Emperor threatened to abandon visit to Madrid. Spanish explanations accepted. Incident closed, but Spanish Government are annoyed at German attempts to coerce (see No. 202)	136

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
215	To Sir E. Egerton ..	25 Tel.	Feb. 19, 1906	German complaints of attitude of Spanish and Italian Delegates. To let it be known that His Majesty's Government regard French attitude as practical and moderate (see No. 214)	136
	„ Mr. Cartwright ..	8 „			
216	To Sir F. Lascelles ..	75	19,	Police question. Conversation with German Ambassador. German rejection of idea of police officers being French and Spanish. England's attitude towards Germany. His Excellency complains of tone of English press. Germany does not desire war with France if Conference breaks up. His Excellency informed that the Conference stands in the way of friendly demonstrations towards Germany in England (see No. 212)	137
217	Sir A. Nicolson ..	57 Tel.	20,	Police question. German reply to French communication. Officers chosen by Sultan to be French and Spanish "does not appear to be compatible with international character of police." Reply is tantamount to a refusal (see Nos. 204 and 216)	138
218	„ „ .	58 Tel.	20,	Bank question. Arrival of German expert. German expert has communicated to French expert novel series of quite unacceptable proposals (see No. 212)	138
219	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	19 Tel.	20,	Police. French proposals should be clearly laid before Conference at early date, so that their moderation may be made clear and public. To consult French colleague as to tactics to be pursued in the event of agreement with Germany becoming impossible (see No. 217)	138
220	To Mr. Spring-Rice ..	93	20,	Position at Algeciras Conference. Conversation with Russian Chargé d'Affaires. His Majesty's Government will continue to support France till end of Conference. Probable break-up of Conference. Germany responsible for present deadlock (see Nos. 207 and 209)	139
221	Mr. Lowther ..	9 Tel.	21,	Report that German Consul at Fez has offered to establish wireless telegraphy between Fez and Tangier has reached French Minister. What action?	140
222	„ „ ..	10 Tel.	21,	Mar Chica factory. Five Frenchmen remain in factory. Moorish Government vessel again bombarded it; result not known. "Lalande" has returned to Mar Chica (see No. 198)	140
223	Sir A. Nicolson ..	59 Tel.	21,	Bank. German and French Delegates presented projects at sitting of Conference on 20th February. Both to be discussed on 22nd February. Sending both by post. They differ widely. French Delegate made clear and convincing statement on question (see No. 218)	140
224	„ „ ..	60 Tel.	21,	Police. Action to be taken when question comes before Conference. French Delegate intends to put Conference in full possession of French views, and Sir A. Nicolson and others propose to emphasize their moderation and practical character. He has sent draft of reply to last German communication to his Government. He does not think further concessions can be made, and his Government apparently take same view (see No. 219)	140

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
225	Sir A. Nicolson .	61 Tel.	Feb. 21, 1906	Responsibility for probable rupture. Repeats telegram to Madrid asking that M. Cambon may be told that precautions will be taken to throw responsibility on right shoulders (see No. 213)	141
226	Mr. Cartwright .	19 Tel.	21,	Conference. French and German attitudes. Conversations with French Ambassador, German Chargé d'Affaires, and Spanish Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. President of Conference inclined to offer Spanish mediation. German Government threaten to refuse to receive second Spanish Delegate as Ambassador at Berlin unless he uses his influence at Conference in sense favourable to Germany. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs confided his dislike of French Ambassador and French influence in Morocco (see No. 215)	141
227	„ „ ..	20 Tel.	21,	German Emperor's visit to Madrid. Spanish Government informed date cannot be fixed until outlook of Conference is clearer	142
228	„ „ ..	21 Tel.	22,	Attitude of Spanish Delegates at Algeciras. Has impressed on President of Council necessity for Duke of Almodovar to support France. His Excellency will telegraph to the Duke urging him to be careful in his action. King Alfonso strongly in favour of remaining in close friendship with England and France (see No. 215) .. .	142
229	„ „ ..	22 Tel.	22,	Attitude of Spanish Delegates at Algeciras Conference. Orders have been sent to President of Conference, on King's advice, to abstain from proposed mediation and not to oppose taking of any vote asked for by other Powers (see No. 228)	143
230	Mr. Spring-Rice ..	40 Tel.	22,	Police question. Count Lamsdorff suggests representations at Berlin pressing German Government to accept last French proposals. He has spoken strongly to one of Ambassadors as to aggressive character of German policy (see Nos. 174 and 220) .. .	143
231	Sir A. Nicolson ..	62 Tel. Confidential	22,	Police and bank. Efforts being made at Berlin by Austrians and Russians to induce German Government to come to understanding. French Government disposed to await result before replying to Germans. Has told French colleague it would be better Conference should break down on police than on bank question, and that it will not be difficult to prolong latter. French Delegate agrees. Spanish making difficulties over bank question owing to inducements held out by Germans (see Nos. 226 and 230)	143
232	„ „ ..	63 Tel.	22,	Conversation with Duke of Almodovar. Urged him to act in harmony with French colleague and self. Duke said he was anxious to do so but was troubled by reported complaints by French Republic against Spanish Delegates. Sir A. Nicolson thought this possibly due to concessions in German bank project to Spain. Duke also annoyed that project for police communicated to French Delegate privately had been telegraphed to his Government (see Nos. 228 and 231)	144

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
233	Sir A. Nicolson ..	64 Tel.	Feb. 22, 1906	State Bank. Discussion in general committee. Wide divergence between French and German views. No probability of agreement being reached unless both sides will make concessions. Spanish Delegates acting in complete harmony with French and British Delegates (see Nos. 223 and 231) ..	144
234	To Mr. Spring-Rice ..	44 Tel.	22,	German reply on police question. Communicated by German Ambassador. Informs of conversation with latter in which Sir E. Grey urged evil effects of failure of Conference owing to rejection of French proposals. To inform Count Lamsdorff and say that owing to Treaty engagements to support France representations made by His Majesty's Government at Berlin would be ineffective. Pressure by Russia would be valuable (see No. 230)	145
235	To Mr. Lowther ..	5 Tel.	22,	German offer to establish wireless telegraphy between Fez and Tangier. Scheme would interfere with installation at Spartel, for which concession promised to Lloyd's by Sultan. Concession would in any case be improper at time when Conference is sitting. To protest (see No. 321)	145
236	To Sir A. Nicolson .	20 Tel.	22,	Contemplated Spanish proposal. If Spain makes proposal it should be with cognizance and approval of France (see No. 232) ..	145
237	„ „ ..	21 Tel.	22,	German offer to establish wireless telegraph between Fez and Tangier. To lay matter before Conference, if confirmed, and to explain reasons for protest (see No. 235) ..	145
238	„ „ ..	21	22,	Regulations for suppression of contraband trade. Authorizes acceptance on behalf of His Majesty's Government (see No. 205) ..	146
239	Sir E. Egerton ..	15 Tel.	23,	State Bank. French Ambassador has learnt that, should this question come to a vote, Italian Delegate will abstain from voting. His Excellency considers this a serious breach of faith. Finds it difficult to believe that such a course would be adopted (see No. 233)	146
240	„ „ ..	16 Tel.	23,	Algeciras Conference. According to French Ambassador, Count Goluchowski expressed himself lately, in conversation with Count Reverseaux, as disapproving German pretensions in Morocco	146
241	„ „ ..	17 Tel.	23,	Algeciras Conference. French Ambassador's opinion that motive of German action as regards Morocco is solely to detach France from England and to prove that the understanding between them is dangerous to the former. Is supporting French attitude as instructed	146
242	Mr. Lowther ..	11 Tel.	23,	German offer to establish wireless telegraphy between Fez and Tangier. English Company have made a private offer to Sultan to connect Poldhu with Tangier and Fez. On strength of this has addressed a note to Moorish Government claiming preferential rights (see No. 237)	147

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
243	Sir A. Nicolson ..	65 Tel.	Feb. 23, 1906	Attitude of Spanish Delegates at Conference. Desirability of orders sent to Spanish Delegates as reported in No. 229. Suggests message to Spanish Government conveying His Majesty's Government's appreciation of their action	147
244	To Mr. Cartwright ..	10 Tel.	23,	Attitude of Spanish Delegates at the Conference. To convey to Spanish Government His Majesty's Government's appreciation of manner in which Spain is fulfilling her engagements (see No. 243)	147
245	Sir A. Nicolson ..	37 Conference Most Conf.	15,	Police question. Certain advance in negotiations. German declaration read to French Delegate, who took act of it. Has urged a clear reply being made by French Delegate, who has submitted such a reply to his Government. M. Révoil despondent (see Nos. 231 and 234)	147
246	„ „ ..	39 Conference Confidential	16,	German proposal that private negotiations at Algeciras should be transferred to Paris. M. Rouvier's refusal to fall in with proposal of German Ambassador in Paris. His Excellency has expressed to Prince Radoiin surprise of French Government at German Government's supporting the fiction that French Government had engaged not to ask Conference for police mandate (see Nos. 177 and 186)	149
247	„ „ ..	40 Conference Confidential	16,	Police question. Conversation with French Delegate. M. Rouvier's suggestion as to informal meeting of Representatives of the Powers to find a solution. Proposal open to great objections. Views of United States' Delegate. M. Rouvier will be informed of objections to his suggestion (see No. 189) ..	149
248	„ „ ..	41 Conference Confidential	16,	Proceedings of Conference. Conversation with French and United States' Delegates. Desirability of expediting work of Conference and of proceeding with discussion of police and bank questions	150
249	„ „ ..	43 Conference	17,	Police question. Transmits German proposal and French reply. French communication is conciliatory and leaves room for further negotiations (see No. 245) ..	151
250	Mr. Lowther ..	27	16,	Mar Chica. Bombardment of contraband stores by Moorish Government vessel. Representations by French Minister as to irregularity of this action (see No. 222) ..	152
251	„ „ ..	28	17,	Raisuli. Angera tribe have vowed vengeance on him on account of disappearance of their three Notables sent to Fez in connection with Deylan's murder (see No. 134)	152
252	„ „ ..	29 Confidential	16,	Proposals made to Moorish Government by Algiers and Morocco Company. Transmits copy of letter from the Company. Unlikely that Sultan will consider proposals unless supported by the Legation. It may be the Company referred to in No. 28	153
253	Sir E. Egerton ..	29 Confidential	19,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with Baron Sonnino. News from Conference not very good. Too much timidity of Germany (see No. 239). Instability of present Ministry	155

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
254	Sir F. Bertie ..	83	Feb. 23, 1906	Germany's uncompromising attitude in Morocco question. Exasperation of French public opinion at. Public press firm in asserting French rights in Morocco (see No. 209) ..	156
255	Mr. Spring-Rice ..	42 Tel.	24,	Algeciras Conference. Emperor has expressed warm sympathy to France and does not appear to be under German influence. Count Lamsdorff considers that difficulty of the situation is that German Emperor's *amour-propre* is deeply engaged. Russia has done what she can at Berlin. Suggestion that President of United States might intervene (see No. 207)	156
256	„ „ ..	43 Tel.	24,	Algeciras Conference. Interview with Count Lamsdorff. Little hope that further representations at Berlin will have any success. Does not believe it possible for Germany on her own motion to break up Conference, if the Representatives of the Powers declare themselves satisfied with French proposals. Fear of nationalist movement at French elections being in favour of war (see No. 234)	157
257	„ „ ..	44 Tel.	24,	Algeciras Conference. Hears very confidently that Austria has offered her good offices so far without result	157
258	Mr. Cartwright ..	25 Tel.	24,	Attitude of Spanish Delegates at Conference. Has conveyed thanks of His Majesty's Government to Spanish Government. Renewed instructions to Spanish Delegates to act with France and Great Britain and to arrange that before Conference breaks up a record should be obtained by vote of views of the Powers on the more important points (see No. 244)..	157
259	Sir E. Goschen ..	2 Tel.	24,	Algeciras Conference. Count Goluchowski is in favour of suspension and not dissolution of Conference, should no agreement be reached. He is discussing matter with Italy and United States, and if supported by them will instruct Austrian Delegates to propose suspension under above circumstances (see Nos. 240 and 257)	158
260	Sir A. Nicolson ..	66 Tel.	24,	Algeciras Conference. Result of Russian representations at Berlin. Italian Delegate anxious that French should make further concessions on bank question. French willing that two Censors should be appointed to supervise certain questions that would come under the Administrative Council. As a last resort they would add a third who might be selected by Germany (see Nos. 174 and 233)	158
261	„ „ ..	67 Tel.	24,	Attitude of Italian Delegate at Conference. Considers observation of Marquis Visconti-Venosta that he might abstain from voting as a casual remark—not as a settled decision (see No. 239)	158
262	„ „ ..	68 Tel.	24,	Bank question. Sent into Drafting Committee with several Articles undecided. Germans clearly desire delay. Proposes to ask President to convene an early meeting to discuss police question. Not much hope of any agreement on bank question (see No. 233).	159

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
263	Mr. Lowther	9 Tel.	Feb. 24, 1906	German offer to establish wireless telegraphy between Fez and Tangier. Has confined himself in note to Moorish Government to line adopted by Sir A. Nicolson. The English Company is Bland's Company, of Gibraltar (see No. 242)	159
264	To Sir E. Egerton ..	28 Tel.	24,	Bank question. To inquire of Italian Government if they have any confirmation of report that Italian Delegate will abstain from voting on bank question, and to state that such abstention will make bad impression on other Powers (see No. 261)	160
265	To Mr. Lowther ..	6 Tel.	24,	German offer to establish wireless telegraphy between Fez and Tangier. In taking any action terms of Sir A. Nicolson's note of July 13, 1903, should be strictly adhered to and nothing done to prejudice Lloyd's priority of claim to establish a signal station at Cape Spartel. What is English Company mentioned in his telegram No. 11? Could they not amalgamate with Lloyd's? (see No. 263)	160
266	Sir E. Egerton ..	18 Tel.	25,	Attitude of Italian Delegate at Conference. Has acted in accordance with No. 264. Minister for Foreign Affairs has heard nothing respecting intention of Italian Delegate to abstain from voting	160
267	Sir A. Nicolson ..	69 Tel.	25,	Bank question. French and German projects have been referred to Drafting Committee. Has proposed clause respecting three Censors (see No. 260) at request of French Delegate. German Delegates pleased. Moorish project submitted more in harmony with German than with French project, but unauthorized by Moorish Government (see also No. 262)	160
268	" " ..	70 Tel.	25,	Visit of Baron de Courcel to Berlin. Appears to have had no very satisfactory results (see No. 260)	161
269	" " ..	46 Conference	20,	State Bank. Transmits copies of German and French projects for its institution. Summarizes points in which they differ (see No. 267)	161
270	" " ..	47 Conference	21,	Police question. Transmits copy of communication handed by German to French Delegate in reply to French proposal. Refers to No. 249. Rejects proposal of French and Spanish officers	165
271	Mr. Cartwright ..	34 Most Conf.	21,	Proposed Spanish intervention to arrange Franco-German differences on bank and police questions. Conversations with French Ambassador, German Chargé d'Affaires, and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Idea of intervention was Duke of Almodovar's, and Señor de Ojeda does not believe that it was inspired by Germany. Has pointed out to his Excellency that if Spain acts as suggested she will give the impression of acting in favour of Germany. Señor de Ojeda's antipathy to France and French Ambassador (see No. 226)	166
272	" " ..	35 Confidential	22,	Duke of Almodovar's contemplated mediation between France and Germany. Conversation with President of the Council. Idea sprung upon Spanish Government by the Duke, who will, however, act with prudence. King has desired that Duke be advised to drop his mediation scheme, and to put no impediment in the way of a vote being taken on any proposition submitted to the Conference (see No. 271)	167

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
273	Sir A. Nicolson ..	71 Tel.	Feb. 26, 1906	Police question. Doubts that open expression on part of some Powers in favour of French proposal could be obtained. Is endeavouring with French Delegate to find some form for a platonic declaration on part of doubtful Powers, which should not wound Germany's feelings nor be too explicit (see No. 270) ..	168
274	" " ..	72 Tel.	26,	Attitude of Portugese Delegate at Conference. He has been instructed by his Government to follow Great Britain as regards police, and seems to be quite ready to enforce his support by giving a vote for French proposal ..	169
275	" " ..	73 Tel.	26,	Police question. Quotes reply which French Delegate has been instructed to make to last communication of German Delegate. Principal of equality for all in economical matters has been accepted without reserve, and it was in no wise endangered by French proposal respecting police organization. Should the Conference desire further guarantees as regards equality in economical matters, French Government will examine the question (see No. 273)	169
276	To Sir F. Villiers ..	2 Tel.	26,	Attitude of Portuguese Delegate at Conference. To thank Portuguese Government for his support (see No. 274)	169
277	To Sir E. Goschen ..	17	26,	Algeciras Conference. Conversation with Austrian Chargé d'Affaires. No imminent danger anticipated if Conference breaks up. Impossibility of improvement in Anglo-German relations as long as Franco-German dispute continues. Impossible for any progress to be made as long as objection is taken to intrusting police organization to France and Spain	169
278	Sir E. Egerton ..	19 Tel.	27,	Algeciras Conference. Language of Minister for Foreign Affairs to French Ambassador more satisfactory. Italian Government recognize obligation to support French attitude (see No. 266)	170
279	Sir A. Nicolson ..	74 Tel.	27,	Police question. Russian Delegates will ask President to convoke an early meeting to consider a proposal which they wish to present. French Delegate thinks it would be best not to attempt to draw up form of declaration for neutral Powers, as suggested in No. 273. Agrees with this opinion (see No. 275)	170
280	Mr. Cartwright ..	26 Tel.	27,	Baron de Courcel's visit to Berlin. German Emperor avoided serious allusions to Morocco. Prince Bülow spoke more freely, but generalities. French Ambassador believes that Italy will vote for French projects, but does not know what Austria will do (see No. 268)	171
281	Sir F. Bertie ..	86	27,	Deadlock at Algeciras. Press suggestions that France and Germany should consent to be bound by any decision which Conference may take by a majority of votes. No serious hope of such suggestion being accepted in view of obvious objections which Germany would have to it (see No. 254)	171

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
282	Sir A. Nicolson ..	75 Tel.	Feb. 27, 1906	Works at Moorish ports. Possibility of public press commenting on statement of Moorish Delegate that they have been intrusted to French Company. French Delegate has explained matter fully. Report by post (see No. 146, Part 27)	171
283	Mr. Spring-Rice ..	47 Tel.	28,	Algeciras Conference. Count Lamsdorff's idea is to find a formula which Germany can accept with reserves, and subject to revision after a term of years. Emperor is prepared, as a last resource, to intervene personally. United States' Ambassador ready to report on state of affairs to the President. Intervention of Austrian Emperor discouraged by Austrian Government (see No. 256 and 273)	172
284	To Sir F. Bertie .. „ Sir A. Nicolson	21 Tel. 34 „	28,	Baron de Courcel's visit to Berlin. Prince Bülow's proposal was that there should be officers of four or five nationalities working together to reorganize police at each of a certain number of ports, at one of which police should be entirely French. French Government regarded proposal as a trap set by Germany to enable her to demand a port for herself (see No. 280)	172
285	Sir A. Nicolson ..	76 Tel.	Mar. 1,	Bank question. German Delegates have obtained postponement of final agreement to Articles of bank scheme till 3rd March. President of Conference told that a General Committee Meeting should be convoked on 5th March to discuss police question (see No. 267)	172
286	„ „ ..	77 Tel.	1,	Correspondence between Sultans of Turkey and Morocco. Former wrote to latter about two months ago, advising him to listen to advice of German Government. Latter has replied, but nature of reply has not transpired (see No. 211)	173
287	Sir E. Egerton ..	30	Feb. 25,	Police question. Conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs. Italian Delegate's rôle that of a mediator and conciliator. Nothing known of his rumoured intention to decline to vote. Efforts made by German Ambassador to convert Italian Government to views of German Government. Believes to be without success (see No. 278)	173
288	Sir E. Goschen .	3 Tel.	Mar. 2,	Police question. Count Goluchowski has done his best to persuade Germany to show a more conciliatory spirit on this point, but without success. French demands for bank too exorbitant. France has overlooked interests of Austria-Hungary and of United States (see Nos. 259 and 277) .	174
289	Mr. Cartwright ..	27 Tel. Confidential	2,	Proposed railway between Tangier and Freetown. King of Spain enthusiastic about scheme for constructing. His Majesty's interview with French Ambassador. M. Cambon impressed on His Majesty that in event of failure of Conference return to *status quo* must mean that all Agreements between Spain and France must continue in force. His Excellency's proposal that in above event His Majesty's Government and French Government should present notes to Spanish Government to define *status quo* ..	174
290	Mr. Lowther ..	31	Feb. 20,	Sultan's congratulations on inauguration of new French President. Offered by Sultan's Acting Commissioner. Stiff demeanour of latter and of French Minister	174

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
291	Mr. Lowther ..	32	Feb. 23, 1906	Establishment of wireless telegraphy between Fez and Tangier. Transmits note addressed to Moorish Government (see No. 265). No confirmation of report of offer made to Sultan by German Consul at Fez. English firm has addressed a private communication to Sultan. French Minister concurs in note to Moorish Government	175
292	Sir A. Nicolson ..	50 Conference Confidential	23,	Attitude of Spanish Delegates at the Conference. Conversation with President. Complaints by French Ambassador at Madrid. Duke of Almodovar at a loss to understand what faults he has committed. He had nothing to do with German bank project. Duke is a well-meaning but weak man, and endeavours to please both sides. Suggests reassuring message to Spanish Government (see No. 244)	176
293	„ „ ..	52 Conference Confidential	25,	Possible breakdown of the Conference. Conversations with M. Révoil. Two points should be kept in view: 1. That the rupture should not occur over the bank question. 2. That the responsibility for the rupture should not fall on France and Great Britain. Bank question not so simple as that of the police. General feeling of the Conference is with French view, but several Powers may abstain from voting (see No. 285)	177
294	„ „ ..	53 Conference	26,	Police question. Transmits copy of reply which French Delegate has been instructed to make to last communication of German Representative. French Government will not refuse to examine any new guarantees recommended by Conference with regard to equality of treatment in economic matters (see Nos. 270 and 279)	178
295	Mr. Tower ..	35	28,	Morocco question and Germany and France. Reports Resolutions passed at meeting held under auspices of Münich Peace Party. Speech by Dr. L. Quidde	179
296	Sir F. Bertie ..	89	Mar. 1,	Concession obtained by French Company for construction of works at Casablanca and Saffi. Transmits extract from "Temps." Company is the "Compagnie Marocaine." Concession given by way of compensation for concession at Tangier formerly authorized but afterwards given to German Company (see No. 282)	179
297	„ „ ..	91 Confidential	2,	Police question. Conversation between M. Rouvier and Sir M. de Bunsen. M. Rouvier disposed to consider seriously a Spanish proposal for a purely Moroccan police without European officers and paid by the State Bank (see No. 294)	181
298	Sir E. Egerton ..	23 Tel.	3,	Police question. Count Goluchowski has submitted to Italian Government proposal for leaving France sole policing of one Moorish port at her choice (see No. 297)	182
299	Sir A. Nicolson ..	78 Tel.	3,	Bank question. Plenary sitting to discuss. Three questions still reserved. Proposal to proceed to discussion of police question on Monday accepted by all except Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Morocco (see No. 285)	182

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
300	Sir A. Nicolson .	79 Tel.	Mar. 3, 1906	Possibility of failure of Conference. Disagreement will be manifest when the reserved questions (police, bank, customs, special "caisse," and expropriation) come up for discussion. If an agreement proves impossible, considers it would be best that sittings should be suspended and that Delegates should leave Algeciras to refer to their Governments. Requests views (see No. 293)	18
301	Sir E. Egerton ..	24 Tel.	3,	German pressure on King of Italy and Italian Government. Very strong during past week. Government weak and irresolute. German contention is that fact of entering the Conference frees Italy from previous engagement to France about Morocco (see No. 287)	18
302	Sir A. Nicolson ..	80 Tel.	4,	Police question. Austrian proposal quite unacceptable to France and would be unworkable in practice. Refers to Foreign Office No. 30 (see No. 298)	18
303	„ „ ..	81 Tel.	4,	Bank question. French Delegate has let German Delegates know that he might be open to a proposal to modify his attitude as to distribution of capital and as to value of preferential rights held by French group who made Moroccan loan. Does not intend to dissuade French Delegate from making any terms he desires on financial questions (see No. 299)	18
304	Sir F. Lascelles ..	61	Feb. 25,	Position in Morocco. Transmits extract from "North German Gazette," giving account of views of Señor Villanueva, former Spanish Minister. Spain would find her interests seriously threatened if alone with France in Morocco. Dislike of Franco-Spanish Agreements (see No. 226)	18
305	„ „ ..	68 Confidential	Mar. 1,	Algeciras Conference. Transmits Memorandum of General Swaine's interview with Baron von Holstein. Latter violent against M. Delcassé and M. Révoil. Emperor's intention to hold out on the police question. Hopes that Conference may yet end satisfactorily	18
306	Sir F. Villiers ..	16	Feb. 27,	Algeciras Conference. Has expressed to Minister for Foreign Affairs satisfaction of His Majesty's Government at loyal support afforded by Portuguese Delegate to Sir A. Nicolson. Instructions given to Delegate have been fully confirmed (see No. 276) ..	18
307	Mr. Spring-Rice ..	154 Confidential	28,	Police question. Conversation with Count Lamsdorff. His views on German attitude. Question of *amour-propre* of German Emperor. Emperor's language to French Ambassador. Not much hope of Russian representations at Berlin being successful. Apprehensions as to coming French elections. If Germany breaks up the Conference, Russia will regard her as the aggressor. Possible suggestion from German Emperor of an arrangement *à deux*, after rupture of Conference (see No. 283)	18

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
308	Sir A. Nicolson .	55 Conference	Feb. 28, 1906	Question of improvements at Moorish ports. Discussion at sitting of Drafting Committee. Casablanca and Saffi works already conceded to the "Compagnie Marocaine." History of this Concession. Company to remain quiescent until end of Conference. French Government have acted in perfect good faith (see No. 296)	188
309	Mr. Cartwright ..	28 Tel. Confidential	Mar. 5,	Proposed visit of President of Conference to Madrid during visit of King of Portugal. Has pointed out inadvisability of such a visit to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. French Ambassador is of same way of thinking. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs urgently asks for views of His Majesty's Government on the subject ..	189
310	„ „ ..	30 Tel. Confidential	5,	Rumour that Germany, in event of failure of Conference, has a promise from Moorish Government of a Concession for constructing a port at Mogador, with organization of sufficient police to protect it. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs professes to have no information on the subject (see No. 290, Part 25)	189
311	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	41 Tel.	5,	Possible failure of Conference. Approves action reported in No. 300. No object in forcing a vote on the Conference if objected to. Conference should separate with as little appearance as possible of political rupture between any Powers. Indefinite suspension to enable Delegates to go home to refer to their Governments may be best course	189
312	„ „ ..	42 Tel.	5,	Police question. M. Rouvier told Sir M. de Bunsen that he was ready to consider seriously a Spanish proposal that there should be a purely Moroccan police without European officers. Has French Delegate mentioned this? (see No. 297)	190
313	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	32 Tel.	6,	Attitude of Spanish Government. Has expressed appreciation of His Majesty's Government to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Chiefly owing to England that Spain has been led into political agreement with France, which she will endeavour to maintain as long as England and France pull together (see No. 292)	190
314	„ „ ..	33 Tel.	6,	Proposed return of President of the Conference to Madrid. He has been instructed to abandon the idea (see No. 309)	190
315	Sir A. Nicolson ..	82 Tel.	6,	Police question. Discussion in General Committee meeting. Statement by Russian Delegate supported by French Delegate. Second Spanish Delegate read a paper developing Russian views, in which Portuguese and British Delegates concurred. German Delegate said that all reforms must be based on commercial liberty without any inequality and on due respect of Sultan's sovereign rights (see No. 302)	190
316	„ „ ..	83 Tel.	6,	Rumour of Germany's having obtained a Concession for a port at Mogador. Mentioned by Spanish to British Interpreter. Moorish Delegate emphatically denies the report. Probable that Germany will press for such a Concession if Conference fails (see No. 310)	191

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
317	Sir A. Nicolson ..	84 Tel.	Mar. 6, 1906	Police question. French Delegate has heard nothing of French Minister for Foreign Affairs' disposition to accept Spanish proposal mentioned in No. 312	191
318	„ „ ..	85 Tel.	6,	Proposed departure of President of the Conference. Has said nothing to him about it, nor has French Delegate. Will speak to latter again on the subject (see No. 314) ..	192
319	Admiralty	Confidential	6,	Proposed establishment of wireless telegraphy between Tangier and Fez by Germans. Wireless telegraph station in hands of a foreign Government would be highly detrimental to British interests. Desirable that all possible steps should be taken to prevent execution of the scheme (see No. 291)	192
320	Sir A. Nicolson ..	86 Tel.	7,	Police question. French Government maintain their attitude. Project prepared by French Delegate. Sultan to organize police force in eight ports, recruited from Moorish subjects and under Moorish commanders. Instructors to be supplied by France and Spain. Experiment to be for three years (see Nos. 315 and 317)	192
321	„ „ ..	87 Tel.	7,	Bank question. Private negotiations through intermediaries having led to no result, French Delegate will leave matter to the Conference (see No. 303) ..	193
322	To Sir M. de Bunsen	15 Tel.	7,	Attitude of Spanish Government. No question of His Majesty's Government's pursuing any other policy than that of adhering strictly to their engagements towards France. They are confident that Spanish Government will do the same. Questions affecting the future *status quo* will require careful considerations between the three Powers (see No. 313) ..	193
323	Sir A. Nicolson ..	88 Tel.	8,	Police question. German Delegate ready to accept French and Spanish police at seven ports and a superior officer selected from a minor Power at eighth port. This communication, made to President of Conference, has probably been caused by representations of Russian Delegate. Moorish Delegates are to present a police project which will probably be found to contain German proposal (see No. 320)	193
324	„ „ .	89 Tel.	8,	Bank question. Discussion on disputed questions to be resumed later. French concessions as to jurisdiction promise to lead to an agreement. Police question. Austrian project leaving organization at four ports to France and at three to Spain, and eighth port to be officered by Holland or Switzerland. Considers that Germany is author of the project, which France should accept, or she will forfeit confidence of the Conference (see Nos. 321 and 323)	194
325	To Sir A. Nicolson .	26	8,	Proposed increase of customs duties on imports into Morocco. Consent of His Majesty's Government is dependent on establishment of special "caisse" for administration of additional revenue. One of the three Delegates to sit on Board for adjudication on tenders for construction of works, should be British. Hopes that other Powers will see justice of giving increase uniformly at 2½ per cent. *ad valorem* on all goods (see No. 206)	194

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject	Page
326	Mr. Cartwright ..	39 Very Conf.	Mar. 5, 1906	French Loan of 1904. French Ambassador's interview with a representative of the holders' interests. His scheme for establishment of of a bank at Tangier in event of non-settlement of bank question at the Conference. His opinion on Germany's attitude ..	195
326*	Sir E. Goschen ..	4 Tel.	9,	Police question. Austrian proposals represent last efforts which Austro-Hungarian Government can make for finding formula for police question to which both sides could agree. Prince Bülow is said to have no further doubts as to entirely satisfactory issue of the Conference (see Nos. 288 and 302) ..	195*
327	Sir A. Nicolson ..	90 Tel.	9,	Police question. Members of Conference in favour of Austrian proposal, with exception of French and Spanish. French Delegate says that French public opinion would not accept Dutch or Swiss officers at a Moorish port. Has suggested bargain to French Delegate by which eighth port could be left to France and France make some concession on bank question (see Nos. 323 and 326*)	195
328	„ „ ..	91 Tel. Confidential	9,	Police question. German Delegate's instructions are to adhere to Austrian proposals. Is going to ask United States' Delegate to sound German Delegate as to whether he would strike a bargain between bank and police questions. Unfortunate if French Delegate does not see his way to accept Austrian proposal with some slight modifications (see No. 327)	196
329	To Sir F. Bertie ..	31 Tel.	9,	Police question. Has told French Ambassador that, in view of Austrian proposal, it would not do to let Conference break up without a settlement. This proposal represents a real concession on the part of Germany (see No. 328)	196
330	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	44 Tel.	9,	Question of increase of import duties. When discussion is reopened, should take opportunity of suggesting that special measures should be taken for dealing with the liquor traffic. This might be done on lines of Article XCI of the Brussels Act of 1892 (see No. 325)	196
331	Mr. Lowther ..	33	Feb. 27,	Insecurity of life and property at Moorish coast towns during 1905. Transmits Memorandum drawn up at request of Sir A. Nicolson ..	197
332	„ „ ..	34 Confidential	Mar. 1,	"Bank of Morocco." Sultan has stated that no concession was ever granted and no promise made by him or his father, as far as he is aware, to any bank with a view to its becoming the State Bank of the country (see No. 193)	200
333	„ „ ..	36	2,	Raisuli. Difficulty experienced by Sultan's troops in attacking him. Conversation with Commander of Sultan's forces camped near Tangier. According to information from other quarters Raisuli could easily be disposed of if the Sultan wished it (see No. 251)	200
334	„ „ ..	37	2,	Angera tribe and the Sultan. They have received messages from His Majesty and will probably take no serious action and allow themselves to be conciliated by a money payment for the murder of their three emissaries. Refers to No. 251	201

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
335	Mr. Lowther ..	38	Mar. 3, 1906	Views of Moorish officials at Fez on the Conference. Makhzen has, in their opinion, sole right of deciding as to reforms. They trust to international jealousy to secure them against being coerced into accepting anything distasteful	201
336	Sir A. Nicolson ..	56 Conference	1,	Bank question. Meeting for consideration of question to be postponed till 3rd instant. Has, with French colleague, concurred in postponement (see No. 324). Police organization to be discussed on 5th instant ..	202
337	„ „ ..	57 Conference Confidential	1,	Bank and police questions. Conversation with Italian Delegate. In his opinion little possibility of agreement being reached. Necessity of police force for affording security to Europeans. German Delegate's desire to render bank as international as possible. France's privileges in financial matters cannot be ignored, and it is unjust of Germany to try to place her on the same level as the other Powers (see Nos. 328 and 337) ..	202
338	„ „ ..	61 Conference	3,	Bank and police questions. Has impressed on President of the Conference necessity for accelerating discussion of. Motion of British Delegate to proceed with discussion of police question carried by the Conference (see No. 337)	203
339	„ „ ..	92 Tel.	10,	Police question. French Delegate has received information that German Government would not, in last resort, insist on proposed Inspector having charge of a port, and is therefore of opinion that their Delegate will give way eventually. Italian and United States' Delegates are sure that German Delegate will make no further concession (see No. 338)..	204
340	„ „ ..	93 Tel.	10,	Bank and police questions. Has suggested, at request of French Delegate, that Inspector might command a police force and be established at Tangier. Amicable meeting of Conference and evident desire to come to a speedy agreement (see Nos. 338 and 339) ..	204
341	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	48 Tel.	10,	Police question. Agrees with opinion expressed in No. 328. No real sacrifice of principle can be involved in accepting Austrian proposal subject to modifications of detail (see No. 340)	205
342	„ „ ..	49 Tel.	10,	Slavery in Morocco. Has there been any opportunity of bringing question before the Conference? Would a collective expression of opinion by all the Treaty Powers have any practical advantage? (see No. 99) ..	205
343	Mr. Lowther ..	13 Tel. Confidential	11,	Intended visit of German Emperor to Tangier. French Ambassador has heard on good authority that it will take place after His Majesty's visit to King of Spain (see No. 227)	205
344	Sir A. Nicolson ..	94 Tel.	11,	Police question. Conversation with German Delegate. Establishment of an Inspector at a fort as Instructor is a *sine quâ non* for German Government, whose last word has been spoken. French Delegate's disappointment. He will suggest to his Government that Swiss, together with French and Spanish, should police Tangier, Swiss officer acting as Inspector (see No. 340).. ..	205

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
345	Sir A. Nicolson ..	95 Tel.	Mar. 11, 1906	Slavery in Morocco. There has been no opportunity of bringing it before the Conference. If Conference can be induced to give a collective expression of opinion on the subject it will produce a good result. Refers to No. 342	206
346	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	41 Confidential	7,	Situation at the Conference. Conversation with French Ambassador. His Excellency looks forward with equanimity to a rupture. Strong position of Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas in Morocco renders establishment of a State Bank unnecessary for France. M. Rouvier's views not so sanguine. Attitude of Spain towards England and France (see Nos. 311 and 322)..	206
347	„ „ ..	42 Confidential	7,	Attitude of Spain at Morocco Conference. Conversation with Señor de Ojeda. His Majesty's Government attach greatest importance to Spain's hearty co-operation. Spain's dislike of France. Spanish Government are, however, determined to be guided by England in present instance. President of the Conference has been instructed to remain at Algeciras for the present (see No. 346) ..	207
348	Mr. Lowther ..	39	6,	Harbour works at Casablanca and Saffi. Statement made by Moorish Delegate at Conference as to alleged promise given by Sultan to firm of Creuzot for contract. French Minister believes there is no truth in statement. French Government have put forward no scheme of the kind. Communications between Paris and Berlin as to statement made by Count Tattenbach respecting Moorish public works (see No. 308)	208
349	Sir E. Goschen ..	23 Confidential	9,	Attitude of Austria-Hungary at the Morocco Conference. Visit of German Foreign Office official to Count Goluchowski. Proposals submitted to Conference by Austrian Delegate were the outcome of this visit. M. de Reverseaux thinks French Government will object to handing over Inspectorship of police to a Swiss (see No. 326*) ..	209
350	Sir F. Bertie ..	17 Tel.	10,	Police question. Conversation with M. Rouvier. French Government will adopt Austrian scheme with some modifications, which, he believes, Germany will accept. Principal modification to be that Instructors at eighth port should be also French and Spanish (see No. 344). (Secret.) M. Rouvier objects to Dutch Inspector. He would accept a Swiss, but would prefer a Dane (see No. 349) ..	209
351	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	35 Tel.	12,	Police question. French Ambassador has telegraphed to French Delegate deprecating appointment of an Inspector-General. Such an appointment would be admission in some sense of internationalization. Suggestion that, if Inspector has to be accepted, he should be Portuguese, and should report either to Sultan or to France and Spain (see No. 350)	210
352	Sir A. Nicolson ..	96 Tel.	12,	Police question. French objections to Austrian proposal. Outcry which would be raised in France if it were accepted might be used to weaken Anglo-French understanding. Has assured French Delegate of His Majesty's Government's constant support, but has warned him that a failure of the Conference would now produce most serious consequences (see Nos. 344 and 351)..	210

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
353	Sir A. Nicolson ..	97 Tel.	Mar. 12, 1906	Bank question. French and German views still widely divergent. German Delegate has received information from Paris that French opposition on this question is not seriously met. Situation again strained (see No. 340)	211
354	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	51 Tel.	12,	Possibility of Sultan's making difficulties in accepting reforms recommended by Conference. Suggests that final Act of Conference should contain a stipulation by which all the Treaty Powers would engage to influence Sultan to accept scheme of reforms ..	211
355	„ „ ..	52 Tel.	12,	Police question. Conversation with M. Cambon. Strong French objection to giving any port to a third Power, and preference for a Swiss Inspector at Tangier. Has told his Excellency that, if this alternative fails, French should accept Swiss at Casablanca rather than let the Conference break up. Germany has given way on seven-eighths of the question (see Nos. 350 and 352) ..	211
356	Mr. Lowther ..	40	6,	Raisuli. Punitive expedition organized by him against a village near Tangier. Probability of feud between him and the Angera tribe being reopened. Has warned Moorish Commissioner of report that Angera are anxious to capture a European (see No. 333)	211
357	Sir A. Nicolson ..	62 Conference	7,	Police question. General Committee meeting of 5th March. Transmits paper read by second Russian Delegate, and others read by German and second Spanish Delegates. Has, with Portuguese Delegate, expressed concurrence in views contained in these papers (see No. 357)	212
358	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	44 Confidential	9,	Spanish attitude at Morocco Conference. Conversation with Señor Moret. Spain's desire to proceed in co-operation with France and Great Britain. His Excellency hopes that England's policy does not exclude return to more friendly relations with Germany, and is reassured on this point (see No. 347) ..	217
359	Sir F. Bertie ..	104 Confidential	11,	Police question. Conversation with M. Rouvier. Austrian scheme acceptable with elimination of some objectionable features. French objection to Inspector-General being Dutch. They would accept a Dane, or, perhaps, a Swiss. M. Rouvier believes Germany will accept modifications in the police scheme (see No. 350)	218
360	„ „ ..	23 Tel.	13,	Police and bank questions. Quotes instructions sent to French Delegate from the "Temps." To admit a reduction of original demands as to bank. To accept creation of Inspectorship of police (see No. 357) ..	219
361	Sir A. Nicolson ..	98 Tel.	13,	Police and bank questions. No agreement reached. Delicate situation. Suggestion that Police Inspector should be established at Tangier unacceptable to German Government. Germany has said her last word. German Emperor has gone far in the way of concession. Danger that His Majesty may recall his Delegates. Sums up the situation (see No. 360)	219

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
362	Sir A. Nicolson ..	99 Tel.	Mar. 13, 1906	Question of Sultan's accepting reforms recommended by the Conference. Has spoken to French Delegate as to necessity of all the Powers binding themselves together to use their influence with the Sultan. German Delegate is sure that Sultan will accept all reforms on which Conference is in accord (see No. 354)	220
363	„ „ ..	100 Tel. Very Conf.	13,	Police question. French Delegate will suggest to his Government that they should agree to Inspector being at Casa Blanca (see Nos. 359 and 361)	220
364	To Sir F. Lascelles ..	15 Tel.	13,	Police question. German Ambassador has urged that Austrian proposal represents a great concession on Germany's part and should be accepted. Has urged that Germany should not make a vital question of having neutral police at Casa Blanca (see No. 363)	221
	„ Sir F. Bertie ..	38 „			
	„ Sir A. Nicolson ..	53 „			
365	To Sir F. Lascelles ..	95	13,	Police question. Conversation with Count Metternich. Great concession made by German Government. His Excellency told that Germany's advance is recognized by His Majesty's Government. Does not think Sir A. Nicolson said that French ought to accept Austrian proposal immediately. Discussion as to Inspector. Urges that German Government should not make a vital matter of small points outstanding (see No. 364) ..	221
	„ Sir F. Bertie ..	159			
366	Sir F. Bertie ..	25 Tel.	14,	Morocco question. Articles from "Temps" quoted in No. 360 gave general sense of instructions sent to French Delegate. M. Bourgeois not yet in a position to decide what further instructions should be sent ..	222
367	Mr. Spring-Rice ..	57 Tel.	14,	German concessions at Morocco Conference. German Ambassador called at Ministry for Foreign Affairs to complain of "extravagant demands" raised by French	222
368	Sir A. Nicolson ..	101 Tel. Confidential	14,	Police question. Telegram sent by French Delegate to his Government stating conditions on which German terms should, in his opinion, be accepted. France might make some abatement in her claims as to bank. Would there be any objection to his negotiating privately, on behalf of French Delegate, with German Delegate, if French Government agree with their Delegate's proposals? (see No. 361)	222
369	To Sir F. Bertie ..	40 Tel.	14,	Police question. In view of instructions to French Delegate (see No. 360), gathers that French Government think it impossible to concede police at Casa Blanca. If this is so, His Majesty's Government will naturally support them. To inform French Government (see No. 363)	223
370	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	54 Tel.	14,	Police question (addition to No. 364). German Ambassador has stated that all Delegates have expressed opinion to German Delegate that France should give way on outstanding points. Has replied that British Delegate cannot have said that France should accept Austrian proposal unconditionally. Danger of French resenting pressure about Casa Blanca. In last resort His Majesty's Government must support them in resisting ..	223

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
371	To Sir F. Bertie ..	161	Mar. 14, 1906	Police question. Conversation with French Ambassador. His Majesty's Government will continue their support at the Conference to the French attitude. M. Cambon assumes that M. Révoil's instructions published in the papers only give summary of his real instructions (see No. 370)	223
372	Mr. Spring-Rice ..	58 Tel.	15,	Police question. Has heard privately that Prime Minister stated on high German authority that Sir A. Nicolson had expressed his approval of Austrian proposal (see No. 370)	224
373	Sir A. Nicolson ..	102 Tel.	15,	Police question. Did not say nor imply to German Delegate that France must give way on any outstanding point. German Delegate states that he has spoken his last word, and complains that French are raising all sorts of difficulties. Overbearing attitude of second German Delegate (see No. 373) .	224
374	Sir F. Bertie ..	27 Tel.	15,	Conference. Thanks of M. Bourgeois for message in No. 369, which has been made use of with excellent effect	224
375	To Mr. Spring-Rice ..	64 Tel.	16,	Police question. Sir A. Nicolson's message that he did not say or imply to German Delegate that France should give way on any outstanding point. His Majesty's Government will continue to support France (see No. 373)	225
376	Sir A. Nicolson ..	103 Tel.	16,	Jews in Morocco. Grand Rabbi of Tangier has informed United States' Legation that Jews are well treated in Morocco, and has suggested declaration on the subject at the Conference. United States' Delegate has asked his Government for instructions (see No. 110)	225
377	„ „ ..	104 Tel.	17,	Police question. Conversation with German Delegate, who believes that France accepts in principle the appointment of an Inspector. His tone much modified (see No. 369.) United States' Government object to establishment of a third Power in charge of police at a port as implying sphere of influence and partition of country ..	225
378	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	58 Tel.	17,	Jews in Morocco. To co-operate with his United States' colleague in whatever manner seems judicious (see No. 376)	226
379	To Sir F. Bertie ..	171	17,	Police and bank questions. M. Cambon has declared to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador that France cannot agree to the establishment in any Moorish port of a police force other than French or Spanish. M. Cambon thinks that Germany is ready to concede this point. On the bank question he was not yet ready to express an opinion (see No. 377) ..	226
380	Sir A. Nicolson ..	106 Tel.	18,	Police question. French Minister for Foreign Affairs' reply to Austrian Ambassador in Paris as regards Austrian proposal. 1. French and Spanish Instructors to be in all eight ports. 2. Question of distributing them amongst the ports to be settled by French and Spanish Governments and the Sultan, and not by the Conference. 3. French Government would be ready to discuss proposal as to Inspector and his attributes (see No. 377)	226

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
381	Sir A. Nicolson ..	107 Tel.	Mar. 18, 1906	Police question. German Government in conciliatory mood. They might allow French or Spanish Instructors, in place of those of a neutral Power, to be established at the eight ports, but would require some compensation. This has probably reference to bank question and allotment of capital (see No. 380)	227
382	Mr. Lowther ..	48	9	Wireless telegraphy between Fez and Tangier. Viziers deny that permission to establish it was even asked for by a German firm. They admit that an English firm applied for the Concession, but the Sultan refused to grant it (see No. 319)	227
383	„ „ ..	44	10,	Mar Chica. The Moorish vessel the "Turki" has returned to Tangier for repairs. As there is now no vessel at Mar Chica to stop the smuggling it will probably recommence (see No. 250)	227
384	„ „ ..	46	10,	Raisuli. His forces have attacked the village of Ramlah, which they found deserted. In view of reported desire of Angera tribe to carry off a European, Moorish authorities have called in some fifty horsemen to patrol Tangier. Angera's animosity against Raisuli (see No. 356)	228
385	„ „ ..	47	10,	Attitude of Moorish Government. Makhzen appears anxious to be on good terms with France, and spontaneously meet French wishes on two points (see Nos. 335 and 362)	228
386	Sir A. Nicolson ..	65 Conference	9,	Police question. Transmits documents respecting. 1. French project for organization of force. 2. Austrian project. 3. "Exposé des vues" of Austrian Delegate. 4. Declaration read by German Delegate (see No. 381)	229
387	„ „ ..	67 Conference	10,	Police question. Austrian project brought forward. Has pointed out that Inspector's position should be independent, and that he should not have a contingent of police. Austrian Delegate thinks Inspector would be too idle had he merely inspection duties to perform. Question then dropped (see No. 386)	231
388	„ „ ..	68 Conference Confidential	10,	Police question. Austrian Delegate submits proposal accepted by Germany that seven out of the eight police forces at the ports should be intrusted to France and Spain. This is a great concession, but France and Spain refuse to accept it, and further efforts are being made to solve the difficulty (see No. 387) ..	232
389	„ „ ..	69 Conference Confidential	11,	Police question. Conversation with German Delegate. Would German Government consent to the third Power being instructed with inspection duties only, leaving executive functions at all eight ports to France and Spain? Useless for German Delegate to try to modify his Government's decision. French Delegate will make a modified proposal respecting the Inspector to his Government (see No. 389)	233

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
390	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	46	Mar. 14, 1906	Mar Chica. Spanish sailing-vessel stopped and taken by armed boat flying Pretender's flag, but crew were allowed to re-embark and sail for Melilla next day. Envoy from the Pretender offered explanations which were accepted by Spanish Commandant. Vessel may have been a smuggler, and seizure a prearranged plan (see No. 383)	235
391	Sir F. Lascelles ..	83	15,	Reported intention of Emperor to revisit Tangier. Herr von Tschirschky and Count Eulenberg state there is no truth in rumour (see No. 343)	235
392	Mr. Spring-Rice ..	194	15,	Morocco Conference. Count Lamsdorff, being convinced that further representations at Berlin would be useless, instructed Russian Delegates to take a more active part. Transmits copy of a note to Count Lamsdorff informing him of the intention of His Majesty's Government to support French contention about Casa Blanca (see Nos. 307 and 389)	235
393	Sir A. Nicolson ..	108 Tel. Most Conf.	19,	Police question. Note received by United States' Delegate from Washington. United States' Government's objections to Austrian proposal. They apparently desire that France and Spain should act as agents of Europe conjointly at each port and with a very strict inspection. France would probably object to inspection on lines proposed by United States' Government (see No. 389)	236
394	" " ..	109 Tel Confidential	19,	Police question. Reasoning in United States' note (see No. 393) is quite clear. Their view is to place French and Spanish Instructors at each port conjointly, with a strict surveillance over them. Thinks German Government will accept this proposal, but doubts its being agreeable to French. It would not be a success in practice .	237
395	Sir E. Egerton ..	40	17,	England's attitude at Morocco Conference. Conversation with Count Guicciardini. Told him that England would not fail to support France on the Casablanca police question, and denied various mendacious stories ..	237
396	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	37 Tel. Confidential	19,	Police and bank questions. Report that arrangement has been reached at Vienna through intervention of Emperor of Austria, and that there is to be an Inspector-General but no separate body of police under his command. Señor Moret regrets that Spain is to share in hopeless task of making the new police force a success (see No. 358) ..	238
397	Sir A. Nicolson ..	110 Tel.	20,	Police question. United States' Delegate authorized to communicate American note to French and British Delegates. German Government entirely concur in views of United States' Government. French and Spanish Delegates consider dual organization at each port would be quite unworkable. Present scheme will probably be cause of friction between France and Spain (see No. 394)	238
398	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	59 Tel.	20,	Police question. United States' proposals seem to be a most undesirable complication if brought forward now (see No. 397) ..	239

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
399	Sir F. Bertie ..	119 Confidential	Mar. 17, 1906	Austrian police proposal. Conversations with MM. Louis and Étienne. His Majesty's Government will continue to support France (see No. 374). Conversation with M. Clémenceau. Doubts raised as to England's fidelity. Has reassured the French Ministers. Reasons for alarm of French Cabinet. Reports spread of England being likely to come to some agreement with Germany	239
400	Mr. Spring-Rice ..	197	17,	Morocco Conference. Transmits a copy of a note to Count Lamsdorff, in which he emphatically denied the report that Sir A. Nicolson told the German Delegate that in his opinion France ought to yield on Germany's last proposal (see No. 375) ..	241
401	" " ..	62 Tel.	21,	Russian attitude at the Conference. Similar rumour spread about it, but Count Lamsdorff has issued a notice to the press, stating that Russia has continued and will continue to support France (see Nos. 392 and 404) ..	242
402	Sir A. Nicolson ..	111 Tel.	21,	Police question. Austrians had abandoned their original proposal. Before United States' proposal arrived they were contemplating a scheme giving four ports to France and Spain and leaving the other four to the Sultan (see No. 398)	242
403	" " ..	112 Tel. Confidential	21,	Secret Agreement between France and Spain as to Morocco. United States' Delegate has been informed of it and has reported it to his Government	243
404	" " ..	113 Tel.	21,	Russian attitude at the Conference. Russian Delegate instructed to deny report that Russian Government contemplated separating from France. German Delegate had circulated same report as to opinion of Russian Delegate in regard to Austrian proposal as he did as to opinion of British Delegate (see No. 401)	243
405	" " ..	114 Tel. Confidential	21,	Police scheme. French Delegate embarrassed by new situation. Has telegraphed to his Government explaining his difficulties. Proposed modification that dual organization should only be introduced at Tangier and Casablanca. French Delegate thinks United States' Government are under a misapprehension as to police mandate (see No. 402)	243
406	" " ..	115 Tel.	21,	Police question. Telegram to United States' Government from German Emperor. His Majesty approves principle of United States' proposal, and his Government would support a proposal based on mixed system with an Inspector-General. The removal of all misunderstanding is far more important to Germany than whole Morocco affair (see No. 405)	244
407	To Sir F. Bertie ..	43 Tel.	21,	Police question. Conversation with Spanish Chargé d'Affaires. Spanish Government object strongly to United States' proposals. Has told Austrian Ambassador that His Majesty's Government hope Austrian Government will not put forward officially any new proposal without ascertaining that it would be acceptable to France and Spain (see No. 406)	244

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
408	To Sir E. Goschen ..	24	Mar. 21, 1906	State of affairs at the Conference. Conversation with Austrian Ambassador. Too many peacemakers at work. United States' proposal seems unworkable. Hopes Austrian Government will not put forward anything without finding out whether it would be acceptable to France and Spain. No hope of neutral police at Casa Blanca being accepted (see Nos. 349 and 407)	244
409	To Sir M. de Bunsen	39	21,	Police question. Conversation with Spanish Chargé d'Affaires. His Government object strongly to United States' proposal. British, French, and Spanish Governments should continue to work together (see No. 407) ..	245
410	Sir F. Bertie .	30 Tel.	21,	Police question. Conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs. His opinion of United States' Government's proposal. It is calculated to produce friction between France and Spain and is not workable. Spanish Government share this view (see Nos. 399 and 407)	245
411	Sir A. Nicolson ..	116 Tel.	22,	Police question. French Delegate has received instructions to object to scheme involving mixed system. Austrian Delegate has been so informed, and will probably make no proposal based on mixed system. Austrian proposal will probably leave all ports to France and Spain, to be divided as two Governments may arrange with Moorish Government, and establish a strict inspection by a third Power. German Government might accept this (see No. 405) ..	245
412	To Sir M. Durand ..	23 Tel.	22,	Police question. United States' Chargé d'Affaires has communicated a telegram saying that arrangement for mandate to France and Spain jointly, with an Inspector-General of another country, would be accepted by Germany. To explain views of His Majesty's Government to Mr. Root and keep French colleague informed (see No. 406) ..	246
413	Sir F. Bertie .	32 Tel.	22,	Police question. Russian representations at Berlin that Russia will support France. Prince von Bülow states that Germany will give up Austrian proposal, but will expect compensation on bank question. German Emperor's communications with United States' President. French Ambassador in London instructed to request His Majesty's Government to approach President Roosevelt. United States' scheme would cause friction between France and Spain and be unworkable. Details of compromise recommended by French Delegate, which French Government are considering (see Nos. 406 and 410)	246
414	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	39 Tel.	23,	Police question. President of the Council learns that American proposal is merging into a new Austrian proposal, and hopes that modification suggested will be accepted. Spain terrified at prospect of policing Tangier by herself (see No. 409) ..	247
415	Sir A. Nicolson ..	117 Tel.	23,	Police question. Conversation with German second Delegate. Austrian proposal, held over pending proposal from Washington, viewed favourably by German Emperor. His Majesty's Government will support France and Spain, who are opposed to mixed system (see No. 411)	247

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
416	To Sir M. Durand ..	24 Tel.	Mar. 23, 1906	Police question. To support his French colleague. Refers to No. 412 ..	248
417	To Sir F. Bertie ..	46 Tel.	23,	Austrian police proposal. Modifications suggested. Conversation with Austrian Ambassador. United States' proposal as to mixed system will not form part of new Austrian proposal. Provision about Casablanca to be eliminated from latter (see Nos. 413 and 415)	248
	„ Sir A. Nicolson ..	64 „			
418	To Sir E. Goschen ..	25	23,	Police and bank questions. Conversation with Austrian Ambassador. Count Goluchowski has given instructions to modify Austrian police proposal by eliminating part about Casablanca and proposing that French should in return make some concessions as regards proportion of shares in the bank. Corps Diplomatique at Tangier would supervise the police, acting through an executive officer chosen from a minor Power, who would be the Inspector (see No. 408)	248
419	Sir A. Nicolson ..	72 Conference Confidential	14,	Adjournment of meeting. Third sitting of Drafting Committee led to no reconciliation of conflicting views about the State Bank, sittings therefore suspended for two or three days. German Government can make no more concessions with regard to Casablanca, and French Delegate considers establishment of a third Power at that port must therefore be accepted, with some modifications, and will suggest this to his Government (see No. 417)	249
420	„ „ ..	73 Conference Confidential	14,	Police question. Views of the French Delegate. Considers must either accept Austro-Hungarian proposal or break up Conference. Suggests conditions on which Swiss Inspector might be appointed at Casablanca. Comments on (see No. 419)	250
421	„ „ ..	75 Conference	15,	Treatment of Jews in Morocco. Mr. White, United States' Delegate, has received a letter from the Chief Rabbi at Tangier declaring that the Jews are fairly treated in Morocco. Subject to His Majesty's Government's approval, he proposes to act in accordance with the instructions Mr. White may receive on the subject (see No. 378)	251
422	„ „ ..	78 Conference Confidential	17,	Police question. Conversation with German Delegate, who states he has no idea what his Government may decide with respect to a third Power at a Moorish port. Probability of a German concession on this point (see No. 420)	252
422A	Sir M. Durand ..	15 Tel.	23,	Police question. Refers to Nos. 412 and 416. French Ambassador wishes no action taken. Mr. Root says there has been no intention of interfering with French and Spanish arrangements so long as the two Powers accepted mandate jointly and agreed to inspection by official of another country ..	253*
422B	„ „ ..	16 Tel.	24,	Police question. Minister for Foreign Affairs has telegraphed to American Delegate at Algeciras in sense of his declaration in No. 422 A	253*
422C	„ „ ..	17 Tel. Confidential	24,	United States' Government's views as to Morocco question. They consider His Majesty's Government opposed to Germany and possibly inclined to push France too far (see No. 422 B)	253*

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
423	Sir F. Bertie ..	34 Tel.	Mar. 24, 1906	Police question. Austrian Ambassador has sounded Minister for Foreign Affairs as to views of French Government on fresh Austrian proposal. French Government having rejected proposal that Inspector should have right of command or control over Instructors or police, he can have no responsibility to Corps Diplomatique. Elimination from Austrian project of special arrangement for Casa Blanca will no doubt facilitate discussions at Algeciras (see Nos. 413 and 417)	253
424	„ „ ..	35 Tel.	24,	Police question. Result of French representations at Washington. United States' Government will instruct their Delegate that, as long as France and Spain agree to accept joint, and not several, responsibility for every port, it will be immaterial, in view of United States' Government, whether Instructors are French or Spanish or of both nationalities, and distribution of ports may be left for French and Spanish Governments to arrange (see No. 422 A)	254
425	Sir A. Nicolson ..	119 Tel.	24,	Public works in Morocco. Paper left by second German Delegate in regard to mode of adjudication. Main idea is that all concessions, &c., should be settled between the Sultan and the Diplomatic Body. French Delegate is consulting his Government on the subject	254
426	Mr. Lowther ..	48	15,	Sid-el-Menebhi's claim against the Moorish Government. Refers to No. 133, Part 26). It has been impossible to obtain the compensation of over 500,000 fr. claimed ..	254
427	„ „ ..	50 Confidential	16,	Sultan of Turkey's advice to Sultan of Morocco (see No. 286). Moors are very jealous of Turkish interference, which is likely to produce the contrary effect to that desired ..	255
428	Sir A. Nicolson ..	79 Conference Confidential	19,	View of United States' Government on police question. Transmits copy of note communicated by Mr. Root to German Ambassador stating attitude of United States' Government (see No. 422 A)	256
429	„ „ ..	120 Tel.	26,	Police question. Plenary sitting of Conference. German Government agree to all ports being left to French and Spanish Instructors. Amendment presented by Austrian Delegate leaving Conference to decide at which ports French and Spanish Instructors should be placed respectively. German Government consider control of police by Diplomatic Body at Tangier a *sine quâ non* condition (see No. 424)	257
430	„ „ .	121 Tel	26,	Police question. Exact words used by German Delegate as to control by Diplomatic Body at Tangier. His Government consider it a principal and cardinal point, and, unless they receive satisfactory guarantees in regard to it, it would be difficult for German Delegates to continue to discuss any project which did not contain it (see No. 429)	258

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
431	Sir A. Nicolson ..	122 Tel. Confidential	Mar. 27, 1906	Police question. Formula drawn up by French, British, Italian, Spanish, Russian, and United States' Delegates respecting police and presented to German Delegate, who will discuss it with his other Delegate. He thinks it is not sufficiently precise. It can probably be arranged that Conference should be satisfied with simply receiving a communication from French and Spanish Delegates as to how they propose to allot the ports (see No. 430)..	258
432	„ „ ..	123 Tel.	28,	Bank question. Censors. Italy, Austria, and Portugal have applied for Censors. Number of Censors would thus be too large. The above Powers would withdraw their applications if Great Britain has no desire to be represented on the Board of Censors. Censors would thus be named by German, French, and Spanish State Banks. Requests instructions (see Nos. 267 and 353) ..	258
433	„ „ ..	124 Tel.	28,	Police question. Has proposed at Conference, in accordance with request of French Delegate, that a Swiss and not a Dutch officer should be nominated Inspector-General. German Delegates proposed to leave choice to the Sultan. They will refer the question to their Government, who hold to having a Dutch Inspector. French are strenuously opposed to such an appointment (see Nos. 350 and 431)	259
434	„ „ ..	125 Tel.	28,	Police question. Difficulty of control by Diplomatic Body has been surmounted by an Article. Quotes terms of the Article, which will most probably be accepted by French and German Delegates. Inspector is to report to the Makhzen and to the doyen of the Diplomatic Body at Tangier (see No. 430)	259
435	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	68 Tel.	28,	Bank question. Censors. We should not be justified in waiving our claim to a Censor in view of our large and important trade interests in Morocco (see No. 432) ..	259
436	Sir A. Nicolson ..	127 Tel.	30,	Bank Censors. Has communicated to Conference desire of His Majesty's Government to be represented. Italian, Austrian, and Portuguese Delegates withdraw their claims. Board of Censors will therefore consist of four selected by Bank of England and State Banks of Germany, France, and Spain (see No. 435)	260
437	„ „ ..	128 Tel.	30,	Increase of import duties. Conference has accepted surtax of 2½ per cent. *ad valorem*. Revenue so derived to form special fund to defray expenses of public works, &c. Bureau of Adjudication of Works will be composed of three Delegates from Diplomatic Body, a Representative of the Moorish Government, and the Engineer. Do His Majesty's Government accept increase of duties under these conditions? (see No. 330)	260
438	„ „ ..	129 Tel.	30,	Introduction of alcohol into Morocco. President of Conference has read letter from British Delegate drawing attention to growing evil of traffic in alcohol. Question to be referred to Diplomatic Body at Tangier to study the matter. Conference adheres to British Delegate's views	260

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
439	Sir A. Nicolson ..	130 Tel.	Mar. 30, 1906	Control of Moorish custom-houses. Has presented to Conference a proposal for exercise of some control through a representative Committee. Question referred to Drafting Committee	260
440	„ „ ..	131 Tel.	30,	Police question. Netherland Government desire to leave question of appointing Dutch Inspector alone. They would only have agreed to it had Conference been unanimous on the point (see No. 433)	261
441	Mr. Lowther ..	51	20,	State of affairs in Morocco. Fresh disturbances in the southern districts. Jealousy between the Governors, and impoverished condition of the people	261
442	„ „ ..	52 Confidential	21,	Harbour works at Moorish ports. Sultan denies he had granted Concession for such works at Casablanca to the French Company. Agent states French Government have nothing to do with the matter (see No. 348)	261
443	„ „ ..	53	22,	Movements of the Moorish vessel "Turki." Left again for Melilla to prevent smuggling (see Nos. 383 and 390)	262
444	Sir A. Nicolson ..	80 Conference Confidential	21,	Police question. Duke of Almodovar declares the United States' scheme unworkable. Spaniards could not share policing of Tetuan with another Power. M. Révoil also considers it impracticable. Austria is preparing fresh proposals (see No. 440) ..	262
445	„ „ ..	81 Conference	23,	Adjudication of public works in Morocco. Transmits copy of scheme drawn up by Count Tattenbach. Conversation with Count Tattenbach and M. Révoil (see No. 425) ..	264
446	„ „ ..	82 Conference	23,	Letters from the Moorish Pretender. Transmits translation of two letters attacking Sultan and his Government, and laying claim to power in Morocco. These letters were addressed by the Pretender to all the Delegates (see No. 111)	265
447	„ „ ..	84 Conference Confidential	23,	Police question. Austro-Hungarian Government are desirous of finding common ground of understanding, but are hampered by reserve of Berlin and difficulty of obtaining concessions from France on the bank (see No. 444)	267
448	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	69 Tel.	31,	Increase of import duties and Board of Adjudicators of Works carried out with extra revenue. There should be a British Adjudicator. If this is understood, scheme of proposed surtax may be accepted. Otherwise number of Adjudicators should be increased (see No. 445)..	269

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. May 1906.

CONFIDENTIAL

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Morocco.

Part 29.

[1]

No. 1.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 1, 1906.)

(No. 300.)

Sir,

Tangier, December 18, 1905.

WITH reference to Lord Lansdowne's despatch No. 115 of the 16th instant, inclosing copy of a letter from the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society in regard to the sale of slaves in Tangier, reported in the newspaper "Moghreb-el-Aksa" of the 28th October, I have the honour to report that it appears to be a fact that some slave boys were taken to various houses and offered for sale, and that there were also some slave girls for sale at a fondak, though I have not heard that these latter were taken into the streets.

The private sale of slaves in the coast towns of Morocco has never ceased to exist, and I fear that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the present, at any rate, to prevent slaves being taken to private houses for sale.

The nationality of the protected person referred to in the article in question is Italian.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[2]

No. 2.

Mr Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 1, 1906.)

(No. 301.)

Sir,

Tangier, December 20, 1905.

WITH reference to Sir F. Bertie's despatch No. 421 of the 16th ultimo on the subject of the recent examination of the mouth of the Sebou River, I have the honour to report that the officers of the French yacht "Aigle" have been continuing their studies with a view to ascertaining whether the Sebou would not be navigable for small craft as far as Fez during the winter months.

On the 24th ultimo Captain Dyé and some of the officers and men launched a collapsable boat on the river, and proceeded to take soundings, until, on the 2nd instant, on reaching the territory of the tribes of the Gharb and the Beni Hassan, which have for some time past been in a disturbed condition, they were attacked, but fortunately escaped without loss of life, and, from the last reports, they were returning to Mehedia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[3] No. 3.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 1, 1906.)

(No. 302.)

Sir, *Tangier, December* 20, 1905.

IN my despatch No. 290 of the 7th instant I transmitted a copy of a note I had addressed to Hadj Mohammed Torres, the Moorish Commissioner, demanding the punishment of the head of the escort who had deserted Captain Crowther and his companion, which act of treachery or cowardice resulted in the capture of these officers by the brother of the brigand known as Valiente.

I have now received a despatch from Mr. Vice-Consul Bewicke at Tetuan stating that the head of the escort on his return to Tetuan was put in prison on the 17th instant and immediately attempted to commit suicide, and that his life is in some danger.

Shortly afterwards I received the same information from Hadj Mohammed Torres, and I have the honour to inclose a copy of his note.

From this you will observe that he suggests that the remainder of the escort, who were imprisoned on the demand of His Majesty's Legation, should now be released, as the responsibility for what occurred rested entirely with the Commander of the escort.

Not being able to share the opinion of Hadj Mohammed Torres I have replied to that effect, adding, however, that I have referred the matter to His Majesty's Government for a decision.

A copy of my note is herewith inclosed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 3.

Sid Hadj Mohammed Torres to Mr. Lowther.

(After compliments.) *Showal* 12, 1323 (*December* 19, 1905).

I RECEIVED your letter of the 14th instant, informing me that you had heard that Ben Hashmi-el-Bokash, who was in command of the soldiers sent as escort to the two British officers, had returned to Tetuan, and you asked me to let you know what steps had been taken in regard to them. I took note of this, and have to inform your Excellency that I wrote to the Governor of Tetuan to arrest and imprison him. He replied that he had done so, but that when he had been in prison about two hours he had cut his own throat but without killing himself, there still being signs of life.

As the soldiers who were accompanying the two officers were under the command of the imprisoned man, and at his orders at the time of the occurrence, he is responsible for what happened, and what is above state dhas now happened to him. It appears to me that the soldiers should be released, and I trust to receive a reply from you agreeing to their release.

May you, &c.

(Signed) MOHAMMED-BEN-EL-ARBI TORRES.

Inclosure 2 in No. 3.

Mr. Lowther to Sid Hadj Mohammed Torres.

(After compliments.) *Tangier, Showal* 22, 1323 (*December* 19, 1905).

I HAVE received your note of to-day's date, in which you inform me that Ben Hashmi-el-Bokash, who was in command of the escort sent by the Basha of Tetuan to protect the two British officers who were captured by the brigands Valiente, has been arrested and imprisoned.

I hasten to express to you my satisfaction that this man has now met with a well-merited punishment.

You add that, as the soldiers who were with this man were under his orders, the responsibility for their disgraceful behaviour rests with him, and that consequently it appears to you that they should be released.

I regret to be unable to share your Excellency's view, and consider that these men, who were all equally guilty of treachery or cowardice, should all be kept in prison for the present.

I will, however, submit your view to His Majesty's Government for their decision.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

---

[5] No. 4.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 1, 1906.)

(No. 304.)

Sir, *Tangier, December* 23, 1905.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 260 of the 25th October, in regard to the punishment of the men implicated in the murder of Mr. Madden, at Mazagan, I have the honour to report that, having learnt that no steps had been taken to give effect to the engagements of the Moorish Government to remove the prisoners from Mazagan to serve the term of their imprisonment elsewhere—a condition upon which I had insisted to minimise the danger of escape, I addressed to Sid-ben-Sliman on the 27th ultimo a note, translation of which I beg leave to inclose herewith, reminding his Excellency of the engagement entered into in this respect by the Makhzen. I also inquired what progress had been made in the investigation of the charge against Abderahman-ben-Yusef, who there was reason to believe was the instigator of the crime.

I have the honour also to transmit translation of the reply I have received from Sid-ben-Sliman, informing me that orders had been issued for the removal of the prisoners to Marakesh, and that the case against Abderahman-ben-Yusef would be inquired into at Fez, to which place he would be removed in custody.

I have now received a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, reporting that the prisoners have actually been removed from Mazagan, and are being sent to Mogador *en route* to Marakesh. A copy of this despatch is inclosed herewith.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 4.

Mr. Lowther to Sid-ben-Sliman.

(After compliments.) *Tangier, November* 27, 1905 (*30th Ramadan*, 1323).

YOUR Excellency will doubtless remember that, by your note of the 24th October, you undertook, on behalf of the Moorish Government, that the murderers of Mr. Madden, at Mazagan, who confessed to the crime, should be imprisoned elsewhere than at Mazagan, and your Excellency added that Shereefian orders to this effect had been issued. I regret to have to state that, according to the latest news I have received from Mazagan, this condition has not been complied with, and the criminals are still in prison there.

I beg to call your Excellency's attention to the danger of allowing these men to remain there, and to express the hope that they may be removed to some secure prison without delay.

In the above-mentioned note your Excellency also stated that should the person suspected of being the instigator of the crime, namely Abderahman-ben-Yusef, be found guilty, his case would be dealt with separately.

I venture to inquire of your Excellency how the investigation into this man's guilt is proceeding, and whether the evidence which has been given against him is not yet considered sufficient to establish his guilt.

It appears probable that as long as this man is left in Mazagan he is not likely to confess to his participation in the crime. I would therefore suggest, for the earnest consideration of the Moorish Government, that Abderahman-ben-Yusef be removed to Fez, and a thorough investigation be undertaken there. I would again recall to your Excellency's attention the observations made verbally by me to you regarding the great danger of leaving the criminals and the accused man at Mazagan

owing to the possibility of a seizure by their friends of a European in order to obtain their release; in this event the full responsibility would rest with the Moorish Government.

May you rest, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 4.

Sid-ben-Sliman to Mr. Lowther.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.) 12 *Showal*, 1323 (*December* 9, 1905).

I RECEIVED your letter in regard to the prisoners in the case of Mr. Madden, at Mazagan, urging that they be speedily removed from there because of what is to be feared from their remaining there, and that Abderahman-ben-Yusef, who is suspected of inciting them, be removed to the Fez prison until the matter as regards him is cleared up. I took notice of this and informed His Shereefian Majesty thereof. I am not neglectful of carrying out the arrangement made with you, and Shereefian orders have been issued to the Governor of Mazagan to send the five prisoners to Morocco City, so that those two who are to undergo a life-term shall be placed in the town prison, and those who are undergoing a term of imprisonment shall be placed in the Misbah prison for a specified term.

As regards Abderahman-ben-Yusef, the Governor has been instructed to send him by sea to Laraiche and thence to the Fez prison. When his case is made clear it will be seen what judgment is to be passed on him.

May you rest, &c.

(Signed) ABDELKRIM BEN-SLIMAN.

Inclosure 3 in No. 4.

Consul Maclean to Mr. Lowther.

(No. 114.)

Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, December* 21, 1905.

RELATIVE to the Mazagan murder case, Mr. Vice-Consul Spinney reports, under yesterday's date, that the five men found guilty of murdering Mr. Madden have been removed, under an escort, and taken on board the Italian steamer "Alemagnia" for passage to Mogador, whence they are to be escorted to Marakesh.

Mr. Spinney went on board and identified the five men. It seems to me that the removal of these men from Mazagan must have a good effect, and the British and European colony is indebted to you for the security afforded to them by this proof that justice can be vindicated, even in the present deplorable state of the country. I regret to have to report that nothing further has transpired in the way of proof of the guilt of Abderahman-ben-Yusef, and, although I believe he was the instigator of the murder, I do not consider the evidence so conclusive as to exclude all doubt of his guilt.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ALLAN MACLEAN.

---

[62] No. 5.

Sir E. Egerton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1, 1906.)

(No. 214. Confidential.)

Sir, *Rome, December* 27, 1905.

TO-DAY I called on the Marquis di San Giuliano at the Consulta for the first time.

As he had only just arrived at the Ministry, and as he told me he had not yet read previous correspondence, our conversation was naturally informal, and he agreed to consider it so.

I said there seemed special need at present for "suite" (continuity and steadiness) in international policy, and I alluded to the Morocco Conference, in which England and Italy, I said, were bound by engagements to France and Abyssinia, respecting which the three Governments appeared on the point of coming to an arrangement.

His Excellency observed that England and Italy were not exactly in the same position, as Italy was bound by the Triple Alliance; to which I replied that a European political combination did not appear to regard special Agreements respecting a local question, such as that of Morocco, and that I trusted that Germany would not create any serious question at the Conference.

He said he had not made himself acquainted with the instructions sent by his predecessor to Signor Silvestrelli, as to his attitude in support of the French Delegate in the coming Conference, but he in general wished to depart as little as possible from the line traced by Signor Tittoni.

I subsequently reminded his Excellency that His Majesty's Delegate would, in accordance with the Anglo-French declaration, give full diplomatic support to his French colleague.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWIN H. EGERTON.

---

[53] No. 6.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1, 1906.)

(No. 223. Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Vienna, December* 28, 1905.

MY French colleague, M. de Reverseaux, spoke to me yesterday confidentially on the subject of Count Goluchowski's attitude with regard to the Morocco Conference. He said that he had told his Excellency that the French Government had heard from Madrid that the Austro-Hungarian Representatives appointed to attend the Conference had received no particular instructions, and that they had apparently until quite lately been even without a copy of the programme.

M. de Reverseaux had found Count Goluchowski somewhat disinclined to talk on the subject, but finally he had ascertained that the Austrian Representatives had been furnished with instructions for their guidance at the Conference, and that these instructions were generally to the effect that they should act as closely as possible with their German colleagues. Count Goluchowski had followed up this admission by saying that at one time he had had misgivings as to the trend of German policy, and had even had some fears that it might lead to grave difficulties, if not actual hostilities, between France and Germany, a state of affairs which would, of course, he said, have placed Austria-Hungary in an extremely delicate and dangerous position.

M. de Reverseaux had here interrupted Count Goluchowski, and said that his Excellency's mention of that danger encouraged him to hope that the Austrian Representatives at the Conference might be instructed to use every opportunity of playing a conciliatory part, and to do everything that lay in their power to moderate the tone of the German Representatives should the demands of the latter prove to be such as France, in her special position with regard to Morocco, would be unable to accept.

Count Goluchowski, however, had answered, in his usual optimistic way, that there was now no danger of any unreasonable demands being made by Germany, as he had heard from Berlin that the German Emperor had caused the German Representatives to be instructed to use the utmost circumspection and moderation, and, in fact, to avoid anything which might in any way offend French susceptibilities.

M. de Reverseaux gave me to understand that he had replied that the German Emperor might be in a peaceful and conciliatory mood to-day, but who could say what mood he might be in a month hence? That, in any case, it would be well to be prepared, and that instructions to their Representatives at the Conference to exercise as far as possible, and when necessary, a moderating and conciliatory influence would redound more to the credit and prestige of the Austro-Hungarian Government than instructions to blindly follow the lead of their German colleagues.

M. de Reverseaux said that, although he pushed this advice *sur tous les tons* he could not extract from Count Goluchowski anything more than a general statement that his Excellency was quite sure that Germany was entering upon the Conference with every desire to make things as smooth and easy as possible.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. E. GOSCHEN

---

[88] No. 7.

M. de Bernabé to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 1, 1906.)

(Translation.)
M. le Ministre, *December* 29, 1905.

IN fulfilment of the telegraphic instructions which I have just received from Madrid, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that, in view of the attachment of His Shereefian Majesty to the idea that the Morocco Conference should take place at Algeciras, the Government of His Majesty the King, my August Sovereign, will receive with pleasure in that town the Delegates to the Conference, and will do everything possible to facilitate the deliberations of the latter and to accommodate the persons attending within the scanty resources of the locality mentioned.

Whilst making to your Excellency this communication, of which the foreign Diplomatic Representatives accredited to the Court of Madrid were yesterday informed by the Duke of Almodovar del Rio, I am instructed to assure your Excellency of the cordiality of the sentiments with which the Government of His Catholic Majesty enter upon the Conference, and to state that, at the request of all those diplomatists summoned to the same, who will also, by reason of the posts they occupy, have to be present at the wedding of Her Royal Highness the Infanta Doña Maria Theresa with His Royal Highness the Infante Don Fernando, Prince of Bavaria, the meeting of the Conference has been fixed for the 16th January, 1906.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) L. ROLO DE BERNABÉ.

[1704] No. 8.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 13, 1906.)

(No. 241. Secret.)
Sir, *Madrid, December* 27, 1905.

THE French Ambassador, in relating to me a conversation which he had held with Señor Moret, the Spanish Prime Minister, mentioned that the latter had stated that he was most desirous of supporting French policy during the approaching Conference on Moorish affairs, and that the instructions which he purposed to give to the Spanish Delegate would, he was sure, be held to be thoroughly satisfactory to the French Government. Señor Moret said that he was pleased to find from a report which the Duke of Almodovar had made to him of some observations which I had made to his Excellency that His Majesty's Government also intended to support France cordially during the Conference, and it was a great satisfaction to him to feel assured that the new Government in Great Britain were desirous that the three countries should work harmoniously together.

Señor Moret added that it would be useless to disguise the fact that Germany had of late been making persistent efforts to detach Spain from France and Great Britain, and to cause her to revolve in the orbit of Berlin. As an instance of this, Señor Moret said he wished to inform M. Cambon very confidentially that during the visit of King Alfonso to Berlin in November last, the German Emperor had spoken to His Majesty of the intimate relations which had existed between the late King Alfonso XII and the German Court, and had intimated that it would be good policy on the part of His Majesty if he were to revive a secret Agreement which his father had made, by which Spain had undertaken to furnish military assistance to Germany in certain eventualities.

King Alfonso had replied that when that Agreement had been made, his father had just re-established the Monarchy in Spain, and was seeking for support and assistance. Now the Monarchy was established and the international situation had

completely changed from what prevailed in the days to which the Emperor had alluded. King Alfonso added that he was, moreover, a constitutional Sovereign, and could not enter into any agreements, secret or other, without previously consulting with, and obtaining the consent of his constitutional advisers. The question was then dropped.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

---

[51] No. 9.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 1, 1906.)

(No. 243.)
Sir, *Madrid, December* 29, 1905.

THE several Representatives who are to attend the Conference met at the Ministry of State yesterday morning in order to select their accommodation at the two available hotels at Algeciras. I informed them that I should require no rooms, which facilitated somewhat the distribution, though I fear much inconvenience will be caused by the limited accommodation.

I spoke to my French and German colleagues as to whether we might not withdraw from the guarantees which we had given to the Spanish Government in regard to the hotel now that the other Representatives were engaging their rooms. They both agreed that we could do so, and we therefore informed the Under-Secretary of State that our guarantees would cease from the 28th instant.

The constant adjournments of the date of meeting have, I fear, entailed an expense of about 450*l.* on each of the four Governments, but had not the hotel been definitely engaged from the 1st instant, it would have been impossible to hold the Conference at Algeciras, and lengthy negotiations would have ensued as to another place of meeting, and still further delays occasioned in a matter which in general interests should not be allowed to drag on indefinitely.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

---

[84] No. 10.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 1, 1906.)

(No. 244.)
Sir, *Madrid, December* 29, 1905.

SEÑOR MONTERO RIOS, the late Prime Minister, who had accepted the post of Spanish Representative at the forthcoming Conference, has now withdrawn his acceptance in a letter to Señor Moret, in which he complains of the criticisms which have been made on his nomination by some parties in the Cortes, and in which he states that he must decline to undertake a part which merely exposes him to calumnies and insults.

The Prime Minister has requested the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Duke of Almodovar, to act as Spanish Representative, and his Excellency has accepted the post.

In view of the refusal of the Sultan of Morocco to agree to Madrid as the place of meeting, the Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the Representatives here that there was no other alternative than to fall back on Algeciras, notwithstanding its inconveniences and deficiencies. In regard to the date of meeting, as the 5th January was a Friday, the Mussulman Sunday, it was proposed at first to defer the first meeting till the 8th January. It was, however, considered that, as the marriage of the King's sister, the Infanta Maria Teresa, was to be solemnized on the 12th January, it might appear discourteous for all the Representatives to absent themselves from Madrid but a few days previous to the ceremony, and it was, therefore, decided to open the Conference on the 16th January.

I told the Duke of Almodovar that I presumed His Majesty's Government would have no objection to that date, and that, personally, I was ready to attend at any time or at any place which might be acceptable to all the Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[215] No. 11.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, January* 1, 1906.

HIS Majesty's Government have no objection to the date proposed for the meeting of the Morocco Conference in your telegram No. 107 of the 28th December, 1905.

---

[230] No. 12.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2, 1906.)

(No. 222.)
Sir, *Stockholm, December* 29, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to report that last evening's "Gazette" announces the appointment of the Swedish Minister at Madrid, M. C. O. R. Sager, to represent this country at the forthcoming Moroccan Conference.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RENNELL RODD.

---

[443] No. 13.

London Committee of Deputies of the British Jews to Foreign Office.—(Received January 4.)

Dear Sir, 19, *Finsbury Circus, London, January* 2, 1906.

WITH reference to the interview which the two Presidents of the Conjoint Jewish Foreign Committee had with you some weeks ago, relative to the Conference in Morocco and the condition of the Jews in that country, I am directed by the Presidents to inform you that they have had reliable confidential communications from Berlin, the effect of which is that the German Government will support any measures proposed for the purpose of improving the position of non-Mahommedans in Morocco.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES H. L. EMANUEL,
Solicitor and Secretary.

---

[682] No. 14.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)

(No. 1. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, January* 5, 1906.

SPANISH Government are somewhat perturbed by the active trade reported to be carried on with the Moorish Pretender in the immediate neighbourhood of Melilla, by a ship flying the French flag. They fear that if, as they are informed, this vessel is about to bring artillery, and a fort is to be constructed, a serious situation will be caused. Both the Minister of State and the Under-Secretary have spoken to me and asked me what I should advise should be done.

I pointed out that as the vessel was flying the French flag, no action could be taken except with French concurrence, but that the Sultan could intercept the ship by means of his steamer, and he was clearly the proper authority for the prevention of illicit trade. They replied that there seemed to be some disinclination on the part of Sultan to intervene, and they gave me to understand that in these circumstances the employment of a Spanish gun-boat might become necessary. I pointed out that if they interfered with the Pretender's trade, they must be prepared for his making things unpleasant at Melilla.

M. Cambon, to whom I have spoken on the subject, tells me that the enterprise is being financed from Hamburg, and conducted by French adventurers. If the Spaniards desired to act, he saw no objection to their doing so.

---

[626] No. 15.

Sir E. Egerton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Rome, January* 5, 1906.

ITALY will be represented by the Marquis Visconti Venosta at the Morocco Conference.

---

[665] No. 16.

Signor de Bosdari to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)

(Translation.)
Sir, *Italian Embassy, London, January* 5, 1906.

BY instruction of my Government, I have the honour to inform you that Marchese Visconti Venosta has been appointed First Italian Delegate at the Algeciras Conference.

His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid, Commendatore Silvestrelli, has received instructions to remain at his post, where his presence is rendered necessary by the new commercial negotiations between Italy and Spain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. DE BOSDARI.

---

[88] No. 17.

Sir Edward Grey to Señor Polo de Bernabé.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 5, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 29th ultimo, and to thank you for the courteous welcome offered by the Spanish Government to the Delegates who will attend the forthcoming Conference at Algeciras.

I have already instructed His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid to acquaint the Duke of Almodovar that that place and the date mentioned by your Excellency, viz., the 16th instant, will be convenient to His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

---

[698] No. 18.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6, 1906.)

(No 305.)
Sir, *Tangier, December* 25, 1905.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 294 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to report that the ex-brigand, Raisuli, is now making a determined effort to increase his jurisdiction, and has expressed his intention of including within it the district of Arzila. He has given an intimation to this effect to the Commander of the Imperial troops, adding that if he was not appointed by the Sultan it would make no difference, as he would name himself Governor of the district.

A few days ago, the Sultan's Commissioner intimated to Raisuli, on instructions from the Court, that it would be desirable that in future his men should not come into the town bearing arms. To this message Raisuli sent an impudent reply, and declined in very clear language to pay any attention to the message.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

---

[699] No. 19.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 6, 1906.)

(No. 306.)

Sir, *Tangier, December* 25, 1905.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 299 of the 17th instant, on the subject of the orders sent by the Makhzen for the capture of the brigands known by the name of Valiente, I have the honour to report the following which has reached me from a reliable source, and which shows the great difficulty that will be experienced in effecting the capture of these brigands.

Duas, the Governor of the Anghera district, received in due course orders to effect the capture of these men, and, in order to endeavour to insure success in this direction, he applied to Abdelkrim Shergui, the Commander of the Government troops in this district, asking him to make a show of force on the boundaries of the Anghera district in order to make it clear to the people of that tribe that the Kaïd was supported by the Government. Abdelkrim Shergui, in his turn, conveyed this suggestion to Raisuli, the ex-brigand and now Governor of the district in the immediate neighbourhood of Tangier. The latter replied that if he moved a single man to assist Duas, he would send men into Tangier, capture two Ministers and cut their throats.

The Commander of the M'hallah, in consequence, decided that perhaps inaction was the better policy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

---

[700] No. 20.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 6, 1906.)

(No. 307.)

Sir, *Tangier, December* 26, 1905.

DURING a conversation I had yesterday with El-Mehedi-el-Menebhi, I asked him whether he had heard any details of the proposals the Moorish Government intend to put forward at the forthcoming Conference. He told me that he had gathered from Hadj-Mohammed-el-Mukhri that these proposals are to be :—

1. *Funds.*—Money is to be obtained for meeting the requirements of the country, but without foreign supervision of the expenditure, which the Makhzen desires shall be in its own hands and uncontrolled.

2. *Policing the Ports.*—The Government is ready to undertake this duty, but the control must be entirely in the hands of the Maghzen. Should the Conference agree to this the Moorish Government will give a written undertaking to be responsible for whatever may happen in those districts.

On the first point, El-Menebhi observed that, if a further loan is obtained by the Moorish Government, and no control is exercised by foreigners, it will only be squandered, as has happened in the case of the two former loans, no part of which has been devoted to the benefit of the country.

On the second point, he remarked that, if the proposal of the Maghzen were accepted by the Conference, the condition of affairs at Tangier and the other ports would remain in the same position as at present. The Maghzen is now responsible for the property of foreigners, a responsibility it seeks to avoid on every occasion, even the smallest claims being settled only after much difficulty, and it is quite powerless to exercise control over the lawless. My despatch No. 306 of yesterday's date is a striking illustration of this.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

---

[702] No. 21.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 6, 1906.)

(No. 309.)

Sir, *Tangier, December* 29, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to report that the following Foreign Ministers here have been appointed to represent their respective countries at the forthcoming Conference at Algeciras :—

M. Malmusi	Italy.
Count Martens Ferrão	Portugal.
Count de Buisseret	Belgium.
Count Koziebrodski	Austria.
Mr. Gummeré	United States.
M. Bacheracht	Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

---

[703] No. 22.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 6, 1906.)

(No. 310.)

Sir, *Tangier, December* 29, 1905.

IT is not an easy matter to ascertain what are the instructions which have been given to the Moorish Delegates for their guidance at the Conference, especially as, according to the admission of one of the Delegates, these instructions are modified every day by letters from the Court.

Influenced no doubt by a severe financial strain, the Sultan himself was perhaps never so much disposed to accept reforms in some shape or another as he is at present, though I cannot believe that any of his Viziers encourage him in that view, and, in the event of reforms being eventually imposed upon His Majesty, they will, if still in power, do all they can to place obstacles in the way of their being carried out.

The Sultan and his Viziers have latterly become a little suspicious of the sincerity and unselfishness of Germany's action, but nevertheless the Delegates, while not furnished with any full powers to accept finally any decision that may be arrived at, have been instructed to lean upon that Power for support during the Conference. Their general instructions are to the effect that in all reforms any control by one Power alone, whether in military or financial matters, is to be stoutly resisted. With regard to military matters, the Sultan has now no objection to the employment of foreign officers and non-commissioned officers to act as police in the ports, and even on the trade routes, provided that such arrangements shall be made for a limited period of years, to be distinctly defined, and that the officers employed be of either Dutch, Belgian, or Swiss nationality.

But His Majesty appears to have a strong objection to the name "police," having some fear that officers of such a body might take upon themselves the duty of entering and searching the houses of Moors and interfering in civil matters. He would like these guardians of the peace to form part of the central army.

His Majesty fully appreciates that this and other reforms cannot be introduced without a considerable expenditure of money, which is not forthcoming, and the Delegates admit that the Makhzen cannot offer any security for a future loan, the available resources being already engaged. They have been instructed to suggest that the duties on some, but not all, imported goods be increased, and that those on exported goods be reduced, and, as the increase produced by these changes would not be a very large one, they seem to be prepared to agree to the introduction into the custom-houses of foreign control, which measure would economize the large sums now eaten up through irregularities, and they estimate that present receipts from the custom-house might be doubled. They also desire to see taxation imposed upon posts and telegraphs which are in the hands of foreigners. The only instructions they have received with regard to the bank which has been spoken about is that they are to make very minute inquiries and not to commit themselves in any way on that point.

My inquiries as to what advice the Sultan has latterly received from Germany, have elicited the fact that His Majesty has been enjoined to reduce his pretensions at the Conference to the lowest limits, and to endeavour, before the Conference meets, to do all he can to prove to the world that he is earnestly desirous to put his house in order and to settle the claims of foreigners as far as he is able—in fact, to show a good disposition in general. In this direction I have latterly noticed some inclination on the part of the Makhzen.

The line adopted by the German Minister, in conversation with his colleagues, is to the effect that he is convinced that all will go smoothly at the Conference, and that Germany is in earnest in persuading the Sultan to accept reform.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to Sir A. Nicolson.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

---

[756] No. 23.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 14.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, January 2, 1906.*

IN the course of a conversation which I had yesterday with the French Minister, M. Boutiron informed me that the Russian Government had instructed Count Cassini, the Russian Ambassador at Madrid, to afford his French colleague his cordial support in the matter of the Morocco Conference. M. Boutiron added that the Imperial Government entirely shared the objections entertained by the French Government to the subdivision of the labours of the Conference among sub-Commissioners.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CECIL SPRING-RICE.

---

[710] No. 24.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 4. Confidential.)
Sir, *Berlin, January 3, 1906.*

I CALLED yesterday afternoon upon Baron von Richthofen, whom I had not had an earlier opportunity of seeing since my return to Berlin. His Excellency received me with the greatest cordiality, and agreed with me in thinking that a decided improvement had taken place in the relations between the two countries. I said that I had had the advantage of more than one conversation with you, and that I could state that you would gladly see the relations between the two countries placed upon a friendly footing on the understanding that friendship with Germany should not in any way interfere with our friendship for other countries.

Baron von Richthofen said that he quite understood this. No one could expect that we should forego our understanding with France, and the German Government certainly would not ask us to do so. I said that what we desired was to be good friends with all, and that few things would give us greater pleasure than to see good relations established between Germany and France.

I then alluded to the recent conversations I had had in England with Count Metternich, who had impressed upon me that much would depend upon the attitude which Great Britain would assume at the forthcoming Conference. If this attitude were conciliatory all would be good, but if England were to urge France to resist the moderate demands of Germany, he feared that the relations would become worse than ever. I had replied that in England the fear was entertained that the German demands would be so exaggerated that France would be unable to accept them, and that, in that case, we should be obliged to support France in resisting them.

Baron von Richthofen said that the German demands would certainly not be exorbitant; on the contrary, they would be very moderate, and would be to the advantage of all Powers who had commercial relations with Morocco. They would merely be that the reforms which are to be carried out in Morocco should be placed upon an international, and not upon a one-Power, basis.

I replied that I was not greatly enamoured of the idea of an international basis, and the results of its operation in Turkey, both as regards the Armenian and

Macedonian questions, were not such as to render its adoption desirable in any other country. Baron von Richthofen replied that, at all events, it was better than the one-Power basis, which would exclude all other Powers who might have interests in the country. I said the ideal would be that the reforms to be introduced into Morocco should be placed as far as possible on a Moroccan basis, with as little interference as possible from other Powers. Baron von Richthofen said that that would indeed be the ideal, but that the weakness of the Shereefian Government made it unrealizable.

Baron von Richthofen then referred to the change of Government in England, and expressed his satisfaction at the constitution of the new Cabinet, which contained several known friends of Germany. He felt, therefore, that His Majesty's present Government would be less hostile to Germany than their predecessors.

I denied that His Majesty's late Ministers entertained any hostility to Germany, and I said that I was convinced that there would be no change in the foreign policy of His Majesty's Government.

I then told Baron von Richthofen of the remark which the Emperor had made to me on the previous day, as reported in my preceding despatch, as to the tone of the English press, for which, as he was aware, His Majesty's Government were in no way responsible. His Excellency begged me not to attribute too much importance to a remark of that nature from the Emperor, who, as I was aware, was extremely sensitive to the criticisms of the press. His Excellency added that there certainly had been a great improvement in the tone of some important organs of public opinion in England, and he had great hopes that the movement which had recently been inaugurated by the Chambers of Commerce throughout Germany, in response to the meetings which had been held in England, with a view to bringing about a more friendly feeling between the two countries, might be crowned with success.

I said that I trusted that this might be the case, but although I had accepted two invitations to such meetings, and would emulate Count Metternich's example in speaking in favour of a friendly understanding, I was afraid that some time must still elapse before the mutual suspicion and distrust which unfortunately existed in both countries should have entirely disappeared.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

---

[742] No. 25.

Sir C. Phipps to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 2.)
Sir, *Brussels, January 4, 1906.*

A DISCUSSION in the Belgian press as to the attitude to be assumed by Belgium at the Algeciras Conference has, I believe, attracted some attention amongst my colleagues, but I am assured by M. de Favereau that it deserves no notice.

Initiated by an obscure provincial paper, it was taken up by the "Indépendance Belge," which arrived at the conclusion that the interests of Belgium should be on the side of France and England—not merely as Powers which both guaranteed her independence, but inasmuch as the Convention of the 8th April, 1904, guaranteed the maintenance of the *status quo* in Morocco. His Excellency remarked to me that his Government would follow its traditional policy of being guided solely by its economical interests, irrespective of political considerations, and that the conclusion referred to was, therefore, an entirely justifiable one. The assumption put forward by the provincial newspaper that Belgium would "follow as far as possible the German attitude" had no foundation whatever.

The "Indépendance Belge," which is frequently inspired, contains this evening a fresh article on this subject, which I have the honour to inclose,* arguing that Belgian interests in Morocco must be on the side of France, and citing the numerous instances in which that country had of late supported Belgian economical interests.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CONSTANTINE PHIPPS.

---

* Not printed.

[685] No. 26.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, January 5, 1906.*

A REPORT has reached me that Sid Torres, the Sultan's Commissioner here, has received orders from His Majesty to negotiate with a certain foreign subject for the concession of two monopolies; one is to be for tobacco and the other for the manufacture of sugar, the price being one-third of the profits, plus a sum of 1,600,000*l.*

Any such concession being contrary to Treaties, the Commissioner has not carried out the Sultan's directions, and explained his reasons.

I have been told that a French Company is the applicant for the concession. Whoever it may be, it seems most unlikely that the sum mentioned should have been offered.

The German Minister, although he has not spoken to me personally on the subject, has stated to others that he knows nothing about the matter.

[1099] No. 26°.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir C. Hardinge.

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, January 8, 1906.*

IT may be desirable that the Emperor should be assured, before you leave St. Petersburgh, that, according to the terms of our agreement with France, we shall support her fully at the Morocco Conference. You should let this be clearly understood.

[1194] No. 27.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, January 9, 1906.*

MOROCCAN affairs.

My telegram No. 1 as to contraband trade with Pretender.

M. Cambon informs me that measures will be taken for repression of this illicit traffic by the French authorities with the concurrence of Moorish Government.

[1180] No. 28.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, January 9, 1906.*

THE Concessions mentioned in my immediately preceding telegram were for sugar and candles, and were applied for by a French Company.

[1182] No. 29.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Lascelles.

(No. 11.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 9, 1906.*

I TOLD the German Ambassador on the 3rd instant that since we last had a conversation on the subject I had been giving further attention to the question of Morocco, and that I felt uneasy as to the situation. I had noticed that a little time ago Prince Bülow had described the question as "*très mauvaise.*" I had also heard that Lord Lansdowne had said to Count Metternich that, in the event of war between Germany and France, public feeling in England would be such that, in his opinion,

it would be impossible for England to remain neutral. Count Metternich said that Lord Lansdowne said that would be so in the event of an unprovoked attack by Germany on France, and that, of course, the question of what was unprovoked was one of interpretation.

I said that we did not intend to make trouble at the Morocco Conference. We wanted to avoid trouble between Germany and France, because I really thought that if there was trouble we should be involved in it. Public feeling here would be exceedingly strong, not from hostility to Germany, but rather because it had been a great relief and satisfaction to the English public to find themselves on good terms with France, and if France got into difficulties arising out of the very document which had been the foundation of the good feeling between us and France, sympathy with the French would be exceedingly strong.

Count Metternich restated again emphatically the German point of view, which was that we and the French had no right to dispose of the interests of a third party in Morocco, however we might deal with our own. I said that we had undertaken distinct engagements to give diplomatic support to France for the purposes of the Agreement—the engagements which were published in Article IX. Count Metternich observed that all we had promised was diplomatic support, and that what Germany resented was that public opinion in England spoke as if armed support had been promised. I said that I could only speak on such a matter as a private individual, my opinion being worth no more than that of Lord Lansdowne speaking in the same way, but the opinion was the same. It was not a question of the policy of the Government; what made a nation most likely to take part in war was not policy or interest, but sentiment, and if the circumstances arose, public feeling in England would be so strong that it would be impossible to be neutral.

Count Metternich said that Germany felt herself too strong a nation and in too strong a position to be overawed by a combination even of two other Great Powers. I said I understood that, but I was speaking frankly now because such a contingency had not arisen, and therefore it was possible now to talk frankly, whereas at a later date, if things became very difficult, he might be much less willing to listen and I might be unable to speak freely. "But," I said, "if things go well at the Morocco Conference, you may be sure of this, that the Anglo-French *entente* will not be used afterwards to prejudice the general interests or the policy of Germany. We desire to see France on good terms with Germany. This is the one thing necessary to complete the comfort of our own friendship with France, and we shall certainly not 'egg on' France at the Conference further than she wishes herself to go." I said this because Count Metternich had told me the other day that he considered that the British Government had been "more French than the French." He said he entirely believed now that we were not more French than the French, and that what I had said represented our real attitude. I said that it really was so, and that our diplomacy was perfectly open and frank. We had gone to a certain point in our engagements with France, from which we could not think of receding. We must keep those engagements; but if the keeping of those engagements proved, at the Conference, to be compatible with Germany's view of her own interests, there would be a sensible amelioration immediately in English public opinion.

We spoke of the tone of the press both in England and in Germany. Count Metternich complained of a recrudescence of a bad tone in our press, and its misstatements. I said that we could not control our press, and that we were not inspiring it, and if I were to say anything in public now to promote a better tone I should at once be told by the press that this was all very well, but that they must wait till the Morocco Conference took place before they could accept my view. On the other hand, if things went well at the Conference, it would be possible afterwards for any one in my position to speak in a friendly tone with effect.

We had some conversation on the details of the Conference. Count Metternich said that Germany could not content herself simply with guarantees for her economic interests, because such guarantees would be worthless if France really had the control of affairs in Morocco. German commerce would then suffer, as foreign commerce had suffered in Tunis and in Madagascar. I said that there were guarantees for the open door in Morocco which did not exist in the cases of Tunis and Madagascar. Count Metternich said that that would not be enough. If French influence was supreme in Morocco, concessions and so forth would be entirely in French hands. I said I understood that there was to be a State bank for Morocco, and that the French had already agreed to German participation in the bank, and surely that in itself was a certain guarantee.

Beyond general statements that Germany could not allow France a special position in Morocco, Count Metternich gave me no idea of what the proposals of Germany were likely to be, or of her attitude at the Conference.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

---

[710] No. 30.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Lascelles.

(No. 12.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 9, 1906.

I HAVE received and read with much interest your despatches Nos. 3 and 4 of the 3rd instant, reporting your conversations with the German Emperor and Baron von Richthofen on the subject of the state of relations between this country and Germany.

Your Excellency's language on both these occasions is approved by His Majesty's Government.

With regard to Baron von Richthofen's observation that the demands put forward by Germany at the approaching Conference on Morocco would merely be that the reforms which are to be carried out in that country should be placed upon an international and not upon a one-Power basis, I have to observe that a special position has been conceded by Great Britain to France by Article 2 of the Declaration of the 8th April, 1904.

That Article states that—

"The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco.

"His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recognize that it appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are conterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require.

"They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France for this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights which Great Britain, in virtue of Treaties, Conventions, and usage, enjoys in Morocco."

It is impossible for His Majesty's Government to suggest to France any departure from the attitude prescribed by the terms of this Article. Moreover, by Article 9, "the two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco."

This engagement His Majesty's Government are bound to fulfil so long as France does not of her own motion propose or consent to some modification of the position conceded to her by Article 2.

The details of this and other questions connected with Moorish affairs must now be left to be dealt with by the Conference at Algeciras.

If, however, Baron von Richthofen should revert to the subject your Excellency can refer him to the two Articles cited above as those which must decide our attitude at the Conference.

As regards the general question of our relations, the attitude and feeling of His Majesty's Government are expressed in a conversation which I held with Count Metternich on the 3rd instant, a record of which forms the subject of my despatch to your Excellency No. 11 of to-day's date.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[1337] No. 31.

Memorandum communicated by the Spanish Ambassador, January 10, 1906.

(Translation.) *Madrid, December* 30, 1905.

THE Powers Signatories to the Madrid Conference, 1880, having agreed to hold at Algeciras the Conference to which they had been invited by the Sultan of that country for the purpose of discussing the nature and scope of the reforms to be introduced in the Shereefian Empire, the Spanish Government, deeply sensible of the honour done to them by the selection of Spain as the meeting place of the Conference, took steps to adapt, as far as possible, the slender resources of Algeciras to the requirements of such an important assembly.

The limited accommodation afforded by so small a place, even in normal circumstances, made the Spanish Government anxious lest the influx of visitors attracted by the announcement that the Conference would be held there, as well as unforeseen augmentations of the staffs of foreign Representatives, would render it impossible to lodge the latter in a manner suitable to their dignity. The Spanish Government, therefore, being anxious to avoid inconveniencing the Representatives of the Powers, suggested that the Conference should be held at Madrid. The Spanish Government considered that this proposal ought to be submitted, in the first instance, to the Sultan of Morocco, and they accordingly deferred issuing invitations to the Powers until His Majesty's views on the subject had been ascertained. But the Sultan's Delegates at Tangier having informed the Spanish Minister there that His Majesty adhered to his preference for Algeciras, the Spanish Government informed the Representatives of the Powers who had signified their intention of attending the Conference accordingly, and addressed to your Excellency a telegram on the 28th December, requesting you to make the necessary communication to the British Government.

In confirming the above telegram, I request your Excellency to express the satisfaction with which His Majesty's Government invites the British Government to take part in the forthcoming Conference, and their deep sense of the valuable services which will be rendered by the British Delegates, in co-operation with those of the other Powers, with a view to bringing the labours of the Conference to a successful conclusion.

I beg your Excellency to read this despatch to the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to leave a copy of it with him.

[1446] No. 32.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 21. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 10, 1906.

THE French Ambassador called here this afternoon, and stated that he had been at Madrid, where he had been in consultation with his brother, the French Ambassador there, and Sir A. Nicolson as to the course to be pursued in the approaching Conference at Algeciras.

They had agreed that it was very important that the Conference should not separate without coming to a conclusion, as in that case the German Government would consider themselves free to take what action they thought best, and would probably obtain concessions from the Moorish Government of a very inconvenient nature. For this reason, it was undesirable that the Conference should commence by discussing the arrangements for organization of the police, which was the question on which it would be most difficult to arrive at an agreement. If an attempt were made to bring forward that question, it might be met by a statement that, before discussing it, it would be necessary to ascertain what resources were available for the purpose of this and other reforms.

The first question therefore would be that of finance, the creation of a National Bank, and the share which the various Powers should have in its capital and management. These questions ought not to present any serious difficulty.

The next question might be that of the prevention of trade in contraband of war. It was clear that the pacification of the country and measures for the preservation of order were scarcely practicable so long as no effective provision was made to prevent the introduction of arms and munitions of war. This question might give rise to

some difficulties, as the trade was largely carried on in Spanish vessels, but it ought not to present insuperable difficulties.

Lastly would come the question of police. It was probable that the German Government would not themselves make proposals, but would induce the Moorish Government to bring them forward. It might be expected that one of two alternatives would be proposed, viz., either that the coast should be divided into sections, and that the police of each section, with the districts lying behind it, should be intrusted to a different Power, or that one of the minor Powers, such as Holland, should be intrusted with the whole organization.

The first of these alternatives would be objectionable, as Germany would make use of it to establish herself on the Atlantic coast.

The second would be ill-advised, inasmuch as the Power undertaking the organization of the police ought to have at its disposal a supply of Mussulmans of Arab race for the purpose.

Neither alternative would be acceptable to France. It would not, however, be desirable to adopt a purely negative attitude, which would make the objecting Powers responsible for a continuance of the present deplorable condition of the country. Some other alternative should therefore be brought forward. The present Russian Minister at Tangier, M. Bacheracht, had made a careful study of the reforms that might be introduced into Morocco, and had devoted part of his attention to the question of police. His recommendations on the subject seemed sound, and might be made the basis of a proposal which might conveniently be brought forward by the Russian Plenipotentiary at the Conference.

The proposal would be to the effect that the duty of organizing the police should be intrusted to France, who was interested in the first line, and had at her disposal all the necessary materials for the force. The susceptibilities of Spain and her interest in the matter on account of her possessions on the Moorish coast must, however, be considered, and on these grounds she should be associated with France in the task. In order to avoid an appearance of wishing to place the matter too much under the exclusive management of the two Powers, it might be proposed that the mandate to France and Spain should be for a short period, say, for a year or even six months, at the end of which time they should submit to the Powers the progress that had been made, and the arrangements that were contemplated in the future.

M. Cambon said that he had submitted these views to M. Rouvier, who had addressed instructions to that effect to M. Révoil. The latter was starting at once for Madrid, and would show his instructions to Sir A. Nicolson.

I asked if it was intended that the Conference should merely adjourn, and should meet again six months or a year hence to receive a Report on the police arrangements.

M. Cambon said that that would scarcely be necessary. The Conference might separate, and it might be provided that the Report should be presented to the Powers. He added that if I wished it, he would ask M. Rouvier's permission to communicate to me M. Révoil's instructions, or a summary of them.

I thanked him, and said that I would be glad if he would do so.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[1168] No. 33.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 5.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 10, 1906.

THE Spanish Ambassador called on me on the 3rd instant and inquired whether I could give him any news with regard to the Morocco Conference. His Excellency told me that he had reason to think that the Duke of Almodovar felt anxious on the subject.

I told Señor Polo de Bernabé that I had not heard what the German proposals would be; that I assumed that as Germany had desired the Conference she would make proposals. Everything would depend on the nature of these proposals.

Our course, in any event, was clear. We should keep our public engagement to France.

All the four Powers most directly interested in the Mediterranean had made arrangements with each other which were satisfactory to themselves, and it was most undesirable that they should allow these arrangements to be disturbed.

The Ambassador said that his Government were determined to keep their engagements, and I remarked that I was convinced that, for all of us, this was not only the honourable but the wise course.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[1337] No. 34.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 11, 1906.

I TRANSMIT herewith to your Excellency a translation of a communication made by the Spanish Ambassador,* conveying the invitation to His Majesty's Government to take part in the Morocco Conference at Algeciras.

I have to request your Excellency to convey to the Spanish Government in suitable terms the acceptance of this invitation on behalf of His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[1457] No. 35.

Sir M. Durand to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 12.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Washington, January* 11, 1906.

THE United States' Government do not consider that American interests are to any great extent concerned in the Algeciras Conference. The instructions sent to the American Delegates are that they should support the policy of the open door, and interfere as little as possible in other matters, that they should do nothing tending to weaken the Anglo-French *entente*, and should use their influence generally for the maintenance of peace.

[1553] No. 36.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 12.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, January* 12, 1906.

MOROCCO Conference.

Last evening I had a long conversation with Prince Bülow, who gave me the impression that he was anxious to get rid of the Moroccan difficulty in a peaceful manner, if this could be done without the appearance of either Germany or France being humiliated.

Prince Bülow expressed his earnest hope that the Conference at Algeciras would pass off peacefully, and in a manner which would be honourable to all parties. The general mandate for the organization of the police was the only point by which difficulty might be caused. A verbal promise had been given by M. Rouvier that France would not put forward a demand for such a mandate at the Conference, and Germany could not consent to one being given to France, as this would involve her acquiring complete control over the whole of Morocco. Prince Bülow now trusted that this claim would not be made by His Majesty's Government on behalf of France in order to show friendship for her.

I expressed doubts whether this point had been brought to your notice, and said that I was without instructions as to it. But we should not "egg on" France to go further than she wished, although, of course, as you had clearly explained to Count Metternich, we should support her at the Conference.

* No. 31.

Prince Bülow was anxious lest M. Rouvier, whilst keeping the letter of his promise, should get some other Power to put forward an unacceptable claim on behalf of France, but hoped that there was no danger of this. The solution of the police question, on which subject he understood the Marquis Visconti-Venosta was preparing a proposal, might be found either in the creation of spheres in which different Powers should control the police, or perhaps by intrusting the task of organizing that force to some perfectly neutral Power, such as Switzerland, Belgium, or Sweden.

If the Conference ended without leaving any feeling of bitterness in any quarter, as he hoped would be the case, Prince Bülow believed that there would be an improvement in the relations between Germany and France, and that there would then be no obstacle to really friendly relations being established between Germany and England.

[1611] No. 37.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 13.)

(No. 2.)

Sir,

Tangier, January 3, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 304 of the 23rd ultimo, I have the honour to report that Abderahman-ben-Yusef, who is suspected of being the instigator of the murder of Mr. Madden, has been sent by sea from Dar-al-Baida to Laraiche *en route* for Fez, where he will be detained in custody pending further inquiry into the charge against him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[1612] No. 38.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 13.)

(No. 3.)

Sir,

Tangier, January 4, 1906.

COMTE SAINT-AULAIRE, the French Chargé d'Affaires, received at the French Legation on New Year's Day a large deputation of French citizens resident here, one of whom delivered a very patriotic oration.

In reply, the Chargé d'Affaires urged his fellow citizens not to be discouraged by the obstacles that they had met with and would still encounter here, and urged them to have patience until the moment should arrive when their legitimate ambitions would be supported by a new situation, the outcome of an exchange of views which, for her part, France desired should be both loyal and sincere.

M. Saint-Aulaire has the reputation of a very discreet diplomatist who always very carefully chooses his words.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[1613] No. 39.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 13.)

(No. 4. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tangier, January 4, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 281 of the 25th November, 1905, I have the honour to report that Taib, the son of Bu-Amama, has, at the request of the French Legation, been released from prison, but is detained under supervision in a private house at Fez.

The French Chargé d'Affaires informs me that he hopes to come to some arrangement about the release of the man, and although, strictly speaking, the Makhzen would be within their right in shooting him, as he took up arms against the Sultan, yet he hoped that His Majesty would consent to his release, on condition that the French

Government would agree to his being lodged in the interior of Algeria, away from the possibility of any intercourse with the Pretender and his people.

M. de Saint Aulaire added confidentially that, as a matter of fact, Taib's nationality was open to discussion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[1614] No. 40.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 13.)

(No. 5.)

Sir,

Tangier, January 4, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 238 of the 4th September, 1905, I have the honour to report that Bu-Mzian Melania, the Algerian who provoked the ultimatum to the Sultan on the part of the French, has been again imprisoned, and this has given rise to reports of further trouble between the French and Moorish Governments.

The facts, however, are that this person, emboldened by the success he obtained by his case last summer, constituted himself a Chief, with full powers in his district, and brutalized and robbed his neighbours. He has therefore been put into prison, not by the Moorish authorities, but by the French Consul at Fez.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[1615] No. 41.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 13.)

(No. 6.)

Sir,

Tangier, January 5, 1906.

I AM informed that recently a foreign firm made a proposal to the Moorish Government to pay to them a sum of 40,000,000 fr. for the monopoly of the growing and manufacture of tobacco and sugar manufacture in this country, the Government to supply the necessary sites for erecting factories. A few days since orders were received from the Court by Cid Hadj Mohammed Torres, Mohammed-el-Mukri, and Cid Abdelkrim-el-Shergui, Commander of the Government forces in this district, to draw up a contract to that effect with the person who made the proposal, and two days since a meeting of these gentlemen took place. It appears, however, that Hadj Mohammed Torres decided not to carry out the instructions he had received, and referred the matter back to the Court. He explained to the other members of the Commission that the project was not possible, as it would run counter to the stipulations in the Treaties regarding the equality of all foreigners.

My informant obtained these details from one of the members of the Commission, and I have received confirmation of them from another official source.

It has been stated that the firm that made the offer was a German or French one, but the German Minister and the French Chargé d'Affaires deny all knowledge of the matter.

It is difficult to understand how the Makhzen could ever have imagined that a contract on such terms could be concluded, and there does not appear to be much likelihood of the matter going beyond its present stage.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[1616] No. 42.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 13.)

(No. 7.)

Sir,

Tangier, January 6, 1906.

A STATEMENT appeared here yesterday in the local press to the effect that Colonel Ferrara, the Chief of the Italian military Mission at Fez, has been appointed as one of the Italian Delegates at the Algeciras Conference. I asked M. Malmusi, the Italian Minister, whether this news was correct, but it had not reached him officially.

He stated, however, that, in his opinion, such an appointment was extremely undesirable, and he had conveyed an intimation to this effect to his Government. I understand that the Moorish Delegates, on the news reaching them, also entered a protest against the appointment.

The nomination of M. Visconti Venosta as first Italian Delegate is regarded by the Moorish Delegates as an indication that this high official will act at the Conference as a peacemaker between the French and German Delegates.

The German Government has lately been using its influence with the Moorish Government to obtain the appointment of an interpreter for the Moorish Delegates who should be fully imbued with the ideas of the German Government, and one of the Moorish teachers of the Oriental Academy at Berlin has been selected, and arrived here yesterday. He has been for the past twelve years in Berlin, and is an accomplished German scholar, but, I am informed, that he is by no means a master of the French tongue.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to Sir A. Nicolson.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[1654] No. 43.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 13.)

(No. 4.)
Sir, *Madrid, January 6*, 1906.

DURING the last two weeks several of the Spanish papers have been conducting an active campaign against supposed French projects and aspirations in Morocco, and have endeavoured to prove to their readers that France has constantly exhibited a studied disregard of Spanish interests in that country. The journal which has been prominent in this respect, and which has been the most bitter in its attacks, is the "Imparcial," the organ of Señor Gasset, one of the Cabinet Ministers, whose brother is the proprietor and editor.

The French Ambassador told me yesterday that he had spoken to the Under-Secretary on the subject, and had remarked to M. de Ojeda that, although he did not desire to make any representations in regard to independent journals, he considered it desirable to draw the attention of the Spanish Government to the tone of the articles in the "Imparcial."

His Excellency added that he considered it most improper that a journal which was practically controlled by a member of the Government should indulge in these attacks on the French Government and their policy, when the Spanish Government had entered into engagements to support that policy, and to act in co-operation with France so far as Morocco was concerned.

M. Cambon apparently did not expect that any results would follow from his representations, and, indeed, in this morning's issue, the "Imparcial" continues its campaign with unabated vigour.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[1655] No. 44.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 13.)

(No. 5. Confidential.)
Sir, *Madrid, January 5*, 1906.

AT his weekly reception this morning the Duke of Almodovar said that he desired to speak to me on a question which he feared might lead to some complications. He alluded to the trade which was being actively prosecuted by means of a vessel under the French flag with the camp of the Pretender at a placed called Mar Chica, in close proximity to Melilla. His Excellency said that this trade was assuming serious proportions, and the Spanish Government had recently received information that the vessel would shortly transport some artillery to the locality, and that it was the intention of the Pretender to erect a fort and arm it with the guns. This might constitute a serious menace to Melilla, apart from the grievous injury which was being caused to the trade of Melilla. The neighbouring tribes had hitherto

supplied themselves from Melilla with all articles of European origin; but as the new establishment levied no customs duties and a free port was being instituted, it was natural that the tribes should now frequent the Pretender's market in preference to Melilla.

His Excellency said that it was necessary to arrest without delay this illicit traffic, which was causing much comment in the Spanish press. He wished to consult me as to what steps the Spanish Government could take.

I told his Excellency that, in the first place, it would be necessary that the French Embassy should be consulted, and that no steps should be taken without their concurrence. The Sultan was undoubtedly the proper authority to check the illegal commerce in his own waters, and though he was powerless to act on land, he was in possession of a lightly-armed steamer which could without difficulty hinder or prevent the operations of the French vessel. His Excellency said that the Spanish Government had already applied to the Sultan, but that no reply had been received. I recommended a second application.

The Duke of Almodovar suggested that a Spanish gun-boat could be employed in the service. This, I said, was, of course, possible if the Moorish Government and the French authorities consented. He should, however, be prepared, in the event of a Spanish man-of-war succeeding in cutting off the supplies of the Pretender, that the latter might create a very uncomfortable situation in the Melilla lines. I added that I would speak to my French colleague on the subject.

M. Cambon told me that he saw no objection to the Spanish authorities acting in the sense suggested, but that he was consulting his Government. He added that he had observed to the Duke of Almodovar that the enterprise was conducted by four French adventurers, who had unsuccessfully endeavoured to raise funds in Paris and Brussels, but had eventually been supplied with the requisite resources in Hamburg.

The Duke of Almodovar was much troubled about the affair, especially as it had arisen on the eve of the Conference; and he has, after speaking to the French Ambassador, decided to apply once more to the Sultan, and request His Majesty to take steps towards preventing the French vessel from continuing its operations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[1656] No. 45.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 13.)

(No. 6. Confidential.)
Sir, *Madrid, January 5*, 1906.

THE Duke of Almodovar stated to me this morning that he had of late been in constant communication with the German Ambassador, an old friend of his, in regard to the Conference, and had requested his Excellency to assist him in his approaching difficult task as President of the Assembly. He had also spoken with the German Ambassador as to the procedure of the Conference, and it seemed to him that it would be best to defer to the later sittings the questions of the suppression of contraband trade and of the police organization. I observed to the Duke of Almodovar that, in my opinion, it would be wisest to begin with questions which would raise no difference of opinion, and that the contraband trade would be a good subject with which to commence, as we were surely, including the Moorish Delegates, all of one mind on that question. His Excellency remarked that I had on one occasion mentioned the advantage of the maritime patrol being exercised by French and Spanish coastguard vessels, and here he feared that Germany would raise objections.

I inquired on what grounds Germany could object to those who had both ports and vessels handy being intrusted with the duty. I presumed Germany did not herself desire to participate in these patrols, as she had neither vessels in the Mediterranean nor ports where the ships could lay, refit, and recoal. His Excellency said that he had understood from M. de Radowitz that his Government would propose that German vessels should take part in the patrol duties.

The Duke of Almodovar then said that Germany would insist on the policing of Mogador being confided to her. I said that, judging from the views expressed in the Cortes and in a portion of the Spanish press, this project would be most unfavourably regarded in Spain in consequence of the proximity of Mogador to the Canary Islands.

I added that we must wait till the Conference met, and till all these questions were examined and discussed, and I then turned to other subjects.

I report these observations of the Duke of Almodovar as they have some significance, both in regard to his tendency to rely on German advice and support, and also with respect to the requests which Germany may advance at the Conference.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[1492]

No. 46.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 12.)

(No. 7.)
Sir,

Madrid, January 9, 1906.

I HAD the honour, in my despatch No. 5 of the 5th instant, to report to you in regard to the illicit trade which was being conducted by a French vessel with the Pretender, and I mentioned the uneasiness which this enterprise was causing in Spanish Government circles.

I happened to meet the French Ambassador yesterday at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and his Excellency informed me that he was authorized to inform the Duke of Almodovar that the French authorities intended to take steps for preventing the continuance of the operations of the French vessel, and that they had secured the concurrence of the Moorish Government with these measures. M. Cambon said that a French gun-boat would be dispatched to the locality and arrest the vessel, and that the participators in the undertaking would have to appear before the French Consular Tribunals at Tangier. M. Cambon was not aware when the French gun-boat would proceed to execute her orders, but he presumed that no great delay would elapse.

I trust that the Spanish Government will be grateful for this intervention on the part of the French authorities, and that the Spanish press will recognize the loyal attitude of the French Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[1657]

No. 47.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 9.)
Sir,

Madrid, January 9, 1906.

I PAID a visit to Señor Moret, the Prime Minister, this afternoon to bid him good-bye before I proceeded to Algeciras, and I took the opportunity of mentioning to him that we intended to act cordially with France throughout the Conference, and that I had little doubt that Spain would follow a similar course. It was clear to me, I said, that Spanish interests could be best served by adapting her line of action to that of France. At the same time, I sincerely trusted that the proceedings of the Conference would progress smoothly, and that some beneficial results would ensue from its deliberations. It would be most unfortunate if an agreement could not be reached on the questions to be discussed, and personally I should consider it lamentable if the Conference were to fail. I inquired if he could give me any indications as to what proposals Germany was likely to make, as I knew he had had several interviews with the German Ambassador.

Señor Moret assured me most positively of his earnest desire to act cordially with France and Great Britain, and he quite agreed that we had interests in common. In his interviews with the German Ambassador, the latter had constantly laid stress on the conciliatory and friendly disposition of the German Government, but he had indicated that, in regard to police organization, the best plan would be to allocate certain sections or districts to several Powers, and had intimated that the Mogador "rayon" would be the most suitable for Germany.

To this, Señor Moret remarked, Spain could never consent, and he trusted that in this she would be supported by Great Britain and France. I replied that the proposal would in time, and probably not a very long time, bear the character of a partition of Morocco, and, even apart from these possibilities, it would not, in itself, tend to introduce peace and security. I hoped, nevertheless, some means would be found to

reconcile conflicting views, and I had great confidence in Marquis Visconti-Venosta being a most useful intermediary to this end.

Señor Moret said that he had welcomed the appointment of Marquis Visconti-Venosta to the post of Italian Representative, but he feared that this police question would be most difficult to solve.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[1642]

No. 48.

Sir E. Egerton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 8.)
Sir,

Rome, January 9, 1906.

ALMOST immediately after assuming office, the Marquis di San Giuliano, who had opportunity of observing the unpopularity of Signor Silvestrelli's appointment as Senior Italian Representative in the Morocco Conference, suggested to the King the name of the Marquis Visconti-Venosta for the post.

His Majesty at once approved of the suggestion, and requested the latter to add to his other many services to the State by representing Italy at Algeciras.

Notwithstanding that he was undergoing a medical cure, the old statesman (he was at the head of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1866) responded to the King's demand, and will leave to-morrow viâ Paris and Madrid for Algeciras.

The general satisfaction with which this appointment has been greeted must strengthen the Marquis di San Giuliano's position.

I have had opportunities of late of talking to the Marquis di Visconti-Venosta on the subject of his mission, and am impressed with his clear, strong intellect and soundness of judgment. His calm reasonableness is most striking.

He trusts the subjects discussed may be few, and he feels that the Conference must not separate without a result.

I was glad to learn from the German Ambassador that he approves of the appointment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWIN H. EGERTON.

[1644]

No. 49.

Sir E. Egerton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 10. Secret and Confidential.)
Sir,

Rome, January 9, 1906.

IT was M. Barrère who first snggested to the Marquis di San Giuliano the name of the Marquis Visconti-Venosta as Italian Representative at the Morocco Conference.

I have advised him not to mention this fact to anybody here.

M. Tittoni, it appears, never mentioned to the King that the French and American Ambassadors and I had urged that Visconti-Venosta would be a better choice than Silvestrelli, and his obstinacy about the latter has been explained to me by the fact of Silvestrelli being a relation and M. Tittoni a Roman (Rome is said to be the home of nepotism); but M. Barrère suggests that at Baden M. Tittoni may have given some assurance to Prince Bülow, and wanted to have a pliable agent under his orders at Algeciras.

The Marquis Visconti-Venosta, when I dined with him yesterday, dwelt on the delicate position of an Italian Delegate at the Conference with the Triple Alliance in Europe and the engagements with France in North Africa.

(I never allow in conversation here that engagements for special objects in one part of the world can extend to another.)

He trusted the discussions of the Congress would not take a wide range, and would not be complicated by subsidiary details.

He had been given to hope that Germany was disposed to be conciliatory, and he would do his best that the Conference would end with a "cloture," not a "rupture."

I said that if the result of the Conference were to secure to Germany full commercial advantages for a long period, and a status in the finances of Morocco consonant with the preponderating rights of France and with those of others, the German nation would have no right to be dissatisfied.

He appeared to agree with me that it would be undesirable were Germany to make a stand on the thorny ground of police or any internal administrative question.

Prima facie he preferred a system of separate Committees to treat various subjects; but I mentioned that I had heard opinions adverse to such special Commissions when the matter in discussion are few and the numbers of a Conference not large; discussion *in pleno* might be more expeditious, and control easier over the matters discussed.

He asked me about his future colleagues, and I told him that the Duke of Almodovar and Count Radowitz were charming men, over whom I trusted he would be able to exercise a calming influence.

To-day I had a conversation with M. Barrère on the subject of the Conference. He considers the essential point to be the recognition of the special position of France in Morocco.

That being conceded, rights and advantages in accordance with that position may be enjoyed by other Powers.

He even suggested that a certain exceptional position with regard to Morocco might be claimed by Mediterranean Powers. I answered I strongly disagreed; it would be somewhat offensive to Germany. It is useless to lay stress on its false position.

Most people think that the German Emperor and Prince Bülow have made a mistake in blustering about Morocco; it was best to help them out of it.

M. Barrère said that from his experience he thought to have special Commissions at Algeciras would be a waste of time.

As for the main question, he considered that the altered tone of the German Government arose from the conviction that the French nation had begun to look things seriously in the face and to refuse any longer to be bullied.

I said I had heard the same language of French patience being exhausted three months ago when I went through Paris, and did not like it. I believe in this case in the public opinion of the civilized world.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWIN H. EGERTON.

[1637] No. 50.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 13.)

Sir, *Berlin, January 10, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith two copies of a White Book on the Morocco Conference, which has just been laid before the Reichstag by the Imperial Government, together with a précis of its contents.

The majority of the papers have given a very favourable reception to this publication, which, they point out, contains only those of the documents bearing on the case which are necessary to establish in the eyes of the world the justice of Germany's demand that the French proposals with regard to Morocco should be submitted to the Signatory Powers to the Madrid Conference.

I have also the honour to transmit an article from the "Frankfurter Zeitung," calling attention to the weakness of the German position at the Conference, and expressing doubts as to whether this will be ameliorated by the publication of the White Book.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 50.

Précis of German White Book on Morocco Question.

THE White Book commences with samples of French and English newspaper articles, which appeared between January and April, 1905, showing the existence in France of a wish to secure a "monopoly" in Morocco, and announcing that the French Minister in Fez had claimed to have a European mandate to introduce reforms in that country.

The first official document, dated the 21st February, 1905, is a despatch from the German Consul Vassel at Fez, reporting an interview with the Sultan, in which His Majesty expressed the intention of affording precisely similar treatment to four Powers, England and Germany on account of their trade, and France and Spain also, on account of their proximity. The Sultan further went on to ask whether the French Minister had received a mandate from all the Powers. This Mr. Vassel at once denied as far as Germany was concerned.

On the 21st April Consul Vassel reports that the Sultan denies the truth of M. Delcassé's statement to the effect that the Moorish Government had desired the French Government to make reform proposals and had promised to accept them, and describes the indignation of the Sultan on learning that the French Government had contradicted the report that their Minister had claimed to have a European mandate. His Majesty's version of his interview with M. Saint-René Taillandier is also given.

On the 15th May Count Tattenbach reports that the Sultan denies having accepted French proposals in principle, as had been stated by M. Delcassé in the Chamber of Deputies after the Emperor's visit to Tangier.

On the 17th May the German Minister reports that the French Minister, on arriving at Fez, had delivered to the Moorish Government a message from M. Delcassé to the effect that the French Government considered it contrary to their interests that their reform proposals should be submitted to the Signatory Powers for their information or discussion. No other Power had a right to intervene in Morocco. The Moorish Government must accept the French proposals, as they were unable to preserve order themselves. The French Government would act as circumstances might dictate, and would carefully watch the course of events in Morocco.

A number of documents also appear on the neglect of the French to bring the Anglo-French Morocco Agreement officially to the notice of the German Government. In these the standpoint is adopted that a formal communication of this Agreement in writing should have been made to the Imperial Government in order that they might make representations if they considered their rights under the Madrid Convention to be infringed. Verbal communications and official publications of the text were merely means of bringing Germany face to face with a *fait accompli*.

On the 7th March Consul Vassel reported on the French reform plans, and on the 30th May a despatch from Count Tattenbach, founded on information supplied by the Maghzen, gives the proposals of the French Government, and characterizes them as calculated to undermine the independence of Morocco, whilst he describes the threats with which M. Taillandier urged the Moorish Government to accept them, and their reply to him.

A report dated the 6th June shows that the French proposals were made verbally to the Moorish Government, and that the French Minister refused to put them in writing.

On the 28th May the Moorish Government sent a note to M. Taillandier rejecting his proposals, and suggesting a Conference, although he had tried to prevent the despatch of this note, and had announced that France would take no part in such a Conference, and further that, if such a Conference did meet, the Powers would certainly intrust France with a mandate to carry out the necessary reforms alone.

The broad outlines of German Morocco policy are outlined in the despatch to the Imperial Ambassador in London, dated the 11th April, which was read by Prince Bülow to the Reichstag on the 6th December (see Mr. Whitehead's despatch No. 297 of the 7th December, 1905).

After the Moorish Government had proposed a Conference, Prince Bülow issued a Circular despatch, dated the 5th June, to the principal German Missions abroad in support of this proposal, pointing out that the introduction of reforms was restricted by Article XVII of the Madrid Convention, and that the consent of the Signatory

Powers was necessary before any one Power could claim a special position in Morocco.

Despatches to the German Ambassador in Paris of the 12th and 16th June give the German point of view as to the questions to be settled at a Conference, but refusing to discuss the question of reforms until France had accepted the Conference.

M. Rouvier's Memorandum of the 21st June, giving arguments against the Conference, is followed by a reply from Germany, dated the 24th June, pointing out that, if France introduced reforms alone, the force of circumstances would compel her to interfere with the independence of Morocco. These are followed by the French acceptance of the Conference on the 8th July, and the Agreement of the 28th September as to the advice to be given to the Sultan with respect to the programme for the Conference.

The White Book concludes with documents showing the attitude of the Imperial Government in the question of the Tangier mole.

Inclosure 2 in No. 50.

Précis of Article in the "Frankfurter Zeitung" of January 9, 1906.

AFTER pointing out that the French Yellow Book treated at length of the historical rights of France in Morocco, but devoted little space to the political part of the question, where many lacunæ occur, the "Frankfurter Zeitung" points out that the White Book mainly devotes itself to supplying these deficiencies. By the Anglo-French Agreement France bound herself to maintain the *status quo,* and Prince Bülow waited to see if her actions would prove in agreement with this promise. The French press, however, showed him that such hopes were vain.

Now that the Conference has been accepted by France, Germany admits that reforms are necessary; but does any one seriously think that these reforms can be carried out without interfering with the *status quo* in Morocco?

France will appear at the Conference and propose to carry out the reforms alone, and all that we shall have gained by the Conference will be that France will act under a European mandate, instead of on her own responsibility and with the approval of only part of the Powers. Germany can, of course, prevent such a mandate being given, for decisions of the Conference must be unanimous, but the only result will be that France will once more revert to her former policy of acting independently by pacific penetration ("pénétration pacifique"), and will then be supported by the United States, in addition to England, Spain, and Italy. Will Germany then resist this by force of arms and kindle a world-wide war for the sake of the sovereignty of the Sultan? Of course not. But then we must go to the Conference at Algeçiras with the certainty of suffering a diplomatic defeat, and must accept it "avec bonne mine à mauvais jeu." Perhaps we can obtain a compromise by allowing France to carry out some reforms, whilst others are carried out internationally, but if France will not agree to this, we must yield or bear all the odium for the failure of the Conference. All the beauties of the White Book will not save us from this.

[1619] No. 51.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 13.)

(No. 20. Confidential.)

Sir, *Paris, January* 10, 1906.

I HAD some minutes' conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day, whilst waiting in his room for the production of the documents for our signature in connection with the exchange of ratifications of a Telegraphic Cable Convention and of a Postal Convention.

M. Rouvier said that he had heard a good deal of the conciliatory intentions of Germany in regard to Morocco; he had not seen any indications of a change in the attitude of the German Government.

The appointment of the Marquis Visconti Venosta as Italian Representative was, M. Rouvier said, satisfactory, as that statesman had negotiated with France the

Arrangement regarding French interests in Morocco and Italian interests in Tripoli, and it was to be expected that he would act according to the spirit of that Arrangement.

His Excellency did not feel confident as to what might be the line taken by Belgium, notwithstanding the importance for that country of French capital for the development of her industries, and he thought that Holland would be found to work with Germany at the Conference.

The feeling of all classes of the French public is becoming more and more irritated at the provocative attitude of the German press, which is taken to represent the views of the German Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[1620] No. 52.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 13.)

(No. 21.)

Sir, *Paris, January* 12, 1906.

THE President of the Council breakfasted at the Embassy to-day. He had this morning received the visit of the Marquis Visconti Venosta, who arrived last night at Paris on his way from Rome to Algeciras. M. Rouvier told me that the Italian Delegate to the Morocco Conference had been profuse in assurances of the desire of Italy to be agreeable to France, but had not been definite as to the form which it would take at the Conference.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[1738] No. 53.

M. Rouvier to M. Révoil.—(*Communicated by M. Geoffray, January* 13.)

Paris, le 12 *Janvier*, 1906.

LA déclaration faite par le Gouvernement à la Chambre des Députés, le 16 Décembre dernier, a posé les principes de notre action politique dans la question Marocaine. Je n'ai pas besoin de les exposer à nouveau. Mais, au moment où vous allez représenter la France à la Conférence Internationale d'Algésiras, il convient, dans l'intérêt même de votre mission, que vous soyez muni d'instructions d'après lesquelles vous puissiez régler votre attitude à la Conférence, et qui résument en même temps les vues du Gouvernement sur les points les plus importants du programme soumis aux délibérations des Puissances. Tel est l'objet de la présente dépêche.

En ce qui concerne les préliminaires de la Conférence, vous appuyerez la proposition de déférer la présidence, suivant une tradition constante, au Représentant de l'Espagne. Quant au mode de discussion, il paraîtrait fâcheux que la Conférence se constituât en Commissions Spéciales dont la tendance serait de pousser trop avant dans le détail des diverses réglementations que peuvent comporter les questions portées au programme.

Vous devrez tout d'abord déposer sur le bureau de la Conférence les Traités et Accords Internationaux conclus par la France au sujet du Maroc, à savoir, la Déclaration Franco-Anglaise du 8 Avril, 1904; la Déclaration Franco-Espagnole du 3 Octobre, 1904; les Protocoles Franco-Allemands des 8 Juillet et 28 Septembre, 1905. Cette communication, destinée à préciser notre attitude, ne saurait d'ailleurs donner lieu à une discussion de principe. Elle ne comprendra pas les Arrangements que nous avons passés avec le Gouvernement Chérifien en 1901 et 1902, au sujet de la frontière, ayant été expressément écartés du programme de la Conférence établi d'accord avec l'Allemagne et accepté par tous les autres États qui prendront part à cette réunion internationale.

La principale étude confiée à la Conférence est celle des moyens de remédier à l'affaiblissement du pouvoir Chérifien. Ce but ne peut être atteint que par la suppression des deux causes qui entretiennent l'insécurité du Maroc. L'une est la contrebande des armes. Les Puissances peuvent y couper court par leurs propres moyens, puisqu'elle est le fait de leurs ressortissants. Ce serait la première question à

examiner. D'autre part, le Maroc et le Maghzen souffrent de l'absence d'une police régulière. Mais on ne peut constituer cette police sans avoir trouvé d'abord les ressources nécessaires pour la payer. On devrait donc discuter en second lieu la réforme financière et les diverses questions d'ordre économique qui s'y rattachent. L'organisation de la police constituerait ainsi le dernier chapitre du programme de discussion.

En ce qui concerne la répression de la contrebande des armes, vous demanderez qu'elle soit confiée aux deux seules Puissances limitrophes du Maroc—la France et l'Espagne.

Parmi les réformes d'ordre financier la création d'une Banque d'État paraît être la plus essentielle. En cette matière nous exposerons à la Conférence les engagements déjà pris par le Maghzen à notre égard, et consignés dans une lettre du Ministre des Finances Marocain (Juin 1904).

D'autre part, une clause du Contrat d'Emprunt de 1904 réserve aux établissements Français, souscripteurs de cet emprunt, un droit de préférence, à conditions égales, pour toute opération de crédit ultérieure. Ces promesses et ces conventions précises ne sauraient être présentées comme portant atteinte au régime de la nation la plus favorisée. Elles se justifient par l'importance de nos capitaux, de notre commerce, de nos Colonies au Maroc, et spécialement par ce fait que 67 millions sur 72 qui constituent la dette étrangère du Maroc ont été prêtés par le marché Français. La statistique du trafic nous attribue 30 pour cent, à l'Angleterre 40 pour cent, à l'Allemagne seulement 10 pour cent du mouvement général; et si nous fusionnons nos intérêts avec les intérêts Anglais et Espagnols, ce groupement représente 80 pour cent de l'activité économique du pays. Bien que cette situation de fait nous paraisse devoir déterminer la combinaison des capitaux qui entreront dans les futures institutions financières du Maroc, nous n'irons point à l'extrême de ce que nous considérons comme nos droits. Les Administrateurs seraient pris suivant la même proportion dans les différentes nationalités. La présidence reviendrait à la France et la Banque serait constituée sous le régime légal Français.

Je crois inutile de démontrer que nos prétentions ne vont point à l'encontre du régime dit "de la nation la plus favorisée" et de l'Article XVII de la Convention de Madrid, non plus que du système de "la porte ouverte." Cette clause et cette doctrine ne sauraient être invoquées dans une matière telle que l'organisation d'une Banque d'État, alors surtout que celle-ci sera constituée par des capitaux internationaux.

L'Accord du 28 Septembre a défini dans ses grandes lignes le programme de la banque. Vous vous y référerez.

D'autre part, on devrait augmenter les ressources actuelles du Maghzen, tout à la fois en assurant le contrôle rigoureux des douanes et en réprimant la contrebande. Ces mesures seraient heureusement complétées par l'assainissement de la circulation monétaire et la stabilité de l'Hassani à un cours normal, opérations qui s'imposeraient tout d'abord à la banque et qu'elle serait seule en état d'accomplir. Ce serait, au contraire, se méprendre sur la solution des difficultés financières dont souffre le Maroc que de la chercher dans un relèvement général des droits de douane. En cette matière on devrait bien plutôt conseiller une meilleure spécification qu'une augmentation uniforme des tarifs.

D'une façon générale c'est sur le programme économique que nous sommes disposés à accorder les satisfactions les plus complètes. Mais vous éviterez de donner votre acquiescement définitif aux solutions de cet ordre jusqu'à ce que vous ayez pu vous assurer que les Plénipotentiaires n'entendent pas faire prévaloir de solutions inacceptables relativement à l'organisation de la police.

Vous savez, d'ailleurs, que nous sommes acquis au principe de la liberté économique sans aucune inégalité. Nous l'avons inséré dans tous nos Accords concernant le Maroc. Vous y adhérerez de nouveau et de la manière la plus complète devant la Conférence, comme je l'ai fait dans ma déclaration du 16 Décembre à la Chambre. Vous devrez, d'autre part, maintenir intégralement les règles posées sous le No. 4 dans le programme de la Conférence: "engagement par le Maghzen de n'aliéner aucun des services publics au profit d'intérêts particuliers; principe de l'adjudication sans acception de nationalité pour les travaux publics," toutes les grandes entreprises devant demeurer Marocaines et l'exécution en être confiée par l'effet de la libre concurrence aux traitants, de quelque nationalité que ce soit, qui offriront les meilleures conditions. En ce qui concerne la police, vous marquerez qu'il ne s'agit pas de réorganiser l'armée Marocaine, qui doit rester sous l'autorité exclusive du Sultan et pour laquelle il suffit de maintenir les missions existantes.

Le moment venu, vous vous spécifierez les droits définitivement acquis par nous (sans qu'on puisse les retenir comme limitant nos prétentions) à Tanger, Oudjda, Rabat, et même Casablanca, où la mission a déjà été confiée à des instructeurs Français.

A notre point de vue, deux observations dominent toute la question de la police:—

1er. La police frontière est en dehors du programme de la Conférence; celle-ci ne peut dès lors s'en occuper en quelque manière que ce soit.

2. Nous ne pouvons, en ce qui touche la région non frontière, nous prêter à une organisation de la police qui porterait atteinte à notre situation spéciale et aggraverait les difficultés de la question Marocaine en perpétuant les rivalités présentes ou en faisant naître de nouvelles; c'est à quoi paraîtrait devoir aboutir fatalement l'internationalisation de la police.

Nous considérons que la France, comme Puissance Musulmane et comme Puissance limitrophe, est qualifiée pour obtenir le mandat d'exercer la police dans l'Empire Chérifien. Nous sommes prêts à le partager avec l'Espagne que les mêmes raisons désignent pour remplir ce rôle conjointement avec nous. La réforme de la police nous semble, d'ailleurs, devoir être limitée aux villes de la côte et comporter un recrutement de gendarmes Marocains avec des cadres mixtes.

Vous devrez donc vous attacher à faire écarter toute solution qui tendrait soit à partager le mandat de police entre plusieurs Puissances, soit à en investir une petite Puissance, soit même à en confier l'exécution à des officiers de Puissances neutres. Le premier système qui sectionnerait le Maroc en zones d'influence pouvant conduire au partage de ce pays, encouragerait des prétentions rivales qui risqueraient à chaque instant de provoquer des complications dangereuses. Quant aux deux autres combinaisons, elles paraissent impraticables, et l'expérience faite en Macédoine de l'emploi d'officiers appartenant à une petite Puissance montre qu'on n'en peut attendre aucun résultat efficace.

Au cas où, à cet égard, les propositions conformes à nos désirs se heurteraient devant la Conférence à une opposition irréductible, nous considérerions que, les questions économiques étant réglées selon nos vues, un accord pour le maintien du *statu quo* en ce qui concerne la police serait une solution acceptable, si cet accord réservait nos droits et impliquait la renonciation des autres contractants à toute action tendant à rouvrir la question auprès du Sultan sans entente préalable avec nous.

En résumé, et aux termes mêmes des assurances qui nous ont été maintes fois répétées au cours des négociations, nul ne saurait attendre de nous une adhésion à aucune solution qui serait de nature à compromettre l'avenir de nos intérêts nationaux. Sous cette condition, vous marquerez, en toute occasion, notre sincère désir de respecter les droits des autres pays, d'ouvrir libéralement le Maroc à la libre concurrence des intérêts commerciaux, et vous affirmerez en même temps notre volonté de ne faire valoir nos droits et nos intérêts propres qu'avec les garanties les plus formelles données aux droits souverains du Sultan, à l'indépendance et aux traditions constitutives de son Empire.

(Signé) ROUVIER.

[1682] No. 54.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 13.)

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, January* 13, 1906.

MOROCCO Conference.

Herr von Holstein thinks that there is danger that France, relying on the support of England, may attempt to create a *fait accompli* by invading Morocco, in the event of the results of the Conference being unfavourable to her. This could, he is convinced, be averted if a hint were given by His Majesty's Government to France to the effect that it was doubtful whether in such a contingency public opinion in England would admit of a resort to arms in support of France.

[1744] No. 55.

Señor Bernabé to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 13.)

(Translation.)
Sir, *January* 13, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that His Majesty the King of Spain, my august Sovereign, has appointed as Spanish Plenipotentiary Delegate to the International Conference of Algeciras his Minister of State the Duke of Almodovar del Rio, and as Assistant Plenipotentiary M. Juan Perez-Caballero, his Minister at Brussels and previously Director of Policy and Under-Secretary in the Ministry of State.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) L. POLO DE BERNABÉ.

[1752] No. 56.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 14.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Gibraltar, January* 14, 1906.

MOROCCO Conference.

On the 12th January M. Révoil called on me in Madrid to discuss matters connected with the Conference, having just arrived from Paris. He imparted to me a proposal that when the Conference opened he should at once lay the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish Agreements of 1904 before the meeting, and then make an announcement that it was the wish of the French Government to obtain the adhesion of the Conference to the principles of the integrity and independence of the Sultan and his dominions, and of the "open door" on their basis. M. Révoil was anxious to do this before a similar motion was brought forward by the German Representatives.

I replied that I strongly deprecated laying the Agreements before the Conference, but that I would cordially support the declaration as to "open door," &c. The production of the Agreements would afford others an opportunity for their discussion and analysis which we could not admit. He therefore agreed to abstain from mentioning or presenting the Agreements, and merely to make the declaration.

On his showing me the notes he had prepared of a lengthy argument as to France's right to exercise the policing of the frontier, I ventured to recommend that, should that question be alluded to in any way, he should confine himself to the statement that it was a matter solely between France and the Sultan, being an acquired right of France which dated from sixty years back. It seemed to me that if he argued the matter he might find himself embarked on a discussion of an embarrassing nature in regard to a subject which his Government, I understood, was anxious should not come within the purview of the Conference.

M. Révoil was good enough to express his concurrence with the opinions I had expressed.

He added that it was his desire that we should act throughout the Conference with mutual unreserved confidence and in complete harmony. I told him that this entirely coincided with my views, and that he could rely on my supporting him to the best of my ability and on my being perfectly frank and open with him.

[1887] No. 57.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 15.)

(No. 14. Confidential.)
Sir, *Berlin, January* 11, 1906.

I CALLED this evening by appointment on Prince Bülow, with whom I had a conversation of more than an hour's duration. The principal subject discussed was the forthcoming Conference at Algeciras. His Serene Highness said that it was the earnest hope of the Emperor, of the whole German people, and of himself, that the Conference would settle the Moroccan question in a manner which would be satisfactory to all parties concerned, and which would not leave any feeling of bitterness or rancour which might be the cause of complications later. All the

reports which had been spread that Germany demanded an acquisition of territory or a seaport, or any special privileges for herself, were perfectly untrue. All that she asked for was the open door, equality of opportunity for all the nations having commercial relations with Morocco, and that no one nation should be granted a privileged position in these respects. There was only one question which His Serene Highness thought would offer any difficulty. It had been arranged during the negotiations at Paris that the police on the Algerian frontier should be intrusted to France. M. Rouvier had admitted that this was a considerable concession, for which he was grateful. Dr. Rosen had asked, in return for this concession, for an assurance that France would not put forward at the Conference a claim to police the rest of Morocco. M. Rouvier had declined to give an assurance in writing, as his doing so would have damaged his position with the French Chamber, but he gave a verbal promise that the French Representatives at the Conference should not put forward such a claim. It would certainly have been more satisfactory to the German Government if they had been able to obtain this promise in writing, as in the event of M. Rouvier's fall from power it would have been possible that his successor might not have felt himself bound to carry it into effect. The German Government had complete confidence in M. Rouvier's word, and knew therefore that the claim would not be put forward by him. But it was just possible that it might be put forward by some other Power, and he asked me most confidentially whether I thought that His Majesty's Government, actuated by their friendship for France, would put forward a claim on her behalf which M. Rouvier would be prevented from doing by the promise he had given.

I replied this was the first time that I had heard the idea mooted, and as I had heard nothing from you on the subject, either in the conversations which I had the advantage of having with you in London, or in the despatches which I have had the honour of receiving from you, I doubted whether it had been brought to your notice. I should, of course, telegraph to you at once, but I would refer to the very frank language in which you had clearly explained to Count Metternich the real attitude of His Majesty's Government. We were bound to support France at the Conference, and had no intention of avoiding our obligation, but we had no wish to "egg on" France, or to be "more French than the French."

Prince Bülow said he had received a full report from Count Metternich of his conversation with you. He was grateful to you for your frankness, and thoroughly understood the attitude of His Majesty's Government, which was exactly what he always expected it would be. He had always been convinced that England would not abandon France, and the German Government would not ask her to do so.

His Serene Highness then explained at considerable length the reasons which would make it impossible for Germany to consent to a mandate being given to France to organize the police throughout Morocco. All the expert advice he had been able to consult was unanimous on the point that if France were given that power, she would acquire complete control over the whole country, and would be in a position to favour her own trade to the detriment of that of other countries. Experience had shown that this had always been the case in French possessions. In no French Colony had German merchants been able to obtain a footing, whereas in English Colonies German and English merchants were competing in the same markets, and living on perfectly friendly terms. It was almost certain that trade with Morocco would be largely developed, and Germany had no wish to be excluded from her fair share in such development.

Reverting to the question of police, His Serene Highness said that, provided that France were not given an international mandate, he thought that the question might be satisfactorily settled, either by mapping out the country, other than the frontier districts, which were to be left to France, into zones, in which the different Powers might exercise police control, or perhaps, what would be better, by placing the control of the whole in the hands of some neutral Power, such as Switzerland, Belgium, or Sweden, who could not be supposed to have any desire of attacking France. He had been interested at receiving a telegram from M. Visconti Venosta, stating that he was preparing a scheme ("una combinazione") which he hoped might meet with the approval of the Powers. The veteran diplomatist was a man of great resource, and it would be interesting to see what his scheme would be. In any case, it ought not to be difficult to find some method which might perhaps be adopted for a limited term, and be modified later, if found unworkable.

I asked Prince Bülow whether I might gather from what he had said that he desired to get rid of the Moroccan question altogether. He replied that such was

indeed his earnest wish, and he thought that he had good grounds for hoping that the Conference would afford him the opportunity of doing so in a manner honourable to all the parties concerned. He had no wish to inflict a humiliation on France. He naturally did not wish to be humiliated by her, but he earnestly hoped that the relations between Germany and France, which had been strained of late, might become normal in consequence of a peaceful solution of the Moroccan question by the Conference. The memories of the war of 1870 still rankled in France, and had created a chasm between the two countries which it would probably take another generation to fill in. It might be too much to hope that the relations between the two countries should become friendly, but they might become correct, and even good, and then he believed that the last obstacle would be removed to the re-establishment of really friendly relations between Germany and England, which formerly existed, and which, in his opinion, ought still to exist.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

[1890] No. 58.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 17. Confidential.)
Sir, *Berlin, January 13, 1906.*

HERR VON HOLSTEIN, who has recently returned to his duties, asked me to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs yesterday evening. He said that there could be no doubt that the French desired to obtain a general mandate for the organization of the police in Morocco. Indeed a suggestion had been made to the German Ambassador in Paris that Germany should herself propose this solution. The suggestion was unofficial, but evidently inspired. Germany, so far from proposing such a measure, would strenuously oppose it if it should be brought forward by any other Power. The danger which he foresaw was that France, dissatisfied with the results of the Conference, and relying on the support of England in any thing she might do, might seek to create a *fait accompli* by invading Morocco. The Sultan would appeal to the Emperor, and war would be the result. What would then be the attitude of His Majesty's Government? Would they consider that a French invasion of Morocco constituted an unprovoked attack by Germany on France? On my observing that the danger seemed to me a very remote one, Herr von Holstein said that France recently had been ostentatiously preparing for war. They had purchased large quantities of chemicals in Germany, and had ordered an inordinate amount of barbed wire to surround their fortresses. This he believed was chiefly bluff, and he thought that the danger to which he had alluded would be averted if His Majesty's Government could see their way to giving the French a hint that, with every wish to support them, it was doubtful whether, in the event of their invading Morocco, public opinion in England would allow them to do so by force of arms. The French were a prudent people, and if there were the slightest doubt that the full support of England would not under all circumstances be given them, he was convinced that they would not attempt the invasion of Morocco.

In the long disussion which followed, Herr von Holstein said that Germany could not consent to any provisional arrangement which would give the control of the police to France, even for a limited time. The police was the administration, and its control by France would create a French Protectorate. The Emperor, less than a year ago, had stated that he looked upon the Sultan as an independent Sovereign, and could scarcely be expected now to agree to his being put under French protection.

I replied that this seemed to me to be the weak point in the German case. They had proclaimed the Sultan as an independent Sovereign, and at the same time had invoked the Convention of Madrid, which in itself was an infringement of his sovereign rights, and were now about to urge the introduction of reforms which, by being placed under international control would still further diminish them. This was not logical. Would it be possible to place the reforms on a Moroccan rather than on an international basis, that is to say, that the Conference should decide what reforms are required, and the Sultan should be called upon to introduce them? Count Tattenbach, to whom I had mentioned this idea in conversation, said that the Sultan

was personally well disposed towards the reforms, but that his Government would probably raise difficulties as to their introduction.

Herr von Holstein, to whom the idea seemed a new one, said that he thought it might provide a solution of the difficulty. Had I worked out any details? Was the idea approved by His Majesty's Government? Would the British Representative at the Conference be instructed to propose it? To these questions I replied that it was only an idea which had crossed my mind in conversation with Count Tattenbach, to whom I had expressed the opinion that the results of the operation of the international system at Constantinople, both as regards the Armenian and Macedonian questions, were not such as to render its extension desirable to other countries. I presumed that it would be necessary for the Sultan to apply for foreign assistance both as regards the organization of the police and the finance of his country.

Herr von Holstein said that the last unofficial suggestion which the German Government had received from France was to the effect that the labours of the Conference should be directed to maintain the *status quo*, to suggest some provisional arrangement as to the police to guard against the danger of the susceptibilities of any Power being aroused if the suggestions of its Delegates should be rejected, and with this view to suggest that the British Delegates should be instructed that they should consult with the Powers most interested, by which Herr von Holstein presumed that France and Germany were meant, before submitting any definite proposal to the Conference. These points, he thought, might be met if it were possible to place the matter on a Moroccan rather than an international basis. He would give his best attention to the idea which at first blush seemed to him to offer a possible solution of the difficulty in which the members of the Conference would find themselves placed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. C. LASCELLES.

[1753] No. 59.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, January 14, 1906.*

MOROCCO.

Telegram No. 5 of the 13th instant from His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin.

I am convinced that it is the desire of the Government of the Republic to avoid a war with Germany, and that they will not, in order to bring about a *fait accompli*, provoke a conflict by invading Morocco, in the contingency contemplated by Herr von Holstein.

The confidence of the French Government in His Majesty's present Government would be shaken were any communication to be made to them such as Herr von Holstein desires. This confidence results from the assurances of His Majesty's Government as to the policy of Great Britain, and, if it were shaken, it might lead to concessions on the part of France to Germany in Morocco injurious to British interests, or to concessions elsewhere made with the object of buying Germany out of Morocco, which, while not greatly detrimental to French interests, might be so to ours.

I would call your attention to Lord Lansdowne's telegram No. 61 of the 22nd April, and my despatch No. 186 of the 25th April, 1905.

I recommend, in the event of it being decided to make a communication to the French Government, that it should be confined to a friendly warning that the German Government impute to them the design—which His Majesty's Government are convinced that they do not entertain—of invading Morocco, should the initial discussions of the Conference be of a character unfavourable to France.

[1976] No. 60.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, January 15, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 17th December, No. 298, concerning the action of the French Company at "Mar Chica."

The French cruiser "Lalande" has been instructed to seize any French boats found infringing maritime law, and leaves here to-day. Count St. Aulaire, the French Chargé d'Affaires, considers this action necessary in view of Spanish feeling, but he is apparently inclined to be doubtful as to whether it is strictly legal.

[1682] No. 60 A.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Lascelles.

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, January 15, 1906.*

YOU should let Herr von Holstein know that His Majesty's Government cannot under any circumstances deprecate action on the part of France, which comes within the terms of the Anglo-French Convention of April 1904. We hope, however, that his anticipations, reported in your telegram No. 5 of the 13th instant, will not be realized, and that the result of the Conference will prevent the contingency, which he fears, from arising.

[2053] No. 60 B.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 32.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 15, 1906.*

SPEAKING to me this afternoon with regard to the procedure at the Algeciras Conference, M. Cambon said that he had noticed that the instructions given to the French Plenipotentiary, which he had communicated to me on the 13th instant, contemplated dealing with the question of contraband first, but he did not think this desirable, because it led so easily to the question of police, which was to be reserved until the end. He had mentioned this point to M. Rouvier, who had replied that the instructions would now be altered so that the economic questions should be those which were first dealt with at the Conference. I told M. Cambon that I had had a telegram from Sir Arthur Nicolson, giving an account of what had passed between him and M. Révoil respecting the opening of the Conference, and I gave M. Cambon a Memorandum giving the substance and result of this. Copy of this paper is inclosed herewith. I also told M. Cambon that I had heard from Berlin that the German idea was that the police should be organized either in separate "secteurs" in Morocco, controlled by different Powers, or that they should be intrusted to a neutral Power such as the Swiss, the Belgians, or the Swedes, and that a rumour reached me from Berlin that the Marquis Visconti Venosta was preparing a proposal of this kind. M. Cambon said that he could not think that the Marquis Visconti Venosta was likely to be a partisan of Germany, because he was a man who had views of his own. I said that I did not suppose that he was going to act as a partisan of Germany, but that it was always possible for someone to suggest to him that he might play the part of pacificator or intermediary, which was a fine but also a dangerous one, and I thought therefore that the French Government ought to know of the report which had reached me.

M. Cambon in the course of this conversation again said that he was sure there would be no trouble with Germany, if Germany was quite convinced that England and France would keep together. He attributed previous difficulties to Germany having been doubtful of this. I said that Germany had at any rate no reason to doubt this at present.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

Inclosure in No. 60 B.

Memorandum respecting Morocco Conference communicated to M. Cambon, January 15, 1906.

THE French Representative at the forthcoming Conference at Algeciras has told Sir A. Nicolson that he proposes, at the opening of the Conference, to lay before it the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish Agreements of 1904 respecting Morocco, and to announce that on their basis the French Government desire to obtain the adhesion of the Conference to the principles of the "open door" and of the independence and integrity of the Sultan and of Morocco.

Sir A. Nicolson told M. Révoil that he would cordially support the proposed declaration, but that he strongly deprecated the communication of the Agreements on the ground that such a procedure would lead to a discussion of those instruments, which could not be admitted by the Signatory Powers.

M. Révoil concurred in this view.

With regard to the right of France to police the Moorish-Algerian frontier, Sir A. Nicolson recommended, and M. Révoil agreed, that in the event of any allusions being made on the subject, the French Representative should confine himself to stating that the policing of the frontier was a right acquired by France some sixty years ago, and that it was a matter which solely concerned France and Morocco.

Sir A. Nicolson apprehends that, if M. Révoil consented to argue the matter, it might lead to an embarrassing discussion of a subject which France desired to exclude from the purview of the Conference.

It should appear that the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish Agreements of 1904 were rather intended to give a formal sanction to a *de facto* state of affairs than to create a new situation.

Foreign Office,
January 15, 1906.

[1990] No. 61.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 26.)
Sir, *Paris, January 15, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of a telegram from the correspondent of the "Temps" at Algiers,* giving particulars of the Governor-General of Algeria's recent tour of inspection on the Algeria-Morocco frontier.

The correspondent states that disquiet had been aroused among certain of the border tribes under French protection by the rumour that France would be compelled to evacuate territory now under her dominion; and that M. Jonnart's tour has had the effect of strengthening French influence in the border regions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[2050] No. 62.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, January 16, 1906.*

YOUR telegram No. 4 respecting Morocco Conference.

I mentioned to M. Révoil that a report had reached me that a verbal promise had been given by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that the question of a general mandate for police should not be raised at the Conference. The French Representative said that there was no foundation whatever for this report. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and himself had persistently refused to give a promise of this character, although the Germans had endeavoured to elicit one during the negotiations at Paris.

* Not printed.

As positive proofs that no promise, verbal or other, had been given, M. Révoil explained that it was precisely with a view to avoiding any possible misunderstanding that the verbal and written declarations, to be found on pp. 305 and 306 (Nos. 348 and 349) of the Yellow Book, had been made by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to the German Ambassador in Paris and Dr. Rosen.

[2133] No. 63.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 9.)

Sir, *Tangier, January 11, 1906.*

THE Arabic interpreter, introduced by the German Government from Berlin for the use of the Moorish Delegates at the Conference, as reported in my despatch No. 7 of the 6th instant, has been submitted to an examination in French by a Committee of polyglot Jews, but has been found ignorant of the French language. The Moorish Delegates are consequently in somewhat of a dilemma there being no efficient interpreter available.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to Madrid.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[2093] No. 64.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 29.)

Sir, *Paris, January 16, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of notes by Sir Charles Hardinge of a conversation which he had yesterday with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure in No. 64.

Notes of a Conversation between Sir C. Hardinge and M. Rouvier on the Subject of the Morocco Conference.

THE statement which had reached M. Rouvier, as coming from Prince Bülow, that he had given privately a promise that he would not raise the question of a mandate for the organization of the police in Morocco was absolutely untrue, and he adheres to the declaration made to Dr. Rosen, on the 25th September, to the effect: "En dehors de la formule qui sera signée par les deux Gouvernements, j'entends n'avoir d'engagement sur aucun point." (See Yellow Book, p. 305.)

The aim of the French Government will be to obtain first a solution of Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the programme of the 28th September, which are all of an economic nature, and which, M. Rouvier thinks, should not raise any serious difficulties with Germany. If these questions are dealt with satisfactorily on the basis proposed in the programme, Germany will find herself absolutely excluded from obtaining an independent footing in Morocco, which must be prevented at all costs. For this reason France will absolutely decline to accept any proposal for the organization of the police by "secteurs," or for handing it over to a minor Power, which might be under the influence of Germany and which would be wanting in the necessary means and prestige to make it a success. When the question of the police is finally raised by the Russian [?] Delegate the only alternative which would be acceptable to France are:—

1. A joint mandate to France and Spain;

2. A mandate to France, Spain, and a third Power to study and elaborate a scheme for submission to the Powers; or

3. The continuation of the *status quo*, with the right of the French to supervise the police organization on the Algerian frontier, a right which has never been in question since the commencement of the negotiations.

If the French Government fail to obtain control of the police, they will not consider that a sufficient reason to draw the sword, but they will strenuously resist any attempt on the part of Germany to obtain a footing in Morocco, and especially the proposal for police organization by "secteurs."

M. Rouvier appeared perfectly satisfied with the attitude of His Majesty's Government, and I impressed upon him the necessity, in the interest both of France and England, of thorough frankness with His Majesty's Government during the Conference at Algeciras. He replied that he fully realized the importance of complete unanimity between the two Governments as the surest means of keeping Spain and Italy in line with France and England in the Morocco question.

C. H.

Paris, January 15, 1906.

[2192] No. 65.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 4.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, January 17, 1906.*

CONFERENCE on Moroccan affairs.

I told M. Cambon this morning that Count Tattenbach, when travelling with me to Madrid, had stated that the German Emperor would be satisfied if the Morocco Conference were to terminate with a provisional agreement and if contentious questions were left over for future settlement, as Russian and Austrian affairs might call for the whole attention of the German Government. In reply, M. Cambon said that in his opinion France would be the gainer by such a termination to the Conference. French interests would run more risk if the internal police question were pressed by Germany towards a settlement, even if such a settlement should exist only on paper. It was better that that question should be left undecided as the position might be more favourable to France in the future. In ten years' time it might be possible to extend gradually French police jurisdiction from the Algerian frontier towards the interior, and Germany might not then be able or willing to oppose it.

M. Cambon added that all his attention would be required in keeping the Spanish Government in line with France and Great Britain. In this respect he feared much mischief might be caused by the evil influence of Señor Ojeda, now in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and he expressed a poor opinion of the Duke of Almodovar, the President of the Conference.

[2179] No. 66.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 4.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, January 17, 1906.*

THE Conference met for the first time yesterday, when the Duke of Almodovar del Rio was elected President, and the Secretaries of the Protocol, &c., were appointed.

In his opening speech the President laid down the principles of the "open door" in Morocco and of the integrity and independence of the Sultan and his dominions. M. Révoil moved the adoption of the above principles by the Conference, expressing his adherence to them. The German Representative seconded the motion, which was adopted.

The meeting then agreed that the suppression of contraband should be the first subject for discussion, and it was suggested by the President that proposals should be submitted in writing by any of the Representatives who desired to make any, and that these proposals should be circulated, and that a day for their discussion could be fixed later on.

Although importance attaches to the question for us, I propose to confine myself to endeavouring to bring others into line with our views and interests, especially as regards the right of search, and not to submit any proposals in writing.

No. 67.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 17.)

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, January* 17, 1906.

MOROCCO.

Trade in contraband.

Information has reached me that a suggestion may be made by the German Representative for the adoption of measures by the Powers to prevent arms and munitions destined for Morocco being exported from their ports. I understand that an unsuccessful attempt was made to introduce similar measures with regard to China. I should be very glad to receive your views on this point and to be furnished with any information as to the project affecting China, as I fear my knowledge of the latter is very vague.

The question will also arise of the right of visit and search of sailing-vessels, of which there are a few at Gibraltar, by maritime patrol.

I suppose that this right should only be exercised in Moorish waters, and when the movements of a vessel are suspicious, and should be as strictly limited as possible. But your instructions on this point would also be very acceptable.

[2214] No. 68.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 18.)

(No. 11. Confidential.)
Sir, *Madrid, January* 15, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that on leaving Paris, on my way to Madrid, I found myself in the train with Count Tattenbach, who had arrived that morning from Munich and was continuing his journey, without stopping, to attend the Conference at Algeciras. As he is an old acquaintance of mine we had during the journey a number of conversations in which he spoke to me in the most frank manner, and as what he said may be of some interest I venture to report it to you.

Count Tattenbach assured me that during the few hours he was in Paris he had seen no one—not even Prince Radolin, the German Ambassador. The general tone of his conversation was most conciliatory towards France. He told me that the Kaiser was most anxious that a reasonable solution should be found for the Morocco question, or, if that was more than could be expected, that at least a truce should be arrived at with regard to it. There were bigger and more vital questions which called for His Majesty's attention. There was the Russian crisis which required close attention, even though the fear which existed at Berlin a little while ago had passed away, that the Russian Imperial Dynasty was in peril; his Excellency did not explain whether this fear had been removed by a promise of armed intervention by Germany in Russian affairs should the Tsar find himself in need of such assistance. Then there was also the possibility of a disruption of the Austrian Empire in the near future—an event which, if it took place, would need the closest attention on the part of Germany. For these reasons, Count Tattenbach assured me, the Kaiser was most desirous that the Conference at Algeciras should close the Morocco question at least for a few years to come. The Kaiser was in the most conciliatory mood at present, but France must not abuse His Majesty's amiable dispositions towards her and ask for impossible concessions; France should remember that Germany must be allowed to keep up appearances while making concessions. In the opinion of Count Tattenbach, the key to the Conference at Algeciras lay in London. His Majesty's Government enjoyed great influence in Paris, and, if that influence were employed to moderate the demands of France, some good would come out of the Conference, even if a complete settlement of the Morocco question were not arrived at.

As regards the state of Morocco, the Count was of opinion that it was not so very much worse than when he left the country, some ten years ago, the only difference was that formerly the Sultan possessed a small military force, which was better armed than the mass of the population and could therefore execute the Sultan's orders and collect the revenue, whereas now, owing to the unimpeded smuggling of arms, every Moor was as well, if not better, armed than the Imperial troops who, moreover, had lost prestige and been reduced in strength by repeated encounters with the Pretender.

The Treasury at Fez was consequently empty, and Count Tattenbach was of opinion that the Sultan would not oppose any reforms which might be proposed to him by the Conference which he could be persuaded to believe would tend to improve his financial situation. If order could be restored in the country, Count Tattenbach thought that a revenue of 2,500,000*l.* could be raised without great difficulty. But before order could be restored in Morocco a system of gendarmerie must be devised by the Conference, and it was the most difficult question with which the Delegates of the Powers would have to deal. The policing of the ports and the coast was a comparatively easy matter to settle, and he thought an agreement on that point would be come to without great difficulty. But what about the gendarmerie for the interior of Morocco? That was the most difficult question with which the Conference would have to deal. Count Tattenbach assured me that if the Conference proposed to hand over the mandate for organizing such a gendarmerie to any one Power the Sultan would absolutely refuse to give his consent to the proposal, and in doing so he would be backed up by public opinion in Morocco. In his opinion, the Sultan would be right in refusing to accept such a plan. Count Tattenbach's language to me does not quite agree with that held by Prince Bülow to Sir F. Lascelles (see Sir F. Lascelles' telegram No. 3), when the Chancellor suggested that an agreement might be arrived at by giving the command of the gendarmerie to a neutral Power, such as Switzerland, Sweden, or Belgium.

Count Tattenbach thought that, as it was useless to expect that the Sultan would admit that the gendarmerie could be commanded by officers of one nationality, the Conference should turn its efforts to elaborating a scheme for an international police. He hinted at the possibility of this being done by zones. The Count did not conceal from me that he was not sanguine about the success of the scheme when finally drawn up by the Conference; it would have to be applied with great care, perhaps not at all for many years to come, but, nevertheless, a great step would have been made if the Conference could draw up, on paper, a scheme for an international police which would be acceptable to the Powers. A principle would have then been laid down which would produce an immediate *détente* between certain Powers in Europe—a thing at the present moment most heartily to be wished for.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[2314] No. 69.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 18.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, January* 18, 1906.

CONFERENCE at Algeciras.

The Austrian Ambassador, who has just arrived in St. Petersburgh from Berlin, where he interviewed Prince Bülow, seems to think it probable that it will be proposed at the Conference by the German Delegate that the organization of the police in Morocco, with the exception of those on the French frontier, should be intrusted to Spain.

[2284] No. 70.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 18.)

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, January* 18, 1906.

THE United States' Representative has been instructed to bring the question of Jews in Morocco before the Conference; but the French Representative has been requesting Mr. White to ask his Government for permission to leave the matter alone, and has begged me to speak in the same sense. We are both of opinion that it would

be dangerous to enlarge the scope of the programme, as it might lead to other and more embarrassing questions being brought forward.

Would you permit me to suggest to my colleagues that, on the termination of the Conference, some of the Ministers at Tangier should make collective or identic representations at Fez on the subject, as my personal opinion is that such a course would produce an equal effect on the Moorish Government.

[2308] No. 71.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, January 17, 1906.*

MOROCCO.

This afternoon I had a long conversation with the French Delegate on the subject of contraband trade. The Conference may meet again to-morrow, as no proposals have been submitted by any of the Delegates.

M. Révoil and I came to the conclusion that it would be better for neither of us to mention the question of maritime patrol, and I agreed to make a suggestion to the Conference that we should simply discuss some more efficient means of exercising supervision over vessels in Moorish ports, and that severe penalties should be inflicted on those engaged in contraband trade; also that the penalties should, on the basis laid down in our Order in Council, be applicable to all foreigners.

Maritime patrol would undoubtedly give rise to many complicated questions, and the French Delegate fears that Germany would insist on participating in it and ask for a port where her ships might recoal and lay. While pointing out that without maritime patrol little could be done towards suppressing contraband trade, I told M. Révoil that, so far as I was concerned, I would make no allusion to it.

I have no great confidence in any measures proving effective in putting a stop to a traffic which is universal and lucrative, and by which Government officials themselves largely profit.

[2377] No. 72.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, January 19, 1906.*

A MEETING of the Conference was held yesterday, at which the attitude and tone of the members were quite friendly and satisfactory. We made considerable progress in discussing the principles by which the suppression of contraband trade should be governed. With a view to putting these principles into practice, a small Committee was appointed to draw up Regulations. No mention was made as to the Powers prohibiting the export to Morocco of arms from their ports. The question of maritime patrol was alluded to, and it was decided that the discussion of that point should be deferred to a later date.

I have sent a copy of the above to His Majesty's Representative at Tangier.

[2392] No. 73.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, January 19, 1906.*

FRENCH traders at Mar Chica: My telegram No. 3 of the 15th instant.

The French cruiser "Lalande" has returned from Mar Chica without finding any boats there. Only a very small warehouse and four tents were discovered there.

Comte St. Aulaire, the French Chargé d'Affaires, says that the French authorities in Algeria will stop any vessels known to be leaving that country for Mar Chica.

[2497] No. 74.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 11. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, January 13, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 298 of the 17th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the French Chargé d'Affaires has informed me confidentially that the cruiser "Lalande" is about to be sent to Melilla, with instructions to the Captain to inquire into and report upon the circumstances connected with the establishment of the French warehouses at Mar Chica.

Comte Saint Aulaire thought it might be somewhat difficult for the Captain to carry out his instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[2431] No. 75.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 64.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, January 16, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I called on the French Ambassador to-day, who has just returned from Paris. As Sir C. Hardinge has informed you in his telegram of the 9th instant, the French Government expressed their inability to sanction a regular loan unless the German Emperor makes a declaration through an official and authoritative channel of his peaceful intentions with regard to Morocco. I asked M. Bompard if he could tell me how the matter stands. He said, in reply, that there had been no regular loan, but that it had been arranged that a sum of about 10,000,000*l.* should be placed at the disposal of the Russian Government, to be kept in the French banks, and that the Russian Government would be able to issue notes against this deposit. At the same time the arrangement was of a temporary character, and could not be regarded as anything more than an advance on short term Treasury bonds with certain stringent conditions.

With regard to the attitude of Germany, France was still completely in the dark. She had believed that with M. Delcassé's departure all would be well, and subsequently she had been assured that if she consented to the Conference there would be no further difficulty. In both expectations she had been disappointed. England, Russia, Spain, Italy, and the United States had informed her of their intentions as to the instructions which their Delegates would receive at the Conference. Only as to Germany was there any uncertainty. The result was to create a general feeling of *malaise*, which agitated not only France but Europe, and which was naturally fatal to that commercial security which was necessary for the issue of a loan. Assurances of a peaceful nature abounded from German official and unofficial sources. But when those who were abounding in such declarations were asked the simple question, "What will be the German instructions?" there was no answer. The result was not unnaturally to intensify the feeling of disquietude with every such declaration. He had used similar language to the Russian Government, and had urged them to use every effort in order to obtain a declaration of a positive kind from the Kaiser himself.

Here he had met with an unforeseen obstacle. It was not denied that there were constant communications between the two Emperors. But Count Lamsdorff insisted that such communications were of a personal and even family character, and that they could not properly be made the subject of official communications between the Foreign Secretary and the Ambassador. No pledge of any sort as to action on the part of the Emperor could be extracted from Count Lamsdorff, who objected finally that if any mention of such communications were made in a yellow book, it would be in the highest degree painful to his Imperial master.

As to the Russian instructions, and the attitude of the Russian Government, he thought that France had nothing to complain. The instructions were all that could be desired. There was unfortunately some doubt as to Spain, as the German press campaign was being carried on in that country with great vigour and success.

As to Italy he assured me that the tone of the assurances received was of a very satisfactory character. He feared, however, that the United States might very easily be led to support Germany in the Conference, on the plea that in advocating absolute equality of treatment Germany was fighting the battle of all the Powers. He thought it required some special knowledge of the circumstances to understand that if the Conference failed the result would be that the place of power would be transferred to Fez, and that German influence would be supreme. I understand that Mr. Meyer has been kept informed of the course of the negotiations, and that he has communicated with the President.

I gathered from M. Bompard that the attitude taken up by Count Witte in regard to the loan had been similar to that reported in Sir C. Hardinge's despatch No. 34 of the 7th instant, namely, "that Europe must provide the sum required, since if Russia failed to fulfil her obligations the shock would resound throughout the whole financial world," that is to say, that France must provide the money, as the ruin of Russia was a matter that was of as much importance to France as to Russia herself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CECIL SPRING-RICE.

[2439] No. 76.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 25. Confidential.)

Sir, *Berlin, January 17, 1906.*

I CALLED yesterday at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to communicate the substance of your telegram No. 4 of the 15th instant to Baron von Holstein, who was not there. I saw, however, Dr. von Mühlberg, and gave him an account of the conversation which I had with Herr von Holstein, and which formed the subject of my despatch No. 17 of the 13th instant. I said that Herr von Holstein's apprehensions seemed to me to be greatly exaggerated. I was therefore not astonished at receiving your telegram expressing the hope that the contingency which Herr von Holstein contemplated will not arise. I added that you wished that Herr von Holstein should know that we could not deprecate any action by France which comes within the terms of the Anglo-French Declarations of 1904.

Dr. von Mühlberg took a note of these words, and did not offer any remark. I said that you evidently wished by these words to reaffirm the decision of His Majesty's Government to give their support to France at the Conference, and not to use any language which might imply that they had the slightest intention of departing from the obligations they had incurred.

Dr. von Mühlberg said he quite understood this, and, in discussing the general situation as regards the Conference, expressed the belief that it would be found possible to bring it to a peaceful and satisfactory conclusion. I replied that I quite agreed with him, and that I believed that the sincere desire of Germany and France, and, indeed, of all the Powers represented, would enable the Conference to come to an arrangement even on the knotty point of the organization of the police.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

[2440] No. 77.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 26. Confidential.)

Sir, *Berlin, January 17, 1906.*

WITH reference to my preceding despatch of this day's date, I have the honour to report that I had an opportunity to-day of conversing with both my French and Italian colleagues on the Algeciras Conference.

M. Bihourd was, on the whole, inclined to be hopeful, but he foresaw great difficulties about arriving at a settlement of the question of the police. He said that

he did not yet know what proposals his Government intended to bring forward at the Conference, and complained that the information with which his Government supplied him as a rule reached him too late to be of much use. M. Bihourd also complained of the action of the German Government in publishing certain despatches in the White Book without asking the consent of the French Government. In one case they did ask consent but did not wait for the reply, and in another case they did not ask for consent at all.

Count Lanza, on the other hand, was absolutely optimistic. He had recently returned from Rome, where he had gone to make the acquaintance of the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, and he had seen a telegram from M. Visconti-Venosta, who, on his way through Paris, had seen M. Rouvier and Prince Radolin, and felt confident that the result of the Conference would be satisfactory to all parties. Since his return to Berlin, Count Lanza had seen Prince Bülow, who was most hopeful. Count Lanza added, most confidentially, that he was convinced that neither Germany nor France intended to go to war, and both desired to get rid of the question. If this were so, it surely would be possible for the Conference to arrive at a solution which would be acceptable to both countries without humiliating either.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. C. LASCELLES.

[2548] No. 78.

British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society to Foreign Office.—(Received January 20.)

51, Denison House, Vauxhall Bridge Road, London, January 19, 1906.

Sir,

I BEG to acknowledge, with thanks, your letter of the 5th instant, stating that His Majesty's Minister at Tangier has reported as to the recent sale of slave children in that town, and that Mr. Lowther fears that it would be, for the present at any rate, difficult, if not impossible, even in the port towns of Morocco, to prevent slaves being taken to private houses for sale. On behalf of my Committee I beg leave to point out that the newspaper report, which was inclosed in my letter of the 4th ultimo, referred to slaves being publicly taken about in the streets, which was represented as an unusual occurrence.

I am directed by my Committee to remind you that in past years the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society has unfortunately very often had occasion to make representations to Her late Majesty's Government on the question of Morocco Slave Trade, and through the efforts of Her Majesty's Minister at Tangier the sale of slaves in open markets in the coast towns was believed to have been stopped about 1886. In June 1884 the late Sir John Drummond Hay reported to Her Majesty's Government that the then Sultan of Morocco had sent orders to the Governors of towns generally to put a stop to public slave auctions, and the late Sir W. Kirby Green actually obtained a verbal promise from the Sultan that these markets should be abolished in all towns, but his death occurred before the agreement could be put into writing.

In 1887 this Society sent out a representative, Mr. Donald Mackenzie, with an Address for presentation to the Sultan, urging the abolition of the Slave Trade in Morocco, when he obtained an interview at Marakesh with His Majesty's Vizier, who handed the Address to the Sultan, which was supported by the late Sir W. Kirby Green.

The Society has had reason to believe that progress against slavery has been made through the action of the European Powers and the United States in instructing their Consuls to prevent their protégés from holding slaves, and that the Slave Trade has been greatly checked since the French and English have obtained control over countries south of the Sahara, and especially owing to French influence on the south-east frontier of Morocco.

In reply to a question put in the House of Commons on the 18th June, 1900, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated that the orders to the Governors of coast towns to prevent the public sale of slaves were renewed in 1898 at the request of Her Majesty's Minister, who would make representations to the Moorish

Government if it should at any time come to his knowledge that these orders were being neglected.

In view of the International Conference which is being held on Moroccan affairs, I am respectfully to ask that the question of slave trading, and especially of the sale of slaves in open market in the towns of the interior of Morocco, may be brought before the Powers there represented, and that the Representative of His Majesty's Government may be asked to support the request for united action against slave dealing. My Committee has long been convinced that the only hope of stopping this evil lies in the co-operation of the Powers to this end.

I have, &c.
(Signed) TRAVERS BUXTON, *Secretary.*

Inclosure in No. 78.

Lord Granville to Sir J. D. Hay.

July 2, 1853.

His Majesty's Government would, in the interest of humanity, make an earnest appeal to the Emperor, and ask him to consider whether the time has not come when he would be ready to place himself on a level with other civilized Rulers by taking steps to abolish slavery in his dominions. They are aware of the difficulty which the Government of the Emperor may meet in dealing with a long-established custom, but that difficulty has been found not to be insuperable by other Mahommedan Sovereigns. His Majesty might be assured that any steps taken by him in this direction would be welcomed not only in this country, but in the civilized world; whereas the position of his State, as the only territory bordering on the Mediterranean in which no effort is made to combat this evil, must become daily more intolerable in the eyes of all nations, whatever may be their religious creed.

I have to instruct you to make a strong representation to the Moorish Government in this sense, and to lose no opportunity of renewing your efforts whenever a favourable opportunity may offer.

[2565] No. 79.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 20.)

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, January* 20, 1906.

REFERRING to Mr. Cartwright's telegram No. 1 respecting Morocco.

(Confidential.)

Yesterday I spoke to the French and Italian Representatives on the police question. We are all agreed that it would be an act of injustice to the Europeans who are living in the coast towns of Morocco for the Conference to be brought to a conclusion without some measures being adopted with a view to their protection, and without an endeavour being made to apply some remedy to the condition of insecurity and anxiety at present prevailing.

I do not despair of some compromise of a provisional and modest character being effected, which would not extend to the interior, but be limited solely to coast towns.

[2588] No. 80.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 20.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, January* 20, 1906.

THE United States' Representative spoke to me on the subject of the position of Jews in Morocco, and I replied in the sense of my telegram No. 6 of the 17th instant. I at the same time told Mr. White that I was hoping to be furnished with your views.

He seemed doubtful as to whether the President of the United States, who is taking a warm interest in the matter, would be satisfied with representations from Tangier.

Our conversation took place in the presence of the French Representative, and he told me this morning that he is making a suggestion to his Government that, perhaps, the Representatives here should, after concluding their labours at the Conference, be instructed to furnish the Moorish Representatives with a semi-official note, for transmission to their Government, in regard to the position of Jews in Morocco. M. Révoil was unable to express an opinion as to whether his Government would consent, or whether such a course would satisfy the United States' Representative.

[2284] No. 81.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. Durand.

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, January* 20, 1906.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding telegram, repeating Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 6 on the subject of the Jewish question in Morocco, I have informed Sir A. Nicolson that I approve his acting as he suggests. Pray address a suitable communication to the United States' Government on the subject.

No. 82.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, January* 20, 1906.

I HAVE instructed His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington to make a representation to the United States' Government on the subject of the Jews in Morocco in the sense of your telegram No. 6 of the 18th instant. I approve your acting as suggested.

[2597] No. 83.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 21.)

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, January* 21, 1906.

FOLLOWING is secret:—

On the 20th instant United States' Representative spoke to me as to the views held by Germany in regard to the question of police. He was, he said, in a position to give me the most positive assurance that the Germans would never agree to the police being intrusted to France and Spain alone, under any circumstances whatever or in any conditions, no matter how strict or limited. On the other hand, Germany would make large concessions to France with regard to the bank and finance questions if France would make concessions with regard to the police question, but Germany must receive distinct assurances that France would make concessions satisfactory to her on the police question before she yielded to France on the former points.

I explained to Mr. White that I was precluded by my position with, and obligations to, my French colleague from suggesting any concessions, but that I would convey to M. Révoil what he had told me.

I mentioned the matter to my French colleague later on, who told me that the Italian Representative had just made a similar communication to him. He expressed his readiness to afford the matter his consideration, but Germany must state more clearly and precisely, firstly, what concessions in regard to the finance questions she was prepared to make to France, and, secondly, what concessions as to the police question she required. These were points in regard to which no room must be left for misunderstandings. M. Révoil said to me privately that Germany had afforded France so many reasons to distrust her promises that he considered that France must, in the event of an arrangement proving possible, make an endeavour to obtain the guarantee of some third party that Germany would not allow the Sultan to upset the arrangement, and that she herself would fulfil her promises. He mentioned the United States in this connection.

The Italian Representative, whom I also saw, will sound, and try to elicit the precise views of, his German colleagues. The Marquis Visconti-Venosti was, at the same time, not much in favour of intermediaries, and expressed his opinion that it would be better that the two parties should ultimately meet and discuss the matter between themselves.

I have some slight hopes that it may be found possible to arrive at some compromise.

[2780] No. 84.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 23.)

(No. 16.)

Sir, *Madrid, January* 15, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to report that, on receipt of your despatch No. 8 of the 11th instant, transmitting the invitation addressed to His Majesty's Government to take part in the Morocco Conference at Algeciras, I duly addressed a note to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, copy of which I have the honour to inclose, accepting this invitation on behalf of His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

Inclosure in No. 84.

Mr. Cartwright to the Duke of Almodovar.

Sir, *Madrid, January* 15, 1906.

SIR EDWARD GREY, His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has communicated to me the note addressed by Señor Polo de Bernabe, Ambassador of His Most Catholic Majesty in London on the 30th December, 1905, inviting His Majesty's Government to take part in the Conference which it is intended to hold immediately at Algeciras to consider the present state of affairs in Morocco.

Sir Edward Grey has now instructed me to inform your Excellency that it will give His Majesty's Government great pleasure to take part in the deliberations of the proposed Conference, and that they have named as their Representative for this purpose his Excellency Sir Arthur Nicolson, Bart., G.C.V.O., Ambassador Designate to the Court of St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

No. 85.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 23.)

(No. 5. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, January* 22, 1906.

MOROCCAN affairs.

I have elicited the following information from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning in the course of a conversation, in which I endeavoured to ascertain whether any overtures had been made to Spanish Government by Germany before the Conference opened.

The contents of the Secret Agreement between late President of Council and M. Cambon, signed at San Sebastian on the 2nd September (see my telegram No. 70 of the 4th September), are known to Germany. As no allusion is made by France in this Agreement to the policing of West Coast ports, the German Ambassador here assumes that the matter has been left open purposely in order to allow Germany to carry out that policing if necessary. He has, moreover, hinted that Germany would not be unwilling to withdraw her claim should the Conference oppose it too strongly, and then propose that the policing of these ports be left to Spain, who would thus become responsible for the coast west of the Spanish possessions, that of the Algerian frontier

and east coast towns being left to France, no immediate provision being made for the organization of the police in the interior.

M. Ojeda said that Spain would of course do nothing without the approval of France, but both France and Great Britain might, he thought, prefer to see the West Coast policed by Spain rather than by Germany. In any case, such an offer as that referred to above, if made to Spain, would require to be considered very carefully from a financial as well as from a political point of view.

My impression is that the idea is not unpleasing to the Spanish Government, and I have thought it right to communicate to the French Ambassador substance of above, which was told me in strict confidence.

No. 86.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 23.)

(No. 6. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, January* 22, 1906.

CONFERENCE on Moroccan affairs.

I called to-day on Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and learnt that Señor Moret, in a conversation with the Marquis Visconti Venosta when on his way through Madrid, had suggested to the latter that it might possibly solve the police question if the State Bank were allowed to build a railway more or less along the coast from Tetuan eastwards. Powers would be given to the Railway Administration to recruit railway guards from subjects of all nations, and these guards would amount to a gendarmerie responsible for the policing of the country which the line passed through. This would at least result in some practical improvement, and none of the rights of any of the Powers interested in Morocco would suffer in any way.

No. 87.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 23.)

(No. 7. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, January* 23, 1906.

CONFERENCE on Moroccan affairs.

I learn from M. Cambon that the French Government has heard rumours as to the possibility of the neutralization of Morocco being proposed by Germany at the Conference, and that M. Rouvier had telegraphed to him that, in the opinion of the French Government, such a proposal would be absolutely inacceptible, as it would cause trouble as soon as ever France attempted to enforce a claim against Morocco.

On sounding Señor Moret as to this suggestion, M. Cambon found that he was as opposed as M. Rouvier to any idea of neutralization, and even went so far as to say that it would involve the abandonment by Spain of historic traditions, and the annihilation of natural aspirations, and that any Spanish Government that accepted it would be stoned by the people. It was, moreover, in his opinion not possible in the case of a barbaric Power, as neutralization was applicable only to small and civilized States.

Instructions in this sense have been sent to the Spanish Delegate at the Conference.

[2833] No. 88.

Sir M. Durand to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 23.)

(No. 4.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Washington, January* 23, 1906.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 4 and 5.

Mr. Root, to whom I have spoken on the subject of the Jews in Morocco, referred to in your telegrams Nos. 4 and 5, says that the United States' Government had no wish to enlarge the scope of the programme by the introduction of new and separate questions.

The matter was looked on here as part of the general question of policing organization in Morocco. He promises to explain this by telegraph to the United States' Delegate.

Secretary of State was not explicit to-day about policing the country, and I am not clear as to what views are held here on the subject. The press of this country profess to think that the United States' Government intend to support some proposal for an international police force, but I was told yesterday by the French Ambassador that he attaches no importance to this view, which is quite contrary to the assurances given to him.

[2897] No. 89.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 24.)

(No. 12. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, January* 15, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 11 of the 13th instant, the French Chargé d'Affaires called upon me to-day to inform me confidentially that the French cruiser, the "Lalande," was leaving to-day for the neighbourhood of Mar Chica, as the question of the establishment of French warehouses and stores in communication with the Pretender was engaging the attention both of the Sultan and of the Spanish Government, the subjects of the latter conceiving that their interests in Melilla were being seriously endangered.

Count Saint-Aulaire stated that it was obviously the duty of the Moorish Government to take measures to rid themselves of these French adventurers if they were doing anything irregular, but the Sultan was powerless to take any measures. The French Government could not well interfere with these traders, but it was most advisable on the eve of the meeting of the Conference that all friction with Spain should be avoided, and consequently the Captain of the "Lalande" has been instructed to proceed to the neighbourhood of Mar Chica and make a full report. He was also directed to look out for the boats of the French traders, and in the event of their being discovered landing goods at places other than recognized ports he was to capture them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[2896] No. 90.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 24.)

(No. 14.)

Sir, *Tangier, Januury* 17, 1906.

IN conversation last night with Dr. Rosen, the German Minister, I asked him whether it was true, as stated by Prince Bülow to Sir F. Lascelles, though I did not mention my source of information, that M. Rouvier had given a verbal promise that he would not at the Conference put forward any claim on the part of France to the organization of the police of this country elsewhere than on the frontier districts, and I added that I concluded that if this promise had been given it had been made to him.

Dr. Rosen replied that it was so, and that M. Rouvier had given him a verbal undertaking to this effect on more than one occasion.

The Minister added that there was another point which had not yet become public, and which he could not reveal to me for the present, which would materially strengthen the position of the Germans at the Conference.

Later on Dr. Rosen said that after the visit of the German Emperor here, and after the vigorous attitude taken up by his Government at Fez, it was impossible for them to abandon the Sultan now, but, without actually saying so, he implied that there was likely in the future to be a change of policy on the part of Germany, and that she would become less energetic here.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to Sir Arthur Nicolson.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[2955] No. 91.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 24.)

(No. 13.)

(Telegraphic,) P. *Algeciras, January* 24, 1906.

FOLLOWING is Secret :—

Complications are beginning to arise from the question of a private meeting between the French and German Representatives. The French Representative has to-day received information from which it would appear that the German Government are of opinion that the initiative should be taken by France. Moreover, they desire that France should declare before the Conference the views she holds in regard to the questions of finance and police, and they are apparently opposed to the intervention of any third party in the matter.

I would mention that no indication has, I believe, been given by the German Government, beyond the verbal and indirect statements of the German Representative here, that Germany would make large concessions to France in finance matters in return for concessions by France on the question of police.

The French Representative is consulting with his Government. He considers, and I venture to think with justification, that in the above circumstances he must proceed with great caution.

[3033] No. 92.

Mr. A. G. Wise to Foreign Office.—(*Received January* 25.)

8, *Carey Mansions, Carey Street, Westminster,*

Sir, *London, S.W., January* 24, 1906.

REFERRING to my interview this morning with Mr. W. C. Cartwright, C.M.G., and to the proposal now under the consideration of the Algeciras Conference for the foundation of a State Bank in Morocco, I have the honour to state that there is at present in existence an institution known as the Bank of Morocco (Limited), which is duly registered at Somerset House.

Certain promises were made by the late Sultan of Morocco to a British subject long resident in that country, to the effect that the bank in question was to become the State Bank of Morocco.

These promises were duly confirmed verbally to the same individual by the present Sultan, who, in confirmation thereof, wrote with his own hand in Arabic the words "The State Bank of Morocco," which words were duly engraved locally. A copy of the autograph is in my possession, and can be submitted to you.

Confirmation of these statements can be afforded if you think fit to grant an interview to the gentleman in question, who is now in London, having come here on the strength of the understanding arrived at between himself and the Sultan.

Relying on these promises, considerable expenditure has been incurred, for which due compensation, I submit, should be made, as it is not right that promises of this nature should be broken without cause or warning.

I beg, therefore, that you will be good enough to move the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to be pleased to make the necessary representations on the subject to His Majesty's Minister now attending the Conference at Algeciras, for such action as may be deemed expedient.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. G. H. WISE.

[3104] No. 93.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 25.)

(No. 7. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, January* 25, 1906.

MOROCCO Conference.

I had a conversation to-day with M. Louis, Political Director, who took a very firm line with regard to the pretension of Germany that France should take the initiative, as reported in Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 13 of the 24th January.

It was at the desire of Germany, M. Louis said, that the Conference had assembled. France had merely submitted to it, and it was therefore clearly for Germany to declare her views and proposals. At the beginning of the controversy, France had been perfectly ready to discuss matters with Germany alone, but he considered the time for that was past, once the Conference had been called.

He trusted that France would maintain her expectant attitude and would not give up what he considered to be the principal element of strength in her position.

Germany doubtless found her present position somewhat embarrassing, but he was none the less pleased at that.

[3103] No. 94.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 25.)

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, January* 25, 1906.

THE following is Confidential:—

Morocco Conference.

The substance of my telegram No. 5 was communicated by M. Cambon to the French Government and, as he now informs me, M. Rouvier has replied that France holds strictly, as far as regards Spain, to the terms of the Agreement concluded on the 2nd September, 1905, at San Sebastian, and that the possible German proposal that Spain should organize the police on the west coast of Morocco would be objected to very strongly by the French Government.

A telegram from the French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh was read to me in strictest confidence by M. Cambon. It stated that he had been informed by the Austrian Ambassador, who had returned to his post viâ Berlin, that in official circles there an idea seemed to exist that, by dividing Morocco into two zones, one of which would be for France and the other for Spain, a solution of the police question might be found.

In the opinion of M. Cambon, the accuracy of the statement made to me by Señor de Ojeda, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, with reference to the hints which M. de Radowitz threw out, seems to be confirmed by this telegram.

[3060] No. 95.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 25.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, January* 25, 1906.

LAST night I communicated the substance of Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 13 of yesterday to Prince Bülow, who was dining with me.

He said that, far from objecting to the intervention of any third Power, he would be glad of their assistance in privately discussing beforehand any definite proposals to be formally laid before the Conference. He thoroughly approved of the idea of the matter being discussed by the German and French Representatives at a private meeting, nor had he any wish that a declaration should be made by France before the Conference as to her views on the questions of finance and police. As he did not yet know what line Herr von Radowitz had taken up on the former question, he could not express any opinion as to the financial concessions which Germany might make to France in return for concessions on the police question, but he had great hopes of a satisfactory solution being found.

[3091] No. 96.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 25.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, January* 25, 1906.

AT yesterday's meeting of the Conference we concluded the discussion on Regulations respecting the suppression of contraband trade. I think that the Moorish Government are likely to request that two or three of the Articles be withdrawn or

modified. Their Delegates promised, however, to forward the Regulations without delay for submission to the Sultan at Fez.

To-morrow the examination of the question of finding new sources of revenue for the Moorish Government is to be commenced.

I have repeated this telegram to Mr. Lowther.

[3092] No. 97.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey—(*Received January* 25.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, January* 25, 1906.

THE following is Secret:—

My French colleague and myself are of opinion that it would be prudent to say nothing for the moment to the Spanish Representative in regard to the German proposals (mentioned in Mr. Spring-Rice's telegram No. 14 of the 18th instant and Mr. Cartwright's telegram No. 8 of the 25th instant) to intrust the police on the west coast of Morocco to Spain.

Some time must elapse before the police question is reached by the Conference, and M. Révoil and I venture to hope that in the meantime His Majesty's Government and the French Government may be able to acquaint us with the views they hold in regard to the matter.

Our own opinion, expressed at first sight, is that Spain will be extremely gratified by the proposal, and that there is a possibility of its being put forward by the German delegates with the view of our being led to offer opposition to it and separate ourselves from Spain.

We are at the same time in doubt whether any formal proposal would be made by Germany by which she would practically undermine the thesis she has always maintained that no one Power alone should be granted the police mandate. We think, however, that it need not necessarily be to her advantage should she do so.

A telegram of a practically identical nature is being addressed to the French Government by M. Révoil.

I would add that the above are merely our views on first thoughts.

(Repeated to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid.)

[3102] No. 98.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 25.)

(No. 16. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, January* 25, 1906.

MOROCCO Conference. Police question.

I have been informed by the French Representative that the following three alternative solutions of the police question have been suggested to the United States' Government by the German Government, and the United States' Representative confirmed this statement in substance to me:—

1. The organization of the police in separate districts to be intrusted to several Powers, with a port on the Atlantic allotted to each.

2. The whole police organization to be intrusted to a small Power. Switzerland would be the most agreeable to Germany, but Holland or Sweden are also mentioned, while Belgium is expressly excluded on the ground of her sympathies being too French.

3. The police to be organized by the Sultan with the assistance of volunteer officers, three of the small Powers to select the officers.

As regards these proposals, I understand that the United States' Government declined to entertain the first, but seemed inclined to consider the other two, having a preference for the third, as in their opinion it would be well for foreign participation to be restricted as much as possible.

My French colleague tells me further that he hears that a fourth solution has been indicated by the German Representative to the effect that France and Spain, with the addition of a third Power, possibly Italy, should be intrusted with the police. As regards this I am inclined to doubt its being an authorized solution.

It is to be observed that in none of the above solutions is any mention made of the policing of the west coast ports being intrusted to Spain alone.

None of the first three solutions appear to me to be practical or adequately to meet the situation, and none of them would, I believe, be acceptable to France.

The French Representative asked me whether he should accept the proposal of the German Representative for a private conversation, and I strongly advised him to do so in order that there might be no grounds hereafter for the German Representative to say that no response had been vouchsafed to his overtures for intercourse of a private and unofficial nature.

M. Révoil is to have a private conversation with the German Representative to-day, and may elicit some further information.

[2548] No. 99.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 4. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 25, 1906.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copies of correspondence, as marked in the margin,* on the subject of the sale of slaves in Morocco.

Mr. Buxton, Secretary of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, called at this Office on the 22nd instant on behalf of the Society, and Lord Fitzmaurice communicated to him the substance of Mr. Lowther's despatch No. 300. He explained that his Society hoped that the opportunity afforded by the meeting of the Conference at Algeciras might possibly be taken to bring forward in some public manner the question of the sale of slaves in Morocco, so as to obtain a more formal acceptance of anti-slavery doctrines on the part of the Sultan than he has yet given. Lord Fitzmaurice said that he thought there might be objections to His Majesty's Government proposing at this stage a formal widening of the programme of the Conference beyond what had been agreed upon by France and Germany, but that if an opportunity presented itself to the British Representatives to refer to the question of slavery in connection with some subject already on the agenda of the Conference, such as the organization of an efficient system of police, he might perhaps do so as a matter of argument in support of other reforms. It was evident that any improvement made with regard to police would facilitate dealing with slavery and the Slave Trade. Lord Fitzmaurice expressed doubts whether in any case it would be possible to go beyond this.

Mr. Buxton declared himself quite satisfied.

I should be glad if your Excellency would furnish me with your views as to the most practical method of dealing with this matter.

I am, &c.

(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[3133] No. 100.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 18. Confidential.)

Sir, *Madrid, January* 22, 1906.

AT an interview I had this morning with Señor de Ojeda, Acting Minister of State, I pressed his Excellency very much to inform me whether the German Government had not made certain overtures to the Spanish Government before the opening of the Conference at Algeciras with regard to certain matters which would be discussed there. His Excellency professed that no such overtures had taken place, and he asserted that Germany had kept perfectly mute to the Spanish Government with regard to her plans: nevertheless, I was able to obtain some information which may prove of some interest.

Señor de Ojeda confessed to me that Herr von Radowitz, the German Ambassador, was in possession of the Secret Agreement signed at San Sebastian by Señor Montero Rios, late President of the Council, and M. Cambon, the French Ambassador (see my telegram No. 70 of the 4th September last), and that he assumed that as France had

* See Part 28, No. 61*; and *ante*, No. 78.

in that Agreement made no provision for the police of the ports on the West Coast of Morocco, it was the intention of France, if pressed by Germany at the Conference, to give way and allow Germany to undertake the policing of Mogador and other western ports. Herr von Radowitz, Señor de Ojeda said, had hinted that should other Powers absolutely object to Germany's presence on the West Coast she might perhaps in that case, as a proof of unselfishness, not be unwilling to withdraw her claim in favour of Spain, and that meant that Spain would receive the mandate to organize a police force for the ports west of a point near her possessions on the coast of Morocco. France doing the same for the ports east of that point, the question of the police for the interior being left open.

M. Cambon recently told me that he was convinced that Señor de Ojeda had communicated to Herr von Radowitz the Secret Agreement between France and Spain of October 1904, and it may not be impossible that he has done the same with regard to the Agreement signed by Señor Montero Rios above mentioned, as he used to me very strong language with regard to that instrument, partly because of its terms, and partly because it had been concluded without his being consulted with regard to it. In his opinion, no man who knew anything about Morocco would have concluded such an Agreement. The greater number of the European population in and near Tangier was Spanish, and if any Moor spoke a European tongue it was Spanish; therefore, in his opinion, the police of Tangier should be entirely Spanish, and not be placed under a French head-officer. If a police system was to be organized in any Moroccan port, it ought to be of one nationality and not mixed. No other method would succeed. As regards the prevention of contraband by sea, Señor de Ojeda made merry over Señor Montero Rios' "naïveté" in arranging for the creation of a Mixed Naval Squadron the command of which would alternate every year. He felt sure that the Spanish officers would not show much zeal in carrying out orders received from a French superior, and he hardly thought that French sailors would pay much attention to a Spanish commander. The scheme was well devised to bring about friction between the two nations.

As regards the hints thrown out by Herr von Radowitz that Germany might perhaps propose that Spain should undertake the organization of a police for the ports on the West Coast of Morocco, Señor de Ojeda observed that this would be a great responsibility thrown upon Spain, and that the proposal would require to be carefully considered both from a political as well as from a financial point of view, but he fully recognized that the Spanish Government were bound to France by the Secret Agreement of 1904, and that therefore without the consent of France they could not possibly take the proposal, if made, into their consideration. Señor de Ojeda was of opinion, however, that His Majesty's Government and the French Government might prefer to see Spain policing the West Coast than some other Power, and my impression is that the German idea is not altogether displeasing to the Spanish Government.

During the course of our conversation Señor de Ojeda informed me that on his passage through Madrid the Marquis Visconti-Venosta at his interview with Señor Moret, the President of the Council, had expressed much doubt as to whether any scheme likely to be proposed at the Conference for the creation of a police for the interior of Morocco would prove acceptable to the Powers, and that Señor Moret had then thrown out an idea which it may be interesting to record.

He thought that a railway should be built under the auspices of the proposed State Bank which would start from Tetuan and run eastward more or less following the coast-line; the Administration of the railway would be empowered to employ railway guards with no restrictions as to the nationality of the officers who commanded them; in Señor Moret's opinion these railway guards would soon extend their influence over the districts through which the railway ran, and would become in reality a kind of gendarmerie, and help to pacify the country without the Powers having to come to an agreement with regard to the organization of an international police.

Señor de Ojeda thought there was a great deal that was good in Señor Moret's idea; but he objected to the coast railway and thought the line should run from Fez to some port.

Señor de Ojeda stated to me that all the schemes for creating a gendarmerie for Morocco which he had seen seemed to him unpractical. Isolated small bodies of gendarmes scattered throughout the country would have little prestige with the turbulent tribes, and if they tried to collect taxes they would be simply murdered. What the Sultan required was an armed force to assert his authority; such a force could be organized by any single European Power, but he did not see how the Conference could give this mandate to any one Power under present circumstances.

I have communicated the substance of this conversation to M. Cambon who will inform his Government of it. M. Cambon again expressed to me his conviction that Señor de Ojeda was bent on causing mischief and on disturbing the good relations which existed between France and Spain, and he begged me to keep him informed of anything that gentleman might say to me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[3216] No. 101.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 9. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, January 26, 1906.*

CONFERENCE on Moroccan affairs.

The French Ambassador yesterday called on Señor Moret and warned him against yielding to possible German offers, though without referring directly to the communication made to me by Señor Ojeda, Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as I reported in my telegram No. 5 of the 22nd January. The President of the Council gave M. Cambon, in reply, satisfactory verbal assurances to the effect that Spain would remain faithful to her engagements with France and would not allow herself to be seduced by any German offers. He added that, in his opinion, if Spain now broke loose from France and Great Britain it would not be to her advantage in the long run.

[3213] No. 102.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, January 26, 1906.*

THE following telegram is Confidential:—

Yesterday morning, at the suggestion of the German Representative, the French Representative had a private conversation with him. From the account which M. Révoil was good enough to give me, the German Representative would not appear to have given much indication of his views in regard to the questions of finance or police. Herr von Radowitz, however, made a suggestion, to which M. Révoil willingly agreed, that, with a view to their endeavouring to arrive at some understanding as to the constitution and attributions of the State Bank, the French and German expert advisers, as well as Count Tattenbach, should meet.

The French Representative was then asked by his German colleague what views the French Government held in regard to the question of police. He replied by inquiring what were the German views; he thought that the French views were fairly well known. He failed, however, to obtain any definite reply, but the German Representative proposed that they should have another meeting on the subject.

The German Representative intimated in the course of the conversation that Dr. Rosen had understood that it was not M. Rouvier's desire to ask for a general mandate for the police at the Conference, but the French Representative stated that he kept his hands perfectly free on this point, and he rectified Dr. Rosen's impression.

Some further information as to German views on the police question may perhaps be elicited by a second interview.

[3219] No. 103.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 1. Conference.)
Sir, *Algeciras, January 17, 1906.*

M. RÉVOIL, the French Delegate at the Conference, arrived in Madrid on the 12th instant, and called upon me in the afternoon previous to my departure for Gibraltar.

He expressed a desire to speak to me on some matters pertaining to the Conference, and especially in regard to a statement which he wished to make to the assembly immediately on its convocation. I understood that he had discussed the question both with M. Rouvier and with M. Paul Cambon; and he intimated his intention to lay on the table of the Conference the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish Agreements of 1904, the notes exchanged between the French Government and the German Ambassador at Paris on the 8th July, 1905, as well as the note signed by himself and Dr. Rosen on the 28th September, 1905. He proposed to declare to the Conference that on the basis of the above documents France would be animated during the proceedings by the principles of the independence and integrity of the Sultan and of his dominions, and of equality of treatment in commercial matters, or, in other words, the "open door." He inquired of me whether I would be disposed to support the declaration.

I told M. Révoil that I would cordially associate myself with the terms of his proposed statement, but that I most strongly deprecated laying the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish Agreements on the table. He observed that he proposed to do so merely with the view of affording some reason for the statement he would make. I replied that it would be easy to make the statement simply as a general declaration of the main principles by which he desired that both the Conference and himself should be guided, but that once the Agreements were communicated to the meeting there was nothing to prevent any member from examining, analyzing, and discussing them, and I frankly told him that I could not be a party to such a proceeding. Moreover, I had always understood that any discussion or allusion to the Agreements was to be carefully avoided, and I thought that my Government were under a similar impression. M. Révoil was good enough to say that he appreciated the force of my argument, and that he would, consequently, merely make his declaration, and abstain from laying any documents on the table.

M. Révoil then said that it was possible that the German Representatives would raise, in some form or another, the right of France to police the frontier districts, and he showed me the notes, which covered two or three sheets of paper, which he had jotted down to serve as the basis of an argument, which he proposed to develop before the Conference. I told M. Révoil that this was a matter which concerned France, and not myself, but I trusted that he would permit me to suggest that any lengthy argument would be unpropitious. To my mind the position of France in the matter of the frontier police was an impregnable one. I had observed that the German press, and I believed the German negotiators also, spoke of the exercise by France of the policing of the frontier as a concession which had been made to her, and for which, possibly, she should make concessions elsewhere. I had understood that France repudiated this view, and had asserted, to my mind with perfect justice, that her duties and privileges in that respect were acquired rights under Treaties and Conventions dating back for some sixty years, and that the questions affecting the frontier were matters solely between her and the Sultan. No one could contest with any reason that view, and if I were in his place I should be content to take my stand on that ground, and decline to enter into any discussion. Were he to develop a lengthy argument in support of the above view he would, I fear, find himself embarked on a prolonged discussion, and thereby weaken considerably his position. After some conversation, M. Révoil said that he agreed with me, and explained that he had prepared his notes with a view of convincing the ignorant of the strength of France's position on the subject. If I thought explanations were unnecessary or likely to lead to discussion, he would willingly abstain from giving them.

M. Révoil expressed the conviction that we would work cordially together during the Conference, and he wished to assure me that he would take no step without previous consultation with me, and would always treat me with unreserved confidence. I fully reciprocated these sentiments, and said that I would throughout the Conference be perfectly frank and open with him, and would support him to the best of my ability.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[3220] No. 104.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 2. Conference. Confidential.)

Sir, *Algeciras, January* 17, 1906.

I HAD the honour to receive from you a repetition of the telegram which Sir F. Lascelles had dispatched reporting a conversation which he had held with Prince Bülow, in which the latter had stated that M. Rouvier had given a verbal promise that France would not raise at the Conference the question of a general mandate being accorded to her for the organization of the police. From conversations which I had had the pleasure to hold with M. Rouvier, both in Paris and Madrid, I had been under the impression that his Excellency had carefully abstained from entering into any engagement on the above point, and that it was one which had been on more than one occasion pressed upon the attention of the French Government. I thought, therefore, that there must be some misunderstanding; and I took the opportunity of a visit which M. Révoil paid to me of mentioning to him that a report had reached me that M. Rouvier had given a promise in regard to the mandate for the organization of the police not being raised by France during the Conference.

M. Révoil said that this was a revival of an old fiction, for which there was absolutely no foundation. During his negotiations with Dr. Rosen the latter had persistently maintained the thesis that Germany had "conceded" to France the policing of the frontier, and had hoped that, in return for this "concession," France should undertake to ask for no mandate for the police organization in other parts of Morocco. He, supported naturally by M. Rouvier, had with equal persistence declined to give such an engagement; and as conversations left no record and might be misunderstood, M. Rouvier had taken the precaution to consign to writing the absolute liberty which France reserved to herself on all points not mentioned in the programme for the Conference. He showed me the statements made by M. Rouvier to Prince Radolin and Dr. Rosen, and which were published in the Yellow Book on pp. 305 and 306. Here M. Rouvier explicitly stated on the 25th September that "en dehors de la formule qui sera signée par les deux Gouvernements, j'entends n'avoir d'engagement sur aucun point;" and again on the 26th September M. Rouvier stated that he had communicated in writing to Dr. Rosen the statements already verbally made, "afin d'éviter toute équivoque et de ne laisser subsister aucun doute sur mon intention de ne prendre par avance aucun engagement à l'égard de l'œuvre de la Conférence." Language, M. Révoil added, could not be clearer or more precise; and I could see from these citations how unfounded was the report which had reached me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[3221] No. 105.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 3. Conference.)

Sir, *Algeciras, January* 18, 1906.

THE Conference met for the first time on the 16th instant, and before the sitting was opened, the German Representative, M. de Radowitz, proposed the election of the Duke of Almodovar as President. This motion was agreed to unanimously, and the gentlemen who are to act as Secretaries for the Conference were then chosen.

As soon as the sitting was opened, the Duke of Almodovar read a statement of which I have the honour to inclose a copy, and on its termination the French Representative, M. Révoil, rose to announce that France would, in treating the questions inscribed on the programme, be guided by the principles of the sovereign independence of the Sultan, the integrity of his dominions, and the equality of treatment in commercial and industrial matters, and he moved that the Conference should declare its adhesion to these principles. This motion was seconded by

M. de Radowitz, and carried unanimously. I will forward the text of the Declaration of the French and German Representatives as soon as I have received the *procès-verbaux* of the meeting.

The Duke of Almodovar then proposed that the first question which should be discussed by the Conference should be that of the suppression of contraband trade, and he said that those who had any proposals to make on this subject should formulate them in writing, and communicate them to the Secretaries, who would cause them to be printed and circulated. When this had been done he would inform us of the date of the next meeting.

I inquired of the President whether this procedure would exclude the faculty of making verbal proposals during the discussions; and I also suggested that it would be well to fix a date before which the written proposals should be delivered, so as not unduly to postpone our next meeting.

I was informed, in reply, that any Representative would be at liberty to make any suggestions or proposals which might occur to him during the discussions, but that it would be preferable to leave open the date of the next meeting.

After some minor matters were disposed of, the meeting adjourned.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 105.

Statement made by the Duke of Almodovar at First Meeting of the Conference, held January 16, 1906.

Messieurs,

EN fixant le programme qui doit servir de base à nos délibérations, les Puissances qui ont contribué directement à le préparer, ainsi que celles qui y ont adhéré par la suite, ont clairement manifesté l'intérêt qui s'attache à ce que l'ordre, la paix, et la prospérité règnent au Maroc. Ce but est en lui-même aussi désirable pour le Sultan qu'avantageux pour les autres Gouvernements, en raison de l'influence qu'il exercera sur le développement du commerce et sur les relations des nations avec le Moghreb. Les Puissances sont également d'accord pour reconnaître que ce but précieux ne saurait être atteint que moyennant l'introduction de réformes dans l'Empire, réformes basées sur le triple principe de la souveraineté du Sultan, de l'intégrité de ses États, et de l'égalité de traitement en matière commerciale, c'est-à-dire, la "porte ouverte."

Sa Majesté Chérifienne et les Puissances, en adoptant le programme, ne nous ont pas, toutefois, investis de la mission de tracer un plan complet pour la transformation administrative du Maroc. Il s'agirait plutôt d'étudier en commun les moyens d'application des mesures qui, dès à présent, paraissent être à la fois et les plus urgentes et les plus faciles à introduire.

La confiance que nous avons tous dans l'influence civilisatrice de la paix et du commerce nous autorise à espérer que ces mesures, bien que leur portée puisse au premier abord sembler limitée, seraient aussi les plus efficaces. Lorsque des corps de police auront été organisés là où la Conférence le jugera réalisable; lorsque la contrebande des armes sera réprimée, des ressources assurées pour les dépenses publiques et pour améliorer l'outillage des ports; lorsque, en conséquence, la tranquillité sera rétablie et les transactions économiques facilitées, la meilleure appréciation par les populations Marocaines des bienfaits de la paix et du travail permettra à Sa Majesté Chérifienne d'ouvrir à son Empire des perspectives de prospérité si conformes aux désirs de tous.

Le respect mutuel de nos intérêts réciproques et le désir sincère de les concilier doivent être, à mon avis, avec les principes de souveraineté du Sultan et de l'intégrité de son Empire, notre règle de conduite à cette Conférence. Si de semblables sentiments ne nous étaient inspirés par la disposition de nos esprits, ainsi que par l'esprit qui anime nos Gouvernements, ils nous seraient déjà dictés par l'attitude expectante du monde entier, qui s'attend à des solutions de concorde, conformes aux inspirations, toujours croissantes, de la solidarité universelle.

[3222]

No. 106.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 4. Conference.)
Sir,

Algeciras, January 19, 1906.

THE Duke of Almodovar suggested to the various Representatives that they should assemble as a General Commitee to discuss the measures to be adopted for the suppression of contraband trade, as he considered that the discussions would be freer and more informal than at a regular Conference meeting, as no detailed *procès-verbal* need be kept. When the Committee should have concluded its discussions, the members could subsequently meet in conference and give formal sanction to the decisions which had been reached. The plan appeared to us all to be a sensible one, and a General Committee meeting was held yesterday afternoon.

In the morning the Duke of Aldomovar and M. Révoil brought me a draft project of the several questions connected with contraband which they thought might be submitted to the Committee, and after considerable discussion between us we agreed upon eight points, on which the Duke of Almodovar said that he would take the sense of the Committee. I have the honour to inclose a copy of the eight points in question.

The meeting which was held in the afternoon passed off most harmoniously, and the several questions were discussed in a business-like manner. A small Committee was appointed to draw up Regulations specifying the mode in which the measures should be carried into effect, and these will be submitted to the Conference at its next meeting.

There are only two points in the matter to which I would beg leave to refer. I recommended that the penalties to which delinquents should be subjected should be equal and uniform, and that there should be no disparity of treatment in that respect. At present the several foreign Legislations impose widely different penalties—some severe and some exceedingly light. The contraband traffic is so lucrative and so universal that it was necessary, I pointed out, that those engaged in it should incur considerable risks in so doing, and severe penalties would, I submitted, act as a deterrent. I suggested that the penalties laid down in our Order in Council seemed to me to meet the case very well; and I have reason to hope that the Committee charged with the drafting of the Regulations will bear this in mind.

The other point I would mention is that, in dealing with the exceptions to be allowed to the general prohibitions of import of arms, &c., the Belgian Representatives requested that all sporting guns should be admitted. The present system, to which the Moorish Government have agreed, is that any individual who desires to import a sporting gun applies to his Legation, who procure a permit from the Moorish authorities. The Belgian Representatives desired that the permits should be abolished, and that any one should be allowed to import as many sporting guns as he desired, either for personal use or for sale. It is clear that this would open the door to many abuses, and the Moorish Delegates expressed their strong objection to it, though agreeing to refer the point to Fez. The Marquis de Visconti-Venosta urged the Belgian Representatives to withdraw their proposal, which met with no favour, but they said that, as it was under instructions from their Government that they had brought it forward, they were unable to withdraw it unless similarly authorized.

When paragraph 8, dealing with maritime control, came forward for discussion, I suggested that this point should be deferred until we discussed the whole coastguard service, and the meeting agreed to my proposition.

The sitting had been so harmonious that I thought it would be unfortunate if at its termination a question were discussed which might lead to considerable differences of opinion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

P.S.—I beg leave to inclose copy of the proposal submitted by the Belgian Delegates.

A. N.

Inclosure 1 in No. 106.

Questions respecting Contraband of Arms.

Paragraphe 1er.—Les mesures de répression doivent avoir comme précédent indispensable la prohibition d'importer des armes et des munitions dans l'Empire Chérifien.

Paragraphe 2.—La Conférence devra-t-elle fixer les exceptions au principe de la prohibition ou les laisser à l'Arbitre du Maghzen, et, dans le premier cas, quelles seraient ces exceptions ?

Paragraphe 3.—Conviendrait-il d'unifier les législations pénales étrangères sur la contrebande des armes au Maroc, et sur quelles bases ?

Paragraphe 4.—La Conférence posera-t-elle quelques principes généraux sur les sanctions pénales applicables aux sujets Marocains, ou laissera-t-elle entièrement ce point à la discrétion de Sa Majesté Chérifienne, et quels seraient ces principes ?

Paragraphe 5.—Tout en conservant l'intégrité du privilège de l'exterritorialité des étrangers au Maroc, ne serait-il pas utile de faciliter au Maghzen l'accusation des fraudeurs devant le Tribunal compétent, et même d'assurer des primes aux particuliers qui auront signalé le délit et contribué à sa découverte ?

Paragraphe 6.—La surveillance et la répression de la contrebande des armes au Riff dans la région de Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña, et sur la frontière Espagnole du Sahara, ainsi que dans la région frontière de l'Algérie, seront effectuées respectivement entre les Gouvernements Espagnol et Français et le Gouvernement du Sultan conformément aux principes de règlement que la Conférence aura adoptés.

Paragraphe 7.—Comment la surveillance devrait-elle être organisée dans les ports et sur les rivages de la Mer du Maroc de manière à être efficace comme dans les pays Européens ?

Paragraphe 8.—Conviendrait-il de faire une étude spéciale de la surveillance maritime de la contrebande des armes au Maroc, ou de la traiter en même temps que la surveillance de la contrebande Douanière générale lorsque la Conférence devra étudier le moyen d'assurer un meilleur rendement des impôts ?

Inclosure 2 in No. 106.

Proposal of the Belgian Delegates respecting Contraband of Arms.

LA question de l'introduction au Maroc des armes et munitions de guerre paraissant être préjugée dans le sens de la prohibition, la Délégation Belge propose à la Conférence que cette interdiction soit limitée aux armes et munitions de guerre proprement dites, et qu'une exception soit faite en faveur des armes et munitions de chasse.

La Délégation Belge demande seulement à la Conférence de se prononcer sur la question de principe. Quant aux espèces d'armes qui seraient admises, le soin de les définir serait laissé à une Commission technique.

(Signé) JOOSTENS.
BUISSERET.

Algésiras, le 18 *Janvier*, 1906.

[3223]

No. 107.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 5. Conference.)
Sir,

Algeciras, January 19, 1906.

MARQUIS VISCONTI VENOSTA called on me this morning, and we had a conversation on Moorish Affairs generally, and the prospects of the Conference in particular. His Excellency said that he was perplexed to find an issue from the dilemma which had been created by the diametrically opposite and apparently irreconcilable views of France and Germany in regard to the police question. If both parties remained on their present respective standpoints a compromise seemed

impossible of attainment. He said that he had had a short conversation with M. Rouvier on the subject, but the latter had remarked that if a solution could not be found the matter had better be left alone altogether. M. Visconti Venosta observed that this method did not appear to him desirable, or as a satisfactory result of the labours of the Conference.

I told his Excellency that I had turned over the question in my mind for some time past, but that I had not hitherto had a detailed conversation with M. Révoil on the subject. My instructions were to support France cordially, and I intended to do so throughout the Conference, but the suggestion, which I had heard previously, to leave the police question alone had caused me some dismay. I considered that the police question, or in other words the protection to be afforded to foreigners living in the coast towns, was the most urgent and the most important of all the subjects before the Conference. To my mind, a serious moral responsibility, apart from every other consideration, was imposed on all of us to enable our compatriots, as far as was possible, to live in peace and security, and that I should leave the Conference with a heavy heart if nothing had been done to remedy the perfectly intolerable situation which at present existed.

I thought it more than probable that, whatever might be the results of the Conference, there would be a recrudescence of the feeling against the foreigners in Morocco, and their security would be still more in danger than it was at present. Respect for the European had long since vanished from the mind of the native, and any neglect on the part of united Europe to afford the most elementary protection to their subjects seemed to me likely to render the position of our compatriots exceedingly critical.

I thought such considerations must have some weight with the German Representatives, and if it were explained to them how urgent were the needs, they would surely not refuse to seek for some immediate remedy. The police organization, to my mind, must be intrusted to those nations who could supply at once efficient and well-qualified material for the purpose. Officers and non-commissioned officers were required who had knowledge of the people and of the language, and such could only be furnished by France and Spain. If a mandate accorded to those two Powers was likely to arouse misgivings and jealousy, the mandate might be for a very limited period, for twelve or even six months. By the end of that period the situation in Morocco might improve, and even if it did not, the officers, if capable men, could have organized a police force which might continue to operate under trained Moorish kaïds, provided always the pay of the men, their rations, and general well-being were supervised by the Consular Body in each coast town. Surely such a modest proposal could not meet with serious opposition on the part of any member of the Conference?

At the same time, I repeated that I had not gone fully into the question with M. Révoil, and whatever his Government and he decided I would loyally follow, as I was working hand in hand with them, and the above were merely my personal views.

Marquis Visconti Venosta replied that he thought the project was a reasonable one, but he did not know if Germany would accept even it. It would be disastrous if the Conference were to break up without having accomplished some good work, and without being able to show some practical results, however modest. He did not think war would ensue in consequence of a failure, but an extremely delicate and embarrassing situation would undoubtedly be produced.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[3224] No. 108.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 6. Conference.)

Sir, *Algeciras, January 20, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the *procès-verbal* of the first meeting of the Conference held on the 16th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 108.

Procès-verbal of First Meeting of Conference, held January 16, 1906.

LES Plénipotentiaires des Puissances se sont réunis à 3 heures de l'après-midi, dans les salons de l'Hôtel de Ville d'Algésiras.

Étaient présents :

Allemagne—
Son Excellence M. de Radowitz, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne à Madrid;
Son Excellence M. le Comte de Tattenbach, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire d'Allemagne à Lisbonne.

Autriche-Hongrie—
Son Excellence M. le Comte Rodolphe de Welsersheimb, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie, à Madrid;
M. le Comte Bolesta-Koziebrodzki, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire d'Autriche-Hongrie à Tanger.

Belgique—
Son Excellence M. le Baron Joostens, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Belgique à Madrid;
Son Excellence M. le Comte de Buisseret Steemberque de Blarenghien, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Belgique à Tanger.

Espagne—
Son Excellence M. le Duc de Almodovar del Rio, Ministre d'État;
Son Excellence M. Pérez Caballero, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire d'Espagne à Bruxelles.

États-Unis d'Amérique—
Son Excellence Mr. Henry White, Ambassadeur des États-Unis d'Amérique près Sa Majesté le Roi d'Italie;
Son Excellence Mr. Samuel R. Gummery, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire des États-Unis d'Amérique à Tanger.

France—
Son Excellence M. Révoil, Ambassadeur de la République Française à Berne.

Grande-Bretagne—
Son Excellence Sir Arthur Nicolson, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande à Madrid.

Italie—
Son Excellence M. le Marquis Visconti-Venosta, ancien Ministre des Affaires Étrangères;
Son Excellence M. J. Malmusi, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire d'Italie à Tanger.

Maroc—
Son Excellence le Hach Mohamed Ben Larbi Torres, Délégué de Sa Majesté Chérifienne à Tanger et son Ambassadeur Extraordinaire;
Sid Mohamed El Mokri, ancien Almotacen à Fez;
Hach Mohamed Seffar;
Sid Abderraman Ben-Nis.

Pays-Bas—

Son Excellence le Jonkheer H. Testa, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté la Reine des Pays-Bas à Madrid.

Portugal—

Son Excellence M. le Comte de Tovar, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté le Roi de Portugal à Madrid;

Son Excellence M. le Comte de Martens Ferrão, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Portugal à Tanger.

Russie—

Son Excellence M. le Comte Arthur Cassini, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie à Madrid;

M. Bacheracht, Ministre de Russie à Tanger.

Suède—

Son Excellence M. Robert Sager, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède à Madrid.

Son Excellence M. le Duc de Almodovar del Rio, Ministre d'État de Sa Majesté Catholique et Délégué Plénipotentiaire d'Espagne, souhaite en ces termes la bienvenue aux Délégués des Puissances:—

"M. les Délégués,—C'est la seconde fois que les Représentants de Sa Majesté Chérifienne se réunissent sur le territoire Espagnol avec les Plénipotentiaires des Puissances intéressées au Maroc pour délibérer sur des questions de la plus haute importance pour l'avenir du Moghreb.

"L'Espagne est heureuse d'offrir aux uns et aux autres une hospitalité que, comme quelqu'un le disait tout récemment, elle peut considérer dans l'espèce comme une tradition; et sous l'empire de ces sentiments, j'ai l'honneur de vous adresser, au nom de Sa Majesté le Roi, mon Auguste Souverain, et de son Gouvernement, les souhaits de cordiale bienvenue, ainsi que de vous exprimer l'espoir que nos communs efforts mèneront à bonne fin la tâche élevée et délicate qui nous est imposée à Algésiras."

Son Excellence M. de Radowitz, Premier Délégué d'Allemagne, prend la parole et s'exprime ainsi qu'il suit:—

"Messieurs,—L'ordre alphabétique me donne le droit de vous prier de vouloir bien m'accorder la parole. J'ai donc l'honneur de vous proposer de confier la présidence des travaux de cette Conférence à son Excellence M. le Duc de Almodovar, le digne Représentant du pays qui, en ce moment, offre son hospitalité aux Délégués des Puissances ici réunis."

Les autres Délégués ayant donné à l'unanimité leur assentiment à la proposition du Premier Délégué d'Allemagne, son Excellence M. le Duc de Almodovar del Rio remercie de l'honneur qui lui est fait par l'allocution suivante:—

"Je remercie vivement son Excellence M. le Premier Délégué de l'Allemagne des termes si pleins de considération pour l'Espagne et de déférence personnelle à mon égard dont il s'est servi pour proposer à leurs Excellences MM. les Plénipotentiaires que, conformément aux pratiques, la présidence de nos travaux me soit confiée; et je suis également reconnaissant aux autres Délégués de l'assentiment bienveillant qu'ils ont voulu donner à cette proposition.

"Ce serait peut-être superflu de vous assurer que, faute d'autres qualités, j'apporterai à l'accomplissement des importantes fonctions qui viennent de m'être dévolues le même esprit de conciliation dont nous sommes tous animés.

"Pour que la Conférence achève de se constituer, je me permets de proposer comme Secrétaires M. Piña, Ministre Résident, Chef de Section au Ministère d'État; M. Pierre de Margerie, Conseiller de l'Ambassade de France à Madrid; et, comme Secrétaires Adjoints, M. Hontoria et M. de Ojeda, Secrétaires d'Ambassade respectivement."

La proposition relative à la constitution du Secrétariat ayant été approuvée à l'unanimité, le Secrétariat se trouve constitué de la façon suivante:—

Secrétaires:

M. Ramon Piña y Millet, Chef du Cabinet du Ministre d'État de Sa Majesté Catholique.

M. Pierre de Margerie, Conseiller de l'Ambassade de France à Madrid.

Adjoints au Secrétariat:

M. Manuel G. Hontoria, Second Secrétaire à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté Catholique à Paris.

M. Jaime de Ojeda, Troisième Secrétaire d'Ambassade au Ministère d'État.

Les Délégués des Puissances se rendent ensuite dans la salle des séances et prennent place à la table par ordre alphabétique, en commençant par la droite du Président. Par exception, les Délégués du Maroc prennent place à la gauche du Président.

Son Excellence le Duc de Almodovar del Rio, s'asseyant au fauteuil de la présidence, prononce le discours suivant:—

"Messieurs,—En fixant le programme qui doit servir de base à nos délibérations, les Puissances qui ont contribué directement à le préparer, ainsi que celles qui y ont adhéré par la suite, ont clairement manifesté l'intérêt qui s'attache à ce que l'ordre, la paix, et la prospérité règnent au Maroc. Ce but est en lui-même aussi désirable pour le Sultan qu'avantageux pour les autres Gouvernements, en raison de l'influence qu'il exercera sur le développement du commerce et sur les relations des nations avec le Moghreb. Les Puissances sont également d'accord pour reconnaître que ce but précieux ne saurait être atteint que moyennant l'introduction de réformes dans l'Empire, réformes basées sur le triple principe de la souveraineté du Sultan, de l'intégrité de ses États, et de l'égalité de traitement en matière commerciale, c'est-à-dire, la 'porte ouverte.'

"Sa Majesté Chérifienne et les Puissances, en adoptant le programme, ne nous ont pas, toutefois, investis de la mission de tracer un plan complet pour la transformation administrative du Maroc. Il s'agirait plutôt d'étudier en commun les moyens d'application des mesures qui, dès à présent, paraissent être à la fois et les plus urgentes et les plus faciles à introduire.

"La confiance que nous avons tous dans l'influence civilisatrice de la paix et du commerce nous autorise à espérer que ces mesures, bien que leur portée puisse au premier abord sembler limitée, seraient aussi les plus efficaces. Lorsque des corps de police auront été organisés là où la Conférence le jugera réalisable; lorsque la contrebande des armes sera réprimée, des ressources assurées pour les dépenses publiques et pour améliorer l'outillage des ports; lorsque, en conséquence, la tranquillité sera rétablie et les transactions économiques facilitées, la meilleure appréciation, par les populations Marocaines, des bienfaits de la paix et du travail permettra à Sa Majesté Chérifienne d'ouvrir à son Empire des perspectives de prospérité si conformes aux désirs de tous.

"Le respect mutuel de nos intérêts réciproques et le désir sincère de les concilier doivent être, à mon avis, avec les principes de souveraineté du Sultan et de l'intégrité de son Empire, notre règle de conduite à cette Conférence. Si de semblables sentiments ne nous étaient inspirés par la disposition de nos esprits, ainsi que par l'esprit qui anime nos Gouvernements, il nous seraient déjà dictés par l'attitude expectante du monde entier, qui s'attend à des solutions de concorde, conformes aux aspirations, toujours croissantes, de la solidarité universelle."

Son Excellence M. Révoil, Délégué de la France, s'associe en ces termes aux paroles de Son Excellence M. le Président:—

"Je m'associe aux sentiments éloquemment exprimés par Son Excellence M. le Président, et je propose à la Conférence de donner son adhésion à la pensée qu'il vient de formuler si heureusement et prendre pour base des réformes projetées le triple principe de la souveraineté du Sultan, de l'intégrité de ses États, et de la 'porte ouverte' en matière commerciale. A ces principes se rattachent ceux qui sont inscrits au programme en matière économique: adjudication pour les travaux publics, aucune aliénation des services publics au profit d'intérêts particuliers."

Son Excellence M. de Radowitz Premier Délégué de l'Allemagne, prend la parole à son tour, adhère aux déclarations de Son Excellence M. le Président et de Son

Excellence M. Révoil, et exprime l'espoir que les travaux de la Conférence seront féconds en résultats heureux.

Son Excellence le Président, constate l'assentiment unanime des Délégués à la proposition de Son Excellence M. Révoil, et propose ensuite de fixer l'ordre dans lequel seront discutés les différents points inscrits au programme. Il croit être l'interprète du sentiment général en suggérant d'examiner tout d'abord la question de la contre-des armes ; puis viendront les questions se rattachant aux améliorations financières et aux moyens d'assurer au Maghzen les ressources nécessaires à l'introduction des autres projets des réformes dont l'examen se fera en dernier lieu.

Dans cet ordre d'idées, il fait remarquer qu'il y aurait sans doute intérêt à déposer au Secrétariat les projets que certaines délégations auraient pu rédiger par avance en vue de la solution de cette question, comme, du reste, de toutes celles qui seront successivement examinées par la Conférence. Le Secrétariat serait chargé de les faire imprimer et d'en assurer la distribution à MM. les Délégués.

Son Excellence Sir Arthur Nicolson, Délégué de l'Angleterre, exprime le désir de savoir si, dans la pensée de Son Excellence M. le Président, ce mode de procéder exclurait la possibilité de présenter des propositions incidentes au cours des délibérations.

Après un échange de vues il est convenu, conformément au désir de M. le Délégué d'Angleterre, que chaque Délégué conserve à ce point de vue sa pleine liberté d'action. Sous cette réserve, la proposition de Son Excellence M. le Président relative à l'ordre et à la procédure suivant lesquels les questions du programme seront examinées est adoptée.

Son Excellence le Président annonce qu'il se propose de faire connaître à MM. les Délégués le jour de la prochaine séance, et sur l'avis de la majorité, il est décidé que les séances auront lieu à 10 heures du matin.

La séance est levée à 3 heures trois quarts.

Au nom de la Conférence :
Le Président,
(Signé) Le Duc DE ALMODOVAR DEL RIO.

Les Secrétaires,
(Signé) R. PIÑA MILLET.
PIERRE DE MARGERIE.

[3225] No. 109.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 7. Conference.)

Sir, *Algeciras, January 20, 1906.*

I REPEATED to M. Révoil, textually, the conversation which I had had with Marquis Visconti Venosta, and which I have had the honour to report in my despatch No. 5 of the 19th instant, in regard to the organization of the police.

M. Révoil said that he entirely shared my views, that it would be wrong that the Conference should break up and disperse without having made some effort to remedy the unfortunate situation in which all foreigners resident in Morocco were at present placed, and towards affording them some protection for their lives and properties. He entirely agreed with the limited conditions which I had mentioned within which the police organization should be restricted, and he was quite ready to accept the minimum, provided always that France and Spain were solely intrusted with the duty. Before the date of dealing with the question approached he would consult with me, and also with the Duke of Almodovar, as to finding some formula which would raise the smallest objection and be of the most innocent character. If put forward as a provisional measure to meet a pressing need it would be difficult to resist it.

I have some hopes, I admit no very substantial ones, that if the question is properly handled and kept on the proper ground, the assent of the Conference may be secured to the proposal.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[3226] No. 110.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 8. Conference.)

Sir, *Algeciras, January 21, 1906.*

MR. HENRY WHITE, the United States' Representative, spoke to me in regard to the position of the Jews in Morocco, and said that he had received instructions from his Government to bring the matter before the Conference in order that representations might be made to the Moorish Government with a view of obtaining some improvement in their situation. The French Representative and myself were of opinion that it was desirable, if possible, to abstain from introducing questions which were not inscribed on the programme, as we considered that if one exception were made it would be difficult to resist admitting others, and the Conference might find itself involved in the discussion of subjects possibly of a very embarrassing and delicate character.

Mr. White recognized the force of these arguments, but was anxious that in some way or another the matter should be brought to the notice of the Conference, as the President of the United States took a warm interest in the question.

I suggested that perhaps it would be sufficient if the Diplomatic Body at Tangier or some of its members should, when the Conference had concluded its labours, receive instructions to make collective or identic representations to the Moorish Government, but Mr. White appeared to have some doubts whether this method of procedure would be satisfactory or sufficiently effective.

I spoke again to my French colleague on the subject, and he said that he would suggest to his Government that on the termination of the Conference, and before the members finally separated, we might submit a semi-official note to be addressed to the Moorish Government in the name of the Conference, enumerating the grievances of which the Jews complained, and request the Moorish Delegates to forward it to Fez. I think that such a procedure would meet the views of Mr. White, and I trust that the other members of the Conference may acquiesce in the course proposed.

Before taking the step indicated above, I think it will be desirable to examine and sift the list of grievances enumerated in the inclosure to your despatch No. 145 of the 8th November, as on a first perusal it seemed to me that several of them had been abolished or greatly modified since the date when they were originally formulated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[3362] No. 111.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 14.)

Sir, *Tangier, January 19, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a few days ago the Sultan's forces at Oujdah fell upon an unarmed caravan with merchandize destined for Bu Amama, the Pretender's ally, killing thirty-six men and acquiring the goods. Upon this the troops of Bu Amama retaliated, recovering the goods and putting the Sultan's troops to flight, many being killed, although they were, it seems, five times as numerous as Bu Amama's forces.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[3363] No. 112.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 15.)

Sir, *Tangier, January 19, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 12, Confidential, of the 15th instant, I have the honour to report that I have been informed by Count St. Aulaire, the French Chargé d'Affaires, that the French cruiser "Lalande" has returned from its visit to Mar Chica.

The report is as follows :—

No boats of any kind were discovered. Four tents of rather mean appearance were seen on the shore quite close to the sea, at a spot about 15 kilom. from Melilla, as well as a very small warehouse, a few feet square, which seems to contain sacks. On the top of this was a flag, green with a circle in the centre, in the middle of which was a black cross. A salute was given to the "Lalande," which was not returned. There was no indication of any works of any kind, either with the object of creating a port or of cutting the land between the sea and the Mar Chica, or of erecting a fort.

Count St. Aulaire said that evidently the whole matter was one of infinitesimal importance, which had been exaggerated by the Spanish press, and that it was obviously the duty of the Sultan's forces to put a stop to this illicit trading, but as they were powerless to move, and too timid to show themselves in the neighbourhood of the Pretender's camp, nothing would be done by them. The Algerian authorities had decided to prevent those vessels that were known to convey merchandize to this spot from leaving Algerian ports. The traders, however, might have other sources from which to provide themselves.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[3253] No. 113.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 27.)

(No. 19.)
Sir, *Madrid, January* 22, 1906.

M. CAMBON, the French Ambassador, informed me to-day that M. Rouvier had communicated to him certain rumours which had reached the French Government to the effect that the German Government had the idea of possibly proposing at the Conference at Algeciras the neutralization of Morocco by the Powers. In the opinion of M. Rouvier this idea was quite unacceptable to France, as at the first claim which the French Government might have to enforce trouble would arise, and Germany would be sure to render herself disagreeable. The neutralization of small but highly civilized States was possible, but not that of barbaric ones. The anarchy which existed in Morocco made neutralization of that country impossible.

In conformity with his instructions, M. Cambon had been to see Señor Moret, the President of the Council, to ascertain his views with regard to this question. Señor Moret, it would appear, did not hesitate in his reply, but declared most formally that the populace would stone any Spanish Ministry who gave their consent to any scheme for the neutralization of Morocco. Neutralization of that country meant for Spain the giving up of her historic traditions and the annihilation of all her aspirations in Morocco. He would have nothing to do with such a scheme.

Instructions in this sense have been sent to the Duke of Almodovar, President of the Conference.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[3262] No. 114.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 27.)

(No. 15.)
Sir, *Stockholm, January* 23, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in reply to an inquiry on my part, told me that he had not as yet received any report from the Swedish Delegate to the Conference at Algeciras.

M. de Trolle, however, when I endeavoured to sound him on the subject, made no secret of the instructions given to the Representative of Sweden. He said that the only aspect of the Morocco question in which his Government took any interest was the commercial one. In that they felt they had a right to be interested, and M. Sager had a general instruction to support the policy of the open door, but to refrain from mixing himself up in any of the political questions.

I apprehend, therefore, that if and when it becomes necessary for the vote of Sweden to be given on any particular point other than that contemplated in his general instruction, the Swedish Delegate will in each case refer home for special instructions.

(Confidential.)

M. de Trolle added that he had read the French Yellow Book and the German White Book, and that, after a perusal of these two papers, his prepossessions were in favour of the French case. It seemed to him impossible to contest the special petition of France in regard to Morocco, while he was unable to see what particular justification Germany had for taking up the question with so much vehemence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RENNELL RODD.

[3231] No. 115.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 27.)

(No. 37.)
Sir, *Paris, January* 26, 1906.

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 7 of yesterday's date, I had some conversation with the Political Director of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the proceedings of the Algeciras Conference. I alluded to the attitude of the German Government as reported by Sir Arthur Nicolson in his telegram No. 13 of the 24th instant, and I found that M. Louis held unusually strong views with regard to it. The idea, he said, that Germany should expect France now to take the initiative in putting forward her views and proposals was preposterous. The Conference had been called at the express desire of Germany; France had merely acquiesced in it, and it was for Germany to speak first. He could well imagine that she found herself in a somewhat embarrassing position, as he believed that she had prepared a graduated series of schemes, any one of which could be produced to suit the turn that matters appeared to be taking, but she had no very clear view of what she genuinely wanted herself, and consequently would be at a disadvantage if obliged to open the discussion. France, he hoped, would do nothing to help her out of this embarrassment, which, indeed, he considered constituted one of the principal elements of strength in the French position. M. Louis did not seem to favour the idea that the French and German Representatives should now discuss matters privately, the time for such discussion he considered was past. France had been all in favour of such a course at the commencement of the controversy, but once Germany had insisted upon a Conference, all proposals had to be submitted openly to it for discussion.

M. Louis appeared very sceptical with regard to the financial concessions which Germany might make to France.

Since writing my above-mentioned telegram I have received your telegram No. 11, reporting Sir F. Lascelles' conversation with Prince Bülow. M. Louis' views were, I imagine, based on information received from Algeciras, and he cannot, I think, when I saw him, have been aware of the conciliatory attitude adopted by the Chancellor in Berlin. On leaving the Quai d'Orsay I met Prince Radolin, who may have been charged with a message in this connection. I notice that Prince Bülow professes ignorance of the line taken by Herr von Radowitz on the question of possible German financial concessions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

P.S.—(Most Confidential.) I have received some information this afternoon from a very private source, but one which I believe to be reliable, which lends colour to the view that the statements of the German agents in different countries purposely do not tally. My informant hears that the reports received from the French Ambassadors in Washington, St. Petersburgh, and Madrid, show that the German Representatives in those three capitals have made absolutely conflicting statements with regard to the views and intentions of the German Government at Algeciras. The French Government, he said, cannot believe that this is accidental, and imagine that these manœuvres are being resorted to with the object of creating confusion in their minds: they are accordingly all the more nervous as to the outcome of the Conference.

R. L.

No. 116.

[Nil.]

[3383] No. 117.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 12.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, January 27, 1906.*

THIS afternoon Herr von Mühlberg read to me a telegram from Herr von Radowitz, dated the 25th instant, recording an interview with M. Révoil, which must have taken place before he learnt the language held to me by Prince Bülow on the night of the 24th, as reported in my telegram No. 10 of the 25th instant.

Herr von Radowitz stated that the work of the Conference was proceeding satisfactorily. He had entered into direct communication with M. Révoil, with whom he had had a friendly conversation, and had explained to him that some other solution of the police question would have to be found, as the granting of a general mandate to France would not be acceptable. M. Révoil, in reply, had expressed his readiness to discuss other proposals for settling the question, and had indicated no intention of putting forward the question of a general mandate as a French demand. He would also be prepared to discuss the financial question in a conciliatory manner.

[3385] No. 118.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, January 27, 1906.*

THE following is confidential:—

Last night the German Representative intimated to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs that, as regards the police, a possible combination might be found by intrusting its organization to Spain, Italy, Germany, and France. At the same time he informed his Excellency that it was the desire of Germany to obtain a footing in Morocco.

The German Representative has suggested to the Representative of the United States that the organization of the police might be intrusted to Italy alone. Mr. Henry White has told his Government that the three solutions communicated by Germany at Washington are inadequate and impracticable.

To-morrow Count Tattenbach and the German and French experts will meet to examine the question of the bank, and at a later date a further private conversation will take place between the German and French Representatives in regard to the question of police.

The various and contradictory proposals which are being made at different capitals and at Algeciras by the German Government and their Representatives have much perplexed M. Révoil.

[3386] No. 119.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, January 27, 1906.*

THE Conference sat in general committee this morning, when the question of an increase of customs duties was discussed. I explained that even before I referred to His Majesty's Government the above question it must be shown to my satisfaction that the revenues which such increases might supply would be kept in a separate "caisse," and would be devoted solely to measures which would facilitate and assist commerce and improve the ports. I would, I said, give no guarantee or assurance that in the

event of my submitting such a proposal to my Government they would be inclined to agree.

Proposals for large increases of customs duties, as well as for taxation of many undertakings, such as telegraphs, posts, &c., were handed in by the Moorish Delegates. They could not possibly be accepted, but a discussion on them will take place on Monday, when our next sitting will be held.

[3387] No. 120.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, January 28, 1906.*

THERE is one passage in my telegram No. 19 of 28th instant which requires correction.

The suggestion that Italy alone might be charged with the police organization was made to the German Representative by the United States' Representative, and the former replied that to Germany such a solution would be very welcome.

[3668] No. 121.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 21. Confidential.)
Sir, *Madrid, January 27, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that yesterday afternoon Baron Stumm, the German Chargé d'Affaires, called on me, and in the course of conversation I obtained from him some information with regard to the Morocco Conference, which I beg herewith to report.

Baron Stumm told me that he had received several letters from Herr von Radowitz, the German Representative at the Conference, of a very optimistic tone as regards the outlook at Algeciras, and he repeated to me very much what Count Tattenbach had said to me, as reported in my despatch No. 11 of the 15th instant—that the German Government desired to be rid of the Morocco question, at least for a time, and would be willing to help to find a solution for the difficulties which might arise at the Conference if only the Powers would meet them half way. The Kaiser, he said, was desirous for peace, and every one in Germany would be glad to be freed from the worry caused by Morocco, so that their Government might turn their undivided attention towards Russia, where the present condition of affairs was likely to have a prejudicial influence both in Austrian and in Prussian Poland.

I asked Baron Stumm in what way he thought a solution could be found for the difficult question of the organization of a police force for Morocco. He had nothing very definite to say on the matter, but he thought something might be arranged by limiting as much as possible the area for which a police force should be organized, and making such arrangement for a short period of time—five or ten years—and, if found satisfactory, renewable for another term of years with the consent of the Powers. In this way something practical might be accomplished without prejudicing the rights of any Power, and leaving the bigger question of police to be decided at some future date. Baron Stumm made no mention to me of Spain being asked to take a considerable part in organizing this limited police force.

I saw M. Cambon this morning and reported to him what I had heard from the German Chargé d'Affaires, and he expressed the opinion that Germany evidently had various schemes for solving the police question, and that the French Government must be prepared to meet them when they are brought up before the Conference. For this reason he informed me he would go to Paris for a few days to discuss with M. Rouvier the views which the French Government should take with regard to the various schemes Germany may bring forward before the Conference.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[3733] No. 122.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, January 30, 1906.*

THE French financial experts had a private interview yesterday morning with the German experts and Count Tattenbach on the subject of the State Bank. An agreement was, I understand, reached in regard to the bank's functions and attributes, but the following points were opposed by Germany:—

(*a.*) That the bank should be placed under French legislation;
(*b.*) That the greater proportion of the capital should be contributed by France, as Germany considers that the right to equal participation should be accorded to all countries;
(*c.*) That preferential rights should be granted to France in regard to any loans in the future.

If Germany would be ready to make some concessions in regard to the second of these points (*b*), I think that France would make concessions in regard to the third (*c*). At any rate, the fact that an interchange of views has taken place denotes that a step in advance has been made.

The French will endeavour to elicit the German views in regard to the police question before they terminate the discussions in regard to the State Bank, as they wish to settle both questions simultaneously.

I propose, when I have had an opportunity of seeing the terms of the understanding at which the two parties finally arrive, to inform the French Representative that I must consult my Government before giving any opinion on the subject.

[3820] No. 123.

Mr. A. G. Wise to Foreign Office.—(Received January 31.)

(Confidential.) 8, *Carey Mansions, Carey Street, Westminster, London, S.W., January 30, 1906.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the letter dated the 25th instant from Mr. F. A. Campbell, C.B., stating that the questions raised in my communication of the 24th instant had been referred to His Majesty's Representative at Tangier, and I beg that you will be good enough to convey to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs an expression of my thanks for his prompt action in this matter.

I much regret, however, to have to inform you that, upon making very strict and careful inquiry, I find that the statement made by me to the effect that a certain autograph was that of His Shereefian Majesty is not correct, being, in reality, the handwriting of one of the Viziers, whose name I am willing to reveal in the strictest confidence, it being, for obvious reasons of State, undesirable to commit the said name to writing.

I still believe that the Sultan is favourable to the establishment of the English bank previously referred to by me (viz., The Bank of Morocco (Limited)), and to its becoming the State Bank. Indeed, I understand that reference to the subject was made by the Moorish Delegates at the Algeciras Conference, as well as to the fact that preliminaries had been entered into.

I trust, therefore, that the importance of the matter may not appear less in consequence of the correction which I have deemed it my duty to make at this juncture.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. G. H. WISE.

[3844] No. 124.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, January 31, 1906.*

MY telegram No. 5 of the 19th instant. The French traders at Mar Chica.

The French vessel "Eider" is reported by the Governor of Melilla to have been wrecked, but a cargo worth 30,000*l.*, consisting of guns, Krupp rifles, and ammunition, has been landed by another vessel. The Pretender has taken these over.

A French man-of-war is leaving to-morrow for Mar Chica, and the "Turki," the Moorish Government vessel, has also left with fifty men to endeavour to check this traffic.

[3955] No. 125.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Lascelles.

(No. 52.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 31, 1906.*

COUNT METTERNICH told me to-day that he had seen recently statements by M. de Lanessan and M. Clemenceau, both asserting that they were opposed to France asking from the Conference a general mandate for the police of Morocco, and I understood him to say that both or one of these gentlemen had suggested that the police in Morocco should be organized under the Sultan as a Moroccan force, but that they should be supported by funds provided by the State Bank, which was to be established, and applied under international control. This had struck him as a plan which the German Government might accept. I asked him who were to be the officers of the police force. Count Metternich did not seem sure, but had assumed that they were to be Moroccans.

The project seems too vague for me to express an opinion upon it, but I have thought it worth while to record it in case future developments should throw further light upon Count Metternich's reason for mentioning it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[3843] No. 126.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 10. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, January 31, 1906.*

CONFERENCE at Algeciras.

I was shown to-day by Señor Ojeda a long private letter from Señor Perez Caballero, the second Spanish Delegate, together with the latest telegrams from the Duke of Almodovar. He expressed at the same time the opinion that we must be prepared for the Conference breaking down, and said that the effect produced on the Spanish Government by the latest news was one of depression. He considered that the intention of Germany seemed to be to work for the neutralization of Morocco by trying to internationalize every reform introduced, adding that to Spain the idea of such neutralization would be most distasteful. The present policy of the German Government with regard to the police question is, according to Spanish information, to propose that some small Power should be given a mandate for the purpose by the Conference; to this, again, Spain would have the strongest objection.

I gather from the Duke's telegram that he considers that, under the proposal for allotting Spain only 20 per cent. of the bank capital, Spanish interests would not receive proper consideration, as they would be entitled to a larger share than those of any other Power, except France. It has been suggested that France and Spain should divide, in the proportion of twenty-seven to twenty-three, half the bank capital.

I was given to understand that if the offer should be made, Spain would be prepared to accept a joint mandate with France for the organization of the police.

In the opinion of Señor Caballero, the Marquis Visconti-Venosta is so feeble from old age that, in the event of a crisis arising, he would not be an efficient mediator.

M. Cambon, who leaves for Paris to-morrow, informed of the above.

[3940] No. 127.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 1, 1906.*

I AM told by my French colleague that he is sending a telegram to his Government in which he proposes to agree to the increase of the customs duties as a temporary measure, but stipulating at the same time that the following conditions must be observed :—

1. The increases are to be limited to 2½ per cent.
2. The revenues arising therefrom are to be handed to a special "caisse."
3. These revenues are to be exclusively devoted to works of a nature to benefit and promote commerce.
4. The Agents of the French Loan, into whose hands 60 per cent. of the customs already pass, are to collect them.
5. The future State Bank is to be intrusted with the keeping of the funds and accounts of the special "caisse."
6. The decision as to what works are to be undertaken is to rest with the Diplomatic Body at Tangier, acting in co-operation with the Moorish Government. The selection of the engineers to carry out the works is to be made by the Diplomatic Body, and the special "caisse" is to pay their salaries.

The project is in my opinion reasonable, and might be accepted.

On Saturday, when we are to deal with the subject in General Committee, I shall be able to judge whether these conditions will be accepted by the Conference. If they are, I would propose to say that I will submit them to His Majesty's Government and request you to furnish me with instructions on the subject. You might, however, think it well to authorize me before Saturday to accept them, on condition that they are passed without modification at the Committee on Saturday.

[4055] No. 128.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received February 2.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, February 2, 1906.*

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of even date, transmitting the decypher of a telegram received from Sir A. Nicolson, reporting the conditions on which the French Delegate proposes to agree to an increase of the customs duties of Morocco.

1. It is not clear from Sir A. Nicolson's telegram whether the proposed increase is intended to apply both to import and export duties, or only to the former. The Board, however, presume that the project only refers to import duties.

2. With reference thereto I am to say that the Board of Trade are of opinion that the consent of His Majesty's Government might reasonably be given to an increase of the import duties in Morocco not exceeding 2½ per cent., subject to the conditions specified in Sir A. Nicolson's telegram, and on the distinct understanding that any increase is to be applied equally to all classes of goods.

3. I am, however, to call attention to the fact that a few categories of articles, *e.g.*, tissues of silk, jewellery, wines, spirits, &c., are at present admitted into Morocco at a duty of only 5 per cent., under Conventions with France and Germany, instead of 10 per cent., as in the case of all other articles. It would appear equitable in principle that these goods (all of which are expensive luxuries), should be made dutiable at the full rate of 10 per cent. applied to imports generally before burdening the latter with any additional duties. The Board think that Sir A. Nicolson might be instructed to make this suggestion to the Committee, and to endeavour to secure their adhesion thereto.

4. The Board assume that the agents of the French loan, who it is proposed should collect the surtax, are considered by Sir A. Nicolson to be suitable for the purpose.

5. The Board have no information as to the proposed constitution of the future State Bank, but they assume that it is intended that His Majesty's Government shall be fully represented on its management.

6. It is observed that, according to the French proposal, the Diplomatic Body at Tangier, in co-operation with the Moroccan Government, are to decide what works are to be undertaken with the funds derived from the increased duties, and that these works are to be exclusively those which assist commerce. The Board have some doubt whether it is intended that the unanimous assent of the Diplomatic Body should be required, or that decisions should be arrived at by a majority vote. In the former case they fear that works of great utility, from the point of view of a country like the United Kingdom, might conceivably be blocked by the opposition of the Representative of some country having little or no commercial intercourse with Morocco. They trust that means will be found to obviate this danger. One possible method which suggests itself might be to confide the control of these works to the Diplomatic Representatives of the four Powers chiefly interested, viz., the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Spain, which collectively are responsible for over five-sixths of the total import trade of Morocco.

I am, &c.
(Signed) H. LLEWELLYN SMITH.

[4042] No. 129.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 2, 1906.*

A UNANIMOUS agreement in regard to fresh sources of revenue for the Moorish Government was arrived at yesterday at a plenary sitting of the Conference. We reaffirmed the internal taxation called "Tertib," about which an agreement was made in 1903 between the Moorish Government and the Powers, with the proviso that until it is levied on the natives it is not to be applied to foreigners. A tax on houses in towns, the proceeds of which are to be devoted exclusively to municipal purposes, was agreed to in principle. Regulations on this subject are to be drawn up by the Diplomatic Body at Tangier in concert with a Moorish Commissioner.

A weighing tax of 1 per cent. on merchandize carried in coasting trade, a tax of 2 per cent. on sales of real property, and a stamp tax on contracts were also agreed to.

The Conference further adopted what I look upon as a very salutary resolution respecting the acquisition by foreigners of real property in Morocco, by which Article XI of the Madrid Convention of 1880 is amplified.

[4034] No. 130.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 2, 1906.*

NEWS has been received here that the Moorish Government are sending their Minister for Foreign Affairs to take part in the Conference at Algeciras. It is possible that he is being sent to take the Moorish case in hand, as I am informed that there is much disagreement among the present Delegates from Morocco. He may also be the bearer of proposals respecting the organization of the police, and the surprise which has been promised us by the German Minister at Tangier may be this.

I have sent Mr. Lowther a copy of the above.

[4035] No. 131.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 2, 1906.*

FURTHER negotiations of a private nature have taken place in regard to the State Bank, and they offer some probability of an eventual agreement being reached. The French will, however, keep the negotiations open until an agreement is reached on the question of the police. I foresee that this latter question will give rise to great difficulty, as up to now it has proved impossible to discover any common ground on which an arrangement can be based. The two parties hold widely divergent views.

[4043] No. 132.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, February 2, 1906.*

MY telegram of the 31st ultimo, concerning the French traders at Mar Chica.

Although the Spanish authorities adhere to the statement that the vessel which landed guns, &c., flew the French flag, the French assert that she was a Swedish ship, the "Ellen," of 1,700 tons, and came direct from Antwerp.

[4055] No. 133.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 2, 1906.*

YOUR telegram No. 23.

His Majesty's Government see no objection in principle to increase of 2½ per cent. in import duties, subject to conditions you specify and to understanding that increase applies equally to all classes of goods. They must, however, reserve right to criticise details on receipt of fuller information, which you will, no doubt, furnish.

Meanwhile, I am sending you observations of Board of Trade on several points requiring consideration.

[4159] No. 134.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 17.)
Sir, *Tangier, January 25, 1906.*

A FEW weeks ago a deputation, consisting of a Notable from each of the three sections of the Anjera tribe, was dispatched to Fez by Duas, the Governor of that tribe, to convey to the Sultan the usual presents at the feast. Having accomplished their mission, these men left Fez on their return journey, but have never reached their homes. Inquiries were made concerning them, and they were traced as far as a village some 20 miles distant from Tangier, where they were to be the guests of the Sheikh appointed by Raisuli. Here they were made prisoners and taken off in chains, but nothing further is known in regard to them, and it is believed that they have been murdered by Raisuli's orders, as he is supposed to have suspected that they had negotiated with the Makhzen for his capture.

This news caused considerable excitement in Anjera, and a meeting of the principal people of the tribe was called by Duas to discuss the situation. Amongst other persons invited to attend the meeting was Deylan, an elderly man of considerable influence, who is a partisan of Raisuli's and a rival of Duas.

On arrival at Duas' village, Deylan and the others of those attending the meeting were invited to supper with Duas. On the conclusion of the meal, while the guests were washing their hands, as is customary, it appears that Duas arose and left the

room, when two men who were at enmity with Deylan, accompanied by some of their friends, entered and shot him, his son, and nephew.

Duas' object in having Deylan killed was to remove a rival and a partisan of Raisuli, who was suspected in being concerned in the seizure and, as is believed, assassination of the Anjera emissaries to the Court, and who would be a source of danger should the tribe attack Raisuli, as during their absence he might have raised his partisans and attacked Duas' party in the rear.

I understand that a further meeting of the Anjera tribe has now been called to decide whether an attack should be made on Raisuli. Should the tribe unanimously decide on an attack in full force, Raisuli will find it hard to defend himself, and will probably take refuge in flight. He has by his arbitrary conduct and exactions alienated his former partisans, who would now gladly see his downfall.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[4160] No. 135.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 18.)
Sir, *Tangier, January 26, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida containing general news from this district.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 135.

Consul Maclean to Mr. Lowther.

(No. 13.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, January 24, 1906.*

THE Governors and Notables of Showia are in constant attendance on Mouley-el-Amin at his camp in Mediouna.

The Ouled Zian tribe are being pressed for taxes, and there is a great demand for Mokhalata and protection certificates.

In Dar-al-Baida the Umana and official classes show themselves nervously interested in the proceedings of the Algeciras Conference.

The health of the Governor is not improving, and it is difficult to get the Khalifa to attend properly to one's representations, but all pending questions have made some progress since my last report.

Rabat is the home of many natives of the class that supplies Government officials, and they are anxious concerning the results of the Conference, but they pretend to desire reforms in the administration of the country.

In Abda Kaïd Aissa-ben-Omar is reported to be pressing heavily on the tribes under his rule, extorting as much money as possible out of them.

The Rahamna tribe has settled down to self-government. The different factions have agreed to accept no Kaïd and to pay no taxes until the Sultan arrives in their vicinity. Any faction showing any inclination towards acknowledging a Governor will be immediately attacked.

Zneeber, the Mohtasseb of Marrakesh, the friend of el-Menebhi, has received an unexpected and urgent summons to Fez.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ALLAN MACLEAN.

[4150] No. 136.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 10. Conference.)

Sir, *Algeciras, January 26, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of the *procès-verbal* of the sitting of the Conference on the 22nd instant.* During the discussion of Article 1 of the draft Regulations for the suppression of contraband trade, Count Tattenbach raised the point as to whether the Regulations which might eventually be drawn up would supersede the provisions of existing Treaties relating to the same subject-matter in those cases where the two instruments differed from each other. It is a point on which I should also desire to be favoured with your views, as the provisions of the Regulations will undoubtedly in some instances modify or extend the provisions not only of the Commercial Treaty of 1856 but also of some Articles in the Morocco Order in Council of 1889. I mention this point at present as an allusion is made to it in the *procès-verbal*, though I would venture to suggest that the question need not be considered until I am in a position to forward the whole Regulations as finally agreed upon by the Conference.

It was considered desirable to deal also with the Belgian proposal that permission should be accorded for the introduction of sporting guns intended for sale, and also for the establishment of licensed shops where such arms should be sold. It seemed to me that this was a dangerous innovation, and would open the door to many abuses. I therefore endeavoured to have the permission surrounded with as many safeguards as possible against improper use being made of it. I think the Conference in general shared these views, and I trust that the Regulations regarding the sale of sporting guns are now so drawn up as to keep the permission within very strict limits and under responsible control. Moreover, the Diplomatic Body at Tangier will presumably not feel disposed to suggest that any licences should be accorded until the country is in a far more settled condition than is the case at present. I have further considerable doubts whether the Moorish Government will agree to making the concession desired by the Belgian Delegates.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[4151] No. 137.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 11. Conference. Confidential.)

Sir, *Algeciras, January 26, 1906.*

THE German Representative, M. de Radowitz, conveyed through two channels to M. Révoil his desire to have some private and friendly conversations in regard to the principal questions which will soon occupy the attention of the Conference, namely, those relating to the institution of a State Bank and to the organization of the police. M. Révoil was willing to agree to the proposal, but he wished to ascertain in the first place whether M. de Radowitz was prepared to state frankly what were the desiderata of his Government in regard to the above two questions. Hitherto he had been given clearly to understand to what the German Government would not agree in respect to the organization of the police, and he had been informed that if France would make concessions on that point, she would receive ample satisfaction from Germany in respect to the financial questions and the institution of a State Bank. He was also told that his concessions on the police question were to be preliminary to any which Germany might make on the other points. He told the intermediaries between M. de Radowitz and himself that if he could obtain some enlightenment preparatory to an interview he thought it would be of advantage. Neither of the intermediaries were able to give him information as to the precise views of the German Representative beyond the assertion that Germany would not consent to the police being organized by France alone, or by France and Spain together.

* Not printed.

In these circumstances, the prospects of an interview seemed a little dubious; but renewed requests from M. de Radowitz reached M. Révoil, and I strongly recommended him to meet the wishes of his German colleague. I told M. Révoil that I thought that every effort should be made to prevent the Conference from terminating in a failure; and that it was most desirable that it should not hereafter be said that overtures had been made by M. de Radowitz for a friendly and private conversation, and that they had met with no response from the French side.

M. Révoil, therefore, arranged to meet M. de Radowitz, and the interview took place the day before yesterday. After an interchange of friendly assurances, M. de Radowitz alluded to the institution of a State Bank, and expressed the opinion that it might be found possible to come to an understanding on that point. He suggested that the financial expert of the French Mission should meet Count Tattenbach and the German financial expert, and that these three gentlemen should exchange views and endeavour to arrive at an understanding. To this proposal M. Révoil willingly agreed; and I believe the first meeting is to take place to-morrow.

M. de Radowitz then approached the police question. He remarked in the first place that France had already secured the organization of the police on the Algerian frontier, which was within the sphere of her interests. M. Révoil pointed out that the sphere of French interests was not limited to the frontier districts, but that she had important and vital interests throughout the whole of Morocco. The policing of the Algerian frontier was a matter which had been settled many years ago between the French Government and that of Morocco, and did not come within discussion. M. de Radowitz then observed that Dr. Rosen had carried away the impression from some interviews which he had had with M. Rouvier that the latter did not intend to ask the Conference for a mandate to organize the police in Morocco. M. Révoil replied that it was difficult to give the denial to an impression, but he could assure M. de Radowitz, and there were documents in the Yellow Book to support the fact, that M. Rouvier had given no engagement whatever as to what he would or would not ask the Conference outside of the programme on which France and Germany had come to an agreement.

M. de Radowitz then inquired of M. Révoil what were the views of France as to the police. M. Révoil said that he thought the French views were sufficiently well known, but that he was anxious to ascertain those of Germany on that difficult question. To this question M. de Radowitz gave no reply, but said that he hoped on another occasion to be able to discuss that matter also with M. Révoil.

The interview, which had been perfectly friendly throughout, then terminated.

M. Révoil presumes that after that the two financial experts and Count Tattenbach have discussed financial matters, M. de Radowitz will suggest another meeting which, of course, he will attend.

But he is much perplexed as to how to treat the police question when he again meets M. de Radowitz. He and the two gentlemen who acted originally as intermediaries are quite without information as to what really are the precise views of Germany in the matter. Berlin appears to be using different language on that subject at Washington, Madrid, and at Algeciras. Numerous projects float about the air, some with an official stamp, others less authentic, while M. de Radowitz and Count Tattenbach deliver themselves of contradictory utterances to their various interlocutors here. He doubts if M. de Radowitz will be really explicit with him, and he is puzzled how to deal with the subject.

I have ventured to tell him that, in view of the cloud of dust which hangs over the real intentions of Germany, it seems to me that the best course would be to be perfectly frank and open. I should be inclined to lay my cards on the table and state what France desires and expects, and then inquire what Germany has to say. M. de Radowitz would, I thought, then be forced to be explicit on his side; or, if he were not, then, at any rate, France could assert with justice that she had acted loyally and frankly, and could not be reproached with not having given to the other side every possible opportunity of explaining and defining her attitude.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[4152] No. 138.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 12. Conference. Confidential.)

Sir, *Algeciras, January 26, 1906.*

MARQUIS VISCONTI VENOSTA was good enough to call upon me this morning, and he informed me that the United States' Representative had read to him a long telegram which he had received from Washington, reporting a communication which had been made by the German Government to that of the United States, putting forward three alternative solutions of the police question.

I told the Italian Representative that I had also received information on this matter, and that the three solutions were :—

1. That the police organization should be intrusted to several Powers, each with a separate district and with a port on the Atlantic.

2. That the police organization should be intrusted to one small Power alone. Germany would far prefer that this Power should be Switzerland; but would not object to a Scandinavian Power or Holland. She, however, expressly excluded Belgium as being too French in her sympathies.

3. That the Sultan himself should organize the police with the aid of volunteer officers, such officers to be selected by three of the small Powers.

Marquis Visconti Venosta said that these were, in fact, the proposals; but he had already been shown them by the German Ambassador at Rome more than a fortnight ago. He was under the impression that they formed what might be called the original programme of Germany, and that they had been superseded by other proposals. He, therefore, did not understand their somewhat belated appearance at Washington, unless the German Government had recurred to them, and that they now represented the "derniers mots" of Germany. In that case a solution would be difficult to find, as they were clearly inacceptable.

He had been much exercised, he said, to find a common ground between the two parties on which a compromise might be effected, and the task was rendered doubly difficult by the mystery, and indeed confusion, with which Germany had enshrouded her real views and wishes. He attached, he added, little importance to casual remarks dropped after dinner, but he had been struck by one which Count Tattenbach had recently made to him to the effect that a solution might be found by entrusting the police organization to France and Spain with a third Power, possibly Italy.

I remarked that, to my mind, such a solution would be admirable; in fact, so satisfactory did it seem to me, that I hesitated to delude myself with the hope that it would be proposed. I did not know how the French Government would view it, but I had some reason to believe that M. Révoil would recommend it; and if it opened the prospect of an amicable solution of the problem it seemed probable that all other Powers would concur. I asked him whether Italy would consent. Marquis Visconti Venosta said that he would have to wait for the French and German Representatives to make the proposal to him, and that then he would lose no time in telegraphing to his Government. He did not, however, appear to have much hope that the idea would ever take a more definite shape.

Marquis Visconti Venosta spoke also about the proposed State Bank; and he feared that here it might be found difficult to reconcile conflicting views.

I again expressed my earnest desire that no means should be neglected which would assist towards a peaceful and amicable termination of the Conference; but I stated that I was not so hopeful of such a happy eventuality as I had been a few days ago.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[4156] No. 139.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 15. Conference. Confidential.)

Sir, *Algeciras, January 27, 1906.*

M. REGNAULT, the French financial expert, explained to me in broad outline the French views as to the constitution and attributions of the State Bank which it is proposed to establish in Morocco. I would not venture to trust to my memory to give you a detailed account of the scheme which M. Regnault explained to me, and he has promised to furnish me with a written Memorandum on the subject. Moreover, as he is to consult with the German financial expert and Count Tattenbach in a private and unofficial manner, it is possible that his scheme will be open to some modifications.

There is one point which I should wish to mention at the present juncture. M. Regnault's project is to raise a capital of some 15,000,000 fr. (600,000*l.*), of which 30 per cent. should be allotted to France, 20 per cent. each to Great Britain, Germany, and Spain, and 10 per cent. to Italy or distributed among small Powers. In order to enable France to have an assured majority on the Conseil d'Administration, who would elect the Directorate, he asked me if I would be authorized by my Government to sign the following Declaration, which I transcribe from his own words :—

"L'Angleterre déclare qu'elle se désistera en faveur de la France, et quand le Gouvernement Français le jugera opportun, de toute participation qui pourrait lui être attribuée par la Conférence dans la formation et l'administration de la future Banque d'État Marocaine.

"La présente déclaration ne saurait infirmer les arrangements particuliers entre le Consortium des banques Françaises et les capitalistes Anglais."

I am not in a position to say what will be the attributions of the bank, but as soon as an agreement is arrived at, if such an eventuality occurs, between France and Germany on the subject I will forward a copy of the project to you. I may add that I will give no final opinion on the matter, and will take whatever decision the Conference may reach merely *ad referendum*.

As regards the Declaration, it seems to me that you would prefer to await the reception of a final project before giving me instructions on one point only.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[4157] No. 140.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 17. Conference.)

Sir, *Algeciras, January 28, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the Regulations which have been drawn up at the Conference for the suppression of contraband trade with Morocco. The Moorish Delegates have forwarded them to Fez, in order to obtain the views of the Moorish Government. I understand that the Delegates were prepared to recommend that the Regulations should be accepted. The question of a maritime patrol has been postponed till that concerning the Coastguard service of the Customs comes under consideration.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 140.

Regulations respecting the Traffic in Arms, &c., with Morocco.

ARTICLE 1er. Sont prohibés dans toute l'étendue de l'Empire Chérifien, sauf dans les cas spécifiés aux Articles 2 et 3, l'importation et le commerce des armes de guerre, pièces d'armes, munitions chargées ou non chargées de toutes espèces, poudres, salpêtre, fulmi-coton, nitro-glycérine, et toutes compositions destinées exclusivement à la fabrication des munitions.

Art. 2. Les explosifs nécessaires à l'industrie et aux travaux publics pourront néanmoins être introduits. Un Règlement pris dans les formes indiquées à l'Article 6 déterminera les conditions dans lesquelles sera effectuée leur importation.

Art. 3. Les armes, pièces d'armes, et munitions destinées aux troupes de Sa Majesté Chérifienne seront admises après l'accomplissement des formalités suivantes:—

Une déclaration, signée par le Ministre de la Guerre Marocain, énonçant le nombre et l'espèce des fournitures de ce genre commandées à l'industrie étrangère, devra être présentée à la Légation du pays d'origine, qui y apposera son visa.

Le dédouanement des caisses et colis contenant les armes et munitions, livrées en exécution de la commande du Gouvernement Marocain, sera opéré sur la production—

1. De la déclaration spécifiée ci-dessus;
2. Du connaissement, indiquant le nombre, le poids des colis, le nombre, et l'espèce des armes et munitions qu'ils contiennent. Ce document devra être visé par la Légation du pays d'origine, qui marquera au verso les quantités successives précédemment dédouanées. Le visa sera refusé à partir du moment où la commande aura été intégralement livrée.

Art. 4. L'importation des armes de chasse et de luxe, pièces d'armes, cartouches chargées et non chargées, est également interdite. Elle pourra, toutefois, être autorisée—

1. Pour les besoins strictement personnels de l'importateur;
2. Pour l'approvisionnement des magasins d'armes autorisés conformément à l'Article 6.

Art. 5. Les armes et munitions de chasse ou de luxe seront admises pour les besoins strictement personnels de l'importateur sur la production d'un permis délivré par le représentant du Makhzen à Tanger. Si l'importateur est étranger, le permis ne sera établi que sur la demande de la Légation dont il relève.

En ce qui concerne les munitions de chasse, chaque permis portera au maximum sur 1,000 cartouches, ou les fournitures nécessaires à la fabrication de 1,000 cartouches.

Le permis ne sera donné qu'à des personnes n'ayant encouru aucune condamnation correctionnelle.

Art. 6. Le commerce des armes de chasse et de luxe non rayées de fabrication étrangère, ainsi que des munitions qui s'y rapportent, sera réglementé, dès que les circonstances le permettront, par décision Chérifienne prise conformément à l'avis du Corps Diplomatique à Tanger. Il en sera de même des décisions ayant pour but de suspendre ou de restreindre l'exercice de ce commerce.

Seules, les personnes ayant obtenu une licence spéciale et temporaire du Gouvernement Marocain seront admises à ouvrir et exploiter des débits d'armes et de munitions de chasse. Cette licence ne sera accordée que sur demande écrite de l'intéressé, appuyée d'un avis favorable de la Légation dont il dépend.

Des Règlements pris dans la forme indiquée au § 1er de cet Article détermineront le nombre des débits pouvant être ouverts à Tanger et éventuellement dans les ports qui seront ultérieurement désignés. Ils fixeront les formalités imposées à l'importation des explosifs à l'usage de l'industrie et des travaux publics, des armes et munitions destinées à l'approvisionnement des débits, ainsi que les quantités maxima qui pourront être conservées en dépôt.

En cas d'infraction aux prescriptions réglementaires, la licence pourra être retirée à titre temporaire ou à titre définitif, sans préjudice des autres peines encourues par les délinquants.

Art. 7. Toute introduction ou tentative d'introduction de marchandises prohibées donnera lieu par l'autorité Douanière à leur confiscation et, en outre, aux peines et amendes ci-dessous, qui seront prononcées par la juridiction compétente.

Art. 8. L'introduction ou tentative d'introduction par un port ouvert au commerce ou par un bureau de douane sera punie—

1. D'une amende de 500 à 2,000 pesetas;
2. D'un emprisonnement de cinq jours à un an, ou de l'une des deux peines seulement.

En cas de récidive, les deux peines seront obligatoirement prononcées.

Art. 9. L'introduction ou tentative d'introduction en dehors d'un port ouvert au commerce ou bureau de douane sera punie—

1. D'une amende de 1,000 à 5,000 pesetas;
2. D'un emprisonnement de trois mois à deux ans, ou de l'une des deux peines seulement.

En cas de récidive, les deux peines devront être obligatoirement prononcées, et le délinquant sera frappé d'une amende supplémentaire égale à trois fois la valeur de la marchandise importée.

Art. 10. La vente frauduleuse, le recel et le colportage des marchandises prohibées par le présent Règlement sont punis des peines édictées à l'Article 8.

Art. 11. Les complices des délits prévus aux Articles 8, 9, et 10 sont passibles des mêmes peines que les auteurs principaux.

Art. 12. Quand il y aura des indices sérieux faisant soupçonner qu'un navire, mouillé dans un port ouvert au commerce, transporte des armes, des munitions ou d'autres marchandises prohibées en vue de leur introduction au Maroc, les agents de la Douane Chérifienne devront signaler ces indices à l'autorité Consulaire compétente, afin que celle-ci procède, avec l'assistance d'un Délégué de la Douane Chérifienne, aux enquêtes, vérifications ou visites qu'elle jugera nécessaires.

Toutefois, en attendant l'intervention Consulaire, la Douane pourra installer un ou plusieurs gardiens à bord.

Art. 13. Dans le cas d'introduction ou de tentative d'introduction par un navire de marchandises prohibées en dehors d'un port ouvert au commerce, la Douane Marocaine pourra amener le navire au port le plus proche pour être remis à l'autorité Consulaire, laquelle pourra le saisir et maintenir la saisie jusqu'à ce qu'il ait acquitté le montant des condamnations prononcées. Toutefois, la saisie du navire devra être levée, en tout état de l'instance, sur consignation du montant maximum de l'amende entre les mains de l'autorité Consulaire ou sous caution solvable de la payer, acceptée par la Douane.

Art. 14. Les marchandises confisquées seront détruites par les soins de la Douane, dans un délai de huit jours à partir du jugement définitif rendu par le Tribunal compétent. La destruction sera opérée en présence d'un Délégué du Makhzen et d'un Délégué de l'autorité Consulaire compétente dûment avisée.

Les moyens de transport à terre pourront être confisqués par les autorités Douanières et seront vendus au profit du Trésor Chérifien.

Art. 15. Les armes réformées par le Gouvernement Marocain ne pourront être mises en vente dans toute l'étendue de l'Empire Chérifien.

Art. 16. Des primes à prélever sur le montant des amendes prononcées sont attribuées aux indicateurs qui ont amené la découverte des marchandises prohibées et aux agents qui en ont opéré la saisie. Ces primes sont ainsi attribuées après déduction, s'il y a lieu, des frais du procès:

Un tiers à répartir par la Douane entre les indicateurs;
Un tiers aux agents saisissants;
Un tiers au Trésor Marocain.

Si la saisie a été opérée sans l'intervention d'un indicateur, la moitié des amendes sera attribuée aux agents saisissants et l'autre moitié au Trésor Chérifien.

Art. 17. Les autorités Douanières Marocaines devront signaler directement aux Agents Diplomatiques les infractions au présent Règlement commises par leurs ressortissants, afin que ceux-ci soient poursuivis devant la juridiction compétente.

Les mêmes infractions commises par des sujets Marocains seront déférées directement par la Douane à l'autorité Chérifienne.

Un Délégué de la Douane sera chargé de suivre la procédure des affaires pendantes devant les diverses juridictions.

Art. 18. Dans la région frontière de l'Algérie, l'application du Règlement sur la contrebande des armes restera l'affaire exclusive de la France et du Maroc.

De même, l'application du Règlement sur la contrebande des armes dans le Riff et, en général, dans les régions frontières des possessions Espagnoles restera l'affaire exclusive de l'Espagne et du Maroc.

[4115] No. 141.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 95.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, January* 30, 1906.

MEMBERS of the Diplomatic Corps with whom I have spoken on the subject appear to be struck by the attitude of comparative indifference adopted by the Russian Government as to the question of Morocco. The French Ambassador seems to think that the personal assurances received from the German Emperor by the Emperor of Russia, to the effect that he desires a peaceful settlement, and will do all in his power to effect it, have been accepted as satisfactory. Count Lamsdorff, when questioned on the subject by the Spanish Ambassador, assured his Excellency that he had no anxiety whatever, and very little information. To the French Ambassador he gave assurances of diplomatic support, informing him that he was confident that a solution would be found. The fact, however, remains that the actual intentions of the German Government are unknown, at any rate to the Foreign Office. A diplomatist who is in close touch with the German Embassy told me that, in his opinion, the German assurances amounted to this: that Germany would take no aggressive action; that the terms of the Russo-French Treaty only contemplated an "aggressive attack" upon either France or Russia; and that the Russian Government was reassured as to the danger of the *casus fœderis* arising.

Attention has been aroused here by the language held by the Emperor in proposing the toast of the German Emperor on the occasion of the banquet given at the Palace in honour of His Majesty's birthday, in which he described him as "mon frère et cher ami." He is reported to have added, in conversation with the German Ambassador, that that was a stronger expression than "ally." It is also stated that the German Emperor has received M. Kokoftsof, the Delegate of the Minister of Finance, and that it is not impossible that the German bankers will take over another block of Treasury bonds.

The French Military Attaché informed me yesterday that he believed that the situation had been modified by the fact that the country had quieted down sooner than was expected, so that there was some probability of Russia regaining her strength within an appreciable period, and also by the increasing uncertainty of the situation in Austria. In any case, he said, he thought the situation had improved, and that the outlook was brighter.

A Member of the Liberal party here, who has recently returned from abroad, informed me that he had recently spoken with Members of the Socialist party in both France and Germany, as well as with Russian Radicals. His impression was that if the German Government brought on a war with France, it would find the situation in Germany itself extremely difficult. There was no doubt that the sympathies of the Russian Liberals and of the great bulk of the Russian people would be very strongly on the side of France, and that if the war continued, the Russian Government, whatever its wishes, might find itself forced by public opinion to abandon an attitude which would be universally attributed to purely dynastic and anti-popular considerations. He added, however, that an aggressive attitude on the part of the French Government would alienate these sympathies and greatly modify the situation, which at present he regarded as favourable to France, at least from his special point of view.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CECIL SPRING-RICE.

[4119] No. 142.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 102. Confidential.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, January* 31, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to state that I saw the French Ambassador this afternoon, and asked him what news he had from the Conference. He replied that the news was not satisfactory. There appeared to be some reason to fear that Spain would yield a willing ear to the blandishments of the German Representative, and would take action inconsistent with the terms of their agreement. There was no certainty as to this—only a fear. The attitude of England was perfectly loyal, and there was no reason to complain of Italy; but if Spain entered into an understanding with Germany, as was now feared, the consequences would be serious. There was also considerable uncertainty as to the attitude of America, and this was an unexpected blow.

I asked him whether he was contented with the attitude of Russia. He replied that he had no reason to complain. Russia was perfectly loyal; but, on the other hand, it was quite clear that Russia was permeated with a spirit of invincible optimism, which he found it difficult to explain and almost impossible to combat. Both Count Lamsdorff and Count Witte had assured him in the most positive terms that, after what the Emperor of Germany had stated to the Emperor of Russia, war or the danger of war was out of the question. And yet he had himself been unable to extract what those assurances were which had had this happy effect. The answer always was the same: that the Emperor was convinced that war was impossible, because Germany was determined to preserve peace; but what action Germany intended to take as regards this object, and what she was willing to surrender, or what she thought it her duty to insist on—as to all this nothing whatever appears to have passed between the Emperors.

He observed to me that the game of Germany was now perfectly plain. To Russia assurances of a most positive nature were given that Germany meant to insist on the maintenance of her just rights, but would do everything possible to avoid war, and in no case would take aggressive action, so that, if war did occur, it would be simply owing to the aggressive policy of France. At the same time, Germany was doing her best to persuade Russia (and, he regretted to add, with some success) that the Liberal Government in England had every intention of abandoning the pledges undertaken by Lord Lansdowne, and of seeking some favourable occasion of leaving France in the lurch. To England certain advances were being made, not so much out of a desire to conciliate England, but in the hope that France should take those advances as having been made *by* England, with a view to securing her own line of retreat when it was too late for France to retire from the ground into which she had been inveigled by England. To Spain she was promising German support in case Spain would consent to profit by the embarrassments of France in order to obtain a privileged position in Morocco.

M. Bompard regarded the attitude of England, and the success of Germany in her policy in that country, as by far the most important feature of the campaign. If Russia and France could be persuaded that England, after signing the Agreement, could be persuaded, by menace or by promise, under the pretext that the Agreement was signed by another Government, to withdraw from it either in letter or spirit, then he regarded the victory of Germany as secured, and the eventual gravitation of both Russia and France to the German "system" as merely a matter of time. Nothing could be more satisfactory than the language held by you and the Liberal Government in regard to this matter; but the battle was being fought with strange and subtle weapons. Everywhere the press was in German hands or under German inspiration or suggestion. The Jew appeared in all quarters of Europe as the devoted agent of the German Empire and as the promoter of German interests. It was this intangible influence of intellectual suggestion, operating through the press and some of the great financial houses and their ramifications, which was to be met with at every turn; and it was for this reason, he thought, most necessary that it should be understood that the contest was in the main an intellectual and a moral contest as much as a physical struggle for superiority. Germany was working here in St. Petersburgh, and he had no doubt elsewhere, by means of suggestion, and she had succeeded here in convincing the Russian Government that she meant peace and had

always meant peace. He added, however, that the Russian Government was perfectly conscious that, if there was war, the fate of Russian finance, at any rate for the time, was sealed; but this did not prevent them, as in the case of the Japanese war, from firmly and implicitly relying on their own assertion that war was impossible.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CECIL SPRING-RICE.

[4221] No. 143.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 27.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 3, 1906.*

MY French colleague has explained to his Government by telegraph that by common agreement the conversations on the subject of the State Bank which have taken place between the French and German experts are to be considered merely in the light of a private interchange of opinions by which neither party is bound, and are subject to reference to the First Delegates of France and Germany. M. Révoil has also stated that, until his German colleague has explained what are the German views on the subject of the police, he does not propose to discuss the question of the Bank with him. He has further told the French Government that he now expects some reciprocity from the Germans, having himself been quite frank with them, and having given proofs of a conciliatory disposition and of great moderation. I quite agree with him.

Yesterday morning, during a casual conversation which I had with M. de Radowitz, the police question was mentioned. He stated that his attitude on the question was a "negative one," but gave me no indication of his views. He said, however, that he would never accept a general mandate being given to France.

I impressed on him the urgent necessity of affording some protection to Europeans in Morocco, especially at Tangier, in view of the intolerable conditions under which they were now living.

I also asked him if the report had reached him that the Moorish Delegates proposed to submit to the Conference a project of their own for dealing with the police question, but he disclaimed all knowledge of the matter.

[4230] No. 144.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, February 3, 1906.*

I HEARD the rumour mentioned in the telegram from Sir A. Nicolson to the Foreign Office of the 2nd February ten days ago. It appears to me improbable that the Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs would be sent to Algeciras, and up to the present I can obtain no confirmation of the report.

The last news I have received from Fez was dated the 29th January. The Moorish authorities are quite satisfied with the reports they receive from Algeciras, and do not credit the rumour.

They are of opinion that the Minister for Foreign Affairs would not be required at the Conference.

I have sent Sir A. Nicolson a copy of the above despatch.

[4238] No. 145.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 4, 1906.*

PROPOSALS for increasing the customs duties were discussed at a general Committee meeting held for the purpose yesterday.

I stated that I must be furnished with full information and guarantees before I

could even refer the question to you, and I read my declaration as to my attitude in regard to the points under discussion.

The question of a special "caisse" is deferred to another occasion, as the French and German delegates did not want to raise it at the present moment. M. Révoil's proposals, which I reported in my telegram No. 23 of the 2nd instant, were accordingly not put forward.

In reply to an inquiry whether I would submit to His Majesty's Government a scheme whereby it is proposed that the customs duties on imports shall be raised from 10 per cent. to 12½ per cent., I said that, until I had full knowledge of how the special "caisse" was to be organized, &c., I could not do so. No decision was consequently come to in the matter, and it remains open for the present.

[4239] No. 146.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 29.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 4, 1906.*

YESTERDAY evening I received a long visit from Count Tattenbach. The most significant and important portions of our conversation are summarized below.

The object which he evidently had in view was either to induce me to urge my French colleague to make concessions which would satisfy Germany, or to try to detach me from him. Count Tattenbach said that I ought to join forces with the German Delegates in order to secure full guarantees for the "open door," as both Germany's and England's commercial interests were endangered by French predominance in Morocco.

In his opinion, since the Conference had been agreed upon the situation had undergone a complete change, and my position *vis-à-vis* to France was now exactly the same as that of the Delegates of the other Powers. My words, he continued, would be decisive, if I urged the French Delegate to concede all that was required in regard to the question of the police, but that I should practically be affording my French colleague encouragement in his resistance by declining to speak those words. He gave me to understand that I should be held largely responsible should the Conference prove abortive.

I told him, in reply, that he must know that ample guarantees in regard to the "open door" were being offered, and would be given, and that I had not the least apprehension of any danger to British commercial interests. So far as I was concerned, the situation had, since the Conference opened, undergone no change, and my position *vis-à-vis* to France was not at all the same as that of the Delegates of the other Powers. Great Britain had entered into special engagements with France, and it was the intention of His Majesty's Government, and my own, to observe those engagements in a loyal and honourable manner. It was not my province, and it would be most disloyal of me, to urge my French colleague to make concessions, but at the same time he would certainly not be encouraged by me to offer resistance.

It was my intention, I said, to stand firmly by my French colleague, who throughout the Conference had shown the greatest moderation and the most conciliatory disposition.

I had continually expressed, both to the French Delegate and to others, my earnest hope that the Conference would be brought to a satisfactory and peaceful conclusion; and no one, I added, would be more gratified than my Government and myself if an arrangement could be reached. The means, however, for arriving at a satisfactory agreement must be devised by France and Germany.

[4240] No. 147.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 4, 1906.*

A CONVERSATION in regard to the police question took place yesterday evening between the French and German Representatives, but led to no result. Beyond throwing out a suggestion that possibly the police might be organized by

the Moorish Government with European officers chosen by them, M. de Radowitz had nothing to propose.

In the conversation which I had with the second German delegate on the same subject Count Tattenbach was more outspoken, and told me that France alone or France and Spain alone would never be accepted by Germany, to which I replied that the matter was one of great urgency, and that those two countries would work within circumscribed areas and under strictly limited conditions, and that they were the only ones with properly qualified elements for the organization of a police.

In answer to my inquiry what alternative he had to propose, Count Tattenbach said that the organization should be undertaken by small Powers, but that no police at all would be best.

The outlook is unsatisfactory, and I fear there is small propect of a settlement being arrived at.

[4343] No. 148.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 5.)

(No. 18. Conference.)

Sir, *Algeciras, January* 30, 1906.

THE Conference sat in General Committee yesterday, and the whole sitting was occupied in an examination of the proposals as to fresh taxation which the Moorish Delegates had submitted at the last meeting, and of which I had the honour to transmit a copy in my despatch No. 14 of the 27th instant.

The discussion was exceedingly loose and discursive, and no decisions were arrived at; and indeed I venture to think, and I am not alone in that opinion, that the time might have been more profitably employed.

The Conference will meet again on the 1st February, in order to discuss in full sitting the question of an increase of customs duties. As at these sittings full and official *procès-verbaux* are taken, I propose to read a written declaration, of which I beg leave to transmit a copy, stating my views and my attitude on the question, so that there may be no misunderstanding, and in order that my declaration may be inserted in my own words in the *procès-verbal*.

The object of the Moorish Delegates is evidently to obtain money from any sources; and they are clearly opposed to any control over the expenditure being established. I submit that in view of the fact that by far the largest portion of any fresh imposts will be paid by foreigners, it is necessary to take every precaution that the revenues which they may furnish should be devoted solely to works of general benefit and utility, and not squandered at Fez in wasteful and useless expenditure.

I propose therefore to submit to the Conference that the Moorish Treasury should look for an improvement of revenue chiefly to internal taxation, to a more honest and efficient administration of their customs revenues, and perhaps also to one or two fresh sources of revenue, such as a stamp tax and one or two more. All taxes of a local character, such as "débits de fabrique, de théâtres, cafés," &c., should be devoted simply to local needs, by which the foreigner will benefit equally with the native.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 148.

Proposals respecting Customs Duties to be Submitted by Sir A. Nicolson to the Conference.

POUR ce qui concerne la question de l'augmentation des droits de douane, je désire, avant de m'en référer à mon Gouvernement, m'assurer que les revenus provenant des dites augmentations, qui, à mon avis, doivent être bien modestes, seront intégralement versés dans une caisse spéciale et exclusivement affectés aux services qui pourraient aider et faciliter le commerce et améliorer l'organisation des ports.

Par conséquent, je voudrais avoir des renseignements sur la manière dont on pense constituer la dite caisse spéciale, ainsi que sur le contrôle qu'on pense exercer afin

d'assurer que les susdits revenus seront intégralement versés à la caisse et exclusivement affectés aux susdits besoins.

Une fois que je serai édifié sur ces différents points je ferai part du projet à mon Gouvernement, mais je ne saurais donner aucune garantie que mon Gouvernement serait disposé à l'accepter.

Je me suis rallié à une proposition faite dans une séance de comité par M. le Délégué de la France qui, à mon avis, visait le but que je viens d'indiquer, mais en me ralliant à sa proposition je me suis permis d'ajouter que mon appui était accordé sous les réserves que j'avais déjà formulées.

[4344] No. 149.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 5.)

(No. 25. Confidential.)

Sir, *Madrid, February* 1, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I called yesterday afternoon on Señor Ojeda, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to inquire whether he had any news to communicate to me with regard to the Algeciras Conference. I found his Excellency in a rather depressed mood with regard to the outcome of the Conference, and he informed me that he had just received a telephonic message from Señor Moret, the President of the Council, drawing his attention to a pessimistic article on the Conference, published in the "Temps" of the 29th ultimo. All the information which had reached the Spanish Government of late tended to confirm the view expressed by the French newspaper. Señor Ojeda went so far as to say that the holding of a Conference was a mistake, and that the Powers must be prepared to see it end in a complete fiasco. I asked Señor Ojeda whether he had received any precise information in support of the gloomy views he was expressing to me; in reply he read to me the latest telegraphic reports, received from the Duke of Almodovar, which, although couched in very careful official language, still gave the impression that the Duke had some misgivings as to the outcome of the Conference. The financial proposals of the Moorish Delegates had come to him as a disagreeable surprise; he was not satisfied with the attitude of Germany; and he thought that Spain was being badly treated in being only allotted 20 per cent. of the capital of the proposed State Bank. In his opinion, Spain should be allotted more capital than any other Power but France.

Señor Ojeda then took up a long private letter which he had received from Señor Perez-Caballero, the Second Spanish Delegate to the Conference, and he read it to me from beginning to end. The writer, who is well versed in Moorish affairs, began by stating that he was apprehensive as to the outlook for the Conference, and he had doubts as to any practical good resulting from its deliberations. He then proceeded to details of technical questions, and warned his Government to be careful before approving the schemes which might be proposed for authorizing the State Bank to issue notes and coin, as such schemes might prove prejudicial to the circulation of Spanish money in Morocco. With regard to the capital of the State Bank, he suggested that half should be allotted to Spain, in the proportion of twenty-seven parts to France, and twenty-three to Spain.

In reply to a question I put to him, Señor Ojeda assured me that the Spanish Government would find the money when called upon to produce it.

Señor Perez-Caballero continued in his letter by giving his impressions of the attitude of Germany at the Conference, which were not of a favourable character; Germany seemed to him to be working for the elimination of French and Spanish influence from Morocco by proposing the internationalizing of every European reform in that country, which was merely a step in the direction of its neutralization. This idea, Señor Ojeda said, would be most distasteful to the Spanish people, and, he added, that, in his opinion, to internationalize services in Morocco was the best way to render these services inefficient, and he hoped the Conference would not accept any schemes of the kind.

Señor Perez-Caballero concluded his letter by certain remarks with regard to the foreign Delegates at the Conference, mentioning that, in his opinion, M. Révoil was very much afraid of Count Tattenbach, and that Marquis Visconti-Venosta was too enfeebled by age, and too lacking in enterprise to be an effective mediator should a crisis arise.

I inquired of Señor Ojeda whether he had received any fresh information as to German plans for settling the police question. He replied that everything tended for the moment in the direction of a proposal that the mandate for organizing should be given to a small Power; to this Spain had a rooted objection.

The impression left on my mind by my conversation with Señor Ojeda, is that the Spanish Government would be glad if the police question could be solved on the following lines:—That the area to be submitted to the new police organization should be as circumscribed as possible, in fact, to be limited to a few ports on the west and north coasts of Morocco; that the arrangement should be of a provisional character, renewable at the expiration of a term of years if found to work satisfactorily; by this means the Powers would reserve their rights unprejudiced; that for this provisional police arrangement the mandate be given to France and Spain.

Señor Ojeda told me that if the Spanish Government were offered the mandate of organizing a police force they would be prepared, with the approval of France, to undertake the duty.

I have communicated the substance of the above to M. Cambon, the French Ambassador, who leaves to-night for Paris to consult M. Rouvier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[4536] No. 150.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 6, 1906.*

THE United States' Delegate was visited yesterday by the German first Delegate, who told him that it was clear that the limit of France's concessions in regard to the police question was that Spain should be associated with her in its organization. Mr. White replied that in his opinion it would be useless to treat on any other basis, as he was convinced that such was the case. In reply to an inquiry from M. de Radowitz whether France could possibly be induced to agree to a third Power being associated in the duty, the United States' Delegate stated that he thought it most improbable. She would not accept a third Power to take an active part in the organization of the police in the way of furnishing officers, &c., although she might possibly do so if the third Power were to act in some measure as a controller or inspector. Mr. White added that he had not spoken to the French Representative on the subject, and that the above were merely his own personal views. In the course of his conversation, M. de Radowitz complained that for two days no communication had been received from Berlin.

The impression left with the United States' Delegate is that the failure of the Germans to induce us to put pressure on France has had a great effect, and that the German Delegate is prepared to yield. Both the Russian and United States' Delegates, however, think that the exact position of affairs here has not been fully reported by the German Delegates to their Government, and Count Cassini will ask the Russian Government to place Berlin in full possession of the facts as they actually are.

[4538] No. 151.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 32.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 6, 1906.*

I WAS told yesterday evening by the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs that he had been sounded by the German Delegates as to whether Spain would be willing to undertake the organization of the police, and that Casablanca and Mogador had been specially mentioned by them as places at which they would like to see her. The Duke of Almodovar assures me that it is his determination to act in the fullest co-operation and the closest harmony with France, and that he consequently avoided giving a direct reply. He is of opinion that the German Delegates are anxiously awaiting instructions from their Government, and that they are much perplexed and troubled.

[4656] 152*.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 11. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, February 7, 1906.*

THE Spanish Government are entirely ignorant as to what the German intentions on the police question are, as the President of the Conference has not reported any negotiations on this point between the French and German Delegates, and the German Chargé d'Affaires does not allude to it.

The papers published this morning what purports to be the Moorish proposals for the reorganization of the police, viz., the employment of Mohammedans from Egypt, Turkey, and Syria; there is no information available as to the authenticity of this news, but the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks it probable that these proposals have been inspired by some European influence.

M. Cambon has not left Paris yet.

It is doubtful whether the President of the Council will be able to avoid a Ministerial crisis before the conclusion of the Conference, though he appears to hope so.

[4644] No. 152.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 7, 1906.*

THE Marquis Visconti-Venosta was spoken to on the police question the day before yesterday by the first German delegate, and expressed to the latter, in the course of conversation, his opinion that France would claim that she and Spain should be intrusted with the organization of the police, and that she would not abandon her position.

M. de Radowitz neither rejected nor accepted the idea of Spain being associated with France in the duty, but discussed the question of the form in which the retention of the Sultan's authority over the organization could be assured. Like all of us who know of the *pourparlers* which have taken place, the Marquis Visconti-Venosta thinks that it is possible that the German delegates, so far as they are personally concerned, may be willing to concede the demands of the French, but that everything is dependent on the decision which may be taken at Berlin, and we are quite in the dark as to the views of the German Government.

In his conversation with me on the 3rd instant Count Tattenbach was very positive that the dual organization would never be accepted by Germany, but his opposition has now greatly diminished.

[4753] No. 153.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, February 8, 1906.*

MOROCCO Conference.

The Russian Representative at the Morocco Conference has reported to Count Lamsdorff that a solution of the question of the gendarmerie has been found in a proposal to place it under the joint control of France and Spain. His Excellency expressed his satisfaction at the solution thus arrived at, which Germany has accepted *ad referendum*.

He said that he would be glad to have the views of His Majesty's Government on this proposal.

[4748] No. 154.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 8, 1906.*

THE question of increasing the customs duties was again brought forward at a plenary sitting of the Conference which was held yesterday. At my suggestion the meeting adjourned the discussion on the question until a project should be communicated to the Conference giving details as to how the special "caisse" was to be organized, &c., into which the revenues from the increases of the duties are to be paid. No such project had as yet been submitted.

The attitude of the Moorish Delegates was singularly obstructive at the sitting yesterday.

Proposals were brought forward for the reduction of the export duties levied on grain, but the Sultan's Delegates refused to entertain them, and much pressure had to be brought to bear on them to induce them even to refer the matter to Fez.

It was also proposed that the Diplomatic Body at Tangier should be empowered, by a resolution of the Conference, to discuss a revision of the anchorage dues with the Moorish Government. I pointed out that, so long as the Moorish ports were so deficient in essential requirements, it was undesirable to contemplate any revision of the dues, and on those grounds I declined to submit this proposal to His Majesty's Government.

Eventually, however, on a clause being inserted to the effect that, until the condition of the ports had been improved, the revision of the dues should not be entertained, I agreed to accept the proposal for reference to you.

On the 10th February there is to be a General Committee Meeting for the purpose of discussing the question of the control of the Customs administration, and how the special "caisse" is to be organized.

[4749] No. 155.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 8.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February* 8, 1906.

WITH reference to the letter from the Board of Trade of the 2nd instant, and your covering despatch No. 8, I fear that the French and German Representatives could not possibly be induced to agree to an increase from 5 to 10 per cent. of the duties on wines, &c. I have not alluded to the difference of duties, although I was aware of it, and I am of opinion that it would be better for me not to do so in the present circumstances.

As regards the surtax of 2½ per cent. to be levied on goods imported by land, I propose to ask the French and Spanish Delegates to agree to it, the French and Spanish Governments to arrange subsequently with the Moorish Government as to the purposes to which the proceeds accruing therefrom are to be devoted.

[4757] No. 156.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 8.)

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February* 8, 1906.

MY French colleague has telegraphed to his Government asking for their final views on the police question, as he assumes that the German Representative must very soon receive his final instructions, and will be in a position to resume the private exchange of views. M. Révoil has explained fully that any reference to any agreements between France and Spain, or to the special interests of those two countries, would be imprudent, as he is anxious that neither of those questions should be discussed. What he recommends strongly is that the matter should be placed on the purely practical ground of the urgent necessity that protection to life and property should be provided.

I told M. Révoil, who asked me for my opinion, that I entirely concurred in his view.

He has also urged the French Government not to limit the police organization to the ports mentioned in the Yellow Book (p. 257), but to allow him to extend it to all the ports. On this point also M. Révoil asked me my opinion. I told him that it had never been clear to me why a selection had been made of four ports alone, as although for the moment the neighbourhood of Tangier was especially disturbed, yet the same insecurity existed at all the ports. My French colleague told me that he had informed his Government that he proposed to attempt to persuade Germany and the Conference to leave the question of how the ports should be distributed to be settled by France and Spain, but it was possible that he would fail, in which case he would propose to the Conference that they should be as follows: that France alone should take charge of Rabat, Casablanca, and Mogador; Spain alone of Laraiche and Tetuan; and France and Spain conjointly of Tangier, Mazagan, and Saffi.

M. Révoil is very hopeful that Germany will agree to concede the organization of the police to France and Spain, and he is making his arrangements in anticipation of that result.

[4753] No. 156*.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Spring-Rice.

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, February* 8, 1906.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 26, you are authorized to inform Count Lamsdorff that His Majesty's Government would raise no objection to any solution of the police question which France was ready to accept.

[4853] No. 157.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 9, 1906.*

WITH reference to telegram No. 26 from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburgh.

Some little confusion seems to have arisen in regard to the police question, no solution of which has as yet been reached.

The combination which the German Representative proposed in the private conversation on the 3rd instant was rejected by the French Representative, who suggested to the former as his personal opinion that, although he must start his negotiations from the basis of the duty being intrusted to France alone, yet perhaps the French Government might be willing to have Spain associated in the control of the organization. This project was neither rejected nor accepted by the German Representative, who said he must submit the matter to his Government, and that he would renew the private *pourparlers* when final instructions reached him.

I understand that Count Cassini telegraphed to the Russian Government that a good solution of the question was offered by the proposal to intrust the police organization to France and Spain, and that he believed that all the Representatives here would concur in it. He accordingly made the suggestion that the solution should be recommended to the German Government by the Government of Russia.

This suggestion of their Representative here has, I am confidentially informed by M. Révoil this morning, been already acted upon by the Russian Government. No instructions, I may add, have up to this morning reached the German Representative, by which he would be enabled to renew his *pourparlers* with M. Révoil.

[4749] No. 158.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, February 9, 1906.*

PENDING further instructions, you should not commit yourself to acceptance of proposals respecting increase of import duties, except subject to conditions stated in my despatch No. 8 of the 3rd instant. I am consulting Board of Trade with regard to your telegrams Nos. 35 and 36 of yesterday's date. At first sight it seems inequitable that goods principally imported from other countries should pay only 7½ per cent., whilst imports of which preponderating share is in British hands should pay 12½ per cent.

[4913] No. 159.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 20. Conference.)
Sir, *Algeciras, February 1, 1906.*

M. RÉVOIL communicated to me yesterday a paper, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy, which he proposed to submit to the Conference when the question of increasing the customs duties came again before the meeting, and he inquired whether I would be prepared to support the proposals which were contained therein.

I told M. Révoil that I should like to see the amount of the "décimes" clearly specified, and that I considered that the maximum increase should not exceed 2½ per cent. *ad valorem*, which would be raising the customs duties on imports from 10 per cent. to 12½ per cent. He agreed with me, and said that he would insert this stipulation. He told me that he was telegraphing the substance of his proposals to his Government, so that he should be able to receive their instructions before the

next meeting in General Committee, which he understood would be fixed for the 3rd instant, and he suggested that I should do likewise.

I told M. Révoil that it was possible that the General Committee might make some modifications, and that I should prefer postponing my telegram till after its meeting, but, as he pressed me, I eventually said that I would telegraph to you on the subject.

I venture to think that the revenues to be derived from the increased duties are well ear-marked and safeguarded, and that every precaution has been taken that the money will be devoted solely to works of public utility, which will be executed by competent European engineers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 159.

M. Révoil's Customs Proposals.

LES décimes additionnels aux droits d'importation seront perçus à titre temporaire. Les sommes en provenant formeront un fonds spécial exclusivement affecté à des dépenses ou à des travaux d'utilité publique, destinés à développer l'outillage économique et le commerce international dans les ports.

Le programme des travaux et leur ordre de priorité seront arrêtés par le Corps Diplomatique à Tanger, avec l'agrément du Makhzen.

Les études, devis, projets et cahiers des charges s'y rapportant seront établis par un ingénieur compétent, assisté, au besoin, d'un ingénieur adjoint, qui seront tous deux désignés par le Corps Diplomatique et dont le traitement sera imputé sur les fonds de la caisse spéciale.

Les adjudications de travaux publics seront présidées par un Délégué du Corps Diplomatique, assisté d'un Délégué du Gouvernement Chérifien et de l'un des deux ingénieurs.

Les fonds de la caisse spéciale seront déposés à la Banque d'État Marocaines qui en tiendra la comptabilité.

[4916] No. 160.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 23. Conference. Confidential.)

Sir, *Algeciras, February 2, 1906.*

MM. RÉVOIL AND REGNAULT paid me a visit yesterday afternoon to communicate to me the progress which was being made in the private negotiations which were taking place with respect to the institution of the State Bank.

I had the honour to inform you by telegraph that on the 29th January the discussions between M. Regnault and Count Tattenbach had practically reduced the points of difference to three:—

1. Under what jurisdiction the Bank should be placed: M. Regnault insisting that it should be under French legislation and actionable before French Tribunals; Count Tattenbach maintaining that some Mixed Court should be established before whom the Bank could be cited. In cases where the Bank was prosecutor the defendant could be cited before his own Consular Tribunal, so that no difficulty would arise in that case.

2. A difference of opinion arose as to the allotment of the capital of the Bank. M. Regnault desired that France should subscribe the larger proportion, say 30 per cent., while Great Britain, Germany, and Spain should each subscribe 20 per cent., and Italy 10 per cent.; Count Tattenbach, on the other hand, desired that those countries which desired to subscribe should do so on an equal footing.

3. Count Tattenbach informed M. Regnault that he could not admit that the

"droit de préférence" allowed to the consortium of French banks (as laid down in Article 33* of the Loan Contract which is to be found at p. 151 of the Yellow Book) should be operative.

At a meeting held on the 31st January point 1, or the question of jurisdiction, was not touched upon.

As regards points 2 and 3, M. Regnault suggested a compromise. He explained to me that his scheme was to form a capital of 400,000*l.*, with 20*l.* shares, or 20,000 shares in all. He would be willing, on behalf of the consortium, to sell the "droit de préférence" to the Bank for 4,000 shares. This would leave 16,000 shares for distribution. He proposed to allot to France, Great Britain, Spain, Germany, and Italy each 2,000 shares, or 10,000 shares in all, dividing the remaining 6,000 shares among the other Powers. The Conseil d'Administration would consist of ten members, each representing holders of 2,000 shares; so that France as holder of 6,000 shares would have three members, Great Britain, Spain, Germany, and Italy each one member; and three members would be left for the other Powers holders of 6,000 shares. By this means France, he considers, would have a majority on the Council of Administration, as he believes Great Britain, Russia, Spain, and Italy would either surrender their shares to France or accord her their votes. The Directorate of the Bank, who would be elected by the Council of Administration, would therefore be French.

The idea is ingenious, and Count Tattenbach did not actually reject it, but it remains to be seen whether he will eventually accept it.

M. Révoil said he wished to put to me a direct question, and that was whether I considered the concessions (and he owned that they were concessions) which M. Regnault had made sufficiently safeguarded French interests in so far as financial control was concerned. I replied that I was hardly a competent judge in such technical matters, but that if M. Regnault were satisfied I presumed that French interests were safe. M. Révoil then said that he knew that an impression existed in certain quarters that he was yielding too much, and he wished to assure me that such was not the case. He asked me if I were not of his opinion that he should not close the negotiations in regard to the State Bank till some agreement had been arrived at between him and M. de Radowitz on the police question. I said that it was evident to me that the two questions should be treated on parallel lines, and that the solution of one must depend on the conclusion of the other. This was an elementary proposition in all negotiations. I asked him to tell me how far he would go in concessions as regards the police question. He said he would be willing to accept the co-operation of Italy with France and Spain in the organization of the police, not according to Italy the faculty of taking an active part in the actual organization, but allowing her to exercise a surveillance over the mode in which the organization was being carried out.

I doubt if Germany would accept this solution, as I understand that she would claim a participation in the police organization if France also took part, but it seemed to me unnecessary that I should impart these doubts to M. Révoil.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[4917] No. 161.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 24. Conference.)

Sir, *Algeciras, February 4, 1906.*

COUNT TATTENBACH having expressed a wish to see me, came to my house yesterday evening, and said that he desired to speak to me on various matters. The conversation, which lasted for an hour and a-half, moved to and fro between the questions of the State Bank and of the police, as well as of my attitude with my French colleague. For the sake of lucidity I would propose to report separately on each of these questions, so as to give as clear and connected a narrative as possible.

* Article 33 of French Draft Bank Scheme:—

"Si le Gouvernement Impérial du Maroc désire contracter un emprunt ou acheter ou vendre des titres, il en fera part aux banques contractantes ainsi qu'à d'autres, et, à conditions et prix égaux, la préférence sera accordée aux banques contractantes. . . . . &c., &c." (follow similar provisions respecting coinage and purchase of bullion).

I will take, in the first place, my attitude towards and relations with my French colleague, as it was clear to me that this question formed the chief object of the visit of Count Tattenbach.

He asked me whether on certain questions I would not be disposed to join forces with the German Delegates, and possibly with others, in resisting the proposals which the French Delegate might bring forward. I replied that my instructions, and I might add my own personal desire, were to support cordially my French colleague throughout the Conference, and that I fully intended to do so. He observed that perhaps M. Révoil might make proposals which would run counter to British interests. I said that I saw no indication of his doing so; were such to be the case, I would speak to M. Révoil.

Count Tattenbach then said that now that the Conference had met, the whole situation had changed, and that *vis-à-vis* to France I was exactly in the same position as any other Delegate. I replied that I differed entirely from him. Great Britain had made certain special arrangements with France, which were enunciated in the Anglo-French Agreement. France had faithfully observed and executed her part of the Agreement, and we were bound in honour to fulfil our part.

Count Tattenbach then asked whether I would not recommend to M. Révoil to make certain concessions which would lead to a satisfactory understanding. He did not specify what concessions. I told him that he appeared to misapprehend my position with M. Révoil completely. It was clear that I was morally bound to be absolutely loyal towards my French colleague, and that if I were to urge him to make concessions, I should not be acting fairly towards him. My line was perfectly clear. If M. Révoil wished to make concessions, it was not for me to say nay; if he did not feel at liberty on certain points to make concessions, it was not for me to urge him to do so.

Count Tattenbach observed that this meant that practically I was urging my French colleague to resist. I replied that this was an erroneous interpretation of my attitude. I would support M. Révoil in whatever line he thought fit to adopt, but that I would not press him to follow any one line.

Count Tattenbach said that I appeared to desire to egg on the French in an indirect way. I replied that he was reviving an old fiction, namely, that we were more French than the French. I could not conceive anything more ridiculous. I had continually expressed to M. Révoil and to any one who cared to listen, my earnest desire that an agreement between France and Germany should be brought about; but that I must leave to the French and German Delegates the task of discovering the means by which such an agreement could be reached. No one, I could assure him, would be better pleased than my Government and myself if the Conference were able to terminate happily and with some results.

Count Tattenbach reiterated his desire that I should point out to M. Révoil the necessity of his making concessions, which alone could bring about an understanding. Were I to say the word, the French would yield; while if I did not, he hinted pretty broadly that the responsibility of the Conference ending in failure would largely rest on my shoulders. He said, "Vous tenez les clefs de la situation."

I repudiated the arguments of Count Tattenbach, pointing out that M. Révoil throughout the proceedings of the Conference, as well as M. Regnault, in his private conversations with himself, had shown the most conciliatory disposition, and had acted with the greatest moderation. No one could deny that. It was illogical to assert that my Government or myself could possibly be in any sense responsible for the outcome of the Conference.

Count Tattenbach remarked that my present warm support of the French differed considerably from the attitude which I had assumed a few years ago at Tangier. I replied that I quite agreed with him on that point. I did not deny that during a great portion of my residence at Tangier a rivalry existed between the British and French Legations, a rivalry which had become almost traditional. The evil effects of this rivalry were notorious. No benefit accrued either to Morocco or to France or England, or to any other Power having interests in Morocco. It was to establish a happier order of things that the Agreement had been concluded, which might have led, and might still lead, to some improvement being effected in that unfortunate country. Once the Agreement was signed, my attitude naturally changed, and old rivals now became firm friends.

Count Tattenbach said that the Conference would do little, and perhaps it would have been better if Germany and France had come to an agreement outside. To this I cordially agreed, but remarked that it was useless recurring to the irrevocable past.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[4918]

No. 162.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 25. Conference.)
Sir,

Algeciras, February 4, 1906.

DURING my conversation of yesterday evening with Count Tattenbach, he spoke at some length as to the State Bank, and though he admitted that M. Regnault had been a conciliatory negotiator, he did not appear at all satisfied with the proposed constitution of the above institution. He said that he did not conceal from himself that it would become an entirely French establishment. The attributions with which it would be endowed would render it a most important factor in Morocco, and it would be enabled to exclude all foreign competition.

I told Count Tattenbach that beyond a hasty verbal exposition which M. Regnault had been good enough to give me, I was without precise information as to the powers with which the Bank would be intrusted, and that I was awaiting a written statement, which I might submit to my Government, as I could not pretend to be competent to express an opinion on such technical matters.

So far, however, as I could understand, the Bank would have the right of issuing notes, of conducting ordinary banking business, and of reforming the Moorish currency. As regards other public enterprises, such as roads, railways, mining concessions, &c., I understood that they were to be placed outside of the Bank, and in some measure under the control of the Diplomatic Body at Tangier, which would afford a certain guarantee. On the whole I gathered from M. Révoil that there was every desire, as indeed he had stated publicly at the Conference, that there should be absolute equality of treatment in the above matters. Moreover, it seemed to me that the composition of the Conseil d'Administration would have an international character. Count Tattenbach said that the composition of the Conseil d'Administration might have apparently an international character, but in reality it would not. All foreign capitalists, Russian, Italian, Belgian, Spanish, and even German were all intimately associated with Paris financiers, and were largely controlled by the latter. The house of Mendelsohn in Berlin, though German in name, was in reality a French banking concern, and the same remark applied to all other countries with the exception of Great Britain.

I said that, in these circumstances, I presumed that he did not want a bank at all, if it were impossible to find in any continental country banks or capitalists independent of French influence. He said that that was not his desire; he did desire that a bank should be established, but not in the manner proposed by M. Regnault. I observed that it would be better to thrash out this question further with M. Regnault, who I knew was animated with the best intentions to meet the views and interests of all, while safeguarding the special position of France in so far as she had such important financial interests already involved in Morocco.

I added that I understood that the branches at the various ports, and the employés generally, would be selected from any nationality. In short, I did not believe that France would seek to establish a monopoly in public works, and I thought he would receive every satisfaction on that point.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[4919]

No. 163.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 26. Conference.)
Sir,

Algeciras, February 4, 1906.

COUNT TATTENBACH broached to me yesterday evening the question of the police organization in Morocco in a perfectly frank manner. In the course of conversation he stated that this question had been made the most prominent one in Berlin, and that the Emperor took a special interest in it. He inquired what my views were.

I told him that, as we were speaking in a friendly and unofficial manner, I should not hesitate to state frankly what my own personal views were. I gave him a sketch of the condition of affairs on the other side of the Straits, and of the intolerable

situation which existed at Tangier, and of which I had had comparatively recent and direct experience. The information which I had received lately was to the effect that the situation had become worse than when I left Tangier little more than a year ago. It was then clear that the case was an urgent one, to which we were all bound to apply as speedy a remedy as possible. I knew of only two countries who had the properly qualified elements at hand to meet the difficulty with the necessary promptitude, and they were France and Spain. If considered desirable, their action might be exclusively limited to the coast towns, and their mandate accorded for a limited period. I could not see what objection could be raised to such a modest proposal, which circumstances so urgently demanded.

Count Tattenbach at first demurred to my statement as to the condition of Morocco, which he contended was not worse than it had been for the past thirty years, and, indeed, asserted that the safety of Europeans was more secure than in some parts of London and Berlin. He believed, indeed, that the organization of police would rather aggravate than ameliorate the situation, and that Europeans would be in the same position as the Spaniards at Ceuta and Melilla, and not able to move a step outside the walls of the town without incurring the risk of being shot down. Germany, moreover, could never agree to France and Spain being solely intrusted with the organization of the police.

I disagreed entirely with his arguments as to the condition of Morocco, adducing self-evident proofs in contradiction of them ; and I asked him what were his reasons against a strictly limited mandate being accorded to the above-mentioned countries. I said I wished to examine the question from the purely practical standpoint of the safety to be accorded to Europeans, without bringing any political considerations into the matter.

Count Tattenbach said that he had no reason to give me, beyond the fact that Germany would not agree to the dual organization. I observed that this would be a difficult attitude to assume before the Conference, and I ventured to think a difficult one to justify. Had he any other combination to propose ? He replied that the organization might be intrusted to the smaller Powers ; but I pointed out that this was not a practical proposal.

Count Tattenbach said that even my own colony at Tangier had protested against the French undertaking the police at that town. I assured him that he was mistaken. The great grievance of my colony in my time had been, not that the French had done too much, but that they had done little or nothing towards safeguarding the security of the Tangier inhabitants.

Our conversation was prolonged for some time on this question, but to little purpose ; and I finally said that I trusted that M. Révoil and M. Radowitz would be able to devise some solution satisfactory to both parties.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[4920] No. 164.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 27. Conference.)

Sir, *Algeciras, February 4, 1906.*

YESTERDAY evening M. Révoil and M. de Radowitz had a private conversation in order to interchange views in regard to the question of the police organization. M. Révoil told M. de Radowitz that the views of his Government were that France should receive a mandate for the above duty, and on being a little pressed he said he would perhaps be ready to associate Spain in the matter, but that he wished it clearly to be understood that he would negotiate on the basis of France alone.

M. de Radowitz stated that Germany could not accept France and Spain alone, and asked what further combination France would be prepared to adopt. His Excellency said that he wished to clear the ground of unacceptable combinations such as one neutral Power alone or a group of small Powers. M. Révoil said he would be glad to learn the views of M. de Radowitz on the point.

M. de Radowitz said a solution might be found in the Sultan himself undertaking the organization and engaging the services of some foreign officers. M. Révoil remarked that such a scheme would be quite unworkable in practice, and that any

Moorish organization could be dismissed from discussion. Moreover, his Government would, he felt sure, consider the proposal quite unacceptable. After a somewhat desultory conversation the interview came to an end without any practical result having been attained, though M. de Radowitz said that he would refer to his Government for instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[4921] No. 165.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 28. Conference.)

Sir, *Algeciras, February 5, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of statistics of foreign trade with Morocco, compiled by M. Regnault, Financial Adviser to M. Révoil, to whom I am indebted for this copy.

These statistics are of interest, as they show the amount of trade crossing the Algerian frontier and the effect produced on that trade by the disturbed state of Eastern Morocco and the Pretender's movement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 165.

Memorandum respecting European Trade in Morocco.

LE tableau ci-joint (Tableau No. 1) indique :

1. La valeur globale des importations ;
2. La valeur globale des exportations ;
3. La valeur globale des importations et exportations réunies ;

pour chaque pays en relations d'affaires avec le Maroc pendant les années 1901, 1902, 1903, et 1904.

Pendant cette période de quatre années, le commerce total du Maroc a atteint 404,217,730 fr. Dans ce chiffre l'Angleterre et la France interviennent pour les trois quarts environ, avec respectivement 160,350,333 fr. et 132,185,502 fr.

La participation des Puissances dans ce mouvement d'affaires exprimée en pour cent est la suivante :—

	Pour cent.		Pour cent.
Angleterre	39·6	Italie	1·3
France	32·7	Autriche	1·2
Allemagne	9·1	Portugal	0·58
Espagne	8·3	Pays-Bas	0·20
Belgique	2·6	Turquie et Tripoli	0·01
Egypte	1·8	Divers	0·68
Etats-Unis	1·5		

Pendant les années 1901, 1902, 1903, et 1904, le commerce du Maroc a atteint respectivement les chiffres de :

	Fr.
1901	93,684,703
1902	103,347,628
1903	109,495,885
1904	97,689,513

La participation des Puissances exprimée en pour cent a été :—

	1901.	1902.	1903.	1904.
	Pour cent.	Pour cent.	Pour cent.	Pour cent.
Angleterre	36·3	41·6	41·1	40·1
France	37·4	31·8	31·1	30·1
Allemagne	6·8	9·01	9·6	11·1
Espagne	10·07	8·4	7·2	7·8
Belgique	2·3	2·7	2·7	2·4
Égypte	1·8	1·2	1·8	2·4
États-Unis	2·9	0·83	1·4	1·2
Italie	1·5	1·5	0·84	1·5
Autriche	1·01	1·1	1·3	1·4
Divers	0·13	0·46	1·05	1·01
Portugal	0·46	0·99	0·47	0·41
Pays-Bas	..	..	0·53	0·08

La France occupait en 1901 le premier rang, avec une participation de 37·4 pour cent dans le commerce total du Maroc. De 1902 à 1904 elle passe après l'Angleterre, et en 1904 sa participation dans le chiffre total du commerce extérieur du Maroc n'est plus que de 30·1 pour cent.

Il est important de remarquer que cette modification n'est nullement due à une diminution de l'activité commerciale Française, mais qu'elle est exclusivement imputable à l'insécurité de la frontière Algéro-Marocaine, qui a occasionné dans les relations commerciales de l'Empire Chérifien avec l'Algérie le ralentissement dont les chiffres ci-dessous permettent de se rendre compte :—

Commerce total de l'Algérie avec le Maroc :—

Année—	Fr.
1901	16,781,307
1902	11,801,946
1903	10,474,289
1904	7,726,596

Mouvement de la Navigation.

Le Tableau ci-joint (Tableau No. 2) indique par année la part de chaque pays dans le mouvement de la navigation.

Sous le rapport du nombre des bateaux les Puissances se classent comme suit :—

	Bateaux.
L'Espagne avec une moyenne annuelle de	1,173
L'Angleterre " "	1,071
La France " "	503
L'Allemagne " "	382
L'Italie " "	66
Le Portugal " "	64
L'Autriche " "	42
La Hollande " "	17
Le Danemark " "	16
La Russie " "	9
La Suède et Norvège " "	8
Les États-Unis " "	7
La Belgique " "	0·75
L'Égypte " "	0·50
La Grèce " "	0·25

Au point de vue de l'importance du tonnage le classement est le suivant :—

	Moyenne Annuelle.		Moyenne Annuelle.
	Tonnes.		Tonnes.
Angleterre	599,254	Suède et Norvège	2,732
France	360,906	Danemark	2,677·75
Allemagne	320,616·99	Russie	2,502·75
Espagne	297,785·75	Égypte	2,150
Italie	48,752	Amérique	1,794
Autriche	35,871·25	Belgique	1,068·50
Hollande	10,607·50	Grèce	1,125
Portugal	5,680·50		

Maisons de Commerce.

Le nombre des maisons de commerce Européennes établies au Maroc est de 213. Dans ce chiffre les Puissances sont représentées comme suit :—

	Maisons.		Maisons.
France	103	Portugal	1
Angleterre	36	Brésil	1
Allemagne	23	Danemark	1
Italie	20	Belgique	1
Espagne	18		
États-Unis	7		
Hollande	2	Total	213

Ces maisons se répartissent comme suit dans les différents ports de la côte :—

	Tanger.	Tetouan.	Larache.	Rabat.	Casablanca.	Mazagan.	Safi.	Mogador.	Total.
France	77	2	5	3	5	5	1	5	103
Angleterre ..	15	..	1	4	5	8	..	3	36
Allemagne ..	7	..	1	2	3	5	2	3	23
Italie	11	..	3	..	2	1	..	3	20
Espagne ..	6	..	2	1	3	6	..	..	18
États-Unis ..	6	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	7
Hollande ..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Portugal ..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Brésil	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Danemark ..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Belgique ..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	1
Total ..	127	2	13	10	19	25	3	14	213

Soit en pour cent :—

	Pour cent.
France	48
Angleterre	16
Allemagne	10
Italie	9
Espagne	8
Autres Puissances	9

Commerce de Banque.

Il ne nous a pas été possible de donner les chiffres d'affaires des banques étrangères au Maroc, le commerce de banque dans ce pays échappant à toute statistique, pour les raisons suivantes :—

1. Absence de base pour apprécier l'importance relative des maisons de banque. En Europe, le portefeuille donne à ce sujet des indications utiles, mais au Maroc il est pour la plus grande partie constitué par des effets en recouvrement, dont un grand nombre sont plusieurs fois renouvelés pendant l'année et grossissent fictivement le portefeuille.

Le chiffre du mouvement de la caisse ne donne pas non plus un moyen d'appréciation qui mérite quelque confiance ; les nombreux virements faits d'un compte à l'autre, et correspondant à des opérations fictives, ne permettent pas de se rendre compte des mouvements réels d'espèces.

2. Impossibilité d'obtenir des renseignements précis de la plupart des maisons de banque qui ne veulent pas qu'on connaisse l'état de leurs affaires.

Mais la prépondérance des banques Françaises s'est affirmée au Maroc d'une façon indiscutable, et particulièrement depuis deux ans elle s'est accrue ainsi que l'indiquent les faits suivants :—

Le Comptoir d'Escompte est établi à Tanger depuis 1897 ; en 1904 deux nouveaux établissements Français ont créé des agences dans cette ville : la Compagnie Algérienne et le Crédit Foncier et Agricole d'Algérie.

En 1904 le Comptoir d'Escompte a ouvert deux agences à Casablanca et Mogador.

En dehors de ces trois Sociétés Françaises, il existe quelques établissements particuliers faisant des opérations de banque. Le plus important par le chiffre de ses affaires est la maison Anglaise, Moses Pariente ; on cite parmi les autres, les maisons Moses Is. Nahon (Italienne) ; Haessner et Joachimsohn (Allemande) ; Braunschvig (Française) ; et Salvador Hassan (Portugaise).

Tous les commerçants de Tanger, à peu d'exceptions près, ont des comptes ouverts dans une des banques Françaises, et particulièrement au Comptoir d'Escompte, qui occupe à lui seul trente employés de tous grades à Tanger, dix à Casablanca, et cinq à Mogador. La Compagnie Algérienne occupe une dizaine d'employés.

L'importation se paie en chèques sur Paris ou Londres ; les chèques que l'on voit circuler sur place à cet effet sont à peu près exclusivement ceux fournis par les établissements Français.

Il a paru intéressant de rechercher quel est le stock en numéraire "Hassani" existant actuellement à Tanger. Il peut s'évaluer à environ 10,000,000 fr., se décomposant comme il suit :—

8,500,000 fr. déposés dans les banques Françaises (Comptoir National d'Escompte de Paris, Compagnie Algérienne, et Crédit Foncier et Agricole d'Algérie).

1,500,000 fr. déposés chez divers.

En résumé, toutes les indications ci-dessus et une enquête impartiale permettent d'affirmer, en restant au-dessous de la vérité, que les banques Françaises représentent au moins les 80 pour cent des affaires de banque traitées au Maroc.

Le reste, c'est-à-dire, le 20 pour cent, se partage dans des proportions très inégales entre les commerçants banquiers étrangers.

Les Anglais ont la plus grande part—approximativement le 12 pour cent. Le reste, c'est-à-dire, environ le 8 pour cent—est partagé entre les maisons Italiennes, Allemandes, Portugaises, et d'autres maisons de diverses nationalités. Encore y a-t-il lieu de remarquer qu'une maison Italienne représente le Crédit Lyonnais et fait pour le compte de cet établissement un chiffre d'affaires assez important.

En récapitulant, la participation des Européens dans le commerce des banques est représentée en pour cent par les chiffres suivants :—

	Pour cent.
Français	80
Anglais	12
Nationalités diverses	8

Pour compléter ce travail nous donnons ci-dessous la liste des maisons de banque installées au Maroc, en mentionnant leur nationalité :—

Maisons de Banque.	Nationalité.
Tanger—	
Comptoir National d'Escompte de Paris	Française.
Compagnie Algérienne	"
Crédit Foncier et Agricole d'Algérie	"
Banques particulières :	
Pariente	Anglaise.
Braunschvig et Cie.	Française.
Théo. Furth et Cie.	"
Haessner et Joachimsohn, correspondant de la Deutsche Bank	Allemande.
Nahon	Italienne.
Nahon (Crédit Lyonnais)	"
Hassan	Portugaise.
Tetouan—	
Comptoir National d'Escompte de Paris	Française.
Compagnie Algérienne	"
Casablanca—	
Comptoir d'Escompte	"
Compagnie Algérienne	"

Maisons de Banque.	Nationalité.
Mazagan—	
Comptoir d'Escompte	Française.
Compagnie Algérienne	"
Crédit Foncier et Agricole d'Algérie	"
Anglo-Egyptian Bank	Anglaise.
Nahon	Italienne.
Pariente	Anglaise.
Mogador—	
Comptoir d'Escompte	Française.

Tableau No. 1.—Commerce Général du Maroc (Années 1901–1904).

IMPORTATIONS.

Années.	France.	Allemagne.	Angleterre.	Belgique.	Espagne.	Pays-Bas.	Italie.	Autriche.	Portugal.	Égypte.	Divers.	Totaux.
	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.
1901	13,001,781	3,442,842	23,551,806	2,215,338	624,703	61,600	132,999	946,789	4,725	..	126,500	44,109,083
1902	14,463,163	4,108,884	28,849,662	2,841,294	913,995	81,720	236,926	1,177,775	2,750	..	361,500	53,037,669
1903	18,685,438	4,041,382	32,143,316	3,003,103	1,980,680	99,180	233,860	1,425,380	..	..	823,150	62,435,489
1904	18,706,143	2,839,090	26,386,856	2,388,114	1,235,052	81,163	783,950	1,394 566	..	9,400	671,190	54,495,524
Totaux ..	64,856,525	14,432,198	110,931,640	10,447,849	4,754,430	323,663	1,387,735	4,944,510	7,475	9,400	1,982,340	214,077,765

EXPORTATIONS.

Années.	France.	Allemagne.	Angleterre.	Belgique.	Espagne.	Autriche.	Italie.	États-Unis	Portugal.	Égypte.	Pays-Bas.	Turquie et Tripoli.	Divers.	Totaux.
	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.
1901 ..	5,275,699	2,986,676	9,484,388	..	8,821,731	..	1,315,876	2,745,772	429,840	1,703,732	..	30,904	..	32,794,620
1902 ..	6,634,992	5,208,783	14,161,933	15,421	7,809,340	5,782	1,327,713	865,013	1,028,675	1,303,232	18,369	8,456	120,250	38,507,959
1903 ..	5,635,597	6,480,801	12,892,778	7,270	5,922,396	7,128	688,760	1,583,306	509,125	2,010,990	491,725	7,295	331,225	36,568,396
1904 ..	4,003,116	8,061,785	12,879,594	41,933	6,427,920	7,320	726,177	1,268,856	407,248	2,344,507	..	..	320,960	36,489,416
Totaux ..	21,549,404	22,738,045	49,418,693	64,624	28,981,387	20,230	4,058,528	6,462,947	2,374,888	7,362,461	510,094	46,655	772,435	144,360,391

COMMERCE—TOTAL.

Années.	France	Angleterre.	Allemagne.	Espagne.	Belgique.	États-Unis	Autriche.	Égypte.	Italie.	Pays-Bas.	Portugal.	Turquie et Tripoli.	Divers.	Totaux.
	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.
1901 ..	18,277,480	33,036,194	6,429,518	9,446,434	2,215,338	2,745,772	946,789	1,703,732	1,448,877	61,600	434,565	30,904	126,500	76,903,703
Algérie ..	16,781,000													
1902 ..	21,098,155	43,011,595	9,317,667	8,723,335	2,856,715	865,013	1,183,557	1,303,232	1,564,639	100,089	1,031,425	8,456	481,750	91,545,628
Algérie ..	11,802,000													
1903 ..	24,321,035	45,036,094	10,522,183	7,903,076	3,010,373	1,583,306	1,432,508	2,010,990	922,620	590,905	509,125	7,295	1,154,375	99,003,885
Algérie ..	10,492,000													
1904 ..	22,709,259	39,266,450	10,900,875	7,662,972	2,430,047	1,268,856	1,401,886	2,353,907	1,510,127	81,163	407,248	..	992,150	90,984,940
Algérie ..	6,704,573													
Totaux ..	132,185,502	160,350,333	37,170,243	33,735,817	10,512,473	6,462,947	4,964,740	7,371,861	5,446,263	833,757	2,382,363	46,655	2,754,775	358,438,156
									Commerce de la France avec l'Algérie par voie de terre				..	45,779,574
														404,217,730

Tableau No. 2.—État de la Navigation Générale du Maroc pendant les Années 1901–1904.

Pavillons.	1901.		1902.		1903.		1904.		Totaux.	
	Nombre.	Tonnage.	Nombre.	Tonnage.	Nombre.	Tonnage.	Nombre.	Tonnage.	Nombre.	Tonnage.
Anglais	721	511,399	793	488,515	1,584	867,504	1,187	529,598	4,285	2,397,016
Français	409	271,097	404	285,660	692	523,664	508	363,203	2,013	1,443,624
Allemand	354	320,377	282	239,921	536	445,703	359	276,466	1,531	1,282,467
Espagnol	897	200,994	977	232,204	1,984	514,943	836	243,002	4,694	1,191,143
Italien	24	36,842	9	8,468	44	29,354	187	120,344	264	195,008
Portugais	70	4,472	38	4,230	60	4,404	90	9,616	258	22,722
Autrichien	17	29,014	82	58,805	46	37,066	25	18,600	170	143,485
Suédois et Norvégien	8	2,886	5	2,403	6	1,114	13	4,525	32	10,928
Marocain	..	..	..	..	43	9,679	24	4,970	67	14,649
Russe	5	716	5	702	20	7,064	8	1,529	38	10,011
Danois	16	1,956	15	2,563	12	3,228	21	2,964	64	10,711
Hollandais	15	8,147	14	9,878	26	18,258	13	6,147	68	42,430
Américain	..	..	..	..	..	..	21	1,794	21	1,794
Belge	..	..	..	..	2	1,556	1	581	3	2,137
Grec	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1,125	1	1,125
Égyptien	..	..	..	..	2	2,150	..	..	2	2,150
	2,536	1,387,900	2,624	1,333,349	5,057	2,465,687	3,294	1,584,464	13,511	6,771,400

[5066] No. 166.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 34.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, February 10, 1906.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 40 of yesterday's date regarding the Morocco Conference at Algeciras, I was informed this afternoon at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that, according to a telegram received from the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, the answer of the German Government to the representations made by the Russian Government has been sent by messenger to St. Petersburgh, and is now on the way here. The telegram contained no indication of the nature of the German reply.

Your telegram No. 38 of the 8th instant.

I have addressed a note to Count Lamsdorff, informing his Excellency that His Majesty's Government will instruct Sir Arthur Nicolson to support any solution of the Moroccan police question which may be accepted by France. I have informed M. Bompard of my action.

[5059] No. 167.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 13. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, February 10, 1906.*

I LEARNED to-day from German Chargé d'Affaires that, according to his information, a failure of the Conference was to be expected. He said that the French and German Representatives had privately exchanged views on the police question, but without result.

I gathered, in answer to questions put to him, that a return by the two Governments to direct negotiations, upon, perhaps, a broader basis, was, in his opinion, the only solution. If the two Powers were allowed to drift apart in a bad humour with one another, dangerous situations might ensue. But as neither France nor Germany desired a continuance of strained relations, a third Power might, he hinted, help matters by tactful intervention.

Acceptance of the French police organization scheme, even if slightly diluted by introduction of Spanish police was, he maintained, quite impossible for Germany.

[4156] No. 168.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, February 10, 1906.*

STATE Bank.

The declaration proposed by the French financial expert, as reported in your despatch No. 15 of the 15th ultimo, would place Great Britain in a position inferior to that of all other interested Powers, and it is therefore impossible for His Majesty's Government to agree to it.

We should be prepared to give the French Government an assurance to the effect that they may rely on the British Representative on the bank supporting his French colleague, just as you are now doing at the Conference.

We should, moreover, be willing to come to an agreement with France to the effect that we would withdraw from the bank if the other Powers ceased to be represented on it, but pending such an eventuality, the representation of Great Britain on it should be as effective as that of the Power which, next to France, receives the most favourable treatment.

[5057] No. 169.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 11, 1906.*

A GENERAL committee meeting of the Conference was held yesterday.

We referred back to the Sub-Committee the project respecting the organization of the special "caisse" in connection with the surtaxes, in order that it might be amended and amplified, as it was incomplete. As regards the Customs administration, a lengthy project was read, but we did not enter on its discussion, as it will require to be studied, and that will take time.

We have now received the Sultan's reply on the subject of the Regulations dealing with contraband trade in arms, munitions, &c. The Sultan merely suggests that one or two of the proposals made by the Conference should be slightly modified.

Very slow progress is being made with the work of the Conference, and at yesterday's meeting I expressed the hope that it might be found possible to display a little more activity.

[5058] No. 170.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 11, 1906.*

FOLLOWING is Confidential:—

Information has reached me that within the last three days the German Government have been making attempts to induce two important Powers to lend their support to a proposal for the organization of the police, which is the same as the one I reported as the third alternative in my telegram to you No. 16 of the 25th ultimo—namely, that the Sultan should be allowed to organize the police himself, with the assistance of volunteer officers whom some of the minor Powers would select.

Information has also reached me, from a source in which I can place implicit confidence, that the German Government instructed their Representative at the Conference to make a suggestion in the above sense to the French Delegate direct, and to enlist the support of the Representatives of the two Powers to whom I have alluded in urging its acceptance on the Delegate of France.

In view of the refusal of the two Representatives to comply with his request, M. de Radowitz has, before addressing himself to M. Révoil on the subject, asked to be furnished with further instructions from Berlin by telegraph.

[5265] No. 171.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, February 12, 1906.*

I LEARNED this morning from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had just seen the German Chargé d'Affaires, his personal opinion that Germany and France were not absolutely resolved to make no concessions on the police question, though neither showed any readiness to give way.

Internationalization of the police or its organization by a small Power, to which Spain and other Powers strongly object, was what Germany at present professed to desire. But, Señor Ojeda said, before the Conference German Ambassador in Madrid had stated that Germany would not object to France retaining police on Algerian frontier, nor to Spain receiving an exclusive mandate for police of the coast towns. The Spanish Government had, however, unfortunately been given to understand, privately and confidentially by their Representatives at Algeciras, that Germany was now less disposed to be friendly to Spain than before the Conference. He thought that their unwillingness to give a mandate for the police exclusively to Spain was to be attributed to German suspicions that Secret Agreements existed between Spain and France of

which German Government had no knowledge, and that under the terms of these Agreements there would be no real distinction between a French and a Spanish police. His Excellency added that, of course, the Agreements between Spain and France must be adhered to, though he appeared to regret them, but he hoped to allay Germany's suspicions and to induce her to withdraw her opposition on this point. He thought that any French objections could also be removed, and it might be well that the Spanish mandate should be temporary, but renewable if found to work satisfactorily. He considered this the only practical solution. He added that President of the Council had heard nothing of any intention on the part of Germany to exclude police question from programme of Conference.

I have not yet communicated above to M. Cambon, who has not returned, though he was expected to-day.

[5250] No. 172.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 12.)

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February* 12, 1906.

THE following information is of a most confidential character :—

An impression prevails here that some misconception exists in the minds of the German Emperor and of the Government at Berlin as to the demands of the French in regard to the police question, and that they believe them to be of a more extensive nature than they really are.

I have been informed in the strictest confidence by the Representative of the United States, who has begged that no mention may be made of it, that he has telegraphed to his Government the substance of the French demands, in accordance with instructions from Washington.

The demands are : French and Spanish instructors to be placed at the disposal of the Sultan's Government for a period of three years for the purpose of organizing native police forces, in the coast towns only. Authority to be granted to these instructors to see that the police receive their pay regularly.

It has been stated by the Government at Washington that they will see that the German Emperor is made acquainted with these demands.

The French financial expert has the intention of communicating a draft project on the subject of the State Bank to Count Tattenbach to-day, so that presumably a continuation will be made of the discussions on this question, but M. de Radowitz states that he is not yet in a position to renew the *pourparlers* on the police question, having so far received no instructions on the subject from Berlin.

It is the general opinion here that it will be found impossible to arrive at an agreement on the police question.

[5311] No. 173.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 13.)

(No. 29. Confidential.)
Sir, *Madrid, February* 10, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to report to you that Baron Stumm, the German Chargé d'Affaires, called on me this morning, and that, in the course, of conversation, he communicated to me that he had heard this morning from Algeciras that the *pourparlers* which have been going on between the French and German Representatives for the purpose of coming to an understanding with regard to the police question have ended in nothing.

Baron Stumm expressed his regret at this, as, in his opinion, it would lead to a failure of the Conference as far as practical results were concerned.

I asked him whether he thought some police scheme might not be approved of by the majority of the Powers represented at the Conference. He replied that such might be the case, but that, as far as he knew, France did not seem inclined to meet on this point the minimum of German demands. Germany could not yield to the claim put

forward by France that she should organize the police, even if she watered down her pretensions by the admittance of a certain amount of Spanish police. To have gone to the Conference to attain this end would be for the German Government to render themselves ridiculous, and the loss of prestige they would incur was more than they could put up with in the interests of conciliation.

I inquired of Baron Stumm whether he had any suggestions to make as regards a possible solution of the difficulty. His answers were of a somewhat vague nature, but as far as I could understand his meaning it amounted to this :—

If the Conference should end in nothing, France and Germany would drift apart in bad humour with each other, and that might create a situation dangerous for the peace of the world. The only way to avoid this was to reopen direct negotiations between Paris and Berlin, and perhaps the tactful intervention of some Great Power might bring this about.

As regards the basis of the negotiations, whether they should extend to more important matters than local questions in Morocco, Baron Stumm became more than unusually obscure; but he observed that the questions at issue between France and Germany, such as that of the Bagdad Railway and certain Colonial frontiers, were too insignificant, in his opinion, to justify Germany in bartering away Morocco in return for their settlement.

The impression left on my mind is that Baron Stumm meant that Germany desired France to alter her general policy so far as to cease to be antagonistic to Germany in major matters rather than that she should come to terms with her on minor ones.

There is one other point which it may be worth recording and that is, that on an observation of mine that some Powers might insist on some police scheme being devised for the protection of their trade in Morocco, Baron Stumm expressed some fears that the United States might intervene and brush aside French and German susceptibilities in favour of some practical police scheme which they might succeed in imposing on the Conference through their prestige and moral weight.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[5405] No. 174.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 13.)

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, February* 13, 1906.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 34 of the 10th instant, I learn that the Russian Government have now received the answer of the German Government to their representations respecting Morocco, which is to the effect that M. Rouvier is bound by a verbal agreement not to ask that France may obtain control of the police in that country. This is in accordance with the assertion made by Prince Bülow to His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin.

The French Ambassador here will have an interview to-morrow with Minister for Foreign Affaires.

[5367] No. 175.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 13.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February* 13, 1906.

A REPORT is, I understand, being circulated in the press that a deadlock has supervened in the negotiations here. At present this can hardly be said to be the case.

I think it just possible, from what I was told last night, that an agreement may be reached in regard to the bank question, and the discussions on the question of the organization of the police between the French and German Representatives may thus be facilitated.

The Italian Delegate has acted as intermediary in conveying to M. de Radowitz an intimation of M. Révoil's desire to have a further conversation with him on the subject of the police, and M. de Radowitz states that he hopes that either to-day or to-morrow he will be in a position to discuss the question.

[5389] No. 176.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 13, 1906.*

THE following information received from Paris this morning has been communicated to me by M. Révoil in the strictest confidence:—

Count Lamsdorff has informed the French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh that Prince Bülow stated to the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, in reply to suggestions made by him that France and Spain conjointly should be intrusted with the police, that such a solution could not be accepted by Germany, who, however, would be willing to agree to a settlement of the question on one of the three following bases:—

(*a.*) That instructors should be selected from among the small Powers by the Sultan, and that the Diplomatic Body at Tangier should have control over them.
(*b.*) That different Powers should have districts assigned to them.
(*c.*) That the Sultan should recruit from among the small Powers a mercenary army of Europeans.

Prince Bülow said that, should it be found possible to arrive at an agreement, there would be no other course left open but the resumption of the *status quo*, with the Convention of Madrid of 1880 for its basis.

The French Ambassador said that France would not accept any of the foregoing solutions, and Count Lamsdorff asked whether Great Britain, Italy, and the United States could not support the suggestion which had been made by Russia at Berlin by similar intervention.

I was asked by M. Révoil if I would recommend this course to my Government, and would speak to the Representatives of the United States and Italy. In reply, I explained to him that, while it was my earnest desire to do all in my power to facilitate a solution, and to support him, it would, nevertheless, be a little difficult for me to suggest to the Representatives of those two Powers that they should recommend pressure being brought to bear upon Germany, in view of the fact that I had refused to accede to the German Representative's request to put any pressure on my French colleague.

I added that, personally, I should much prefer that our two Governments should consider in London or Paris the question of intervention by His Majesty's Government.

M. Révoil said that he appreciated my difficulty, and that he would suggest to his Government by telegraph that the matter should be mentioned to you by M. Cambon.

As M. de Radowitz says that his instructions have now reached him in regard to the question of police organization, M. Révoil is to see him to-day.

[5482] No. 177.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 99.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 13, 1906.*

THE French Ambassador called at this Office to-day, and in the course of a conversation which he had with Sir Charles Hardinge, alluded to the statements made during the last few days by the German news agencies and press with regard to the intentions and attitude of France at the Algeciras Conference.

In accordance with instructions received from his Government, M. Cambon made a communication to the following effect:—

It is quite untrue that M. Révoil endeavoured to reverse the order of discussion

as adopted by the Conference and to place the question of the police before that of the bank. It was at the express request of the German Delegate, M. de Radowitz, that the French Delegate agreed to take part, in a semi-official and private interview, in an exchange of views with regard to the bank and police. It is also untrue that M. Rouvier withdrew his claim on behalf of France to a general mandate for the police of Morocco in exchange for a recognition of the right to control the police on the Algerian frontier. The French Government have never allowed their right to police the frontier, which is theirs in virtue of longstanding Agreements with the Sultan, to be called in question. They could not, therefore, think of making their previous rights matter for exchange.

Furthermore, M. Rouvier's declarations were published in the Yellow Book, and were not disputed by the German Government.

As regards the general mandate for the police, M. Rouvier considers it important that the false construction put by the German press on the expression "mandat général" should not gain credence. The Yellow Book contains conclusive proof that we did not at any moment propose to organize a police force outside the coast towns. The proposals of the French Government were in the first instance confined to four ports, Tangier, Laraiche, Rabat, and Casablanca, with the reservation that, if it were subsequently recognized as necessary to organize a police force in other towns, France should be charged with the task. Mention of Fez is, it is true, made in the Yellow Book (No. 265). But in asking for French co-operation at Fez, as at Ujda, in conformity with previous Agreements with France, the Sultan did not contemplate organizing a police force, in the strict sense of the words, there, but putting troops there in a position to resist the Pretender.

No doubt could arise as to the meaning of the words "mandat général," of which use was made for want of a more precise expression to indicate the task of organizing the native police in the coast towns. This mandate was general only in the sense that no analogous mandate was intrusted to any other country at any point on Moorish territory. With regard to the mandate with which the French Government would, as is well known, be satisfied now in a spirit of conciliation, it would be no longer in any respect a general one, for they are prepared to share the task of carrying it into effect with Spain, after coming to an agreement that that Power should do so in the localities mutually agreed upon.

The French Government have declared that this police force would have as its principal task—and, if necessary, they could, doubtless, say for its sole task—the security of foreigners.

The German newspapers profess, without however making any attempt to prove it, that the effect of such an organization would be to assure to France, in matters economic, a preponderating position which would infringe the principle of the open door. It is difficult to understand how the presence of a few French and Algerian officers and non-commissioned officers at the head of a few hundred Moorish police could have such a result, when the principle of economic equality and liberty has been accepted by France without reserve. If, however, the guarantees with which this principle has already been surrounded appeared insufficient in view of the mandate for the police which it is proposed to intrust to France and Spain, the French Government would be quite prepared to give fresh guarantees if the Conference considered them desirable in this connection.

The French Government will thus again demonstrate their sincere desire to see the Conference arrive at a solution which would satisfy all the Powers.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[4919] No. 178.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 10.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 13, 1906.*

I APPROVE the language which you used in reply to Count Tattenbach, as reported in your despatch No. 26 of the 4th instant. Count Tattenbach seems to have desired that you should put yourself in the position of urging France to yield to the German view. This would have been entirely out of accord with the spirit of the *entente*, and a departure from the letter of our Agreement with France. With reference to Count Tattenbach's remark that you were practically urging your French

colleague to resist, and appeared to desire to "egg on" the French in an indirect way, I have to observe that the support you have given to France has been entirely within the limits of the Declarations exchanged between us and France on the subject of Morocco, which are known to the German Government, and to which Count Tattenbach must have known that it was our intention to adhere loyally. But, apart from these Declarations, by which we are bound, it appears to me that the German attitude is not a reasonable one. France is ready to respect the sovereignty of the Sultan and the independence of Morocco. There remain two objects which we desire to see secured. One is the maintenance of order, more especially in the ports; and, from the point of view of common sense, it is clear that the best way to secure this is to intrust to France and Spain—the only two Powers who have suitable personnel and experience—the organization of the police at the ports. Our second object is to safeguard our economic interests by securing the open door. This we consider has been done by our Agreement with France, but if Germany's interests be, as was at one time declared, economic interests, I am surprised that the Conference has proceeded so far without her making any proposals for stronger guarantees of an economic nature if she considers that those which already exist are not sufficient. I gather from the reports which I have had from you that were Germany to accept an organization of the police at the ports such as I have described, and were she to limit her demands to securing economic guarantees, there would be little difficulty in securing a unanimous agreement of the Conference, and one which would be acceptable to France. I consider, therefore, that Count Tattenbach's remark, tending to throw upon you or upon the policy of His Majesty's Government the blame for obstructing the Conference, is entirely unwarranted.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[5501] No. 179.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 14.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February* 14, 1906.

AT a plenary sitting of the Conference held yesterday, we agreed to some very slight amendments which the Moorish Government proposed to the Regulations dealing with contraband trade in arms, munitions, &c.

We also discussed, and made considerable progress with, the draft Regulations in regard to frauds perpetrated on the Customs, &c. These will be further discussed at a sitting this morning, when we hope to finish them.

Owing to the draft project respecting the special "Caisse" for the surtax revenues not having yet been finally settled, the question of the increase of the customs duties still remains in suspense. I have informed M. Révoil that, if the 10 per cent. duties are to be raised to 12½ per cent., the 5 per cent. duties must be increased to 7½ per cent., and that I could not submit to His Majesty's Government a proposal to increase by a quarter the existing duties, or, in other words, to raise those duties whose present rate is 5 per cent. to 6¼ per cent., and those whose present rate is 10 per cent. to 12½ per cent. The French Representative said he would agree to the addition of 2½ per cent. to all the rates of duty. It would in my opinion be useless to endeavour to get the 5 per cent. duties raised to 10 per cent., and I fear that the above will be the only concession it will be possible for me to obtain.

[5503] No. 180.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 14.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February* 14, 1906.

THE French Representative has been informed of the German proposal, in regard to the organization of the police, by M. von Radowitz, who stated that he was making the communication privately, and merely with the object of furnishing a basis for an exchange of views. He added that the German Government were anxious that an understanding should be reached.

The proposal is that in certain specified localities a police force shall be established, of which the Sultan shall be requested by the Conference to undertake the organization, that foreign officers selected freely by the Sultan shall organize and command this force; the future State Bank will place the necessary funds at the Sultan's disposal. The execution of the police organization shall be controlled by the Diplomatic Body at Tangier, and the inspection intrusted to a foreign officer of superior rank, whose selection shall be made from among the minor Powers; the Diplomatic Body at Tangier shall be furnished with reports by this officer.

A period of from three to five years, probation to be accorded to the scheme.

The German Representative left the above communication in writing with the French Representative, who told him that he took act of it, and that he would submit it to Paris with a request to be furnished with instructions.

With regard to Count Lamsdorff's suggestion that Great Britain, Italy, and the United States should urge the German Government to agree to the police organization being intrusted to France and Spain, my French colleague says that he has suggested to the French Government that it would be advisable that no action should be taken for the moment.

M. Révoil does not think that the German proposal will be accepted by his Government in its present form, but he is hopeful that Germany has not spoken her last word, and that it may be possible to induce her to consent to limiting to France and Spain the countries from which the Sultan is to select officers.

[4919] No. 181.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Lascelles.

(No. 67.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 14, 1906.

I OBSERVED to Count Metternich to-day that I regretted that so little progress had been made at the Morocco Conference. Count Metternich said that progress had been made with some points, such as Moorish taxation, but that no doubt a difference of opinion with regard to the police remained, the German view being that the police should be organized under the Sultan of Morocco, with officers drawn from minor Powers, the police as a whole to be directed by one officer appointed by the Diplomatic Body at Tangier. I said that in our view, from the point of view of common sense, apart altogether from any engagements that we might have towards France, the only Powers who were qualified as regards personnel and experience to organize the police at the ports effectively were France and Spain. France had agreed to respect the sovereignty of the Sultan and the integrity of Morocco. Our British interests were two. In the first place the maintenance of order, which was essential to trade, and for this purpose we considered that the organization of the police at the ports should be intrusted to France and Spain as the most effective way of securing this object. Our second interest was that there should be economic guarantees for the "open door," and this we considered we had obtained—at any rate for a considerable number of years—under the Declarations which we had exchanged with France. I had heard it suggested that our Representative at the Conference had gone too far in supporting France and encouraging her to make demands. On the contrary, we had kept well within the limits of the Declarations we had exchanged with France, and it appeared to me that the French attitude had been most moderate and reasonable.

Count Metternich said that the object of the German Government had originally been, and still was, to prevent France from getting a monopoly or a paramount interest in Morocco, and that for her to have the control of the police would give her this. I replied that the organization of the police at the ports could not really endanger the economic interests of other Powers, and even in this organization France would be associated with Spain. Besides this there was the question of the establishment of the State Bank, which had something to do with economic interests, and that France had shown herself, as I understood, quite ready to discuss in a conciliatory spirit.

Count Metternich would not accept the view that the organization of the police at the ports could be intrusted to France without prejudice to the economic interests of other Powers. He said it was only the beginning from which France would proceed to acquire a predominant position in Morocco, which would be inconsistent with equal rights and opportunities for others.

I said there was evidently a difference of view between us. I could only hope that as the tone of the discussions at the Conference remained friendly, and the Conference

was still proceeding, some better result might be hoped for there. Count Metternich said that, with regard to the tone in which the discussions had been carried on, though he admitted that it had been quite friendly at the Conference, there had lately been a marked outburst of impatience in the French press, which he attributed to official instigation either on the part of M. Révoil or some official source in Paris, and which he took to mean that France wished the Conference to break up without result. I said that the impression produced upon me had been that M. Révoil had acted with the greatest moderation and patience, and that that had been the policy of his Government; but it had to be borne in mind that France had a great deal at stake in Morocco. As a neighbouring Power she was politically very much affected by what went on in Morocco. She had had the greatest share of the trade in Morocco, and owing to the unsettled state of the country, which had diminished the trade on the Algerian frontier, French trade had lately suffered more than British trade or than that of any other country. It was therefore natural that the French press should show a certain anxiety and impatience, but I was firmly convinced that the French Government, simply because their interest in securing a settled condition of things in Morocco was so great, both politically and economically, desired a favourable result from the Conference.

Count Metternich said that Germany considered she had already made a great concession to France by recognizing that it belonged to France to police the Algerian frontier. Should the Conference break up without any result because France had been unwilling to meet Germany on other points, Germany would regard the concession respecting the Algerian frontier as not having been made. His Government considered that the organization of the police should be, as already stated, under the Sultan, with officers of minor Powers, controlled by one officer appointed by the diplomatists at Tangier, or else that Morocco should be divided into sections, the policing of which should be intrusted to separate Powers. I said that this seemed to me to be working on the Macedonian model, which was not a hopeful one; and I observed that of all the other Powers at the Conference I did not think one, except Germany, had raised any independent objection to the police at the ports being intrusted to France and Spain. Count Metternich said neither had they objected to the internationalization of the police at the ports. I said I did not think they could have had any love for internationalization, which I thought they must all feel would lead to confusion; but I asked, as the other Powers did not object to the police being intrusted to France and Spain, why should Germany raise objection to it, seeing that her trade interests were analogous to the trade interests of the other Powers, being, at any rate, much nearer to those of the other Powers than they were to those of France and Great Britain, which were much the largest of all? If, therefore, the Powers, other than France and Great Britain, did not think their trade interests would be endangered by the police at the ports being intrusted to France and Spain, why should Germany object? To this Count Metternich said that a great export trade was more necessary for Germany than it was for such countries as Spain or Italy. Morocco, he believed, had great possibilities and a great future. It was one of the few places still left open, and Germany, looking forward to the expansion of her own trade, could not see the prospect sacrificed.

I said I was sorry that Germany attached so much importance to political influence in Morocco and so little to economic guarantees. Our view was that we could safely concede political influence to France where we had no political ambitions, and accept in return economic guarantees for our trade. It appeared to me that a real difference of view existed between us on this point, but that as the discussion was still proceeding at Algeciras I was not without hope that it might yet be reconciled. We did not appear, however, to be able to make any progress at present.

Should an opportunity arise you may use similar language at Berlin, but I do not think any good would be done at this moment by making a special communication.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[4150] No. 182.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 11.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 14, 1906.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 10 of the 26th ultimo, transmitting a copy of the *procès-verbal* of the sitting of the Conference of the 22nd ultimo, and requesting an expression of my views with regard to a point raised by the

second German Delegate as to whether the regulations which may be drawn up by the Conference would supersede any contrary stipulations contained in existing Treaties between Morocco and any of the Powers now represented at Algeciras.

In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding on this point, it would, in my opinion, be advisable that, following the precedent of the Brussels Act of 1890 (Article 96), the Conference should insert in the General Act, which it will doubtless eventually draw up, a provision to the following effect:—

"The present General Act repeals all contrary stipulations of Conventions previously concluded between the Signatory Powers."

I request that you will, when the occasion arises, suggest the insertion of such a provision.

Your Excellency will, no doubt, eventually call my attention to any provisions of the General Act of the Conference which may necessitate modifications in the Morocco Order in Council of 1889, and I will then cause steps to be taken with a view to amend it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[5612] No. 183.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received February 15.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, February* 15, 1906.

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th instant, transmitting copy of telegraphic correspondence with the British Delegate at the Algeciras Conference on the subjects of proposed increase in the rate of the Moorish import duties, and the contemplated revision of the anchorage dues at ports of Morocco.

In reply to your request to be furnished with any observations and suggestions which the Board may have to make upon these matters, I am to state, for Sir E. Grey's information, that, after careful consideration and confidential inquiry in the quarters most likely to be interested, the Board are of opinion that the proposed increase of the import duties to the extent of 2½ per cent. *ad valorem* would not be felt as a serious hardship by British trade, provided it were equally applied to all goods imported into Morocco, from whatever country arriving and by whatever frontier (sea or land) they may be imported.

They are still of opinion that it would be equitable in principle to raise the duties on the articles at present charged only 5 per cent. to the general level before imposing any further surtax, and they hope that, unless Sir E. Grey sees any objection, the point will at least be raised in Committee by Sir A. Nicolson, even if it has ultimately to be abandoned.

As regards the suggested revision of the anchorage dues, which the Board understand to be proposed in respect of all Moorish ports, and not at Tangier only, as mentioned in your letter, I am to say that, in the absence of any indication as to the nature of the revision, and the scale of dues to be suggested, they are unable to express a definite opinion upon this point. The confidential inquiries which they have made, however, establish the fact that the dues now being levied are moderate in amount, and that the interests concerned would not object to some small increase in the scale, provided that the revision be accompanied by the improvement of shipping facilities at Moorish ports. At present ship-owners have to complain of certain impediments to business, such as the insufficiency of the lighterage accommodation provided and the obstruction of certain ports by sunken wrecks.

The Board are informed that the lack of proper lighterage accommodation is an old-standing grievance which badly wants remedying. The so-called ports of Morocco are open anchorages, and goods have to be removed from ship to shore in lighters, the supply of which, in virtue of Treaty stipulations, is a monopoly of the Moorish Government, who are entitled to levy specified charges for their use. It usually happens that, when two or more vessels are lying off a port, desirous of landing or loading cargo, the supply of lighters available is insufficient, the result being that ship-owners are put to considerable inconvenience as regards delay and expense.

The Board further understand that one or two of the Moorish ports, *e.g.*, Mogador, are at present obstructed by sunken wrecks, and that the efforts made by the shipping

interests to induce the Government to permit their removal have so far been unavailing. These wrecks are a source of danger to the vessels frequenting the ports, and to the lighters engaged in the removal of goods, and in one case the wreck is said to occupy the best anchorage.

Another matter which should be considered in connection with any revision of anchorage dues is the abolition of the compulsory pilotage charges now imposed, in accordance with Treaty, at Laraiche and Rabat for services which the Board understand to be entirely unnecessary.

I am to add that the question of the raising of the customs duties and the revision of the anchorage dues appear to the Board to be closely connected, since in both cases the proceeds of any increase would be presumably devoted to the improvement of the port facilities and of commercial conditions generally. Should it prove necessary to withdraw eventually our proposal for the equalization of the rates of customs duties on all classes of articles, the Board suggest that this concession should, if possible, be conditional on our obtaining satisfactory compensation in the shape of the removal of the various grievances referred to in this letter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) H. LLEWELLYN SMITH.

[5609] No. 184.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 48.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 15, 1906.*

THE discussion of the project relating to frauds perpetrated on the Customs, &c., was practically concluded at a plenary sitting of the Conference yesterday, one Article being held over to be discussed on a subsequent date.

I availed myself of the occasion to urge that, while we were agreeing, in the interests of the Moorish Customs, to measures by which shippers and others were rendered liable to severe penalties, we should not be unmindful of the interests of our navigation and commerce, and that some reciprocity should be shown in the matters under discussion. I added that I sincerely hoped that measures would be taken to remedy the deficiencies in the Customs administration, and that some guarantee would be given that it would be carried out with more order and regularity.

I am still of opinion that some of the provisions of the project are a little vexatious and onerous, and I will, of course, only accept it subject to reference to you.

We hope to deal with the question of the State Bank on Monday, and with the question of the increase of the customs duties on Saturday.

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister in Morocco.)

[5610] No. 185.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 49. Most Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 15, 1906.*

YESTERDAY morning M. Révoil had a conversation with me as to the terms in which he should couch his communication to the French Government, suggesting the reply to the proposal of the German Government on the police question. I communicated the German proposal in my telegram No. 47 of yesterday.

M. Révoil said that it was in his thoughts to suggest a reply of a very vague nature, in which the German proposal would be neither entirely rejected, nor, of course, fully accepted, so that the German Representative would remain practically in the dark as to the views of the French Government.

I explained to M. Révoil that I was always in favour of a frank statement, especially as the views of his Government were perfectly well known to the German Government, and I said that, while I saw that a vague reply might give rise to still further misunderstandings, I did not see what would be gained by it.

The following reply was then drafted by M. Révoil :—

He would express his willingness that the Sultan should be requested by the Conference to undertake, in certain specified districts, the organization of a police force, the necessary funds to be provided by the State Bank, and a limited period to be assigned to the scheme. At the same time he would add that the officers selected by the Sultan to assist in the organization, &c., should be French and Spanish, and that he would be ready to examine the question of surveillance over the organization as soon as an understanding with regard to the nationality of the officers to be selected had been reached.

M. Révoil having asked me for my opinion, I told him that it seemed to me that his proposed reply would do very well, it being quite clear, as the German proposal had also been.

My French colleague said that he quite agreed with the views I had expressed, and that he would telegraph the above draft reply to the French Government. He explained that he had asked me for my opinion as to whether a vague or a clear reply should be returned in order to dispel a doubt which he had in his own mind on the subject. He personally far preferred a clear reply.

[5625] No. 186.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 98.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 15, 1906.*

M. CAMBON came to see me to-day and asked me whether I was informed of the German proposal for the organization of the police in Morocco, which he briefly described to me. He then said that Prince Radolin had been to M. Rouvier and had asked M. Rouvier to discuss the Moroccan question with him. M. Rouvier had replied that Germany having laid down the principle that the Moroccan question could not be settled between the Powers separately, but must be discussed at a general Conference, it was impossible for him (M. Rouvier), after having accepted the Conference, to entertain separate discussion.

M. Cambon said that his view was that the French should stand on the ground which they had occupied, namely, that the organization of the police should be intrusted to France and Spain; but, he said, it would be desirable, for the sake of concession, or to give this a chance of being accepted, that something should be added on the suggestion of another Power. The first suggestion should be that the Sultan of Morocco should be asked to take the initiative in the organization of the police, on the condition that he did so within a short limit of time. Should he not act within this limit of time, it would then be for France and Spain to take the initiative. It should also be a condition that the Sultan of Morocco should address himself to France and Spain. It might further be proposed that a French Inspector, or two Inspectors, one French and one Spanish, should be appointed, who should be charged with the duty of reporting to the Diplomatic Corps at Tangier respecting the police. This organization of the police would be for the ports alone, not for other parts of Morocco, and its functions would be limited to the protection of foreigners only. All these points, M. Cambon thought, might be accepted by France, but they must be proposed by some other Power. England clearly could not make these proposals, because she was too much engaged in the matter, and suspected of *parti pris*. Italy and the United States were the two Powers, one of whom might most probably make this suggestion. M. Cambon was afraid that President Roosevelt, owing to the objection taken in the Senate to his having sent a Plenipotentiary to Morocco at all might be reluctant to instruct Mr. White to take upon himself the responsibility of making these proposals, but it was possible that they might be made by the Marquis Visconti Venosta. M. Cambon asked me my opinion, and I said I agreed to these proposals, and should be quite ready to support them, and that, in my opinion, it was important that the Conference should not be allowed to separate without these proposals having been clearly made as those which France would be prepared to accept. In this way it would appear that any blame for the failure of the Conference did not rest upon France.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[5468] No. 187.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 16.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 15, 1906.

MR. STUART SAMUEL, M.P., of the firm of Messrs. Samuel Montagu, who in December 1903 were in negotiation with the Foreign Office for making a loan to the Moorish Government, called here on the 12th instant with reference to the question of the formation of a State Bank at Tangier.

Mr. Samuel dwelt on the importance of British interests being well represented on the bank, and strongly recommended the appointment of Mr. Pariente, banker and agent of Messrs. Samuel Montagu at Tangier, as British delegate.

Mr. Samuel was understood to intimate that his firm would be prepared to find the British share of the capital. He was informed that a note would be made of his proposal.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[5650] No. 188.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 30.)
Sir, *Madrid, February* 13, 1906.

WITH reference to Sir A. Nicolson's despatch No. 7 of the 9th ultimo, respecting the illicit trade being conducted by a French vessel with the Pretender in the neighbourhood of Melilla, I have the honour to report that the "Imparcial" of to-day's date states that the Minister of Marine has ordered the cruiser "Extremadura" to proceed immediately to Melilla in order to patrol the coast and the factory of Mar Chica.

The Commander-General of Cadiz has also been given instructions to keep one of the vessels under his command in readiness to proceed immediately to the same destination.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[5705] No. 189.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 50.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February* 16, 1906.

THE French Representative has received a telegram from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, which has crossed his telegram to Paris, submitting a draft reply (quoted in my telegram No. 49 of yesterday) to the German communication respecting the police question.

M. Rouvier says that, in his opinion, further private exchange of views on this question is not desirable, and expresses the wish that an informal meeting of the Representatives of the eight Great Powers should take place with a view to an attempt being made to effect some satisfactory settlement.

M. Révoil consulted our American colleague and myself in regard to this proposal, and all three of us think that, in the circumstances, it is hardly advisable. The German Government would probably object to it on the ground that it would be creating a Conference within the Conference, and would draw invidious distinctions between the Powers by not placing them all on the same footing. We consider that it would lead to little practical result, while offending the minor Powers.

My French colleague will, I think, telegraph these considerations to his Government, whose views on his proposed reply to the German communication he expects to receive to-day.

Two days ago the German Ambassador at Paris suggested to M. Rouvier that they should discuss the question of the police together, but M. Rouvier replied that the matter must be left in the hands of the Representatives at Algeciras, and declined to act as proposed.

[5711] No. 190.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February* 16, 1906.

NEXT week it will be impossible to defer any longer laying before the Conference the questions of the State Bank and the police, and M. Révoil has had a discussion with the United States' Representative and myself in regard to the procedure to be followed.

The French Representative told us that he understood that the German Delegates desired that the Conference should sign Protocols dealing with questions in regard to which a settlement had been arrived at, and that the question of the police should be left over.

M. Révoil and Mr. White were both strongly of opinion that it would be impossible to drop the latter question, and I concurred in this view. Mr. White went so far as to say that, if the most important item in the programme were abandoned, he would request his Government to authorize him to leave the Conference. As regards the question of the State Bank, no agreement has yet been reached. It should come before the Conference for discussion on Monday next. As next week the Conference will have sat five weeks, we feel that it is impossible for us to ask it with propriety to mark time still further. The general situation, too, is being rather aggravated than improved by the continued delay.

In our opinion it will be best not to impede the business, but to let matters take their course, and although it is regrettable that the above questions should be discussed in Conference, still their public discussion will have to be faced if no agreement can in the meantime be reached.

[5741] No. 191.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 21.)
Sir, *Tangier, February* 6, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mogador, reporting the high prices the country Governors are willing to pay for rifle cartridges.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 191.

Vice-Consul Madden to Mr. Lowther.

(No. 4.)
Sir, *Mogador, January* 13, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to report that Kaïd Mohammed Anflus of Meknuffa has just paid a visit to this town in order to deliver a letter from the Maghzen to the Umana of the port, instructing them to hand to him all their reserve of cartridges on his paying for them at the rate of 10 dollars per hundred. The Umana at first made some difficulty about it, and Kaïd Anflus, much annoyed, went with some of his horsemen to the waterport. The Umana then produced a private letter from Kaïd Tiggi of N'teuga offering 15 dollars per hundred for the cartridges, and said that the matter must therefore be referred to the Maghzen. Thereupon Kaïd Anflus paid

2,500 dollars and took the cartridges at 15 dollars per hundred, some 16,000, refusing other ammunition offered to him for flint-lock guns.

It seems one may deduce from these facts, which I am anxious to bring to your notice at once, that the desire among the Kaïds for cartridges is such that they think very little of paying for them more than five or six times as much as they are worth, and that there is as yet no stint of funds among the powerful country Governors. It shows also what a temptation and gain there is in the smuggling of ammunition into the country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

[5742] No. 192.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 17.)

(No. 22.)
Sir, *Tangier, February* 9, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from Mr. Maclean, His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, transmitting a private letter from Mr. Madden, His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mogador, concerning the operations of the Compagnie Marocaine at Mogador.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 192.

Consul Maclean to Mr. Lowther.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, February* 6, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a private letter I received this morning from Mr. Vice-Consul Madden reporting that the Mogador agent of the Compagnie Marocaine is purchasing the keys of Makhzen buildings which are let to Europeans.

These operations are the subject of general remark.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ALLAN MACLEAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 192.

Vice-Consul Madden to Consul Maclean.

I AM informed that the Compagnie Marocaine is getting as much Makhzen property into its hands as possible, by buying the keys at a high figure; it has bought a store for 4,000 dollars, a Dweeria for 600 dollars, and is on the point of getting a house for 4,000 dollars, all in the Kasbah, and they say they are ready to buy any Makhzen keys that are offered to them.

They seem to be backed by any amount of funds. Their agent here is a man who has been only three or four months in the country, and therefore cannot understand much about the business of the place yet. I am told he buys anything at any price thereby preventing ordinary merchants who cannot buy at a loss from doing business.

I am told they are extending their business into Sûs, and are collecting a good number of protégés. Amongst these is a man of the family of the Kaïd of Shiedma, and they say they are in treaty with Kaïd Ayad-el-Menebhi, the late Kaïd of Mogador, and who is now in Saffi to protect him too.

People think this is really a political venture, judging by the way they are carrying on here, so I am anxious to let you know what is being said about them.

(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

[5744] No. 193.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 17.)

(No. 24. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, February* 10, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 14 of the 25th ultimo, transmitting copy of a letter from Mr. A. G. H. Wise relating to alleged promises on the part of the late and present Sultans of Morocco that the "Bank of Morocco" was to become the State Bank, and you instruct me to report on the matter.

I have since also received your despatch No. 17 of the 1st instant.

It is difficult to obtain accurate information as to the alleged promises of the late and present Sultans, and I have written to Fez on the subject, but I may observe that if it is merely on the signature of an unnamed Vizier that Mr. Wise relies for such an important engagement no value would be attached to it.

In the meantime I have ascertained that the title of the bank here was the "Bank of Morocco, 1884, Limited." The originator was a certain "General" Seager, who appears to have resided in Morocco off and on since about 1875, and spent most of his time in Tangier and Mogador, but was not registered at the British Consulate until about three years ago. He passed, I believe, as a General in the Austrian army, did not bear a good character, and until his departure from Tangier last year had, so far as he was able, lived on people who were foolish enough to accept shares in his Morocco Bank in lieu of payment.

About twenty years ago he asked my informant to undertake the local agency of the Bank of Morocco, but the latter replied that he must first have full particulars as to the members and their financial situation, after which he heard no more from "General" Seager.

My information leads me to the conclusion that the bank never had any actual existence, nor conducted any business in this country.

As it seems that this "General" Seager's financial standing was exceedingly shaky, and since, so far as is known, he was not to any great extent supported, although the bank purported to have a capital of 1,000,000*l.* in 50,000 shares of 20*l.* each, it would seem improbable that the Sultan or any of his Viziers would have promised that this bank was to become the State Bank of Morocco.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

P.S.—I have sent a copy of this despatch to Sir Arthur Nicolson.

G. L.

[5750] No. 194.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 17.)

(No. 32. Conference.)
Sir, *Algeciras, February* 7, 1906.

THE Conference held a plenary sitting to-day, and continued the discussion on the question of discovering new sources of revenue. The proposal to increase the customs duties was mentioned, but as no project was submitted defining the organization of the special "caisse" into which such increases should be paid, I suggested that the matter should be held over until we were in possession of full details. To this suggestion the Conference agreed.

It was proposed further that some reduction should be made in the export duties on chick peas, largely consumed in Spain, on maize, barley, and wheat. The Moorish Delegates firmly opposed this proposition, although it was explained to them that if the export duties were lightened the area of cultivation would be largely extended, with consequent benefit to the Moorish Government. They, however, not only declined to accept the proposal, but refused even to refer it to Fez. It was impressed on them that the Conference was unanimous on the point, and that they were in consequence bound to submit it to their Government. They replied that unanimity did not prevail,

as they opposed the proposal. Eventually they agreed, after much demur, to refer the question to Fez. I think that this attitude of the Moorish Delegates will not be an isolated instance when other more important matters are under consideration. They seem to be disposed to ignore the weight which an unanimous vote of the European Delegates should carry with it.

I may mention that the Russian Delegates reserved the right of refusing to accept the reduction of export duties on wheat and barley, but they agreed to the reduction on chick peas and maize, and it was in regard to these two articles that the Conference was unanimous with the exception of the Moorish Delegates.

The desire of the Conference that the coasting trade in various articles of consumption and in grain should be re-established by the Moorish Government was adopted unanimously, and the Moorish Delegates promised to refer the matter to Fez.

An Article regarding the harbour and anchorage dues levied on foreign vessels in Moorish ports was then submitted. The Article was drawn up in the following terms :—

"Le taux des droits de stationnement ou d'ancrage imposés aux navires dans les ports Marocains, se trouvant fixé par des Traités passés avec certaines Puissances, ces Puissances se montrent disposées à consentir à la revision des dits droits. Le Corps Diplomatique à Tanger est chargé d'établir, d'accord avec le Makhzen, les conditions de la revision."

I said that I was not in a position to accept this Article, and I pointed out that though the dues at present levied might be modest, they were, to my mind, amply sufficient in view of the complete absence at Moorish ports of the ordinary facilities and securities for navigation. After some discussion, I agreed to accept the Article *ad referendum*, on the words "qui ne pourrait avoir lieu qu'après l'amélioration des ports" being added after the word "revision."

The Moorish Delegates expressed their desire to establish a monopoly of tobacco, and to this I felt that I could make no objection, as their right to do so seemed to me to be secured under our Treaty of 1856. An Article will be drawn up providing for compensation being accorded to those tobacco factories already established in Morocco, and also for securing that, if the monopoly is farmed out, the adjudication will be equitably made under public tender.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[5752] No. 195.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

No. 34. Conference.)
Sir, *Algeciras, February 11, 1906.*

THE Conference sat at first in plenary sitting and then in General Committee yesterday, and a short discussion ensued on a draft project for the institution of a special "caisse" into which the revenues to be derived from the proposed surtax on imports are to be paid.

This project was incomplete, as no provision was made as to the manner in which this surtax was to be levied, and there was no definite statement as to what arrangements were to be established for the collection and disposal of the surtax on merchandize imported over the land frontiers. The project was therefore referred back to the drafting Committee. It is important that the attributions and organization of the special "caisse" should be carefully defined; and I have made it clearly understood that until this is done I am unable to submit the scheme to His Majesty's Government, and that I in no wise give any assurance that they will be disposed to accept it. At the same time I have great doubts if the Moorish Government will agree to the institution of the special "caisse," as the Moorish Delegates have asserted that all the revenues should be paid into the Moorish Treasury, and are, moreover, of opinion that the surtax should be far heavier than is proposed. I need not remark that it would be out of the question to consent to the revenues from the surtax passing into the coffers of the Moorish Treasury, and trusting to the Moorish Government to apply it to such works of public utility as they may deem necessary.

A project of twenty-six Articles relating to the suppression of frauds on the Customs was presented to the meeting; but as the members of the Conference had

not had an opportunity of examining the project, it was decided merely to read it. A hasty perusal showed me that it entered into considerable detail as to ships' manifests and other similar matters, and that severe penalties were proposed in cases of infraction of the Regulations. I should much like to consult with Mr. Consul White on these subjects, as he is well informed on such questions, and I am grateful for your permission to allow him to come to Algeciras for a day or two.

The Moorish Delegates presented a French translation of the reply which they had received from the Moorish Government in regard to the Regulations for the suppression of the contraband trade in arms and munitions. The Moorish Government appear to have accepted with one or two slight modifications the Regulations to which the Conference had given its consent. At the same time, the translation had been made by a Moorish member of the Shereefian delegation, which was not a sufficient guarantee that it was in conformity with the original Arabic. At my suggestion the Conference decided that the Arabic document should be translated by the European dragomans who are present at the sittings.

At the conclusion of the sitting I ventured to express the hope that we should expedite our labours a little more actively, as nearly four weeks had elapsed since we had assembled, and the results were but modest.

There is a general feeling that the proceedings are dragging somewhat; and, in proof of the need of greater activity, I may mention that the Conference only sat for four hours during the whole of the past week, while the drafting Committee were only occupied for eight hours during the same period.

I beg leave to transmit a copy of the *procès-verbal* of the short plenary sitting held yesterday.*

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[5753] No. 196.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 35. Conference. Confidential.)
Sir, *Algeciras, February 11, 1906.*

THE past week has, I regret to say, brought the French and German Representatives no nearer together in regard to a satisfactory solution of the police question, and, indeed, there are indications that the Conference will very possibly separate without having reached any agreement on the above subject. As I have mentioned in previous despatches, the question of affording protection to foreigners in the coast towns is the most urgent, and perhaps the most important, of all the subjects submitted to the Conference, and a failure to solve that question would render the Conference abortive.

Since the conversation which took place between M. Révoil and M. de Radowitz on the 3rd instant, the latter has, I understand, been in frequent communication with his Government, but he does not appear to have been furnished with instructions which would enable him to reopen the discussions with his French colleague. On the other hand, I am informed that the German Government have addressed themselves to two Governments, which I may now state very confidentially are those of the United States and of Italy, requesting them to instruct their Delegates to support M. de Radowitz in urging upon M. Révoil to agree to a solution by which the Sultan should undertake the organization of the police with the aid of officers either selected from the smaller Powers or from all the Powers in general. The United States' Representative, Mr. White, on the matter being mentioned to him, declined to act in the manner suggested unless specially authorized by his Government, and he remarked that he had already informed his Government that any such proposal was unworkable and unpractical. His Government have subsequently expressed their concurrence with his views.

M. de Radowitz has not yet evinced any desire to reopen communications with M. Révoil, being probably of opinion that it would be useless to suggest as a solution a project which he knows would be refused.

* Not printed.

Mr. White, with the view of bringing the two immediately interested parties to an agreement if possible, and anxious that there should be no misunderstanding as to the nature of the French demands, suggested to his Government that they should take measures for bringing these latter to the knowledge of the German Emperor. There have been so many misrepresentations in the Press and in other quarters as to the character of the French views that it was possible some misconception might exist in regard to them in the highest quarters at Berlin.

Simply stated, all that France demands is the following: In order to provide some security for the safety of foreigners in the coast towns, she, with Spain, would be willing to place at the disposal of the Moorish Government for a period of three years certain instructors, officers, and non-commissioned officers, who would organize some small bodies of native police, and who would also be authorized to supervise the punctual and sufficient payment of the men. The police forces should be strictly limited to the coast towns.

The United States' Government, I understand, are quite ready to undertake that these demands, in their moderate and practical form, should reach the German Emperor, and they are being telegraphed in consequence to Washington to-day for transmission to their high destination.

Should they be accepted, the Conference would reach a satisfactory termination without much further delay; should they be refused, I am afraid that it will have to be dissolved, having failed in its task.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[5727] No. 197.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 71.)

Paris, February 15, 1905.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you, with reference to your despatches No. 93 and No. 94 (4919) of yesterday, that I have communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs copies of Sir Arthur Nicolson's despatches Nos. 24 and 26 of the 4th instant, and of your reply No. 10 of the 13th instant, in regard to his Excellency's conversation with Count Tattenbach.

What M. Rouvier said to me as to the position of the question of Morocco as between France and Germany corresponds so much with the purport of an article which has been published in to-day's "Temps" newspaper that I have no doubt that the information, and appreciation of the situation, contained in it, emanated from the Quai d'Orsay. I inclose a copy of the article and also a statement published by the Havas Agency on the subject of the visit paid on the 13th instant to the Minister for Foreign Affairs by the German Ambassador.

M. Rouvier told me that Prince Radolin had called on him on Tuesday the 13th, and had enlarged on the sincere desire of Germany to come to an understanding with France on the Morocco question, and the slow progress towards a solution made by the Conference at Algesiras. Would it not be possible, Prince Radolin suggested, for the French and German Governments to come to some agreement outside the Conference on the question of the police? The German Government had been given to understand that France would not ask the Conference for a mandate for the organization of the police, but it appeared to be her intention to apply for it. To this M. Rouvier had at once replied to the Prince that he had never given any such undertaking. The Yellow Book had published his Declaration to Dr. Rosen that outside the signed Agreements between France and Germany he had given no undertaking whatever. No objection had been taken to this Declaration by the German Government when it was made. It was Germany who had insisted on a Conference in spite of the objections of France. The French Government had finally given way, and now that the Conference had met, the questions at issue between Germany and France had best be threshed out at Algesiras, where all the Powers in Morocco were ably represented, and were acting under the instructions of their respective Governments. If, however, the German Ambassador had any proposals to make as to what might be submitted to the Conference, he, M. Rouvier, was ready to hear them.

Prince Radolin said that he had no instructions to make proposals, but would it not be possible for France to agree that the Sultan should himself organize a Moorish police force under the command of officers obtained from the Minor Powers or foreign officers to be selected by him without restriction as to their nationality, such force to be under some sort of control by the Diplomatic Body at Tangiers.

M. Rouvier's observations on these suggestions had, he said, been that he saw no objection to the police force being organized by the Sultan, and being in some measure controlled by the Diplomatic Body, but that the Moors would have no sort of respect for the authority of officers from minor countries of which they knew nothing. They knew France and Spain as powerful neighbours, and of England they knew from the frequent visits of her ships to their ports. It would be impossible for France to accept such a solution of the police question as the placing of the force under officers taken from the Minor States, nor could the French Government consent to the Sultan having a free hand to select officers of nationalities other than French and Spanish. There could be no doubt that the best solution would be that the force should be commanded by French and Spanish officers, and almost all the Great Powers appeared to be of that opinion, viz., Russia, who was the ally of France, but also the friend of Germany; Italy, who was the ally of Germany and the friend of France; America, who was the ally of neither France nor Germany, but the friend of both. He did not speak of England, for she had a Conventional arrangement with France. Spain, which, like France, was vitally interested in the maintenance of order in Morocco, supported the views of France. Of the Great Powers there remained only Austria-Hungary, the ally of Germany, and her support of German desires did not seem to be very wholehearted. The fact of so many of the Powers concurring with the view that the police organization should be undertaken by France and Spain was striking evidence of the reasonableness of the French attitude. The French Government, M. Rouvier stated to Prince Radolin, were quite ready that the Conference should discuss the details of the organization and control of the police force, but they could not agree to its being under the command of European officers of other nationalities than French and Spanish.

M. Rouvier was greatly interested in Sir Arthur Nicolson's two Reports, and expressed much satisfaction at the terms of your despatch to the British Delegate.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 197.

Extract from the "Temps" of February 15, 1906.

LA SITUATION À ALGÉSIRAS.

LE "Temps" a fait connaître qu'hier à midi le Prince Radolin a rendu visite à M. Rouvier. Le soir même, l'Agence Havas communiquait une note, qu'on trouvera plus loin, et qui, en annonçant cette entrevue, ajoutait que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne n'avait soumis à M. Rouvier aucune proposition nouvelle au sujet de la question Marocaine, "ce qui s'explique d'ailleurs, les négociations devant se poursuivre à Algésiras." C'est là un point qu'il importait de préciser, et nous sommes heureux que le Gouvernement y ait songé.

Rien ne serait en effet plus fâcheux, à l'heure où nous sommes, que de faire ou de laisser naître l'impression qu'il puisse y avoir place pour de nouveaux pourparlers directs entre la France et l'Allemagne. Convaincus de la possibilité et de l'utilité d'un règlement amiable des difficultés pendantes, nous avions, il y a dix mois bientôt, exprimé l'avis qu'une conversation entre les Représentants de la France et ceux de l'Allemagne, était le meilleur moyen de préparer ce règlement. C'est à Berlin qu'on n'a pas accepté cette idée. Pas plus qu'on n'avait voulu causer avec M. Delcassé, on n'a consenti à causer avec M. Rouvier avant d'avoir obtenu de lui une adhésion formelle au principe de la Conférence. Si aujourd'hui la diplomatie Allemande s'aperçoit que cette Conférence, qu'elle nous a imposée comme une condition, devient, de par la justice de notre cause, le soutien de nos prétentions, ce n'est pas à nous qu'elle doit s'en

prendre. Quoi qu'il en soit, il est trop tard pour parler à Paris. C'est à Algésiras, à Algésiras seulement, que l'affaire doit être désormais traitée et résolue—et ce dans la forme même que l'Allemagne a réclamée, à savoir par les Plénipotentiaires assemblés et par voie d'accord international.

Plus que jamais, nous estimons donc qu'on aurait grand tort d'abuser des conversations préalables souhaitées par M. de Radowitz et qui n'ont jusqu'ici pas donné de résultat. Nous avons depuis le 6 Juin dernier l'expérience de ce que sont ces conversations. Les Délégués Allemands y manifestent simultanément les plus cordiales intentions de conciliation et l'intransigeance la plus obstinée. C'est en attestant leur modération qu'ils ont exigé en Juin la Conférence et rappelé d'un ton comminatoire que "l'Allemagne était derrière le Maroc." C'est en proclamant leur désir d'entente qu'en Septembre, au cours de la Mission Rosen, ils ont tenté de nous lier les mains par des engagements anticipés que M. Rouvier refusa toujours de prendre. C'est en affirmant leur volonté d'être modérés qu'ils nous proposent aujourd'hui à Algésiras les combinaisons mêmes qu'ils savent que nous refuserons. A quoi bon persévérer dans cette route ingrate et stérile? Peut-être, au grand jour de la salle des séances, avec l'Europe comme témoin, cette obstination s'adoucira-t-elle. En tout cas, c'est notre intérêt de tenter l'épreuve, et, en la tentant, d'obtenir l'avis motivé des Puissances sur les solutions contradictoires défendues par l'Allemagne et par nous.

Il convient d'ailleurs d'observer que le plus récent communiqué officieux qui nous renseigne sur les intentions de l'Allemagne—nous voulons parler de la dépêche de Berlin à la "Gazette de Francfort" publiée dans nos dernières nouvelles d'hier—montre le Gouvernement Impérial obstiné à nous proposer des "arrangements" inacceptables. A aucun prix, nous ne voulons que, soit directement, soit indirectement, ou par ses propres officiers, ou par ceux de Puissances secondaires, l'Allemagne fasse du Maroc la base d'une action non point certes militaire,—ce lui serait impossible,—mais politique contre nous. A aucun prix, nous ne voulons que des influences Européennes, derrière lesquelles se cacherait l'influence Allemande, viennent s'organiser à nos portes et préparer, à leur heure, une agitation Musulmane dont nous serions les premières victimes. Nous ajoutons d'ailleurs, et c'est incontestable, qu'au point de vue objectif, nous sommes plus capables que personne de poursuivre avec succès l'œuvre limitée de réorganisation de la police Marocaine. Et si M. Jaurès trouve que ces deux ordres d'arguments, qui touchent de si près à l'intérêt Français, sont sans valeur, libre à lui! Ni le Gouvernement ni l'opinion ne partagent sa manière de voir, et tous deux sont d'accord pour revendiquer à notre profit un mandat dont l'objet précise et modeste concilie les droits généraux des Puissances avec les droits spéciaux de la France résultant de sa situation et de ses Traités antérieurs.

La dialetique courtoise de plusieurs de nos confrères Allemands ne saurait nous convaincre d'abandonner les positions que nous avons prises et où nous soutient la sympathie de l'Europe. La polémique grossière de la "Gazette de l'Allemagne du Nord" ne fera que fortifier notre résolution de nous y maintenir. La traduction que nous en donnons plus loin les édifiera sur cette littérature. L'organe attitré du Ministère Allemand des Affaires Étrangères est obligé de reconnaître qu'en démasquant —sans violence aucune dans la forme, mais de façon péremptoire – la mensongère dépêche de l'Agence Wolff, nous avons dit la vérité, il ajoute qu'au surplus tout cela est d'importance secondaire. S'il en était ainsi pourquoi la "Gazette de l'Allemagne du Nord" se serait-elle, il y a peu de jours, approprié la dépêche, qu'elle trouve négligeable depuis que nous l'avons démentie? S'il en était ainsi, pourquoi aurait-elle donné à cette dépêche la publicité quasi officielle de ses colonnes? S'il en était ainsi, d'où viendrait la colère qu'elle marque de voir que le coup a manqué? La "Gazette de l'Allemagne du Nord" prend souvent ses inspirations près des hauts fonctionnaires de la Chancellerie Impériale. La phrase par où s'achève sa note d'aujourd'hui vient évidemment de plus bas. Et pour juger ce morceau comme il mérite de l'être, nous laissons la parole à la "Gazette de Francfort": "Quand on veut polémiquer aussi grossièrement que le fait dans le cas actuel la 'Gazette de l'Allemagne du Nord,' on devrait tout d'abord avoir sous les yeux le texte original de l'article qu'on discute et ne pas se mettre dans le cas de commencer par avouer qu'on juge d'après les résumés d'autres journaux et sur de simples 'on dit.'"

Inclosure 2 in No. 197.

Extract from the "Temps" of February 15, 1906.

LA VISITE DU PRINCE RADOLIN AU M. ROUVIER.

L'AGENCE Havas a publié hier soir la note suivante :—

"Au cours de la visite qu'il lui a faite aujourd'hui, le Prince Radolin n'a soumis au Président du Conseil aucune proposition nouvelle au sujet de la question Marocaine; ce qui s'explique d'ailleurs, les négociations devant se poursuivre à Algésiras."

[5754]

No. 198.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 17.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, February* 16, 1906.

I WAS shown to-day, by Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, telegrams officially confirming report of events at Mar Chica, published in this morning's papers. According to information received by Spanish Government, Moorish ships of war will bombard and destroy factory as soon as French subjects have been removed.

This factory has been a source of much worry to Spanish authorities at Melilla, and the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his satisfaction at prospect of its destruction.

[5834]

No. 199.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 17.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, February* 16, 1906.

I FOUND this morning that Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs held somewhat less pessimistic views than those yesterday expressed by the President of the Council. He assured me that Germany was now realizing that weight of European opinion was in favour of French demands, and that her only desire at present was to get out of the Conference with as much dignity as possible. The situation turned on the possibility of satisfying her *amour propre*, and he thought that the concessions she would now be prepared to make might prove to be acceptable.

I asked what he considered the furthest point to which Germany would go on the police question, and he replied that he thought that the policing of the Algerian frontier, and possibly of a few coast towns in that vicinity, might be conceded to France. The police of the towns near Spanish possessions, and probably of Tangier, would be given to Spain; the Moorish Government, with the assistance of European officers selected by them, would police the West Coast.

On my pointing out that German officers would probably be selected by the Sultan under German influence, he said he thought that the Sultan would probably be advised by Germany to employ subjects of one of the smaller Powers for this purpose. He added that Germany would, he was sure, be disinclined to raise further difficulties in Morocco for some time to come if she could succeed in retiring with dignity from the Conference.

[5851] No. 200.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February* 17, 1906.

I FEAR that when I suggest that the surtax shall be fixed at 2½ per cent. *ad valorem* for all imports, the proposal will be strongly opposed by the Spanish Delegates. I find that in the draft project the drafting Commission have recommended fixing the amount of the surtax at a quarter of the present rate of duty. Yesterday morning I had a conversation with the Duke of Almodovar, and explained matters to him. He is, unfortunately, Senator for a large wine-growing district, and is himself a large wine-grower, so that I did not convince him.

I was told by M. Révoil yesterday evening that, before he can finally accept my proposal, he will have to obtain the consent of the French Government.

[5844] No. 201.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 53.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February* 17, 1906.

M. RÉVOIL, having received a telegram last night that the French Government approve the proposed reply to the German communication, reported in my telegram No. 49 of the 15th instant, he will hand it to M. de Radowitz without delay.

[5858] No. 202.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 54.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February* 17, 1906.

M. CAMBON telegraphed from Madrid yesterday to the French Representative here that the Spanish President of the Council had been informed by the German Chargé d'Affaires that the attitude of the Spanish Delegates at the Algeciras Conference towards Germany was causing dissatisfaction to the German Government, and that on one of the reports which had been received from the German Delegates the German Emperor had noted his displeasure.

Señor Moret was at the same time given a hint by the German Chargé d'Affaires that the German Emperor might possibly find it necessary to abandon the visit which His Majesty proposed to pay to Madrid in April next.

Neither my French colleague nor I have noticed anything in the attitude of the Spanish Delegates which could be construed as unfriendly to the German Delegates. I have always thought that they were on friendly, not to say intimate, terms.

[5870] No. 203.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February* 17, 1906.

A PLENARY sitting of the Conference was held this morning. The opinions of the Representatives appeared to be divided as to my proposal that the surtax, stated in the draft proposal concerning the special "caisse" as a quarter of the present duties, should be 2½ per cent. *ad valorem*, but they agreed to refer to their respective Governments for instructions on this point.

A draft Article allowing expropriation for purposes of public works was left over for the consideration of the Moorish Delegates, who had strongly objected to it as being contrary to the law of their religion.

The Conference will meet to discuss a few outstanding matters on Tuesday, and on Thursday the State Bank question will come up for examination.

[5871] No. 204.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 56.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February* 17, 1906.

YESTERDAY the French Government's reply to the German proposal on the police question was communicated by the French Representative to M. de Radowitz, who said that it should be telegraphed to his Government at once.

Although both German Representatives admit to others that the substance of the French reply is conciliatory, and that a basis for discussion may be found, these statements inspire but little confidence, as all depends on the light in which the German Government regard it.

[4157] No. 205.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 17, 1906.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Board of Trade, a copy of a despatch which has been received from the British Representative at the Conference at Algeciras,* inclosing the Regulations drawn up for the suppression of contraband trade with Morocco.

The Board will observe from the second paragraph of the inclosed telegram,† subsequently received from Sir A. Nicolson, that the Sultan of Morocco appears to have agreed to the proposed Regulations subject to certain slight modifications.

Sir Edward Grey proposes, if the Board of Trade concur, to inform Sir A. Nicolson that he sees no objection to the acceptance of the Regulations in their present form.

I am, &c.
(Signed) F. A. CAMPBELL.

[5851] No. 206.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, February* 18, 1906.

YOU should insist on the proposed increase of customs duties (referred to in your telegram No. 52 of the 17th instant) being applied all round, as it would be quite inequitable, when raising duties, that particular countries should be favoured to the exclusion of Great Britain, who holds the largest share in the trade of Morocco.

[5937] No. 207.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 112.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February* 7, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to state that I asked Count Lamsdorff to-day whether he had received any news from the Morocco Conference. He said that he had just heard from Count Cassini that a proposal had been made for intrusting Spain and France with the organization of the gendarmerie, and that this proposal had been agreed to by all the Representatives except the German, who had accepted it *ad referendum*.

He expressed the opinion that this solution was satisfactory, and asked me what view His Majesty's Government took of it. I said that I had no instructions on the

* No. 140. † No. 169.

subject, but that I imagined that if the French Government approved of it, His Majesty's Government would certainly support it. Our action in the Conference was guided by the terms of the Anglo-French declaration, clause 2 of which recognized the right of France "comme Puissance limitrophe de veiller à la tranquillité dans ce pays, et de lui prêter son assistance pour toutes les réformes administratives, économiques, financières et militaires dont il a besoin." I added, that I had been informed that some attempts had been made here to throw doubts on the earnestness and good faith of Great Britain in regard to her obligations towards France. Count Lamsdorff at once replied that he had never himself had any doubts on the subject, and that Count Cassini's reports bore witness to the zeal with which Sir Arthur Nicolson had supported his French colleague. Speaking with considerable earnestness, he expressed the hope that a solution would be arrived at, and that an end would be put to the state of tension from which Europe suffered at present. It would be a disgraceful thing, he said, if Europe should be plunged into war in consequence of a question arising out of the condition of affairs in Morocco. I observed that this was not the real question from which the difficulty arose. The real question was whether or no the Powers of Europe were to be free to choose their own friends and follow their own policy. It was not Morocco that was in question, except so far as Morocco was the subject of an Agreement between England and France, which was (as we maintained, quite falsely) interpreted as a threat to Germany. Count Lamsdorff maintained that nothing could be further from the thoughts of the Russian Government than an aggressive policy in Europe, and that, from the standpoint of the interests of peace, he had warmly welcomed the conclusion of that understanding. The Agreement was published while he was in Darmstadt with the Emperor; he had at once asked the Emperor's instructions, and, in conformity with His Majesty's desire, he had, during his visit to Paris, made a public declaration as to the satisfaction with which the Russian Government had received the news. "Les amis de nos amis," he had said, "sont nos amis."

I said that I well remembered the declaration, which had made a deep impression in England, all the more so as it could not be attributed to any aggressive design. Since the time of Alexander I the traditions of Russian diplomacy had been bound up with the maintenance of the European equilibrium, and we had every confidence that those traditions would be strictly followed if the balance of power should be threatened.

Count Lamsdorff replied that we need have no doubts on that score, and that it was a source of satisfaction to him that as England and Russia had acted together in Crete and Turkey for the preservation of order, and the protection of the oppressed, so they were also, at Algeciras, working side by side for the maintenance of peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CECIL SPRING-RICE.

[5947] No. 208.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 19.)

(No. 123. Confidential.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February* 13, 1906.

ON receipt of your telegram No. 38 of the 8th February I called upon M. Hartwig, Director of the First Department of the Foreign Office, and informed him that Count Lamsdorff had inquired what view was taken by His Majesty's Government as to a suggestion which had been made at Algeciras to the effect that France and Spain should be intrusted with the organization of the gendarmerie, and that I had been instructed to inform his Excellency in reply that His Majesty's Government would agree to any solution of the question which is acceptable to France.

M. Hartwig expressed great satisfaction, and promised to inform Count Lamsdorff at once.

In order to leave no doubt as to the position taken by His Majesty's Government, and with a view to the fact that written communications from foreign Representatives are at once submitted to the Emperor, I addressed a letter to Count Lamsdorff (after informing the French Ambassador) embodying your telegram above referred to. I transmitted a copy of this letter to you in my despatch No. 117 of the 10th instant. I have since learnt from M. Bompard that Count Lamsdorff was much gratified with this

communication, which, as he said, left no room for doubt as to the attitude adopted by His Majesty's Government.

In the course of my conversation with M. Hartwig he informed me, with some hesitation, that a communication had been sent to the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, relative to the solution of the question of the police which had been suggested at Algeciras, and instructing him to urge the German Government to accept it. An answer had been received from his Excellency to the effect that he had carried out his instructions and that the German reply would be transmitted by courier.

M. Bompard informed me to-day that Count Lamsdorff had communicated to him the substance of the German answer. It was to the same effect as Prince Bülow's words recorded in Sir F. Lascelles' despatch No. 14 of the 11th ultimo, namely, that M. Rouvier had given a private promise that he would not raise the question of a mandate for the organization of the police in Morocco, and that therefore the French Government was bound not to raise that question directly or indirectly. I asked M. Bompard what was the effect of this answer upon Count Lamsdorff. He replied that evidently some impression had been made, but that it was not difficult to explain how unfounded was this statement. The argument advanced by the German Government was that M. Rouvier, in consideration of an "abandonment" by Germany to France of the right of policing the frontier, had received in exchange a verbal promise that France would not put forward at the Conference a claim to police the rest of Morocco. The answer was simple. With regard to the right of France to police the frontier, she had exercised it for forty years. With regard to the supposed verbal promise, M. Rouvier had taken care to communicate in writing to Dr. Rosen, on the day on which this conversation on the subject of the police had taken place, a written declaration to the effect that "en dehors de la formule qui sera signée par les deux Gouvernements, j'entends n'avoir engagement sur aucun point." Dr. Rosen had the same day telegraphed the result of the negotiations to his Government "dans leur esprit." This declaration had been published in the Yellow Book after due communication to the German Government, who had raised no objection.

What, said M. Bompard, would be the effect, for the future, on diplomatic negotiations, if such a formal declaration, accepted without protest by the other side, were not to debar the possibility of a claim being raised which that very declaration was intended to preclude?

M. Bompard went on to discuss the statement issued in Berlin on the 9th February and telegraphed to St. Petersburgh by the official Wolff Agency.

In that statement it was alleged that the French Government had desired that a confidential understanding should be arrived at on the question of finance before the question of the police were allowed to arise, and that when negotiations were begun on the finance question the French Representatives had suddenly declared that it was the police question which they wished to settle before any other.

As a matter of fact, the private negotiations between the French and German Representatives had been begun on the proposal of the latter (a statement confirmed by Sir Arthur Nicolson in his telegram of the 26th January), and it was the German Representative who had started the question of police. M. Révoil had indeed taken care that both Mr. White and the Marquis Visconti-Venosta should be witnesses to what had passed, so that there could be no doubt about the question.

M. Bompard said that he is to see Count Lamsdorff to-morrow and will discuss the whole question at length.

I understand that both Count Lamsdorff and Count Witte have expressed themselves in the strongest manner as to their desire for a peaceful settlement, satisfactory to France. The latter is especially anxious for such a settlement, as he is convinced that it is a necessary preliminary to that financial aid which is hourly becoming more necessary to Russia. At the same time, the main factor in the situation here—that is, the Emperor's personal disposition—is shrouded in mystery, and the diplomatic negotiations between the Foreign Minister and the French Ambassador throw little light on the private communications which are known to be passing between the Russian and the German Emperors.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CECIL SPRING-RICE.

[5955] No. 209.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 131.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February 14, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the French Ambassador called at the Embassy this afternoon and told me that he had just been to see Count Lamsdorff, to whom he had explained at length the groundlessness of the accusation of breach of faith which had been advanced by the German Government against M. Rouvier. He had at the same time called Count Lamsdorff's attention to the fact that the notices published in the German press were apparently designed to render an understanding impossible by systematic falsification of facts, and by embittering public opinion in France and elsewhere. Count Lamsdorff had listened with attention, and had promised the French Government his steady support at the Conference. His Excellency had added that it was to him somewhat a matter for surprise that, whereas Germany justified the line of action which she was taking by the assumed fact that she was defending the interests of all the Powers against French aggression, those Powers themselves who presumably would profit by Germany's action were unanimous in opposing it.

During our conversation Count Benckendorff also called, and listened with attention to M. Bompard's description of his interview. Count Benckendorff was just on the point of calling on Count Lamsdorff, who, he said, was much preoccupied by the dangers of the present situation. In the general conversation which followed both the Ambassadors spoke with some earnestness on the subject of the German press campaign which was being conducted in all quarters of the world, and apparently with some success. Count Benckendorff cited as an instance a communiqué which had just been received from Berlin through the official telegraph agency, but which the Russian Government had not allowed to appear in the Russian press. It was to the effect that all the Powers, including England, were anxious to prevent the absorption of the administrative control of Morocco by France through the police, and that they were all ready to return to the *status quo ante* and to provide for the defence of their own interests. They both agreed that the main question in dispute—of which Morocco was only a pretext—was the question of the independence of the several members of the European family. As matters at present stood, it seemed that unless Germany gave her formal consent to any arrangement, with a view to the settlement of outstanding difficulties arrived at by non-German nations, such an arrangement would inevitably be the object of an attack on the part of Germany, in which no means, however unusual in diplomacy, would be left untried. M. Bompard remarked that the great danger for France, if the Conference failed, was that a situation would be created which would be very trying to the *sang-froid* of the nation, and that an incident might arise which would cause popular opinion to lose its self-control, and therefore give the world the impression that France was the aggressor. He said he was perfectly alive to this danger, to which Count Benckendorff drew his special attention, and that he believed that the French nation would show self-control.

When M. Bompard had left, Count Benckendorff remarked that he had spoken with some earnestness on this question, as he was convinced that the Russian Government had received assurances to the effect that Germany would in no case be the aggressor, and that therefore Russia need not be alarmed as to the *casus fœderis* arising. He added that the question of the action and policy of Great Britain was one of popular opinion. If the English people were convinced that there was an unprovoked attack on France, war in her defence was probable; if, however, the English people thought that France was the aggressor, war was less likely. He himself thought that 80 per cent. of the English people would be prepared to fight if France were attacked. But all depended on the nature of the origin of the war. I said that both Lord Lansdowne and yourself were also of opinion that, in the event of war between Germany and France, it would be impossible for England to remain neutral. He said that he had so informed his Government, which had expressed satisfaction. At the same time the situation was a very unpleasant one, as there was no doubt that, for the time at least, the military aid of Russia was a negligible quantity. What was France to do? She could count on the assistance of no great military Power, and the naval aid of Great Britain could not save her from invasion. If she acquiesced in the abandonment of the Conference she would have to submit to

a serious diplomatic defeat, and would be in the position of having bartered away her rights in Egypt for a consideration which would never have been realized. If she persisted there was danger of war, and war without Russia to help her. The situation was also in the highest degree dangerous to Russia, for a continuance of the present uncertainty made it impossible for Russia to float a loan, which was necessary to the stability of the Government. Count Witte was much preoccupied with this subject, and was full of denunciations of Germany, by whom he said he had been entirely duped.

I observed that the question was one of such immense importance that I did not believe that France, England, or Russia would be able to acquiesce in the new doctrine of the dependence of Europe on Berlin, whatever might be the cost of resisting it. Count Benckendorff entirely agreed, and said that his Government was very much preoccupied with this aspect of the question, and that every effort would be made to maintain that solidarity among the Powers threatened which was the first condition of successful resistance. He was glad to hear that you had instructed me to formally assure the Russian Government that you would agree to any solution acceptable to France, and he advised me to write to M. Hartwig on the subject of the communiqué from Berlin, reiterating the statement made by you already, that the engagements of England towards France were binding, and that England intended to adhere to them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CECIL SPRING-RICE.

[5873] No. 210.

Sir A. Hardinge to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 26. Confidential.)

Sir, *Brussels, February 12, 1906.*

MY French colleague has given me his views as to the feeling in this country, where he has resided several years, with reference to the possibility of war, and of the violation of Belgian territory.

M. Gérard shares the general opinion that both these dangers may now be deemed remote, but he tells me that the Belgians were extremely nervous in the summer and autumn of last year, and that the King apprehended that Great Britain might anticipate the entry of German troops into Belgium by herself seizing Antwerp as she did the Danish fleet in 1806. Orders had, he heard, been given by His Majesty to have mines and torpedoes placed in the Scheldt below Antwerp, and it was partly on account of these apprehensions that the Fortifications Bill, which so nearly wrecked the present Government, had been pressed. M. Gérard believes that if Germany were to violate the neutrality of Belgium, the Belgian Army and Government would fall back on Antwerp, which the Belgians call their "réduit national," evacuating all the rest of the kingdom. On my expressing surprise at this idea, and observing that I quite understood that the Belgian Government could not prevent a German army from marching through Belgian Luxemburg and Namur, I yet failed to see why it need abandon all the other provinces except Antwerp. M. Gérard said that the German line of advance would probably be further north, through Hainault upon Lille, as the French defences to the south would be much less easy to turn. In any case he was convinced that the Belgian Government would take the course he had described, and the present Prime Minister had used in Parliament expressions which practically implied it.

Speaking of the King's personal views, the French Minister said that His Majesty had been a good deal disturbed at the first news of the Anglo-French Agreement, as his African policy in the past had lived upon Anglo-French rivalry, and that fear of its consequences to himself in Africa, combined with the anti-Congo campaign in England and his difficulties with the Egyptian Government, had perhaps predisposed him of late rather to look for help and guidance to Berlin. He had received so far from that quarter only vague assurances of good-will, and M. Gérard believed that there was no foundation for the sensational rumours which had found expression in some journals as to a secret understanding between Belgium and Germany respecting Antwerp. He thought, however, that the German Government had held out promises to the King of a gratifying share to be assigned to Belgian officials in the internationalization of Morocco, in return for Belgian assistance at Algeciras.

On my asking if there was anything in certain statements in the Brussels press to the effect that the minor Powers—*i.e.*, Holland, Belgium, and Sweden—were supporting Germany at the Conference, he replied that he attached no credence to them, that he knew for a fact that the Swedish Delegate had been instructed to refrain from voting on any "political" question, and that he had inferred from what had been said to him here that similar instructions had been given to the Representative of Belgium. As to Holland he would express no opinion, but he thought Dutch policy much less German than had been the case in the time of Dr. Kuyper.

Reverting to the King, he observed that the French Government had felt indirectly the effect of His Majesty's irritation with England on account of Congolese affairs. To a remark by me that these questions had nothing to do with Belgium, he replied that the strong personality of King Leopold exercised a considerable effect on the general foreign policy of the country. During the earlier part of his reign the King, following the example of his father, had carefully deferred to the views of his constitutional advisers, but the success which attended his efforts as an absolute ruler in the Congo had gradually imbued him with an inclination to assert his personal authority more vigorously than heretofore in Belgium, and this tendency had grown more marked as his Ministers, such as M. Malon and M. Frère Orban, had been succeeded by a younger generation of statesmen inferior to His Majesty in ability and political experience, and disinclined from their consciousness of this to dispute his views, especially in the domain of foreign policy.

I report the French Minister's opinions for what they may be worth, without hazarding any conjectures of my own as to their value.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

[5980] No. 211.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 86. Confidential.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 12, 1906.*

IN my despatch No. 293, Confidential, of the 1st May last, I had the honour to report to the Marquess of Lansdowne the information which had reached me of the attempt made by Germany to induce the Sultan to send a mission to Morocco with a view to creating closer relations between the two Moslem States; even at that time the Sultan showed some reluctance to comply with the German Emperor's suggestion, and His Majesty has since definitely declined to do so.

When that decision was taken, I was not in a position to enlighten Lord Lansdowne as to the reasons which had actuated the Sultan, but it has since come to my knowledge, from a trustworthy source, that secret emissaries were actually sent from here to Morocco, but that their proceedings and the intrigues which they endeavoured to set on foot, aroused the suspicions of the Emperor of Morocco, and that His Sherifian Majesty showed that he was disposed neither to send a formal mission to Constantinople nor to receive one from thence.

It is also reported to me from the same confidential source, that the Sultan wrote to Abdul Aziz saying that the German Emperor was the great friend and Protector of Islam, and that His Sherifian Majesty would do well to follow his counsel and advice. These facts have perhaps at present little more than an academic interest, but it is nevertheless instructive to note that the German Emperor is prepared, in certain eventualities, to endeavour to make use of the influence in the Islamic world which the Sultan possesses as Caliph of the Faithful, and which he alone, among the occupants of the Ottoman throne, has succeeded in making an attribute of the Sultanate of Roum.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[5912] No. 212.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 53. Confidential.)
Sir, *Berlin, February 15, 1906.*

IN the course of conversation yesterday, Dr. von Mühlberg informed me that the German Government had instructed their Representatives at Algeciras to propose a new solution of the question of the organization of the police of Morocco. They would withdraw their proposals for the division of Morocco into spheres, in which the different Powers should control the police, and would suggest that the Sultan should be called upon to organize a police force, and should be left at liberty to choose the foreign assistance he might require, wherever he thought advisable. Dr. von Mühlberg believed that such a solution would strengthen the authority of the Sultan, and would be acceptable to the Powers, and, at all events, furnish a basis for further negotiation. He trusted that it would not meet with serious objection on the part of France, as it would leave the Sultan at liberty to apply, if he chose to do so, for French assistance in organizing his police force. He hoped also that his proposal would meet with favourable consideration at the hands of the other Powers, to whom it had been communicated by telegraph, and would be considered as evidence of the conciliatory spirit of the German Government, and of their desire that the Conference at Algeciras might arrive at a satisfactory conclusion.

Dr. von Mühlberg also told me that the German Government were about to send a financial specialist to Algeciras to assist the German Representatives in their negotiations as to the establishment of a Bank of Morocco, as it would appear that the French proposals would make the Bank a purely French institution. He did not, however, anticipate that there would be much difficulty in arriving at an understanding on this point, and as the German and French Delegates had now resumed their confidential conversations, he was in hopes that the Conference might come to some satisfactory arrangement.

I thanked Dr. von Mühlberg for this communication, but did not enter into a discussion of the subject, nor did I propose to telegraph to you on the subject of the new German proposals with regard to the question of the police, as it had already been brought directly to your notice.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

[6222] No. 213.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, February 19, 1906.*

THE French Ambassador has asked me to refer the following points to Sir A. Nicolson for his opinion. He has not submitted them to the French Delegate, as he wishes to avoid any appearance of interfering in the proceedings of the Conference:—

Failing an agreement between France and Germany on the police question, M. Cambon considers that when Russia brings forward her proposal on this point an immediate vote should be taken. In this case he thinks the proposal would obtain a majority of the Powers, and a moral victory would be secured to France. If the vote is delayed by Germany bringing forward one counter-proposal after another, she will be able to give the public the impression that she has made a series of concessions. Should she then end by proposing that Spain be given the police of the West Coast ports, M. Cambon is afraid that the United States may abstain from voting, out of consideration for France, and Spain take the same course, out of delicacy. The small Powers might then group themselves behind the United States and also abstain, whereby France, Russia, Great Britain, and probably Portugal would be left to confront Germany, Austria, Morocco, and probably Italy. Germany would, in such an event, find it easy to represent that France was practically isolated on the police

question, and that her concessions had the real support of public opinion in Europe. This would be a most unfortunate termination of the Conference for France.

M. Cambon thinks that the plan of campaign with regard to the police question should be carefully considered, and he would be glad to learn confidentially Sir A. Nicolson's views.

[6223] No. 214.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 19.)

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, February* 19, 1906.

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that German Chargé d'Affaires called on him about a week ago and told him with some agitation that he learnt officially from Berlin that recent reports from Madrid and Algeciras having been submitted by Prince Bülow to the Emperor, the latter had expressed dissatisfaction at the attitude assumed at the Conference by the Spanish Delegates. His Majesty thought them disposed to favour every proposal distasteful to Germany, and more friendly to their other colleagues than to the German Delegates. The complaints as repeated by the German Chargé d'Affaires were not very definite. He seemed to find some difficulty in explaining the instructions he had received. On being referred to the President of the Council he spoke in the same sense, adding that the Emperor might be compelled to reconsider his intention of visiting Madrid if the Spanish Government maintained their unfriendly attitude. The President of the Council succeeded in convincing German Chargé d'Affaires that there was no ground for these complaints, and the latter stated a few days later that he had heard from Berlin that these explanations had been accepted. Unfortunately, next day certain remarks, improperly attributed to the President of the Council, appeared in the Madrid newspapers, and there immediately followed another telegram from Berlin. The explanations required have been given and this incident also is now considered closed.

In his interview with President of Council, German Chargé d'Affaires hinted that Spain might take German commercial interests into consideration in drawing up her new Tariff, should she be anxious to prove her friendly sentiments towards Germany.

These frequent attempts of Germany to coerce Spain have much annoyed Spanish Government, and the King has telegraphed to the Emperor asking him to fix a date for his visit, in order to stop it being used as a means of pressure. No answer has yet been received; German Chargé d'Affaires gives out that until Conference is over no date can be fixed. I was assured by Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that it was a matter of indifference to the Spanish Government whether the Emperor came or not.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[6194] No. 215.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Egerton.**

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, February* 19, 1906.

YOU should let it be known that His Majesty's Government consider French attitude, both with regard to State Bank and police at Moorish ports, so moderate and practical that they must continue to support it, though anxious that a friendly solution should be reached. It does not appear that any Power but Germany objects to proposals on above points which would be made or accepted by France.

German Government are exercising pressure similar to that described in your cypher despatch No. 28 of the 15th February at Rome.

---

* Also to Mr. Cartwright (No. 8), *mutatis mutandis*.

[6274] No. 216.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Lascelles.

(No. 75.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 19, 1906.

THE German Ambassador asked to see me to-day, and showed me the instructions which had been sent to M. de Radowitz with regard to the police question, which are the same as those recorded by Sir Arthur Nicolson. He showed me also the text of the French reply, in which the French expressed themselves willing that the Sultan should be intrusted with the organization of the police, provided that he employed French and Spanish officers, that the arrangement should be regarded as provisional, and that they would be willing to discuss the question of some inspection being exercised by the Diplomatic Corps at Tangier. Count Metternich translated to me from the German the drift, at any rate, of the German reply to these proposals, which was that they entirely rejected the idea of the officers of the police being French and Spanish, on the ground that this would destroy the international character of the police, that the French and Spanish officers would work in the interests of their own countries, and look upon their task from a national, and not from an international, point of view.

I said that this appeared to be a complete deadlock, for which I was exceedingly sorry. Was it really possible that the German Government considered that to intrust to France and Spain the organization of the police, not in the interior of Morocco, but at the ports only, and with functions limited to the protection of foreigners, would destroy the chances of equal trade opportunities in Morocco? Count Metternich said that if the police were to have such slight influence, why did France attach so much importance to the question? I said, in the first place, in the interests of good order, that France and Spain alone had the personnel and experience necessary to organize the police; and, in the next place, no doubt France did object to anything like the internationalization of Morocco; her political interests were so much bound up with the country; she had suffered already in trade, and political disorder was always liable to spread to her own possessions; and we therefore took the view that what was important to us was not to dispute the political influence of France, but to secure direct economic guarantees. If Germany did not think the economic guarantees we had secured were enough, why did not she ask for others which were longer in time or more explicit in terms? I understood that the other Powers at the Conference did not object on their merits to the proposals which would be acceptable to France, and if the Conference failed because Germany objected it would postpone the day when it would be possible to improve the relations between England and Germany.

Count Metternich said that, if England was to use the French *entente* always to side with France against Germany, of course Germany would come to look on England as her enemy. I said there had been no question of always siding with France against Germany. Since the *entente* was framed there had been one point of difference—the subject of Morocco—which happened to be one of the very subjects covered by a definite Agreement between England and France. We considered the French proposals, looking to her position in Morocco, as being exceedingly moderate and reasonable, and it was absolutely impossible for us not to support her when her action kept so well within the limits of the actual Agreement between us. I could again assure him that, were the Morocco difficulty satisfactorily settled, it was our desire to show that the *entente* was not to be used in a sense hostile to Germany.

Speaking of what might happen if the Conference broke up as a failure, Count Metternich said that Germany did not desire to have war with France. I said I thought it was much too soon to talk of anything so serious as war. I could only say again that, in such an event, public feeling in England would be so strong that the British Government would be involved in it, and that that was why I was so anxious to find a possible solution.

Count Metternich spoke a good deal about the press, arguing that British attacks upon Germany were more violent than German upon England, and saying that the series of friendly domonstrations in Germany by Chamber of Commerce and so forth lately were meeting with no response in England. I said that I thought it was the Morocco Conference which stood in the way. People in England might not be taking much interest in the particular points raised at the Conference, but they had felt generally that relations were difficult between Germany and France on a matter in which we had engagements to France, and that naturally kept things in suspense. I

said I was sure that either I or the Prime Minister, or any one in a prominent position, could speak with considerable effect in moderating the tone of the press and of public feeling in England if we had a favourable opportunity. Were the Algeciras Conference to result in a favourable solution and agreement, there would be such an opportunity, and I should have been delighted to make use of it; but if the Conference broke up without result, and the feeling of *malaise* still remained, it would be impossible for me, however much I desired it, to speak with effect in affecting public opinion in England favourably.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[6272] No. 217.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 57.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 20, 1906.*

THE German reply to the last communication made by the French respecting the organization of the police, which I reported to you in my telegram No. 53 of the 17th instant, was handed to M. Révoil by M. von Radowitz last night. It is as follows:—

"It does not appear to us that the condition that the officers to be chosen by the Sultan should be French and Spanish is compatible with the international character of the police.

"We wish therefore to maintain our proposals, while declaring ourselves ready to examine any other proposal which would have, as point of departure, the principle, accepted by the Conference, of the equality of the rights of all."

The meaning of the last sentence is not understood by the French Representative nor myself, as equality of rights has never been accepted by the Conference, but only equality of treatment as regards public works, commercial interests, and so forth.

There now seems to be no hope of reaching an agreement, as the German reply is equivalent to a refusal.

[6273] No. 218.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 20, 1906.*

THE German Delegate has completely changed his attitude in regard to the question of the bank since the arrival of a financial expert from Berlin, and a novel series of proposals have now been communicated to the French expert. They are such as the French could not accept, and an agreement is thereby rendered practically impossible.

The Conference will have the bank question before it to-day, but in view of the reply of the German Representative on the question of the police, which I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 57 of to-day, it seems extremely doubtful whether the German Delegates will be prepared to offer assistance in the endeavour to find a solution which might prove satisfactory.

[6222] No. 219.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, February 20, 1906.*

IN order that the moderate and practical character of the French proposals with regard to the police question may be made clear and public, it is, I think, of great importance that they, and the modifications which the French Government would be prepared to accept in them, should be very clearly set forth at a plenary meeting of the Conference at an early date.

I would suggest that, if you share this opinion, you should consult your French colleague and concert with him as to the tactics which should be adopted in case it becomes impossible to come to an agreement with Germany on the question of the police.

[6295] No. 220.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Spring-Rice.

(No. 93.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 20, 1906.*

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires came to ask me to-day what was the position at Algeciras, and what I thought of it, that he might inform his Government.

I told him that matters had arrived at a deadlock; that the Germans had refused point-blank the last suggestions made by the French on the subject of the police; and that assuming that both Germany and France had spoken their last word, of which one could never be quite sure until the end, the Conference would break up without result and without any agreement being reached. I said that I should regret this result very much, but that I could not help it. Our interests in Morocco were two. First, the preservation of order, which could only be effectively carried out by intrusting the organization of the police at the ports to France and Spain, the only two Powers who had the personnel and experience on the spot necessary. The German idea of the internationalization of the police would be sure to result in difficulties, and would not be effective; neither in Macedonia nor in Crete had the results of this system been satisfactory. I pointed out that France was quite willing that the police should be organized under the Sultan, the arrangement to be provisional, limited to the ports, and the functions of the police limited to the protection of foreigners. Our other interest in Morocco was equal opportunities for trade. As regards this we had direct guarantees in our Agreement with France, but it was open to Germany, if she thought our guarantees not good enough, to ask for direct economic guarantees of a more explicit kind. This she had not cared to do. In my opinion, therefore, the attitude of France had been conciliatory and practical, and if the Conference broke up without result, it would not be on France that the blame or responsibility would rest.

M. Sazonow asked me what I thought would follow the break-up of the Conference. Would there be war? I said I could not think that war would follow the break-up of the Conference. For Germany to attack France simply because no agreement had been arrived at at the Conference would be a thing too outrageous to conceive. I could not suppose that that was possible, but what I did fear was, that Morocco being in a very disturbed state, either France or Germany might take separate action in Morocco, which might make difficulties between them. If Morocco was a strong and independent country, the break-up of the Conference would not necessarily have any result whatever, but Morocco being in such a disturbed condition, one could not tell what might happen there after the Conference was over.

I assured M. Sazonow that we should continue till the end of the Conference to give our diplomatic support to the French attitude there, as we had done all through. The attitude of the French had been so conciliatory, reasonable, and moderate, that it had made it very easy for us to give them the support which we had promised. I was most anxious to see France and Germany arrive at an agreement about Morocco, especially because it was a subject on which we had our own Agreement with France, and we would do anything we could to bring about peace between Germany and France which could be done without giving France away or sacrificing her interests.

M. Sazonow alluded to certain preparations in France, and to the naval strength which Great Britain had at present in the North Sea, as reasons which he hoped would deter Germany from any idea of war. Indeed, he said that it appeared that, should Germany go to war as the result of the Conference at Algeciras, she would have against her the moral opinion of the whole of Europe; and generally, he seemed to take the view that German action was responsible for all the present difficulty and uneasiness.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[6375] No. 221.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, February 21, 1906.*

THE French Minister has heard that an offer has been made by the German Consul at Fez to establish, immediately, and free of cost, a wireless telegraphy installation between Tangier and Fez. There would also be an intermediary station at Alcazar.

I understand that in the opinion of French officers it would be very difficult for this project to be carried out promptly.

Would you wish me to take any action?

For previous correspondence see Foreign Office despatch No. 42 of the 6th April, 1903, and Sir A. Nicholson's No. 8, Commercial, of the 28th May, 1903.

[6393] No. 222.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, February 21, 1906.*

FRENCH at Mar Chica.

Your telegrams Nos. 2 and 3 of 20th February.

I hear that five Frenchmen remained in the factory, and they refused to leave. It was again bombarded by the Moorish Government vessel, and the fire was returned, but I have not heard with what result.

The French cruiser "Lalande" has gone back to Mar Chica.

So far as I can learn, no previous notice of their action was given by the Moorish authorities to the employés at the factory, although M. St.-René Taillandier warned Sid Torres of the measures which might be taken.

[6366] No. 223.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 21, 1906.*

A GENERAL Committee meeting of the Conference was held yesterday, when a draft project on the bank question was presented by the German Delegates, and another by the French Delegates. There is to be a further sitting to-morrow, at which both will be discussed. I am forwarding by post a copy of each. They differ widely on important points.

At yesterday's sitting M. Révoil, who spoke with much moderation and calm, and produced a great impression on the Conference, made a clear and convincing statement in regard to France's predominant financial position in Morocco and her special financial interests there. He pointed out that, in dealing with the organization of the bank, it was impossible to ignore these facts. No reply was made by the German Delegates.

[6376] No. 224.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 21, 1906.*

I HAVE been in communication with the French Representative as to the best line to take when the Conference has to deal with the police question.

It is M. Révoil's intention to explain the French views fully to the Conference, and I, together with others, propose to lay emphasis on their practical and moderate character.

M. Révoil has sent the French Government a draft of the answer he suggests should be returned to the last communication of the German Delegate, but I shall postpone telegraphing it to you until its final text has been decided upon in Paris.

I gather that the French Government feel that, in view of public opinion in France, they can go no further; and my French colleague is not in a position to make any more concessions; but he would not be unwilling to agree to a third Power (Italy for choice) exercising a certain surveillance.

I personally believe that the majority of the Representatives at the Conference look upon the German proposal as unworkable, and favour the French view.

I venture to state that I entirely agree with the views communicated to me in your telegram No. 19 of the 20th instant.

[6377] No. 225.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 21, 1906.*

I HAVE sent the following to Mr. Cartwright in reply to his telegram No. 17 of the 19th instant:—

"Please convey my best regards to M. Cambon, and tell him that, in view of Germany's refusal to agree to France's last proposal on the police question and of the sudden change of attitude she has assumed in regard to the bank question, little doubt will be left in the minds of the Conference that France is not to blame for the consequences should a breakdown occur. M. Cambon may rely on all precautions being taken at the Conference to throw the responsibility of the probable rupture on the proper shoulders."

[6454] No. 226.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, February 21, 1906.*

M. CAMBON received this morning a long telegram from M. Révoil which he read to me.

The Duke of Almodovar seemed inclined, in order to arrange an understanding between France and Germany, to offer the mediation of Spain. This step seemed to his Excellency dangerous and likely to lead to Spain being placed in an equivocal position as regards her engagements to France. He begged me to impress upon the Spanish Government that, as the present moment was critical, the bank and police were necessarily questions on which Spain, France, and Great Britain should stand firm together.

I called on Baron Stumm before I went to see Señor de Ojeda and found him fairly hopeful. In his opinion, both parties would yield a little. He did not allude to the mediation of Spain. It was absolutely necessary that Germany should take every possible precaution to keep Morocco open to her enterprise and trade, more especially as commercial difficulties were arising with the United States and the German Colonies were proving useless.

After my interview with Baron Stumm I went to see Señor de Ojeda and impressed upon him the necessity of Spain, Great Britain, and France showing a common front at the Conference. The Spanish Government were, he said, of the same opinion, and their engagements would be kept; but the President of the Conference considered that, as Spain was the host of the Conference, a supreme effort should be made by her to prevent its total failure.

The Duke of Almodovar's idea was approved by the Spanish Government in principle; but they left the method of, and the proper moment for, its execution to his Excellency's judgment.

The danger of this course was, I pointed out, that Germany might end in making the world believe she had succeeded in winning Spain to her side, Señor de Ojeda trusted, however, that this would be prevented by the Duke's judgment.

I understand that the Spanish Government are anxious about the effect of the reform of the currency introduced into the French Bank proposals, as they fear that Spanish silver may be driven out by the gold standard proposed. I have communicated this to M. Cambon.

(The following is strictly Secret.)

M. Cambon is informed by M. Révoil that it is the aspiration of the second Spanish Delegate to be appointed Spanish Ambassador at Berlin and that the German Government, who know this, use threats to refuse to receive him, unless his influence with the President of the Conference be used in favour of Germany.

I was told to-day by Señor de Ojeda, in an outburst of frankness, that he disliked French influence in Morocco and hated France. He said that he personally disliked M. Cambon and had no confidence in him and he gave me his reasons for this. As Minister for Foreign Affairs, he would, however, act faithfully in accord with the engagements of Spain, though he disliked them. I have been told by the French Ambassador that only strictly official replies can be got by him from Señor de Ojeda. This at the present moment is a most unfortunate state of affairs.

[6394] No. 227.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, February 21, 1906.*

MY telegram No. 18.

The Spanish Government have been informed by Baron Stumm that, until the outlook at the Conference becomes clearer, the Kaiser cannot fix the date of his visit to Madrid.

[6483] No. 228.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, February 22, 1906.*

MY telegram No. 19 of yesterday.

I saw Señor Moret last night, as I was not satisfied with the assurances which Señor de Ojeda gave me respecting the attitude of the Spanish Government at Algeciras. I pointed out to his Excellency the danger of Spain offering her mediation between Germany and France, as long as the German Government had given no assurance that the demands of France would be met by her in a real spirit of conciliation. As regards the results of mediation, which was entirely the idea of the President of the Conference, Señor Moret did not express himself as sanguine. The Spanish Government could not, however, refuse, he told me, for political reasons, to allow an attempt to be made to conciliate differences at a Conference held upon Spanish soil.

His Excellency said that he feared that a vote would be taken on some minor point by the German Delegate, and that he would declare that further discussion on that part of the programme was barred if unanimity were not obtained.

I told Señor Moret that, if the Duke of Almodovar allowed himself, as regards matters of procedure at the Conference, to be swayed by Germany, it would be fatal, and that I must insist that if Russia, France, or Great Britain demanded that the views of the Powers should be placed on record as regarded projects proposed by them, the Duke should not only oppose this, but should vote for such projects, as they would merely embody the principles to which Spain and France agreed last September at San Sebastian. Nothing would prevent the world from believing, if the Duke of Almodovar wavered in his attitude, that the Spanish Government were also wavering in their intention of adhering honestly to the engagements they had entered into.

This seemed to strike Señor Moret, and he gave me an assurance that Spain would strictly adhere to her engagements. He said that he would immediately

telegraph to the President of the Conference, and tell him to avoid compromising the Spanish Government in any way, and to be very careful as to what steps he took.

In reply to an inquiry as to whether King Alfonso had any personal views on these questions, Señor Moret told me that on one point His Majesty was most decided, and that point was the necessity for Spain to remain in close friendship with France and Great Britain.

[6484] No. 229.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, February 22, 1906.*

I HAVE been just informed by Señor de Ojeda that Señor Moret has seen King Alfonso since my interview last night with his Excellency, and that the Duke of Almodovar has been ordered by telegraph, on the advice of His Majesty, to abstain from the mediation proposed, in order to prevent any misunderstanding as to attitude of Spanish Government, and that he has also been instructed not to oppose the taking of any vote which the other Delegates may ask for.

[6471] No. 230.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, February 22, 1906.*

COUNT LAMSDORFF suggests that, in view of the latest news from the Conference, representations should be made at Berlin, urging the German Government to accept the last French proposal, which seems to him to meet all objections.

I have reason to believe that his Excellency spoke to one of the Ambassadors in very strong terms as to the necessity of European public opinion making itself felt at Berlin, and complained of the aggressive character of German policy at the Conference.

[6470] No. 231.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 62. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 22, 1906.*

THE Austro-Hungarian Government and Count Witte are making efforts at Berlin with a view to inducing the German Government to arrive at some agreement in regard to the question of the organization of the police.

The French Government are of opinion that it is desirable to postpone their reply to the last communication from the German Delegate until the results of these efforts are known.

I told M. Révoil that he was confronted by a German refusal and not by a German proposal, there appeared no necessity for haste, and that the above course seemed prudent.

Last night we had a long conversation in regard to the procedure to be followed in discussing the question of the State Bank which comes up to-day for the first time. I told him that, to my mind, if a failure were inevitable it would be better that it should be on the question of the police, and that I thought it would be unfortunate if a breakdown occurred on that of the Bank.

There would be, so far as I could see, no difficulty in protracting for a day or two the discussions respecting the Bank, and we could refer the question to the "Comité de Rédaction" at the end of this week. While a report was being prepared by this Committee, a general discussion on the police question could be begun, possibly on

Tuesday next, the 27th instant, which would allow ample time for the results of the representations at Berlin to be known.

M. Révoil expressed his entire concurrence.

Considerable difficulties are being made over the Bank question by the Spanish Delegates, owing to enticements held out by the German Delegates, who say that they would support a proposal that the Bank's "siège social" should be in Madrid, and its capital formed in pesetas. Experts say this would be impossible in practice.

[6480] No. 232.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 22, 1906.*

I EXPRESSED the hope to the Duke of Almodovar, whom I saw to-day, that he would act in complete harmony with the French Representative and myself, especially at the present time. The Duke said that such was his desire, but that he had just received a telegram from Madrid, by which he had been much troubled. It stated that the French Representative at the Conference had made complaints against the attitude of the Spanish Delegates. I told the Duke that possibly some doubts had been raised by the apparent concessions to Spanish interests which the Germans had included in their project respecting the Bank—for instance, that the formation of the capital should be in pesetas—and also by a report, which I had heard yesterday, that the Germans would be ready to afford their support to a proposal for the transference from Tangier to Madrid of the "siège social" of the Bank. He replied that the question of capital was of great importance to Spain, but he assured me that he knew nothing of the latter proposal.

His Excellency further complained that the French Representative had telegraphed to Paris a project respecting the police, which he himself had prepared, as offering a possible solution of the question, and had only communicated to M. Révoil for examination.

I said I had been told that the Spanish Ambassador in Paris had communicated it to the French Government, who had rejected it. This, he replied, was the case, but it was only when he heard that it had been communicated to the French Government by M. Révoil that he instructed the Spanish Ambassador to present it. His project was that the organization of all the police should be left to the Sultan himself without European assistance, except in the case of Tetuan, where the police should be organized by Spain, and of Oujda, where they should be organized by France.

[6482] No. 233.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 22, 1906.*

SOME progress was made with the Articles of both the French and German projects in regard to the State Bank at a General Committee Meeting of the Conference held to-day.

The French and German Delegates held widely divergent views about the rights of the French group who made the Moorish loan and the proportion in which the distribution of the bank's capital should be made. To avoid the discussion on other Articles being interrupted, these questions were left over. It is improbable that an agreement will be reached unless both sides are ready to make concessions. However, as I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 62 of to-day, M. Révoil and I hope that we may be able to keep the discussion on the Bank question open until the police question is brought up.

At to-day's sitting the attitude of the Spanish Delegates was entirely satisfactory. They acted in perfect harmony with the French Delegate and myself.

Some further controversial points will come up for discussion on Saturday, when we hold our next meeting.

[6471] No. 234.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Spring-Rice.

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, February 22, 1906.*

PLEASE inform Count Lamsdorff that, during an interview on the 19th instant with the German Ambassador, at which he communicated the German reply entirely rejecting the French proposals, I urged upon his Excellency the view held by His Majesty's Government, and by the other Powers at the Conference, that these proposals were practical, reasonable, and moderate, and insisted on the deplorable effect which would be produced by the failure of the Conference should they be rejected.

Impress on His Excellency the value which His Majesty's Government attach to any pressure that the Russian Government may be able to exercise at Berlin with a view to obtaining Germany's acceptance of the proposals, adding that, any representations on our part at Berlin, such as those suggested in your telegram No. 42 of the 22nd instant, would probably be ineffective, on account of our Treaty engagements to support France in Morocco.

[6375] No. 235.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lowther.

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, February 22, 1906.*

YOU should protest against the scheme to establish wireless telegraphy between Tangier and Fez, and take all possible steps to frustrate it. You should also keep Sir A. Nicolson and your French colleague informed on the subject. Former has been instructed to bring the matter before the Conference should he receive confirmation of the report mentioned in your telegram No. 9 of yesterday's date.

A concession of the kind to Germany would be quite unjustifiable at the present moment, when the Powers are discussing the reform of the general administration of Morocco in friendly Conference.

Moreover, Lloyd's applied as early as 1903 for a concession to establish wireless telegraphy at Cape Spartel, and Sultan has declared he has no objection. The concession has hitherto been withheld solely in consequence of the opposition of the German Legation. Proposed installation at Tangier would make Lloyd's establishment quite unworkable.

[6454] No. 236.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, February 22, 1906.*

ALGECIRAS Conference.

Mr. Cartwright's telegram No. 19 of yesterday.

I consider it most desirable that, except with the cognizance and approval of the French Representative, no proposal should be put forward by the Spanish Delegates at the Conference.

[6375] No. 237.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, February 22, 1906.*

GERMAN Consul at Fez is reported to have offered to establish wireless telegraphy between Fez and Tangier viâ Alcazar at once and free of cost. Should you receive confirmation of the report, which reached Mr. Lowther through the French Minister

at Tangier, you should take an early opportunity to lay the matter before the Conference, and explain reasons for the protest which I have instructed Mr. Lowther to make. I have telegraphed to him as follows :—

[Insert last two paragraphs of telegram No. 5 to Mr. Lowther.]

[6382] No. 238.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 21.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 22, 1906.

I HAVE considered, in consultation with the Board of Trade, the Regulations drawn up for the suppression of contraband trade in Morocco, which formed the inclosure in your Excellency's despatch No. 17 of the 28th ultimo.

You are authorized to inform the Conference that His Majesty's Government accept the Regulations.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[6629] No. 239.

Sir E. Egerton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Rome, February* 23, 1906.

FROM information received from Algeciras, the French Ambassador understands that the Italian Delegate will abstain from voting should the Bank question come to the vote.

This would, in M. Barrère's opinion, be a serious breach of faith.

That such a course so fatal to Italian diplomacy throughout the world, and so contrary to public opinion in Italy, is really contemplated appears hard to believe.

[6631] No. 240.

Sir E. Egerton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Rome, February* 23, 1906.

I LEARN from M. Barrère that in a recent conversation between Count Goluchowski and the Marquis de Reverseaux, the former expressed his disapproval of German pretensions in Morocco.

[6632] No. 241.

Sir E. Egerton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Rome, February* 23, 1906.

M. BARRÈRE has consistently and repeatedly expressed his conviction that, as regards Morocco, German policy is actuated solely by a desire to detach England from France, and to demonstrate the danger to the latter of the understanding between the two countries.

It is with reluctance that I am coming to the same conclusion.

I have not failed to support the attitude of the French Government, and will continue to do so.

[6637] No. 242.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, February* 23, 1906.

I AM addressing a note to the Moorish Government on lines of Sir Arthur Nicolson's note of the 13th July, 1903, claiming preferential rights for an English Company, which has made a private offer to the Sultan to connect Tangier and Fez with Poldhu by wireless telegraphy. I have no confirmation of the German offer reported in my telegram No. 9 of the 21st instant.

[6620] No. 243.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 65.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February* 23, 1906.

WITH reference to the two telegrams addressed to you yesterday by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid, I admit that there was some reason for a little uneasiness as to the attitude of the Spanish Delegates, and I think it was desirable, and perhaps necessary, to let the President of the Conference know that he should not make any attempt at mediation, but at the same time I consider that they are now acting in a perfectly loyal manner, and my French colleague, to my knowledge, fully concurs in this opinion, and has reported to the French Government accordingly.

I would respectfully submit that, in these circumstances, it would be advisable to send to the Spanish Government some comforting message of a nature to explain that the manner in which they intend to carry out their engagements is appreciated by His Majesty's Government. M. Révoil has agreed to recommend to the French Government that they should make a similar communication. I am sanguine that he and I will find it possible to arrange a form of procedure with the President of the Conference which will coincide with our views, and it would be of great assistance to us if the Duke were aware that his attitude was appreciated by our Governments.

[6620] No. 244.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Cartwright.

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, February* 23, 1906.

ATTITUDE of Spanish Delegates at Algeciras Conference. Your telegram No. 22.

Should your French colleague be similarly instructed, you should express to Spanish Government the high appreciation of His Majesty's Government at the manner in which Spain is fulfilling her engagements, and their conviction that most beneficial effects will ensue from the continuance of the loyal attitude adopted by the President of the Conference.

[6750] No. 245.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 37. Conference. Most Confidential.)
Sir, *Algeciras, February* 15, 1906.

DURING the past few days a certain advance has been made in the negotiations regarding the question of the future police organization in Morocco, but I am afraid not in a direction which is likely to lead to a satisfactory conclusion.

Although I have had the honour to telegraph to you some intimations of the views of the German Government on the police question which were communicated by Prince Bülow to the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, and although I have also mentioned the

proposed intervention of third parties, I would wish to limit this despatch to a report of what has passed here, as I am afraid that otherwise the matter might be presented to you in a somewhat confused form.

On the 13th instant M. de Radowitz paid a visit to M. Révoil, and stated that, by instructions from his Government, he was now in a position to communicate privately to him a proposal for the settlement of the police question, which he begged M. Révoil not to consider as a "proposition ferme," but as serving as a basis for discussion. M. de Radowitz added that his Government earnestly desired that an agreement should be reached on the above question, and to avoid all possibility of a misunderstanding he had consigned the proposal to writing, which he would be happy to leave with M. Révoil on the termination of their interview.

M. de Radowitz then read a declaration, the substance of which was as follows:—

That the Conference should request the Sultan to undertake the organization of a police force which should be established in certain specified localities, and which should be commanded and organized by foreign officers who should be freely selected by the Sultan. The funds which would be required for the establishment of this police force would be placed by the future State Bank at the disposal of the Sultan. The Diplomatic Body at Tangier would exercise a control over the execution of the police organization, and a superior foreign officer to be selected from among the minor Powers would be intrusted with the duty of inspecting the police force, and would report to the Diplomatic Body at Tangier. The above project was to be an experimental one, and would be put into execution for a period of from three to five years.

M. Révoil replied that he would take act of the communication which M. de Radowitz had been good enough to make to him, and that he would consult with his Government before giving a reply.

I called on M. Révoil yesterday afternoon, the 14th instant, and found him and his expert adviser, M. Regnault, engaged in drafting several telegrams to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, giving their views as to the nature of the reply which should be made to the German communication. It appears that M. Rouvier was desirous of ascertaining the opinion of M. Révoil before sending him final instructions. M. Révoil told me that he was in some perplexity as to the character of the reply which he should suggest to his Government. He sketched verbally the terms of a reply which he had under consideration, but I must frankly state that it was so involved and so puzzling that I was unable to gather its full sense. It neither refused nor did it accept the proposal of the German Government, but left the matter quite open, intimating that perhaps M. de Radowitz might be able to discover some formula which might lead to further negotiation. He asked me what I thought of it.

I told M. Révoil that it seemed to me to be very vague, and it might, I feared, lead to further misunderstandings, of which, of late, we had had already so many. I did not myself see what object could be gained by giving a vague answer; suspicions might be aroused, and a wrong interpretation might be given to it. The German proposal was perfectly clear and had been given in writing, and it seemed to me it would, in these delicate matters, be prudent to be equally clear, especially as the German Government were already well acquainted with the views of the French Government.

M. Révoil said that he entirely agreed with me, and he had only put the question to me in order to dispel a doubt which had arisen in his mind. He therefore, in conjunction with M. Regnault, drew up a draft reply which he said he would telegraph to his Government at once.

The reply was to the effect that the French Government agreed that the Conference should request the Sultan to undertake the organization of a police force in certain specified localities; and that the State Bank should supply the requisite funds, and that the scheme should be for a limited period. The French Government desired that the Sultan should select French and Spanish officers to assist in the organization of, and to command, the police force; and they would be ready to examine the question of surveillance over the organization when an agreement had been reached as to the nationality of the officers.

I saw M. Révoil this morning, when he told me that he felt convinced that the German Government would never agree to any proposal as to the police question which would be acceptable to the Government and public opinion in France. He did not see how any satisfactory issue could possibly be found, and he had little confidence, in view of the present attitude of the German Government, in the success of any well-meant efforts of third parties to bring about an understanding. He remarked with some bitterness on the absence of good faith which had characterized the action of the German Government and of their Representatives throughout the whole of the

negotiations both before and during the Conference, and he observed that he knew that, having pinned France down in Morocco, Germany would not be inclined to set her free except on impossible conditions. To a remark I made that in the unfortunate event of the Conference having to disperse without having come to an agreement it might be possible for direct negotiations to lead to a more satisfactory result, M. Révoil replied that he knew what would be the character of any direct agreement, as every point in it would be directed against Great Britain, and inspired by a desire to disturb or overthrow the existing Anglo-French understanding.

It was the first time that I found M. Révoil so despondent, and, if I may say so, so ready to look disagreeable facts frankly in the face, as hitherto he has always buoyed himself up with a sanguine optimism that Germany would eventually agree to the police organization being arranged in accordance with the wishes of France.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[6752] No. 246.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 39. Conference. Confidential.)
Sir,
Algeciras, February 16, 1906.

M. RÉVOIL informed me yesterday that Prince Radolin had, within the last two or three days, asked M. Rouvier whether his Excellency would not be disposed to transfer to Paris the private negotiations which were taking place at Algeciras between the French and German Representatives in regard to the police question. M. Rouvier had stated positively that he could not possibly fall in with this suggestion. He explained to Prince Radolin that Germany had induced France to go to Algeciras to discuss with the Representatives of the Powers Signatories of the Madrid Convention certain questions laid down in a programme, and among these questions was that relative to the organization of a police force in Morocco. It would therefore be impossible to take this question out of the hands of the Conference, and he must leave the matter to be discussed at Algeciras, and not at Paris. M. Rouvier appears to have taken the opportunity of expressing to Prince Radolin his surprise that the German Government apparently still supported the fiction that the French Government had taken an engagement not to ask the Conference for a mandate for the police organization. He drew the attention of Prince Radolin to the statement which he had made both verbally and in writing both to him and to Dr. Rosen, and which had been officially communicated to Berlin, to the effect that he had taken no engagement on any point outside of the programme to which the two Governments had agreed. These statements were made on the 25th and 26th September, 1905, and no exception had been taken at the time by the German Government, nor had any remark been made when they were published in the Yellow Book.

He subsequently embodied the substance of his remarks in an *aide-mémoire*, which he communicated to Prince Radolin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[6753] No. 247.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 40. Conference. Confidential.)
Sir,
Algeciras, February 16, 1906.

M. RÉVOIL showed me yesterday a telegram which he had received from M. Rouvier, in which his Excellency expressed some doubts whether it was advisable to continue the private pourparlers in regard to the police question, and he suggested that perhaps the Representatives of France, Germany, Great Britain, Spain, Russia, Italy, the United States, and Austria-Hungary should meet informally, and endeavour to find an acceptable solution on the above-mentioned subject.

I told M. Révoil that I thought it was a suggestion which required some reflection, and we arranged to meet in the evening in the rooms of the United States' Representative.

We met again in Mr. White's apartment, and after some conversation we agreed that the proposal, though it undoubtedly presented some advantages, was, in our opinion, open to greater objections. In the first place it seemed to us extremely doubtful if Germany would consent, as she had always contended that all Powers had an equal status and equal rights at the Conference—a proposition which in many respects is a sound one. She would probably regard the convocation of the eight Great Powers as establishing a kind of inner Conference; while at the same time it would in all likelihood mortify those Powers who were excluded, and incline them to believe that we merely considered them as being convoked to Algeciras for the purpose of registering the decisions of the Great Powers. Moreover, if the private pourparlers between the French and German Representatives were to lead to no results, we doubted if the meeting of the other Representatives would assist towards a solution.

The United States' Representative, Mr. Henry White, added that he would naturally have to consult his Government before giving his adhesion to the project, and he frankly stated that he would not be able to recommend its acceptance to them.

M. Révoil said that he would inform M. Rouvier of our views, and as M. Rouvier's telegram had crossed one which he had sent submitting the reply which he proposed to give to the last communication which M. de Radowitz had made to him on the police question, he thought it probable that the French Government would not be disposed to press the matter further.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[6754] No. 248.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 41. Conference. Confidential.)

Sir, *Algeciras, February 16, 1906.*

DURING the conversation which M. Révoil, Mr. Henry White, and myself held last evening, we discussed what was likely to be the course of the proceedings of the Conference during the next week. To-morrow, the 18th [? 17th] instant, there was every possibility that the Conference would conclude its labours in regard to the questions with which it had been recently occupied. There would then be nothing in the way of the Conference treating the question of the State Bank on Monday the 19th instant. We were aware that no final agreement had been arrived at between Count Tattenbach and M. Regnault on this question, although it appeared likely at one moment that they would be able to come to terms. It would not, we considered, be proper or desirable that the Conference should suspend sittings while further efforts were being made to reconcile conflicting views, as already three or four weeks had elapsed in an unsuccessful attempt to find an acceptable solution. On Monday the 19th five weeks would have elapsed since we all arrived at Algeciras, and it would not be possible to elude any longer a discussion on the bank question.

This discussion might be commenced in general Committee on Monday and concluded in plenary sitting on Wednesday the 21st instant. The police question could then come up for discussion in general Committee on the 24th instant, and by this means about nine days from now would still remain for endeavouring to arrange an understanding before the matter came before the Conference. This seemed to us the utmost limit of delay which could properly be accorded. Moreover, a lengthy postponement of the discussion of the two important questions was not improving, but rather aggravating, the general situation: and although it was unfortunate that differences of opinion would arise in presence of the Moorish Delegates, this was a misfortune which would have to be faced.

I said that if there were reasonable hope that further delay might lead to a satisfactory solution, I personally would be willing to wait and drag on matters in the Conference; but, if not, it seemed to me best to tackle the questions when they came in their order before the Conference. Mr. Henry White and M. Révoil were of the

same opinion. M. Révoil said that he had been informed that the German Delegates, and, he believed, the Italian Representatives also, were disposed to suggest that if no understanding could be arrived at on the police, or even on the bank question, that the Conference should record their assent to what had been passed in regard to minor questions, and leave open for the future those subjects which had failed to secure unanimous consent. In short, that the Conference should not break up without signing "something." We were all agreed that such a termination would be ludicrous. The minor measures could not in reality be carried through with any chance of success unless both the bank and police questions were settled. These two questions governed all others; and it would not be right to arrive at such a lame and impotent conclusion as was suggested. Mr. Henry White said that he could not entertain such a proposal, and, were it made, he would request permission from his Government to withdraw from the Conference.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[6756] No. 249.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 43. Conference.)

Sir, *Algeciras, February 17, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of the proposal regarding the organization of a police force in Morocco which was handed by M. de Radowitz to M. Révoil on the 13th instant, and also copy of the reply which the latter gave to his German colleague yesterday evening.

Until a reply is received from Berlin, in respect to the latter communication, it would be idle to speculate as to whether it will be regarded as furnishing a basis for further discussion.

Both M. de Radowitz and Count Tattenbach, in desultory conversations with other Representatives, have given the latter to understand that, in their view, the door for further negotiation is still open and that the French communication is conciliatory in substance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 249.

German Proposal as to Police.

IL serait à proposer que la Conférence demandât au Sultan de se charger de l'organisation de la police. Il aura le devoir d'entretenir, dans des places déterminées, une troupe de police, laquelle serait formée et commandée par des officiers étrangers choisis librement par le Sultan. Les fonds nécessaires pour l'entretien de la troupe seraient mis à la disposition du Sultan par la nouvelle Banque d'État. Le Corps Diplomatique à Tanger aura à exercer le contrôle de l'exécution de cette organisation. Un officier supérieur étranger appartenant à l'une des Puissances secondaires pourrait être chargé de l'inspection et en rendre compte au Corps Diplomatique à Tanger.

Toute cette institution serait faite à titre d'essai pour une durée de trois à cinq ans.

Le 13 Février, 1906.

Inclosure 2 in No. 249.

French Reply to German Proposal.

IL n'y a pas d'opposition à l'organisation de la police par le Sultan dans les ports, ni au paiement des troupes et des officiers par la Banque d'État, ni à la courte durée de cette institution, mais sous la condition que les officiers étrangers choisis par Sa Majesté Chérifienne soient des officiers Français et Espagnols.

Le point de la proposition Allemande relatif à une surveillance de l'exécution de cette organisation pourrait être examiné, si la question de la nationalité des officiers avait été résolue comme il est indiqué ci-dessus.

Le 16 Février, 1905.

[6759] No. 250.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 27.)

Sir, *Tangier, February* 16, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 15 of the 19th ultimo, and my telegram of the 31st ultimo, I have the houour to report that the Moorish Government steamer "Turki," which went to Melilla, fired some shots from two guns which she took with her upon the contraband stores at Mar Chica.

This act having come to the knowledge of the French Minister, he pointed out to the acting Moorish Commissioner the irregularity of dealing in this manner with persons suspected of introducing contraband goods, and insisted that the Moorish authorities should confine themselves within the limits of their powers. He had taken this step "par acquit de conscience," being fully aware that the Commissioner had no authority to give any instructions to the Commander of the "Turki." As the French cruiser "Lalande" was still off Melilla, she would probably receive instructions direct from Paris as to how to deal with this matter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[6760] No. 251.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 28.)

Sir, *Tangier, February* 17, 1906.

SINCE the 25th of last month, on which I reported in my despatch No. 17 the murder of Deylan and his family by the Angera Chief, Duas, communications have been passing between him and Raisuli and with the Court to clear up the mystery of the disappearance of the three Notables sent to Fez from the Angera. Raisuli maintained that they were detained in chains at Fez, but inquiries did not corroborate this assertion, and it now seems quite certain that they were murdered by the orders of Raisuli. The Angera are therefore determined to revenge themselves on the latter, but as the valour of these tribes appeared always to be tempered with extreme caution, they hesitate to attack Raisuli until they obtain a guarantee from the Sultan that the M'halla, composed of some 300 to 400 horsemen, will not take part in the engagement. This promise the Angera have been endeavouring for some time past to obtain, but so far unsuccessfully, and as it seems improbable, though not impossible, that the Sultan will engage that his troops will not assist to keep order when they are sent here for that purpose, the Angera will probably not risk attacking Raisuli, but will content themselves with carrying off some of his headmen, and hold them until they receive from the Sultan the assurance they are asking for. They may, however, adopt the simpler procedure of capturing a European in order to achieve their object, and they are already disseminating threats of this nature. Raisuli will also probably take similar measures if any of his men are captured by the Angera.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[6761] No. 252.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 29. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, February* 16, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a letter which has by chance come into my hands addressed by the representative here of the Algiers and Morocco Company to two Moorish officials, one the Commander of the Sultan's troops in the neighbourhood of Tangier, the other an official of the Makhzen in Tangier.

The letter has, as a matter of fact, not yet been delivered, as there has been some difficulty about getting it translated properly, but it confirms proposals previously made and apparently encouraged by the addressees.

The Company is an English one, duly registered in London, but its representatives here are French citizens.

The generosity of the proposals made to the Sultan's Government are, at first sight, very striking, and appear to be in direct opposition to Article I of the Convention of Commerce and Navigation signed between Her Majesty the Queen and the Sultan of Morocco on the 9th December, 1856.

The Company has made no effort to enlist my support on their behalf, and it is extremely unlikely that the Sultan will seriously consider the proposals made in the letter unless supported by His Majesty's Legation.

Under present circumstances, however, the matter may be of interest, and you may, perhaps, be disposed to make some inquiries as to the status of the Company, which, however, in its proposals appears to have neglected not only its own interests by the generosity of its offers, but also the existence of certain Treaties which would clash with the fulfilment of its engagements.

It is not impossible that this may be the same Company that made the offer to the Sultan referred to in my telegram No. 2 of the 9th January and despatch No. 6 of the 5th January, and which it was then thought was a French Company.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 252.

Algiers and Morocco Company to Moorish Officials.

(Gloire à Dieu !)

A son Excellence le Pacha Abd-el-Krim Oult-ben-M'ahmed Sergui et au Caïd Mohamed-ben-Said, que Dieu garde, Salut !

JE suis bien arrivé en Europe, et j'espère que cette lettre vous trouvera en excellente santé, ainsi que tous les vôtres.

Le Grand Conseil de notre Société vient de se réunir ; il m'a chargé de vous envoyer tous ses saluts de prospérité et de bonheur.

Il m'a prié de vous dire qu'il est prêt à vous remettre les sommes auxquelles il s'est engagé dans les diverses propositions qui vous ont été faites par M. Jourdan, mais pour la bonne règle de nos affaires, et comme nous devons nous conformer aux usages établis en Europe, je vous serais très reconnaissant de vouloir bien m'écrire pour que je montre votre réponse aux gens de ma Société. C'est pour cela que, plein de confiance en vous, je vous prie de me dire par écrit ce que vous m'avez déjà dit par votre bouche.

Le 10 Novembre et le 4 Janvier, notre représentant, M. Jourdan, qui est votre ami, vous a remis deux lettres pour le Gouvernement du Maroc ; ces deux lettres je vous les recopie textuellement.

PREMIÈRE LETTRE (DU 10 NOVEMBRE, 1905).

"*Offres pour le Haut Gouvernement Marocain faites par MM. Jourdan et L'Hermitte Représentants de la Société Algiers and Morocco Company (Limited).*

"Le Gouvernement Marocain, voulant, pour le bien de ses sujets, faire les grands travaux d'intérêts publics dont il est utile de doter le pays, nous avons pensé, au nom de notre Société, lui faire les propositions suivantes, et en les acceptant, le Gouvernement Marocain ne fera que suivre l'exemple des États Européens qui confient à des Sociétés moyennant redevances l'exploitation de toutes sortes d'entreprises et de fabrications, telles que : allumettes, tabacs, routes, chemins de fer, ports, douanes, &c., ce qui pour ces pays est une grosse source de revenus et leur permet de se passer d'emprunts, peut-être la même chose pour le Gouvernement Marocain, qui, suivant l'exemple des autres États, ne doit prendre ses ressources que sur le revenu naturel donné par la consommation des produits utilisés par ses sujets.

"Ces choses dites, nous offrons comme cadeau au Gouvernement Marocain, et à titre définitif, et cela immédiatement :

"5,000,000 fr. en espèces ;

"5,000,000 fr. en matériel d'artillerie, fusils ou munitions de guerre.

"Pour cette donation, qu'en signe de joyeux avènement au Maroc de notre Société (the Algiers and Morocco Company) nous nous permettons d'offrir au Gouvernement Marocain, nous demandons :

"1. Le droit seul (monopole) pour notre Société de fabriquer au Maroc des allumettes, des bougies, du sucre.

"2. Sur cette fabrication prenant les formes officielles, nous verserons dans les caisses du Gouvernement Marocain :

"5 pour cent sur le total de tous les produits qui sortiraient des usines pour être vendus ;

"5 pour cent sur le bénéfice de toutes les productions de ces diverses usines.

"3. Nous verserions encore en reconnaissance de ce que nous devons aux bénédictions de Dieu :

"2 pour cent sur nos bénéfices aux mosquées du pays.

"Tout cet argent serait prélevé après vérification de nos livres par des employés Marocains, et aux temps qui seraient décidés d'un commun accord.

"4. Nous achèterions dans le pays tous les produits que nous trouverions convenables à notre fabrication ; nous apprendrions aux habitants (si le climat s'y prête) à cultiver la betterave, plante avec laquelle on fait le sucre.

"Nous prendrions des ouvriers Marocains de préférence aux autres.

"5. Les produits et matières de fabrication ou servant à alimenter nos machines, et que nous ne pourrions acheter dans le pays, seraient pris à l'étranger, mais sous le contrôle d'employés Marocains. Tous ces produits arriveraient dans nos entrepôts sans payer de droits de douane, puisque tous les produits fabriqués valant plus cher que les matières reçues franche de droits nous payerions une redevance au Sultan de 5 pour cent (voir plus haut, Article 2).

"6. Tous les produits que nous fabriquerons au Maroc n'empêcheraient pas qu'il n'en vienne d'autres de même qualités ; donc le sucre, les bougies, les allumettes, pourraient, comme par le passé, continuer de rentrer dans le pays aux mêmes conditions qu'aujourd'hui et payer les mêmes droits de douane.

"7. Nous nous tenons à la disposition du Gouvernement Marocain pour discuter toutes modifications et donner toutes explications qui paraîtraient devoir être faites.

"8. Le Sultan donnera à la Société tous les terrains qui seront utiles pour la construction des usines. Les usines seront la propriété du Sultan, et la Société n'en sera que le locataire gratuit, et ce pendant la durée de la Société ou des Sociétés filiales que cette dernière créera."

DEUXIÈME LETTRE (DU 4 JANVIER, 1906).

"A son Excellence le Caïd Ben Said pour le Haut Gouvernement du Maroc.

"Comme suite à la convention que nous vous avons remise la 10 Novembre dernier, nous venons ajouter aujourd'hui que la Société Algiers and Morocco Company (Limited), au nom de qui nous avions agi, veut bien augmenter de 10,000,000 fr., soit un total de 20,000,000 fr., la somme à laquelle elle porterait sa remise pour que le haut Gouvernement Marocain lui accorde le monopole du sucre, des bougies et des allumettes, monopole au sujet duquel nous avons déjà eu diverses conférences et dont nous avons renvoyé la conclusion après la Conférence d'Algésiras.

("Pour la Société et par ordre),
"Nous vous saluons sincèrement,
(Signé) "L'HERMITTE ET JOURDAN."

A ces deux lettres je vous prierai de vouloir bien m'écrire la réponse qu'a faite Son Excellence Sa Majesté le Sultan, que Dieu garde pour toujours en votre haute compagnie. M. Jourdan a vu le Naib. Je vous serais obligé également de me confirmer ce qu'il a dit de notre proposition. Merci encore de votre dévouement en toute cette affaire. Nous sommes de cœur avec vous et nous travaillons tous avec ces propositions pour la grande satisfaction de Sa Majesté le Sultan et le bien de votre pays. Nous vous envoyons toutes nos amitiés.

(Pour la Société et par ordre),
Le Directeur-Général,
(Signé) ROLLAND-CHEVILLON.

[6674] No. 253.

Sir E. Egerton to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 24.)

(No. 29. Confidential.)

Sir, *Rome, February* 19, 1906.

I WENT to see Baron Sonnino this afternoon, who, from what he tells me, is extraordinarily busy, working twelve hours a day to make himself master of details of the interior, and discussing with M. Luzzati the finances and the measures necessary for the railway improvement, which he admits will require at least a milliard of lire, to be distributed over some years, as it would be impossible for all the necessary work to be begun at once.

His news from Algeciras was, he said, not very good ; it was not there so much as in Berlin and Paris that discussion appeared to be going on. I said to him, as I have said to previous Ministers, that Italy appeared to me, like England, bound by previous engagement to support France ; that it was a mistake which might have inconvenient results to appear tacitly to admit that an alliance in Europe for European objects could be appealed to in other quarters of the globe. There had been, I thought, much too much timidity of Germany displayed already in parts of the world where her interests and true influence were really very small, and this was bad for Germany herself as well as others. It appeared to me that the present "querelle d'Allemand" would last longer if reason were given to German pretensions.

M. de Sonnino did not appear to disagree, and was curious to know what Germany's aim has really been.

To Abyssinian matters he has not given his attention.

It is not very certain whether M. Sonnino's Ministry will be of long continuance, the question of the nomination of the President of the Chamber may not be satisfactory to the Government. The Marquis de Rudini, who might have been of assistance, has apparently been neglected since the last crisis, and there does not seem now so good a prospect of the Ministry lasting till November at least, which was expected when

M. Giolitti showed no present disposition to return to office. It is clear that Baron di Sonnino is a man of governing energy and resource, and he appeared to me most straightforward.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. H. EGERTON.

P.S.—I was loth to credit Baron de Sonnino's news that France was throwing away the advantage of the support of Europe at Algeciras by negotiating direct with Berlin.—E.H.E.

[6642] No. 254.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 24.)

(No. 83.)
Sir, *Paris, February* 23, 1906.

THERE are signs of growing exasperation in French public opinion during the last few days, in consequence of the uncompromising attitude assumed by Germany in the Morocco question. The view generally expressed is that France has gone almost to the limit of possible concessions in regard to the question of the police, and that the only course which she can take with dignity, should Germany persist in her present line of opposition, is to fall back on the *status quo* in Morocco, taking no action of an aggressive character, but throwing upon the German Government the responsibility for any complications which may ensue.

The "Temps," which without doubt has been in close touch with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has been conspicuous for the energy and resolution with which it has defended the French cause and replied to attacks from the German press. The great majority of the other organs of French opinion of different shades have been equally firm in their assertion of French right in Morocco. It must, however, be admitted that the public and the press have throughout the Algeciras negotiations shown considerable self-restraint under considerable provocation, and even papers usually noted for their Chauvinistic tendencies have been on the whole careful to refrain from language that could be considered violent or provocative.

M. Jaurès' Socialist organ, the "Humanité," deplores alike the attitude of the French and the German Governments in the negotiations, but M. Jaurès avoids advocating any further definite concessions on the French side, which he is no doubt conscious that public opinion would not tolerate.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. BERTIE.

[6775] No. 255.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 24.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, February* 24, 1906.

IN an audience granted to the French Ambassador by the Emperor on the 21st instant His Majesty, speaking of the Morocco question, expressed his entire sympathy with France and promised to facilitate a solution by every means in his power. M. Bompard informs me that he could detect no sign of the influence of Germany over His Majesty.

M. Bompard told Count Lamsdorff this afternoon that Germany had shown her intention to render a solution impossible by her recent refusal to accept the French proposals relative to the organization of the police and by formulating a new and quite inadmissible demand about the State Bank. Count Lamsdorff, who expressed his acquiescence in this view, said that the Emperor had instructed Count Osten Sacken to present the French case in the strongest terms to the German Government, but that this had been unsuccessful. In Count Lamsdorff's judgment the only remaining course was to bring the opinion of the civilized world to bear upon the German Emperor, whose *amour-propre* was deeply engaged—a fact which constituted the difficulty of the situation. An attempt should be made to induce His

Majesty to accept the decision at which the representation of the Powers at the Conference had almost unanimously arrived. England had declared herself determined to maintain the Convention by which she was bound, and further representations on her part would carry no weight. Russia could do no more than she had already done. The intervention of the President of the United States, his Excellency suggested, might perhaps be useful.

Later on the Austrian Ambassador pointed out to his Excellency in strong terms the danger of permitting the present situation to continue.

I will deliver your messages to Count Lamsdorff to-morrow.

[6835] No. 256.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 24.)

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, February* 24, 1906.

IN conversation to-day Count Lamsdorff stated that he quite understood your communication on the subject of Morocco, and thanked you for it. Count Osten Sacken had just sent him from Berlin a telegram which showed that but little hope remained of the successful issue of any further representations that might be made.

The German Ambassador here had contended that Germany was acting in the interests of Europe at Algeciras, but he had clearly stated to his Excellency that, in his opinion, Germany had no right to speak without authority on behalf of the European Powers, who were the best judges of their own interest.

He pointed out to me that the Conference had met in deference to the wishes of Germany, and said that he did not believe she could possibly break it up on her own motion if the Representatives of the Powers declared themselves satisfied with the French proposals. If Germany acted in this manner the whole world would be clearly aware of her aggressive policy.

He stated that he felt sure of the French Prime Minister, but not of the French people, for he feared that the approaching elections in France might result in a strong nationalist movement which might force the country into war.

He could make no proposal for relieving what he considered a dangerous situation except that, by showing an united front, the Power represented at the Conference might give Germany an excuse for yielding to the wishes of Europe, reserving her Treaty rights and making her Agreement conditional on the revision after a term of years of the arrangement adopted.

[6836] No. 257.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 24.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, February* 24, 1906.

I HAVE received information from a confidential source that the good offices of Austria have been offered with a view to effecting a settlement of the Moroccо question.

The offer has so far had no result.

[6841] No. 258.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 24.)

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, February* 24, 1906.

YOUR telegram No. 10.

M. Cambon and I to-day conveyed the thanks of our respective Governments to the Spanish Government for their attitude, as he had received similar instructions to mine.

Señor Moret, Señor de Ojeda informs me, has sent another telegram to-day to the Duke of Almodovar, telling his Excellency that, without unnecessarily wounding the feelings of Germany, he should use his best efforts to arrange that a vote should be taken, before the Conference is broken up, so as to place on record the views held by the different Powers on the more important points in dispute. Señor Moret has emphasized the fact that Spain must remain in line with Great Britain and France.

[6838] No. 259.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, February* 24, 1906.

FRENCH Ambassador has been informed by Count Goluchowski, who appears much depressed by bad outlook at Algeciras, that he is in favour of suspension and not dissolution of Conference in event of no agreement being reached. Although French Ambassador does not appear to favour this arrangement, he said that he presumed his Excellency would, under above circumstances, instruct Austrian Representatives to propose suspension of the Conference. Count Goluchowski replied that he would do so if supported by Italy and the United States, with whom he was discussing the matter.

[6826] No. 260.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February* 24, 1906.

I AM informed by the French Delegate that he has received telegrams from St. Petersburgh. Count Lamsdorff appears to have used strong terms to the German Ambassador with regard to Germany's stubborn attitude, which, in his opinion, contrasts in a striking manner with the conciliatory disposition displayed by France. The blame was laid by the German Ambassador on the French press, but the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked that the German press had not been backward in the fray and that the Ambassador would do well to read it.

I am told by Count Cassini that the Russian representations at Berlin may not be without effect, and he is recommending his Government to continue them.

Marquis de Venosti Venosta told me yesterday that he considers it essential that an agreement should be reached on the Bank question, even if no solution is forthcoming on the Police question. He is anxious that the French should make further concessions on the former. I told him that, although the French had already yielded on so many points, yet I believed they were prepared to concede one or two more. I was convinced, nevertheless, that, until a discussion at least had taken place on the Police question, they would not be disposed to close the Bank question. My views, I added, entirely coincided with those of the French Representative.

The French are willing to agree to the appointment of two censors by whom certain questions which would come under the "Conseil d'Administration" would be supervised, and who would be selected by Italy and Belgium. They would also be willing as a last resort that a third censor should be added, whom Germany might select. The control to be exercised by the Diplomatic Body at Tangier would be replaced by these consors.

They are, moreover, disposed to concede a few points on the question of the jurisdiction under which the bank would be placed.

[6831] No. 261.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February* 24, 1906.

IN a private conversation which I had with the Marquis Visconti-Venosta he mentioned the possibility of his abstention from voting, as reported in telegram No. 15 from His Majesty's Representative at Rome, repeated to me in your telegram

No. 23 of the 23rd instant. I mentioned the fact to my French colleague when we were discussing which Powers might possibly abstain, although I paid no great attention nor attached much importance to it, as it was merely a casual remark.

I think that my French colleague, who says that he telegraphed it to his Government when reporting generally as to the Italian Delegate's somewhat reserved attitude, agrees with me in considering that it can hardly be taken as a definite expression of opinion or as a settled decision.

[6832] No. 262.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February* 24, 1906.

THE question of the State Bank has been referred to the Drafting Committee, with several Articles undecided. As the Committee is likely to be occupied with it for some days, I asked the President of the Conference whether it would not be possible for him to convene a meeting for Tuesday, when any order of the day which he might desire to present could be discussed. Very strong exception was taken to this by the German Delegates, who maintained that the labours of the Drafting Committee could not possibly be completed by Tuesday. They objected to the President fixing any special day, as several points respecting the bank question would have to be referred to their Government. The Duke of Almodovar stated that he would fix no definite date, but expressed his readiness to convoke a meeting any day if any member desired one.

It is clear that the Germans wish that matters should be allowed to drag on, and if their views in this respect are regarded, the sittings of the Conference will be suspended for an indefinite number of days.

M. Révoil and I are strongly of opinion that it would be unwise at this juncture to suspend the sittings of the Conference for more than a few days. Great embarrassment will be caused if the German tactics of delay meet with success. The course we wish to pursue, if it meets with the approval of our Governments, is to request the Duke of Almodovar to convene a meeting for the discussion of the police question not later than the Thursday, the 1st March, while the bank question is being examined by the Drafting Committee. We propose to delay our request to the Duke till the afternoon of Tuesday, the 27th, or the morning of Wednesday, the 28th instant, in order to await the receipt of definite news as to the results effected by the intervention of third parties at Berlin.

Neither my French colleague nor myself have much hope of an agreement being reached on the bank question, and we are therefore anxious to bring the police question before the Conference as soon as possible. We hope that our Governments agree that if there is to be a breakdown of the Conference it should take place on the police question rather than on that of the bank.

[6840] No. 263.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, February* 24, 1906.

IN my note to the Court respecting the proposal to establish wireless telegraphy between Fez and Tangier, I have, in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 6 of to-day's date, entirely confined myself to the line which Sir Arthur Nicolson adopted in his letter to Ben Sliman.

Bland and Co. of Gibraltar is the English Company which has put forward the present proposal.

[6629] No. 264.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Egerton.

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, February* 24, 1906.

INFORM Italian Government that abstention from voting at the Conference on the part of their Delegate would make a bad impression on other Powers, and enquire if they have any confirmation of the rumour on this point reported in your telegram No. 15 of yesterday's date.

[6637] No. 265.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lowther.

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, February* 24, 1906.

WHAT is the English Company mentioned, in your telegram No. 11 of yesterday's date, as having made a private offer to the Sultan to establish wireless telegraphy between Poldhu, Tangier, and Fez? Could they not amalgamate with Lloyd's? You should be careful not to prejudice Lloyd's priority of claim to establish a signal station at Cape Spartel, and when addressing the Moorish Government you should adhere strictly to the terms of Sir A. Nicolson's note of the 13th July, 1903.

[6839] No. 266.

Sir E. Egerton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Rome, February* 25, 1906.

ALGECIRAS Conference.

Rumour that Italian Delegate proposes to abstain from voting. Your telegram No. 28. Minister for Foreign Affairs says he knows nothing to substantiate report. M. Visconti-Venosta is merely acting part of mediator and conciliator.

I urged that to treat questions on their merits and fulfil engagements would be the safest course he could pursue.

[6833] No. 267.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 69.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February* 25, 1906.

THE examination of the French and German projects in regard to the State Bank was terminated by the Conference yesterday, and the projects have been referred to the Drafting Committee, as there were several controversial points on which no agreement was reached.

A project was presented by the Moorish Delegates. They acknowledged that the Moorish Government had no knowledge of it, and that it had been drawn up without instructions from Fez. It was certainly more in harmony with the German than with the French project, and by it the Moorish Government were invested with a considerable faculty of intervention in the affairs of the bank.

In accordance with the desire of my French colleague, I proposed the clause relating to the appointment of censors (see my telegram No. 66 of the 24th instant). I proposed three censors, and stated that they could be selected from any nationality, without specifying any particular one. The German Delegates, who are under the impression that I drew up the clause on my own initiative, are pleased with it. I think it well to mention this in order to counteract any possible reports in the press to the effect that I am taking action independently of my French colleague.

[6834] No. 268.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 70.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February* 25, 1906.

IT appears from a telegram which the French Foreign Office sent to my French colleague yesterday morning that the visit of Baron de Courcel to Berlin has not led to any very satisfactory results.

M. Rouvier has promised to telegraph again to M. Révoil at greater length.

[6981] No. 269.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 46. Conference.)
Sir, *Algeciras, February* 20, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of the German and French projects for the institution of a State Bank in Morocco, which were laid before the Conference to-day. These projects will be discussed at a meeting to be held on the 22nd instant.

I would beg leave to point out that the two projects differ both in character and in the details. The German project wishes apparently to invest the Bank with an official character, and to associate the Powers, either directly or through their Representatives at Tangier, with the creation and the administration of the Bank. The French project, on the other hand, desires to restrict the action of the Bank within its proper sphere, and I venture to think that the statement of the French Representative, of which I beg leave to transmit a summary, explains this point of view far more clearly than I can pretend to do.

With respect to the details, I would beg leave to point out that the German project desires that the "siège social" of the Bank should be at Tangier, while the French scheme wishes place the Bank under French law, subject to the jurisdictions of the several countries. By this it is intended that in cases where the Bank is prosecutor the defendant should be tried by his Consular Tribunal, in accordance with the laws of his country, while when the Bank is defendant it should be tried by French law, in first instance by the French Consular Tribunal, with appeal to a Superior Court in France. The German project, on the other hand, wishes that in cases where the Bank is prosecutor the defendant should be tried by his Consular Tribunal, but not in accordance with the laws of his country, but by the Egyptian codes; and when the bank is defendant it should be tried, without appeal, by a Court composed of the "Presidents of the Foreign Consular Tribunals." To those who are acquainted with the Consular Tribunals in Morocco this suggestion seems a singularly unpractical one, and also one by which justice would be strangely administered. To be debarred the right of appeal constitutes a further and, I venture to submit, a fatal objection.

The proposal in the German project that the Diplomatic Body at Tangier should form a "Conseil de Surveillance" over the Bank has justly caused surprise. It would be no disrespect to the Diplomatic Body to say that its members are hardly competent to perform the functions with which the German delegation desires to invest them, apart from other objections of a more general character.

For the composition of the "Conseil d'Administration" the two projects suggest different proposals, and the German project does not allude to the rights of the French Consortium, which is practically the sole creditor of Morocco. It is worthy of remark that the German project (Articles 12 and 13) appears to ignore the position acquired by the French undertakers of the loan to the Sultan of Morocco, and to be oblivious of the fact that, if the French contract is not taken into consideration, two rival and clashing administrations will be established—the State Bank, with its attributions and powers, and the French Consortium, with its "droits de préférence" as regards loans and coinage, and its lien on 60 per cent. of the Moorish customs. Allusion is made to this contradiction in the statement of my French colleague.

I have ventured to draw your attention to a few differences in the two projects which it may be difficult to reconcile, and it is possible that closer study by

greater experts than myself may discover other points on which there is a divergence of conception.

I have not the "Acte de Concession" of the Ottoman Bank to which reference is made in five Articles in the German project, and so I am unable to express any opinion on these points.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 269.

Project by the German Delegate respecting Institution of State Bank of Morocco.

ARTICLE 1er. Pour venir en aide financiellement au Maghzen, une Banque sera fondée au Maroc, concessionnée par Sa Majesté Chérifienne pour la durée provisoire de cinquante ans, à dater de la ratification du présent Acte de Conférence et régie par les dispositions suivantes :—

La Banque portera le nom de "Banque d'État du Maroc."

La Banque aura son siège à Tanger. Elle pourra, en tant que le besoin en sera éprouvé, établir des succursales et des agences dans toutes les autres places de l'Empire Chérifien.

Art. 2. Le capital de la Banque est fixé provisoirement à . . . . millions de pesetas.

Ce capital sera fourni par les Puissances représentées à la Conférence ou par les banques qu'elles désigneront. Chaque Puissance voulant y participer aura le droit de réclamer, soit pour elle-même, soit pour une banque ou pour un groupe de banques de son pays, une part sociale égale pour tous. Les États qui voudront se prévaloir de ce droit auront à communiquer cette intention au Gouvernement Royal d'Espagne dans un délai de quatre semaines à partir de la ratification du présent Acte de Conférence. Ce délai écoulé, la Banque sera considérée comme fondée en mesure des communications faites.

Art. 3. La Banque aura dans chaque pays représenté à la Conférence qualité de personne morale.

Sa position légale au Maroc et les rapports judiciaires dans lesquels elle y entrera avec d'autres personnes, seront régis par les prescriptions des codes introduits en Égypte pour les procès mixtes sous le titre de "Code Civil" et "Code de Commerce." Ces prescriptions prévaudront au droit national du défendeur dans les cas où la Banque se présente comme demanderesse.

Art. 4. Au Maroc la juridiction sur la Banque, en tant que celle-ci se présente comme défenderesse, sera exercée, même dans les procès immobiliers, par une Cour Mixte à Tanger, composée des Présidents des Cours Consulaires des Puissances intéressées à la Banque, avec l'adjonction d'un Délégué Marocain.

Cette Cour décidera en première et dernière instance. Elle sera autorisée à se donner elle-même son organisation.

A la procédure s'appliqueront les prescriptions du "Code de Procédure Civile et Commerciale" introduit en Égypte pour les procès mixtes.

Si, au Maroc, la Banque se présente comme demanderesse, la juridiction se réglera d'après les principes qui y sont en vigueur pour d'autres causes civiles.

Art. 5. La Banque formera une Société Anonyme. Son capital sera divisé en . . . . actions au porteur de 500 pesetas chacune ; il pourra être augmenté au moyen de la création et l'émission de nouvelles actions.

La Banque relèvera d'un Conseil de Surveillance ; elle sera administrée par un Conseil d'Administration et un Directoire.

Art. 6. Le Conseil de Surveillance se composera des Représentants Diplomatiques à Tanger des Puissances ayant pris part à la Conférence, avec l'adjonction d'un Délégué Marocain. Le Conseil de Surveillance sera autorisé d'établir lui-même son Règlement.

Le Conseil de Surveillance aura le droit de prendre connaissance, de tout temps, de la gestion de la Banque, soit directement, soit par des Commissaires, et de veiller à la stricte exécution des prescriptions réglant la constitution de la Banque et sa sphère d'action.

Il devra, cependant, s'abstenir de toute ingérence dans la marche des affaires de la Banque, en tant que les Articles 16 et 17 ne lui attribuent pas des fonctions spéciales.

Art. 7. Le Conseil d'Administration se composera de deux Délégués de chacun des États, banques ou groupes de banques, qui ont fondé la Banque, en y prenant une part sociale, et qui se trouvent en possession d'au moins un quart de leur quote-part primitive du capital d'actions. Les banques d'un pays pourront, cependant, être remplacées par d'autres banques du même pays avec le consentement du Gouvernement de ce pays.

Le Conseil d'Administration surveillera la marche des affaires de la Banque ; il aura le droit de donner des instructions au Directoire, en tant que ce droit n'est pas réservé au Conseil de Surveillance.

Le règlement et les compétences du Conseil d'Administration seront fixés par les statuts de la Banque.

Art. 8. Le Directoire sera nommé par le Conseil d'Administration. Il gérera les affaires de la Banque et la représentera judiciairement et extrajudiciairement.

L'organisation et les compétences du Directoire seront réglées par les statuts de la Banque.

Art. 9. Les statuts de la Banque seront dressés, d'après les dispositions du présent Acte de Conférence, par le Conseil d'Administration, qui, à cet effet, se réunira au plus tôt à Tanger. Les statuts seront sujets à l'approbation du Conseil de Surveillance.

Art. 10. La Banque aura le droit de faire toute opération qui ressort des fonctions d'une institution de banque.

(Voir Article 8 de l'Acte de Concession de la Banque Ottomane.)

Art. 11. Émission de billets de banque.

(Voir Article 9 à 12 de l'Acte de Concession de la Banque Ottomane.)

Art. 12. Fonction de trésorier-payeur pour certains revenus et certaines dépenses de l'État conformément aux dispositions d'un règlement spécial à établir entre le Maghzen et la Banque.

(Voir Articles 13 et 14 de l'Acte de Concession de la Banque Ottomane.)

Devraient être assignés à la Banque les revenus des douanes—peut-être déduction faite des sommes nécessaires au service de l'emprunt Français—de même que les nouveaux revenus créés par la Conférence.

En ce qui concerne les dépenses de l'État, la Banque aurait, conformément à l'Article 17, à effectuer les paiements nécessaires pour l'organisation de la police et pour certains travaux publics urgents. Il serait désirable de la charger en outre du service de la Dette Publique—notamment de celui de l'emprunt Français et des avances Allemandes.

Art. 13. Agence Financière de l'État, notamment priorité pour des emprunts.

(Voir Article 15, alinéa 1, de l'Acte de Concession de la Banque Ottomane.)

Art. 14. Ouverture d'un certain crédit au Maghzen.

(Voir Article 16 de l'Acte de Concession de la Banque Ottomane.)

Art. 15. Exemption de taxes et d'impôts.

(Voir Article 18 de l'Acte de Concession de la Banque Ottomane.)

Art. 16. D'après les directions qu'aurait à lui donner le Conseil de Surveillance, la Banque entreprendra l'assainissement du système monétaire Marocain.

Le gain provenant de la frappe de monnaie reviendrait au Maghzen.

Art. 17. La Banque prélèvera sur le crédit du Maghzen, d'après les instructions qu'aurait à lui donner le Conseil de Surveillance, les sommes nécessaires à l'organisation de la police et à l'accomplissement des travaux publics urgents, en tant que les frais de ces derniers ne seront pas ouverts par les "dîmes additionnelles." La Banque emploiera les sommes ainsi prélevées indépendamment des dispositions du Maghzen.

Le Budget de l'organisation de la police sera fixé par le Conseil de Surveillance.

Quant aux travaux publics, le Maghzen en gardera la décision.

Le Conseil de Surveillance aura le droit de faire au Maghzen des propositions pratiques à cet égard.

Inclosure 2 in No. 269.

Project by French Delegate for Institution of Imperial Bank of Morocco.

UNE Banque d'État sera instituée au Maroc avec privilège de trente-cinq années.

La Banque établira des succursales et agences dans les principales villes du Maroc et dans tout endroit où elle le jugera utile.

La Banque d'État, dont l'objet social comprendra toutes les opérations rentrant dans les attributions d'une banque, sera l'agent financier du Gouvernement Marocain; elle sera chargée de toutes les opérations de Caisse et de Trésorerie, ainsi que des opérations monétaires qu'elle effectuera pour le compte et au bénéfice du Gouvernement.

La Banque fera au Gouvernement des avances en compte-courant pour le service de Trésorerie et des avances successives pour les dépenses d'intérêt général reconnu, sans que le total des avances ainsi effectuées puisse excéder le montant de son capital; le taux des avances ne dépassera pas 7 pour cent, commission de Banque comprise.

La Banque aura le privilège de l'émission de billets au porteur, remboursables à présentation, ayant force libératoire dans les Caisses publiques de l'Empire Marocain; son pouvoir d'émission sera limité au triple de son encaisse métallique.

Le Gouvernement Marocain nommera auprès de la Banque un Haut Commissaire résidant à Tanger, chargé de surveiller l'exercice du privilège de l'émission des billets de banque et les relations de la Banque avec le Trésor Impérial.

Le capital social, fixé à 15,000,000 fr., sera divisé en quinze parts, réparties de la manière suivante:—

La souscription de onze parts sera réservée aux groupes financiers constitués par l'Allemagne, l'Angleterre, l'Autriche-Hongrie, la Belgique, l'Espagne, les États-Unis, la France, l'Italie, les Pays-Bas, le Portugal, la Russie, et la Suède, sans que le même groupe ait le droit de souscrire plus d'une part. Dans le cas où les onze parts n'auraient pas été toutes souscrites, la ou les parts disponibles seront réparties entre tous les groupes financiers ayant pris part à la souscription, et ce proportionnellement à leur souscription initiale.

La souscription des quatre autres parts sera contribuée aux établissements contractants de l'Emprunt Marocain de 1904, contre l'abandon en faveur de la Banque Impériale du Maroc de leurs droits de préférence pour les emprunts et opérations monétaires stipulés par l'Article 33 du Contrat d'Emprunt du 12 Juin, 1904.

Les augmentations ultérieures de capital auront lieu sur décision de l'Assemblée Générale des Actionnaires et, à l'exception de la partie que le Conseil d'Administration jugera utile de réserver dans l'intérêt de la Société, la souscription en sera attribuée, sans distinction de nationalité, aux porteurs d'actions proportionnellement aux titres possédés par chacun d'eux.

Le Conseil de l'Administration élu par l'Assemblée Générale des Actionnaires sera composé de quinze membres, désignés à raison d'un administrateur par part entière choisi dans la nationalité de chaque groupe souscripteur. Dans le cas où une ou plusieurs parts auraient fait l'objet de répartition entre différents groupes souscripteurs, ainsi qu'il est prévu ci-dessus, le choix de ou des Administrateurs correspondant à ces parts serait fait par l'Assemblée des Actionnaires directement et sans distinction de nationalité.

Les Statuts stipuleront l'obligation pour les actionnaires de maintenir pendant dix ans à partir de la constitution de la Société la représentation par nationalité telle qu'elle vient d'être définie; passé ce délai, l'Assemblée des Actionnaires sera maîtresse de choisir tous les Administrateurs sans distinction de nationalité.

Le Conseil d'Administration nommera ses Président, Vice-Président, Directeurs, et Sous-Directeurs. Il déterminera leurs pouvoirs et attributions, ainsi que ceux des Comités qu'il jugerait utile de constituer.

Un Comité International d'Escompte, composé de membres choisis par les notables commerçants et banquiers de Tanger possédant au moins vingt-cinq actions, sera constitué auprès de la direction de cette ville. Le Comité sera consulté sur les crédits à ouvrir et les conditions générales d'escompte.

Tous les emplois de la Banque seront accessibles à des ressortissants de toute nationalité.

La Banque constituée sous le régime de la loi Française sera placée dans les conditions de juridiction et de compétence fixées au Maroc par les Capitulations.

Un Comité constitué par les divers groupes souscripteurs suivant les règles fixées pour l'élection du Conseil d'Administration arrêtera un projet de Statuts, qu'il soumettra à l'Assemblée des Actionnaires convoquée pour constituer la Société dans un délai de trois mois à dater de la signature du présent Protocole.

Inclosure 3 in No. 269.

Statement by M. Révoil.

LES termes dans lesquels le programme de la Conférence, préparé d'accord entre les Gouvernements Français et Allemand, a prévu l'institution d'une Banque d'État montrent qu'il a été entendu entre eux que la Banque Marocaine serait exclusivement un instrument de crédit et de régularisation, mais que là se bornerait son rôle, qu'elle ne devrait être ni un instrument politique ni un organe administratif.

D'autre part, il a été entendu que la Banque ne pourrait servir une influence étrangère aux dépens d'une autre. Les mesures que nous avons adoptées en ce qui concerne les adjudications publiques en confiant au Corps Diplomatique à Tanger le contrôle de ces entreprises, les principes d'égalité que nous avons affirmés en cette matière garantissent l'exercice impartial des prérogatives et des attributions données à la Banque, notamment quant aux avances faites pour les travaux publics.

La question se pose de savoir si, en constituant ce nouvel organe, on doit faire abstraction complète du passé. Fidèles à l'attitude que la France a observée depuis le début de la Conférence, nous nous sommes placés sur un terrain à la fois pratique et libéral. On ne peut prétendre sérieusement faire litière des faits établis et des droits acquis. Le crédit du Maroc a été fondé par le marché Français. Le Sultan, dans le libre exercice de sa souveraineté, a contracté en 1904 un emprunt dans des conditions déterminées. Ce contrat a été passé avec un groupe Français. Il comporte des droits de préférence, qui, sans constituer un privilège, sont un excellent instrument de crédit. Il est sage, il est normal, que le passé soit absorbé dans le présent. C'est pourquoi, sans vouloir tirer argument de notre situation commerciale au Maroc, nous croyons qu'il faut faire une part aux droits acquis dans la constitution de la future Banque. Les intérêts Français, reconnus par le Sultan dans sa souveraineté et sans porter atteinte à aucun droit, doivent être sauvegardés. Dans ces conditions et sous cette réserve nous sommes disposés à admettre l'égalité des Puissances dans la formation du capital et le libre accès au Conseil d'Administration et aux emplois dépendant de la Banque, sans distinction de nationalités. Mais faire sortir la Banque de ses limites étroites, en faire l'arbitre des services publics, la charger de dresser des budgets, la soumettre à l'action directe du Corps Diplomatique agissant comme Conseil de Surveillance nous paraît une véritable hérésie. C'est étendre au Maroc le champ des dissensions politiques au lieu de le restreindre. Constituer la Banque sans tenir compte du passé ni des droits acquis, c'est l'empêcher de rendre les services qu'on en attend et l'exposer à de perpétuels litiges.

Enfin, j'insisterai sur une garantie donnée au commerce international au Maroc. Créant un instrument de crédit, nous avons voulu donner l'assurance qu'il ne serait pas fait une répartition arbitraire des crédits entre les commerçants des diverses nationalités. C'est en vue d'empêcher des abus de ce genre que nous proposons la création d'un Conseil d'Escompte composé de notabilités des diverses colonies.

Tel est l'esprit du projet de Banque que je suis chargé de présenter et que je suis prêt à soutenir.

6982] No. 270.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 26.)

(No. 47. Conference.)

Sir, *Algeciras, February* 21, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the communication which M. de Radowitz handed to M. Révoil on the 19th instant, in reply to the French proposal in regard to the organization of the police, a copy of which I transmitted in my despatch No. 43 of the 17th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 270.

German Reply to French Proposal as to Police Organization in Morocco.

LA condition que les officiers étrangers choisis par Sa Majesté Chérifienne soient des officiers Français et Espagnols ne nous paraît pas compatible avec le caractère international de l'organisation de la police.

Nous désirons donc maintenir nos propositions, en nous déclarant prêts à examiner toute autre qui aurait comme point de départ le principe de l'égalité des droits pour tous accepté par la Conférence.

Le 19 *Février*, 1906.

[6852] No. 271.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 26.)

(No. 34. Most Confidential.)

Madrid, February 21, 1906.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that this morning M. Cambon read to me a long telegram, which he had just received from M. Révoil, to the effect that the Duke of Almodovar, the President of the Conference, had come to him to put forward the idea that Spain might, perhaps, with advantage intervene to arrange the differences which had arisen between France and Germany on the bank and police questions. The Duke assured M. Révoil that the idea was his own, and had not been suggested to him by Germany; but M. Révoil had some doubts upon this point.

The idea of Spain offering her mediation was one which M. Cambon did not like. It seemed to him a clever move on the part of Germany to push Spain forward, and thus bring about friction between her and France; he therefore begged me to see Señor de Ojeda, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and impress upon him the necessity at this moment that France, Spain, and Great Britain should remain firm together in matters in dispute at the Conference.

On leaving M. Cambon I called on the German Chargé d'Affaires, Baron Stumm, to inquire whether he had received any news from Algeciras. I found him somewhat hopeful, as he knew that the Emperor did not wish the Conference he had called together to end in nothing. He thought both parties would yield a little, but he made no allusion to Spanish mediation. Baron Stumm observed that Germany must take every precaution to prevent Morocco from being closed to her commerce and enterprise, and that to yield on the police question to France would be the first step in the direction of establishing French domination in that country—a fatal blow to German aspirations. Germany had miserable and useless Colonies, her trade with the United States was threatened by a Tariff war; she must therefore, at all costs, maintain a hold of such markets as were still open to her. Baron Stumm concluded by saying that if the Conference ended without attaining anything, Germany would then avail herself of all her influence at Fez to obtain as many concessions as possible, a state of things which would not be satisfactory to France.

It may be interesting to note that, in speaking of M. Révoil, Baron Stumm observed that he seemed to be inspired by the policy of M. Delcassé, by which I presume he meant that he did not yield sufficiently to German pressure. He complained that M. Révoil had a bad influence on M. Rouvier, and that until the Delcassé men were removed from French official life better relations between Germany and France could not be expected.

I called subsequently on Señor de Ojeda, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and asked him whether he could throw any light on the Duke of Almodovar's action in attempting to mediate between France and Germany. Señor de Ojeda replied that the idea was the Duke's own, and he did not believe it had been inspired by Germany. The Spanish Government, although they had doubts as to any practical results being attained by this suggested mediation, still were of opinion that, as the Conference was held on Spanish soil, it was their duty to make a supreme effort to try and bring about conciliation between the opposing views of the Powers.

I inquired how the Spanish Government proposed to act, should mediation assume concrete form.

He replied that they would follow the judgment of Solomon, and, by cutting the points in dispute and taking a little from one and giving a little to the other side, arrive at some arrangement.

I pointed out that so far all the concessions had been made on the French side, and that, if the Spanish Government acted as Señor de Ojeda suggested, the only result would be that Spain would give the impression of having acted in favour of Germany, and faith in her desire to maintain her engagements would be greatly shaken. This was not the moment to let any doubt exist upon this point.

At this point Señor de Ojeda said that he always spoke to me in the frankest manner, that the opinions he had expressed to me very often were merely personal ones, but that, before he went further, he wished me clearly to understand that as long as he remained Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs he would maintain the policy of Spain on the Morocco question in line with that of Great Britain and France. Then he gave expression to his personal views; he disliked the Agreements entered into by Spain with France with regard to Morocco; they tied her hands; they had been forced upon her by circumstances which he regretted. For eight years he had worked with Sir A. Nicolson to combat French influence in Morocco. He hated France, and now Spain was compelled to work side by side with France in Morocco. Necessity and the weakness of Spain had brought this about, and it was pitiful. Señor de Ojeda gradually worked himself up to a point, when he gave vent to all his feelings on these matters. I gathered from what he said that he personally disliked M. Cambon, the French Ambassador, and had no confidence in him. He complained that during the peace negotiations between Spain and the United States, M. Cambon had wilfully deceived the Spanish Government with regard to the real intentions of the United States' Government.

Whatever be the causes of this personal antipathy which exists between the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and the French Ambassador, the results are most unfortunate at the present moment, when France and Spain should be working together in good harmony; and M. Cambon has informed me that he rarely calls on Señor de Ojeda, as he can only obtain from him the barest official replies.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[6945] No. 272.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 26.)

(No. 35. Confidential.)

Madrid, February 22, 1906.

Sir,

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report that, as I was not satisfied as to the attitude of Señor de Ojeda, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, with regard to the Duke of Almodovar's contemplated mediation between France and Germany, I arranged to have an interview last night with Señor Moret, the President of the Council.

I pointed out to his Excellency what a dangerous step the Duke was taking, and how little likelihood there was that any satisfactory result would come of it. On the other hand, if it failed, suspicion would be aroused that Spain had acted in favour of German interests, thereby throwing doubts as to her good faith with regard to her engagements towards France, and rendering her position at the Conference very equivocal. I said that there was only one policy for Spain to follow at the present moment, and that was to hold fast to France and Great Britain, and to act in a manner that was above suspicion.

Señor Moret replied that the idea of making Spain offer her mediation to France and Germany had been sprung upon the Spanish Government by the Duke of Almodovar, who, knowing the conditions at Algeciras, seemed to be of opinion that it might lead to good results. He, however, was not so sanguine as the Duke, yet it was difficult for the Spanish Government to prevent the attempt being made, and then there was public opinion to be counted with, which might become adverse to the Government if it should leak out that influence had been brought to bear to prevent the Spanish Representative at the Conference from using his good offices to smooth over difficulties which might arise there. As the Conference was held on Spanish soil, it was the duty of Spain to do her utmost to make it a success. Señor Moret assured me that the Duke would act with great prudence, and that any proposition he might contemplate making

he would first submit to the French Government through the Spanish Ambassador in Paris.

Turning to another matter, Señor Moret expressed his fear that Germany desired to withdraw from the Conference without a decisive vote having been recorded on the bank and police questions, and that she would attain this end by taking a vote on a matter of secondary importance touching those questions; unanimity not having been obtained, she would declare that further discussion of these questions must be dropped in the plenary sittings of the Conference.

I at once pointed out to Señor Moret that if the Duke of Almodovar, as President of the Conference, allowed himself to be swayed by the German Delegates in questions of procedure at an international gathering like the present one at Algeciras, not only he, but the Spanish Government, would inevitably give the impression that they had acted in bad faith towards France and Great Britain. I told his Excellency that I must insist on orders being sent to the Duke not to oppose himself to a vote being taken on any proposition which might be submitted to the Conference by the Representatives of France, Russia, or Great Britain, and that he should not only act in this way, but should support such propositions with his vote, as they would only embody the principles agreed to between Spain and France at San Sebastian in the month of September last.

Señor Moret seemed to be struck by my repeated insistence that the good faith of the Spanish Government might be impugned if too free a hand were allowed to the Duke at Algeciras, and he promised me that he would think the matter over very carefully, and would then telegraph to the Duke.

I took the opportunity of inquiring of Señor Moret whether the King had any personal views on the Morocco question. His Excellency replied that, although His Majesty was not an expert on details of the question, yet he was firm upon one point, and that was that Spain must remain on the best terms of friendship with both France and England.

I went this morning to see Señor de Ojeda, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, with the intention of repeating to him what had passed between myself and Señor Moret, and to impress upon him how careful the Duke of Almodovar should be in the action which he contemplated taking.

Señor de Ojeda at once informed me that Señor Moret had been early to see the King, who had observed that, in his opinion, the Duke should be advised to drop his mediation scheme from fear that it might give rise to misunderstandings, and affect the honour of the Spanish Government. He was also to be advised to put no impediment in the way of a vote being taken on any proposition which might be submitted to the Conference by any of the Delegates of the Powers.

Instructions in this sense are being telegraphed to-day to Algeciras, and I have informed M. Cambon, the French Ambassador, of the fact.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[7027] No. 273.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 26, 1906.*

WITH reference to telegram No. 43 from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburgh (repeated in your telegram No. 28 of the 25th instant).

I am doubtful as to some Powers giving an open expression of opinion that they are in favour of the proposals put forward by the French in regard to the organization of the police. I feel convinced that, excepting Morocco and Germany, all agree that these proposals are practical, reasonable, and moderate, but I fear that some will have scruples in appearing to take sides with France against Germany and will hesitate to express their opinion openly.

M. Révoil and I are trying to discover some suitable formula in which a platonic delaration of their sentiments could be couched by the doubtful Powers and which would give evidence of their disposition, being at the same time not too explicit nor such as to wound the feelings of Germany. In this we find considerable difficulty, but I hope that either to-day or at latest to-morrow I shall be able to submit a formula for your approval by telegraph.

[7028] No. 274.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir E. Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 26, 1906.*

I HAVE been informed by the Portuguese Representative that he has received instructions from his Government to conform to any course which may be adopted by Great Britain when the police question is discussed. He says that, if I so desire, he is quite ready to give proof of his support by voting for the French proposal. In expressing my cordial thanks, I said that it was very probable that I might find it necessary to ask him to make an open declaration of his views at the Conference.

[7057] No. 275.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 73.)
(Telegraphic.) *Algeciras, February 26, 1906.*

FOLLOWING is the reply which the French Delegate has been instructed to make to the last communication of the German Representative in regard to police. The reply will be handed in to-day.

"The principle of equality for all in economical matters, to which reference is made in German proposal, has been accepted by us without reserve. We are convinced that this principle was in no wise endangered by the proposal which we made in regard to the organization of the police. But if the Conference should be of opinion that so far as regards equality of treatment in economical matters it would be useful to have further guarantees, we will not refuse to examine the question. It is for the Conference to decide on a solution in conformity with the Agreement of 8th July."

No. 276.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers.

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, February 26, 1906.*

HIS Majesty's Government have learnt with great satisfaction the attitude adopted by the Portuguese Delegate at the Conference, as reported by Sir A. Nicolson in his telegram No. 72 of the 26th instant (repeated to you in my telegram No. 1 of to-day's date). The Conference will, before long, be called on to decide the most important issues now in question, and we earnestly trust that Sir A. Nicolson will continue to receive the friendly and loyal support of his Portuguese colleague.

Please inform Portuguese Government in this sense.

[7165] No. 277.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 17.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 26, 1906.*

THE Austrian Chargé d'Affaires asked me to-day about the Conference at Algeciras, and whether the prospects were not a little better. He said he hoped that Baron de Courcel might have brought some favourable news from Berlin. I said that I was afraid there was not any real improvement. As regards what had passed between Baron de Courcel and the German Government at Berlin I remained so far without information, but I was afraid that if there had been any very favourable result I should have heard of it by this time.

The Austrian Chargé d'Affaires said that he hoped I did not anticipate any imminent danger if the Conference broke up without result. I said no, nothing imminent; but undoubtedly, with the disturbance continuing in Morocco, a state of general uneasiness would continue through Europe, and I impressed upon him how

impossible it was to improve the relations between England and Germany as long as there was this dispute between Germany and France about a matter on which we had an Agreement with France which was publicly known to the whole world, and which had been the very beginning of our friendship with France. If that difficulty were out of the way, the whole political sky in Europe would be cleared, and the tone of the British press and of British public opinion towards Germany would be sensibly improved.

The Austrian Chargé d'Affaires aske me whether I did not think that commercial competition would still continue to have a bad effect on the relations between Germany and England. I said no, that commercial competition did not affect the political relations, and did not have a political effect on public opinion in England. I then urged upon him how unfortunate it was that Germany could not see her way to accept the organization of the police in Morocco by France and Spain as a starting point in the negotiations. They were the only two Powers who had the personnel and the experience necessary. International police would mean an international muddle. If Germany would accept this one point—the organization of the police—it would be possible for her, or for other Powers who had apprehensions, to ask for safeguards and limitations, such as that the police should be restricted to the ports; that their functions should be confined to the protection of foreigners; and, perhaps, some other conditions of the same kind. They could further ask for more explicit guarantees with regard to equality of trade than were contained in the Anglo-French Agreement, if these were considered necessary. But as long as objection was taken to intrusting France and Spain with the police it was impossible for any progress to be made.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[7180] No. 278.

Sir E. Egerton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Rome, February 27, 1906.*

MOROCCO Conference. My despatch No. 28.

Italian Government realize obligation to support French attitude. M. Barrère attributes more satisfactory tone of Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs to our representations.

[7168] No. 279.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 74.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, February 27, 1906.*

IT has been arranged between M. Révoil and Count Cassini that the President of the Conference shall be requested by the latter, and not by M. Révoil or myself, to convene a meeting on Thursday, the 1st proximo, in order that he may present a proposal respecting the police question for examination.

My French colleague is now of opinion that it will be best to leave it to the neutral Powers to vote or abstain, as they may think desirable, on the question of the police organization, and we shall not therefore attempt to draw up a form of declaration by which they might express their sympathy with the French views. This decision appears to me a wise one, as, after careful consideration of the matter, I think that it would have been impossible to find a form which, while being explicit, would at the same time have been acceptable to the neutral Powers.

[7192] No. 280.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, February 27, 1906.*

I AM informed by M. Cambon that in the conversations which the German Emperor had with Baron de Courcel His Imperial Majesty, while avoiding serious allusions to the question of Morocco, was very amiable. Prince Bülow, although he spoke more freely, kept to generalities, and, while offering no concessions on the part of Germany, waited for concessions to be made by France. There is therefore no change in the situation at Algeciras.

In M. Cambon's opinion, as expressed to me this morning, Italy would vote for the French proposals. He had no idea what Austria would do; she should be, at least, induced to abstain from voting against the French proposals, and an attempt should be made to induce her to remain neutral. It is probable that M. Paul Cambon will be instructed to speak to you on this subject.

M. Cambon is going to telegraph in above sense to French Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day.

[7208] No. 281.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 86.)
Sir, *Paris, February 27, 1906.*

SEVERAL Paris newspapers this morning suggest, as a solution of the present deadlock at Algeciras, that France and Germany should consent to be bound by any decision which the Conference may take by a majority of votes, thereby in effect converting the Conference into an Arbitral Tribunal.

In view of the obvious objections which Germany would have to such an arrangement, it may be assumed that the suggestion is made not so much with any serious hope of its being accepted as with the object of emphasizing the fact that a majority of the nations represented at Algeciras sympathize with the French claims. The "Matin," "Humanité," and other papers, however, call attention to a remark said to have been made by M. Rouvier in the course of the debate in the Chamber of Deputies on the 23rd instant, which would seem to indicate that he had considered the possibility of constituting the Conference a Tribunal of Arbitration. According to the two papers named, the President of the Council, in reply to a suggestion from a Socialist Deputy, said that France could not object to this course; but no such statement is recorded in the official report of the debate which I had the honour to forward to you in my despatch No. 84 of the 24th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[7272] No. 282.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 75.)
(Telegraphic). P. *Algeciras, February 27, 1906.*

I THINK it not impossible that allusion may be made in the public press to a statement, which has produced some unfavourable comments here. Yesterday, at a sitting of the drafting Committee, one of the Moorish Delegates stated that a French Company had recently obtained promises of concessions for works at two Moorish ports. The matter has been explained to me by my French colleague, and I am quite satisfied that the French Government and authorities have acted in strict accordance with the Agreement of the 8th July and in perfect good faith.

I am forwarding to you by post a report on the subject.

[7251] No. 283.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, February 28, 1906.*

THE Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs is anxious to find some formula which Germany could accept, with reserves, and subject to revision after a term of years. M. Bompard thinks that the idea should be encouraged, but is sceptical. He trusts that no step such as arbitration or the plan recommended in Article VIII of The Hague Convention may be taken. Any such action would result in the withdrawal of the matter from the cognizance of Europe assembled in Conference before an expression of opinion had been obtained.

As a last resort the Emperor is prepared to intervene personally, but the Russian Government are unwilling to expose His Majesty to a rebuff, which is rendered probable by the present attitude of the German Government.

The Austrian and American Ambassadors in this capital have been in communication as to the steps to be taken. It is believed that by result of their action at Berlin the Austro-Hungarian Government have been discouraged from recommending the Emperor of Austria's intervention.

The American Ambassador is prepared, if asked by the Russian Government, to report the state of affairs to the President of the United States.

[7192] No. 284.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, February 28, 1906.*

THE French Ambassador has informed me privately that Prince Bülow proposed to Baron de Courcel when in Berlin that officers of four or five nationalities should be stationed at each of a certain number of the Moorish ports; that these officers should be charged with the reorganization of the police, and that, as a recognition of the special position of France in Morocco, Germany should consent to the police at one of the Moorish ports being entirely officered by French.

This proposal has not been considered seriously by the French Government, who regard it as a mere trap to enable the Germans to put forward a claim for some port elsewhere, on the pretext that the placing of a port under exclusively French domination entitles them to demand a similar concession.

[7383] No. 285.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March 1, 1906.*

THE President of the Conference was requested to convoke a meeting of the Conference for to-day for the purpose of obtaining a final agreement on those Articles respecting the State Bank which had been left over by the Drafting Committee since the 27th ultimo. The German Delegates raised strong opposition, declaring that they would not be ready. They said that by the 3rd March they hoped to have received instructions which might render an agreement in regard to the still undecided Articles possible. The meeting will consequently not be held until the 3rd instant.

As this request for delay was possibly prompted by a sincere and genuine desire and hope that a satisfactory solution would thus be facilitated, I felt that it would not be for me to run counter to it. But, at the same time, M. Révoil and I consider that much time is being wasted, and I am personally of opinion that we should not always allow German wishes to carry the day.

We have told the Duke of Almodovar that he ought to convene a General Committee Meeting on the 5th instant, at which the police question could be discussed, and his Excellency stated that he would inform the members of the Conference accordingly.

---

* Also to Sir A. Nicolson (No. 34).

[7409] No. 286.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 77.)
(Tlegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March 1, 1906.*

THE French Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople has stated, in a telegram which was read to me to-day by my French colleague, that a letter was sent to the Sultan of Morocco by the Sultan of Turkey about two months ago, in which the former was advised to follow the counsels of the German Government, whose desire to protect and promote Mussulman interests throughout the world had always been manifest. The German Legation at Tangier forwarded this letter to Fez. The nature of the reply of the Sultan of Morocco is apparently not known. It is said to have been sent recently, through the same channel.

[7426] No. 287.

Sir E. Egerton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 30.)
Sir, *Rome, February 25, 1906.*

ON receipt on the 20th instant of your telegraphic instructions, I repeated bot to Baron di Sonnino and to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government fully supported the French attitude at Algeciras as regards the State Bank and police at the Morocco ports; that this attitude had been both moderate and practical; and that the French proposals do not appear to have been objected to on their merits by any Power except Germany.

I added that this question should be treated on its merits, and not on the basis of engagements regarding other parts of the world. There would be no possibility of contracting engagements out of Europe if they had necessarily to receive the sanction of a third and distant Power not directly interested.

Again to-day I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and asked him whether there was any truth in the report that the Italian Delegate would abstain from voting on the question of the State Bank.

Count Guicciardini said that M. Visconti-Venosta's rôle at Algeciras was that of a mediator and conciliator—to use his great knowledge to arrive at an understanding. He repeated the difficulty of the position of the Italian Delegate under the circumstance of the engagements with France and Germany, but knew nothing of any intention of the Marquis Visconti-Venosta to decline to vote.

I could not see that the position of the Italian Delegate was such as to prevent him voting on the merits of the case and acting in accordance with the engagements with France.

The matter treated at Algeciras was not only a question between France and Germany; the latter was remotely interested; and it was a bad principle that would be established if the same weight were to be given to outsiders as to those directly concerned. I said I had a few minutes previously alluded, in speaking with my friend the German Ambassador, to the disproportion between French and German interests involved.

Count Guicciardini, as usual, kept a discreet silence. I have reason to believe that great efforts are being made by Count Monts, the German Ambassador, to convert the Italian Government to the views of his Government, but I have no reason to believe he has any great success; though at first, owing to Baron di Sonnino's long absence from affairs, the latter may have misunderstood the position.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWIN H. EGERTON.

[7502] No. 288.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, March 2, 1906.*

I WAS told yesterday by Count Goluchowski that he had done all he could to persuade Germany to show a spirit of conciliation respecting the question of police. He had pointed out that France had exhibited every disposition to make all possible concessions. The German Government had, however, proved quite intractable.

His Excellency thought that the demands of France as regards the bank had been too exorbitant. The interests of Austria and of the United States had been overlooked by her in her first proposals, and this had been a great mistake.

[7524] No. 289.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 27. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, March 2, 1906.*

IN a recent audience with the King, M. Jules Cambon found His Majesty enthusiastic about a scheme for improving trade between Spain and the South American Republics, and for developing the west coast of Morocco by a railway from Tangier to Freetown, financed by Spain and the Republics. M. Cambon pointed out some of the difficulties which would have to be met, but did not treat the scheme seriously. Turning the conversation to probable failure of Conference, he impressed on His Majesty the necessity of Franco-Spanish Agreements continuing in force should matters relapse to the *status quo ante*. The King did not dissent.

Should the Conference fail, M. Cambon is strongly of opinion that directly it closes identic notes should be presented to Spain by France and Great Britain, defining clearly the meaning of the return to the *status quo* in Morocco, and declaring the continuance of all engagements.

This note could be published together with Spain's reply.

(Sent to Algeciras.)

[7550] No. 290.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 31.)
Sir, *Tangier, February 20, 1906.*

THE Sultan's Acting Commissioner, accompanied by another big Moorish official, called on the 18th instant on the French Minister in order to offer the congratulations of the Sultan on the inauguration of the new President of the French Republic.

Contrary to the custom which always prevails here of indulging in somewhat fulsome compliments, the congratulations were offered in very dry language and with little cordiality, the Commissioner adding that he hoped that M. Fallière's term of office would be one of peace. It was clear to M. Saint-René Taillandier that these officials were either acting under instructions from Fez or under advice offered by the German Legation here.

The Minister in acknowledging the congratulations assumed a similarly cold manner, and expressed the hope that M. Fallière's term of office would see some improvement in the desperate condition of this country, which caused so much anxiety to France.

Before leaving, the Moorish Delegates, evidently appreciating that their demeanour had perhaps erred somewhat on the side of stiffness, endeavoured to soften their observations, and added that they trusted that the relations between the Makhzen and the French Government would be pleasant. M. Saint-René Taillandier said that his Government had done everything in their power to make them so; they had given

endless proofs of their friendly feeling on the frontier and elsewhere, and it only remained for the Moorish Government to reciprocate.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[7551] No. 291.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 32.)
Sir, *Tangier, February 23, 1906.*

I HAD the honour to receive in due course your telegram of the 23rd instant, but until now I have received no confirmation of the report of the offer to the Sultan, by the German Consul at Fez, for the establishment of wireless telegraphy between Fez and Tangier. Indeed, such confirmation will be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.

Between the dispatch of my telegram of the 21st and the receipt of your telegram of the 23rd instant, news had, however, reached me that an English firm had, without appealing for the support of His Majesty's Legation, addressed a private communication to His Majesty, asking for the authority to establish wireless telegraphy to connect Tangier and Fez with Poldhu.

Under these circumstances, and without waiting for confirmation of the German proposal, I thought it well to address a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, recalling the statement made to Sir Arthur Nicolson by Hadj Mohammed Torres in 1903, which, however, appears to have been given verbally, to the effect that the Moorish Government would require the concurrence of all the foreign Representatives before such wireless telegraphy could be established at Cape Spartel. I reminded Ben Sliman that Sir Arthur Nicolson then stated that he did not doubt that the claim of the Cape Spartel Signal Station would, under the circumstances, be considered to rank first. No reply appears to have been received to Sir Arthur Nicolson's note.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of my note to Ben Sliman.

Before dispatching it, I saw M. Saint-René Taillandier, and he concurred that such action was most desirable, and would probably have the effect of putting a stop to the granting of the concession. He had been in communication with some of the French officers who had been connected with the working of such telegraph in Algiers, and who had pointed out to him the great difficulty of its working overland over long distances. This, however, is beside the mark, and I will omit no endeavour to frustrate the present plans.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to Sir Arthur Nicolson.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 291.

Mr. Lowther to Sid Ben Sliman.

(After compliments.) *Tangier, February 23, 1906.*

A REPORT has reached His Majesty's Government that an offer has been made to the Government of His Majesty the Sultan to establish wireless telegraphy between Tangier and Fez.

Your Excellency is aware that in 1903 it was proposed to establish wireless telegraphy at the signal station at Cape Spartel, with a view to improving the useful and international work at that station, and your Excellency was then good enough to inform my predecessor, through Hajd Mohammed Torres, that the Moorish Government had no objection to the scheme if the foreign Representatives concurred in it.

As, however, the matter required further study and consideration, the decision was postponed, and my predecessor informed you that he did not doubt that when the Moorish Government were in a position to sanction the establishment of such a system the claims of the Cape Spartel Signal Station would be considered to rank first,

as the application in regard to it was the first submitted, and because its object was of general and international interest.

The establishment of a system of wireless telegraphy between Tangier and Fez would interfere with any similar system established at Cape Spartel, and His Majesty's Government presume that the Moorish Government will adhere, under the circumstances, to the engagement given in 1903 to my predecessor by Hajd Mohammed Torres.

May you rest, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[7546] No. 292.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 3.)

(No. 50. Conference. Confidential.)

Sir, *Algeciras, February* 23, 1906.

I CALLED on the Duke of Almodovar yesterday morning, and in the course of conversation I said that, as we were now arriving at a critical moment in the deliberations of the Conference, I felt sure that he would act in complete harmony with M. Révoil and myself.

His Excellency said that he was most anxious to do so, but that he was much troubled by a telegram which he had received but half an hour previous to my visit from Señor Moret. It appeared that M. Jules Cambon had visited the President of the Council in Madrid, and had complained of the attitude of the Spanish Delegates at Algeciras, which, he intimated, had not been in accordance with the engagements which existed between France and Spain.

The Duke of Almodovar said he was at a loss to understand what fault he had committed which could justify such a complaint, and, indeed, he was puzzled now as to what attitude to assume. A few days ago the German Government complained at Madrid that he was too French, and now the latter were complaining that he was too German. He said he must speak to M. Révoil on the subject, as he resented being made the butt of these attacks from both sides.

I told his Excellency that possibly some doubts had arisen in regard to the position which Spain would assume in regard to the Bank question, as I might tell him that some suspicions had been aroused that the Spanish Delegates had been consulted in the drafting of the German project concerning that subject. The German project laid down that the capital of the Bank was to be in pesetas, and that the subscribers were to intimate their adhesion to the Spanish Government; and, further, a report had reached me yesterday that the German Delegates would support a proposal that the "siège social" of the Bank should be transferred from Tangier to Madrid.

His Excellency assured me that he had had nothing whatever to do with the German project, and that he had never heard of the report concerning the transfer of the "siège social" of the Bank. As to the capital being in pesetas, this was a question of importance to Spain.

The Duke of Almodovar then said that he had been most anxious to find a solution of the Police question which might lead to an agreement between France and Germany, and he had communicated, some days ago, a project to M. Révoil, who had replied that he must consult with me. He said he had heard nothing further from M. Révoil on the subject.

I told his Excellency that I was entirely to blame for this omission. It was quite true that M. Révoil had mentioned the matter to me some days ago, but I confessed that it had completely escaped my memory until M. Révoil recurred to it last evening, when he said that the Spanish Ambassador had presented this project to the French Government, and that M. Rouvier had rejected it, and had remarked at the same time that its terms were in distinct contradiction to the Franco-Spanish Agreements. The project, I understood, was that the Sultan, unaided by any European assistance, should organize the police force, but that the police at Tetuan and Oujda should be organized by France and Spain respectively.

His Excellency said that he had communicated the project to M. Révoil simply for examination, and that he had been surprised to hear that the latter had telegraphed it to M. Rouvier. In these circumstances, no other course had been open to him than to send instructions to the French Ambassador to formally communicate it to the French Government.

My own opinion is that the Duke of Almodovar is a well-meaning but very weak man, and that in endeavouring to please both sides he has incurred the displeasure of both. I have no doubt that he is exposed to much pressure from the German Delegates—a pressure of a composite character, varying between threats and temptations. Moreover, he has an excitable Spanish public opinion to deal with, and he is consequently inclined, with a view of flattering that opinion, to endeavour to place Spain in the position of an arbiter or mediator between two Great Powers. In regard to the second Spanish Delegate, Señor Perez Caballero, I can say but little, as my acquaintance with him is slight. He is in constant communication with Count Tattenbach on the Bank and other questions, and it is not improbable that the domineering personality of the latter may have influenced him.

The Duke of Almodovar acted most loyally at yesterday's meeting of the Conference, and as he has been deeply pained by the reproaches of which he has been the sufferer, and as we shall want his assistance very shortly as President, I ventured to suggest that some expression of the appreciation of His Majesty's Government would be highly valued at this moment. M. Révoil has made a similar suggestion to his Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[7548] No. 293.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 3.)

(No. 52. Conference. Confidential.)

Sir, *Algeciras, February* 25, 1906.

I HAVE had several conversations with M. Révoil in regard to the best procedure to follow with respect to the possible breakdown of the Conference, as there are two points which we venture to think should be kept clearly and constantly in view—

1. That the rupture should not occur over the Bank question; and
2. That the responsibility for the rupture should not fall on France and Great Britain.

The first point should, if I may say so, be treated as a question of tactics. It is clear to both my French colleague and myself that unless the German Delegates change their attitude no agreement will be reached on the Bank question, and it is equally clear to us that the German Delegates will endeavour by all the means at their disposal to prevent the Police question being brought before the Conference until that body has discussed in a plenary sitting the Bank question, when the impossibility of an agreement will be made manifest, and perhaps an effort made to adjourn or dissolve the Conference on that point. Both my French colleague and myself desire to avoid this eventuality. The Bank question is not so simple as that of the Police, and it would be difficult for the general public to understand why an agreement had not been arrived at over what would appear to it as merely technical financial details. Moreover, the Police question has been brought prominently before the public: it is a simple one, and easily understood by the "man in the street"; its urgency is apparent: the moderation and conciliatory disposition of France can be most clearly manifested; the right of France with Spain to undertake the policing of the ports and her especial qualifications for this duty can be shown to be indisputable, while the attitude of Germany on this question can be exhibited in striking contrast to that of France.

We are, therefore, strongly of opinion that, before the Bank question emerges from the Drafting Committee, the Police question should be brought forward, and the Conference made fully acquainted with the question in all its bearings, and an opportunity afforded to the French Delegate, and to those who support him, to state their case in an open and public manner. To enable us to effect this we shall have to invoke the assistance of the President of the Conference, and the Duke of Almodovar has readily promised us to give us all the aid in his power.

At the present moment we stand in this position. No date has been fixed for our next sitting, but the Duke of Almodovar, at the close of the meeting of yesterday, stated that, though he did not mention a day for our reassembling, he would be ready

to convoke a meeting on any day desired by any member of the Conference to discuss any question on the programme.

M. Révoil and myself therefore submitted to our Governments a suggestion that on the 27th or 28th instant we should request his Excellency to call together the Conference on the 1st March to discuss the Police question; and we are of opinion that we should then enter fully into this matter so far as we can, and, if possible, test the sense of the Conference on the subject. The sitting will have to be in General Committee in accordance with the precedents hitherto observed, but, once the question has been thoroughly discussed at a General Committee, it will not be difficult to bring it rapidly before a plenary sitting so as to avoid its being transferred to the Drafting Committee, there being no necessity for such a reference, as both in its principles and details the question is an exceedingly simple one.

It is therefore desirable to consider what I have mentioned as Point No. 2, namely, to insure that the responsibility of a rupture should not fall on France and Great Britain. I have no doubt that the declaration which my French colleague will make on the occasion will demonstrate very clearly that France has done her utmost to go to the furthest limits of conciliation; and I have also no doubt that others will be able to show that France and Spain alone possess the necessary qualified elements for meeting an urgent need.

Such evidence will have much weight—at least I have every reason to hope that it will. But though we are both aware that the general feeling of the Conference is with the French view of the case, still we are in some doubts whether all our colleagues, when the moment arrives, will be disposed to give a frank expression of their views and a public adhesion to the French project. We count upon Spain Russia, and Portugal being ready to record their votes in favour of the French project, which would make five in all. On the other side we calculate that Germany would secure the votes of Austria-Hungary and Morocco, but we fear that the others, viz., the United States, Italy, Holland, Sweden, and Belgium may be disposed to abstain. The United States' Representative is, I know, personally in favour of the French view; but considerations of home politics, such as the relations between the President and the Senate, and the desire of the American public not to take a decided line in differences between two European Powers, may force him to maintain silence. Italy is a member of the Triple Alliance, and may hesitate to record a vote diametrically opposed to the wishes and opinions of her two allies. The three smaller Powers, for various reasons, may also consider it more prudent to abstain from recording their opinions.

It is in view of this difficulty that M. Révoil and myself are considering what proposals we can submit to our Governments to bring clearly into relief the undoubted disposition of the majority of the Conference to favour the French in preference to the German project as to the organization of the police. We have not yet discovered a course of procedure which we could venture to recommend to our Governments, but before this despatch reaches your hands, I have hopes that we shall have been in a position to submit certain recommendations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[7549] No. 294.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 53. Conference.)

Sir, *Algeciras, February 26, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of the reply which the French Delegate has been instructed to make to the last communication of the German Representative in regard to the question of organizing a police force in Morocco.

M. Révoil intends to hand in the reply to M. de Radowitz this morning.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 294.

Reply of French Delegate to German Representative's Note respecting Police Organization in Morocco.

LE principe de l'égalité pour tous en matière économique auquel se réfère la proposition Allemande a été accepté par nous sans aucune réserve. Nous sommes convaincus que rien n'y saurait porter atteinte dans la proposition que nous avons formulée pour l'organisation de la police. Mais si la Conférence reconnaît au point de vue d'une égalité de traitement économique l'utilité de nouvelles garanties, nous ne nous refuserons pas de les examiner. C'est à la Conférence qu'il appartient, conformément à l'Accord du 8 Juillet, de déterminer la solution.

Le 26 Février, 1906.

[7618] No. 295.

Mr. Tower to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 35.)

Sir, *Munich, February 28, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a meeting took place in Munich on the 22nd instant under the auspices of the Munich Peace Party ("Friedensvereinigung"). On this occasion a speech of some interest was delivered by Dr. L. Quidde (whom I mentioned in my despatch No. 5 of the 6th ultimo in connection with the Munich meeting for improving the relations between the United Kingdom and Germany) entitled "The Morocco Question: Germany and France."

He criticized the sceptical attitude in Germany with regard to the possibilities of universal peace. He described the rivalry which had existed in the past between Germany and France, but which, thanks to the present condition of the French Republic, had no longer any *raison d'être*. He looked to a possible friendly understanding with France, even in spite of the Anglo-French Arrangement of 1904, which constituted a serious menace to Germany. It was on account of this condition of affairs that he welcomed the convocation of the Morocco Conference, which he hoped would produce the best results. "Nothing which we and France can gain or lose in Morocco is of any account in comparison with the tangible results of hostilities between the two countries."

A M. Pelissier, from Paris, then addressed the meeting, and made the most pacific utterances.

Thereupon a series of Resolutions were passed unanimously by the meeting, expressing—

1. A sincere wish for a permanent *rapprochement* between Germany and France;
2. A conviction that neither nation had interests in Morocco large enough to outweigh the calamity of an estrangement between them;
3. Thanks to the French members of the Peace Party for their efforts made;
4. A desire that the Morocco question should be submitted for arbitration to The Hague Tribunal; and
5. Satisfaction at the early convocation of a second Hague Conference.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to Sir F. Lascelles at Berlin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD TOWER.

[7532] No. 296.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 89.)

Sir, *Paris, March 1, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith an extract from the "Temps," of yesterday evening, giving particulars regarding the concession obtained by a French Company for the construction of works at the port of Casabianca and Safi.

The Company in question is the "Compagnie Marocaine," with which is associated the "Société d'Études de Travaux Publics du Maroc," and Messrs. Schneider are interested in the enterprise. The "Compagnie Marocaine" is the French Company in whose favour a letter, dated the 7th March, 1905 (printed in the Yellow Book, p. 311), was addressed by the Moorish Government to the authorities of Tangier authorizing the Company to make surveys of the port of Tangier with a view to subsequent work on the port. The "Temps" states that the Company was at the same time authorized to commence similar surveys at Casabianca and Safi, and gives details of the surveying operations which were carried out by the Company at the three ports in May and June 1905 in pursuance of this authorization.

It was subsequently ascertained that a German firm had a superior claim to the concession for the execution of works on the port of Tangier; and thereupon, according to a statement furnished to the "Temps" by the "Compagnie Marocaine," the Sultan by way of compensation undertook verbally to give the French Company the concession for the works at the other two ports; but it is added that the French Government, although informed of the circumstance, were not concerned in the negotiations with the Maghzen.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure in No. 296.

Extract from the "Temps" of March 1, 1906.

LA CONFÉRENCE D'ALGÉSIRAS.

L'INCIDENT EL MOKHRI.

L'INCIDENT auquel a donné lieu la déclaration d'El Mokhri, que les ports de Safi et de Casablanca avaient été concédés à une Société Française, la Compagnie Marocaine, vise des engagements antérieurs à la conférence et même aux négociations Franco-Allemandes, engagements sur lesquels le "Temps" du 6 Décembre a donné des renseignements complets. La question devant faire aujourd'hui l'objet d'une interpellation de M. Jaurès, nous croyons devoir reproduire les principaux de ces renseignements.

Depuis 1902, Abd-el-Aziz avait le désir de faire procéder à des travaux publics importants. Les troubles intérieurs l'en empêchèrent.

Ces projets furent repris à la fin de 1903, époque à laquelle la Compagnie Marocaine, d'accord avec le Makhzen, fit faire les préliminaires de plusieurs travaux pour le Gouvernement Marocain; dans le courant de l'année suivante, elle construisit à Tanger de vastes magasins pour le service des douanes Cherifiennes. . . . .

Les pourparlers que la Compagnie Marocaine n'avait cessé de poursuivre avec le Sultan aboutirent à la remise, le 15 Mars, 1905, de lettres officielles enjoignant aux autorités de Tanger, Casablanca, et Safi de se concerter avec les représentants de cette Compagnie pour les études à faire dans ces ports, de les aider de leurs avis et de leur offrir, le cas échéant, les concours nécessaires.

M. Renaud, ingénieur en chef de la marine, fut chargé de procéder aux études.

Parti de Marseille le 10 Février, 1905, cet ingénieur se rendit d'abord à Tanger, puis successivement aux divers ports de la côte ouest. C'est pendant qu'il faisait cette reconnaissance que la Compagnie Marocaine reçut du Makhzen les trois lettres dont il a été question plus haut, lui demandant d'étudier la construction de quais, terre-pleins, et magasins dans chacun des trois ports de Tanger, Casablanca, et Safi.

A Tanger, les études durèrent d'Avril à la fin de Mai. Le 29 Mai, le navire spécial affrété par la mission partait pour Casablanca, où il mouillait le 31 Mai.

La mission fut bien accueillie dans cette ville par le Pacha et les Oumanas de la Douane, qui parurent comprendre l'intérêt que présentaient, pour leur pays, les études qu'elle venait entreprendre et qui donnèrent tout le concours qu'impliquaient les lettres Chérifiennes. Le levé, sans être aussi complet que celui de la rade de Tanger, comprenait la partie de la baie de Casablanca qui s'étend depuis la porte nord de la nouvelle enceinte de la ville jusqu'au "mur de prières," au delà de Sidi-Belliot; au large, les

sondages ont dépassé la ligne des fonds de 10 mètres; comme à Tanger, les opérations furent faites avec toute la précision nécessaire à ce genre de travail. Les sondages révélèrent l'existence de plusieurs hauts-fonds dangereux, dont la position et le brassiage furent de suite signalés au Ministre de la Marine et portés à la connaissance de tous les navigateurs. Le 15 Juin, M. Renaud soumettait aux autorités Marocaines un dessin donnant les dispositions générales d'un projet d'amélioration du port de Casablanca; ce plan fut longuement examiné, discuté, et finalement approuvé dans toutes ses parties.

La mission se rendit ensuite à Safi, où elle arriva le 18 Juin.

Précédée, comme à Casablanca, de la lettre du Makhzen et officiellement accréditée par la Compagnie Marocaine, elle reçut à Safi le meilleur accueil et put commencer de suite, sans difficulté, les travaux du levé. De même qu'à Casablanca, la population semblait très favorable à l'idée des travaux dont on avait annoncé l'exécution prochaine. Un seul fait suffira à le prouver: un des jalons plantés par la mission pour servir de signal ayant été enlevé, le voleur fut dénoncé, emprisonné par ordre du caïd, sans aucune intervention de la part de M. Renaud.

Le levé, fait avec la même précision que les deux précédents, s'est étendu devant la plage de Safi, depuis le méridien de Sidi-Bouzi jusque par le travers du saillant sud de l'enceinte de la ville; au large, les sondages ont atteint les fonds de 15 mètres. Il fut dressé deux projets différents: le premier pour l'établissement d'un port d'embarcations, le second pour la construction d'un appontement s'avançant assez au large pour dépasser, par presque tous les temps, la ligne des brisants. Les plans d'ensemble de ces projets furent mis sous les yeux des Oumanas de la Douane, qui vinrent se rendre compte de l'emplacement des ouvrages projetés et en approuvèrent les dispositions.

La mission quittait Safi le 1er Juillet, ayant rempli le programme qui lui avait été tracé; elle arrivait à Tanger le 2, et de là gagnait le Havre, où elle était de retour le 12 Juillet.

La Compagnie Marocaine nous communique d'autre part la note suivante:—

Les dépêches d'Algésiras ont mis inexactement en cause MM. Schneider et Cie. à propos de l'obtention des concessions de travaux des ports de Safi et Casablanca.

La Compagnie Marocaine et la Société d'Études de Travaux Publics du Maroc, qui comprennent un groupe important d'entrepreneurs et d'industriels Français (entre autres MM. Schneider et Cie.), sont seules en jeu dans cette question.

La Compagnie Marocaine est, depuis deux ans, en négociations avec le Makhzen pour la concession des travaux du port de Tanger et de diverses autres entreprises.

Le Sultan ayant été amené à donner à une maison Allemande la construction d'un môle à Tanger, s'est engagé verbalement à donner à la Compagnie Marocaine, par mesure de compensation, les travaux de Safi et Casablanca.

Cette décision du Sultan est bien antérieure à la réunion de la Conférence, et le Gouvernement Français en avait été informé, bien qu'il n'ait eu aucune part aux négociations.

Telles sont les conditions dans lesquelles s'est produite avant-hier la déclaration d'El Mokhri.

[7534] No. 297.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 3.)

(No. 91. Confidential.)

Sir, *Paris, March* 2, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a Memorandum by Sir M. de Bunsen, giving an account of a conversation which he had with M. Rouvier yesterday, in reference to the Morocco question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure in No. 297.

Memorandum by Sir M. de Bunsen.

I HAVE just seen M. Rouvier. He spoke very openly, and left me under the impression that he will go very far to prevent the Conference ending in failure. Though he did not think war would be the consequence of such failure, Europe would be kept on tenterhooks, and the financial operations which are so necessary to set up Russia again, to enable her to take her place in the councils of Europe, would be impossible. He had just heard that gold was much needed in London to send to Japan. A period of rest was therefore essential. He had noted a slight "détente" in the German press, and did not think the attitude of Germany at this moment was an uncompromising one. M. Révoil had been instructed to reply to the Germans that, as they considered that a Franco-Spanish police in Morocco was incompatible with absolute commercial equality, France would willingly consent to the Conference being charged with the task of devising any fresh guarantees that might be necessary to secure such commercial equality. He hoped the Conference would be induced to pronounce on this question. But failing an agreement in this way, he was quite disposed to consider seriously a Spanish proposition, made not long ago, that there should be a purely Moroccan police, without European officers. Such a force, if regularly paid by the State Bank, would, anyhow, be a great improvement on the present state of things. But his readiness to accept this idea, if need be, had not yet been mentioned to Spain, and he hoped something better might yet be obtained.

The last German proposals, following on Baron de Courcel's visit to Berlin, did not afford a basis of discussion.

(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Paris, March 1, 1906.

[7645] No. 298.

Sir E. Egerton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Rome, March* 3, 1906.

I AM informed by Count Guicciardini that a proposal has been submitted to the Italian Government by Count Goluchowski that the exclusive policing of one port in Morocco should be intrusted to France, the choice of the port to rest with her.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that this proposal may open the door for escape from the present dilemma, but no promise appears to have yet been made to support it.

[7639] No. 299.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 78.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 3, 1906.

THE Bank question was discussed to-day at a plenary sitting of the Conference. Three questions, on which it was found impossible to come to an agreement, were reserved.

I inquired what would be the order of the day at our next meeting, which the President asked us to hold on Monday. I added that, as we had examined the question of the Bank for two weeks, both in the Conference and in the Drafting Committee, and no arrangement had been arrived at, it was evident that we should be in no better a position to discuss it again on Monday. Moreover, instructions would probably be desired by some of the members.

I proposed therefore, in accordance with precedents, that the reserved questions should be left for the moment on one side, and that on Monday we should take, in General Committee, the Police question, which was the next subject for discussion on the programme.

This proposal was objected to by the German Delegates, but on being put to the vote was carried, the Representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Morocco alone dissenting.

[7640] No. 300.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 79.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 3, 1906.

IT seems to me probable that the Conference, at its sitting on Monday next, will decide to discuss all reserved questions on Wednesday—that is, those of the Police, Bank, control of Customs, expropriation, and Special Caisse. It will then be clearly shown what are the points of disagreement.

The apparently inevitable failure of the Conference is much regretted by my French colleague and myself, and we are anxious that its rupture should be of the most inoffensive character. We have considered the feasibility of drawing up a Protocol by which failure should be rendered as little abrupt and final as possible, the dispersal of the Delegates facilitated, and the few points on which we have come to an agreement brought into relief; but the difficulty of drawing up such a Protocol which would meet with the approval of the Germans appears to us almost insuperable.

We think, therefore, that if it is not found possible to come to any agreement, it would be better to simply suspend the sittings. The members could then refer to their respective Governments.

I should be glad of an expression of your views on the question.

[7646] No. 301.

Sir E. Egerton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Rome, March* 3, 1906.

GERMAN pressure on the King and Government of Italy with regard to the Morocco Conference has, according to the French Ambassador, been very strong of late, and the Italian Government is weak and irresolute. The German contention is that Italy's previous engagements with France about Morocco are suspended by the fact of her entering the Conference.

[7641] No. 302.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 80.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 4, 1906.

MARQUIS VISCONTI-VENOSTA received instructions to support the proposal of the Austrian Government as to the police if he obtained the co-operation of the United States' Representative, which the latter declined to give.

The Austrian proposal would not be workable in practice, and France could not accept it.

[7642] No. 303.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 81.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 4, 1906.

THE French Representative has been sounded by the German Delegates as to whether any further concessions could be expected from him on the Bank question, and has replied, through Marquis Visconti-Venosta, that, as regards the value of the preferential rights which the French contractors of the Morocco loan now hold, and the distribution of the capital, his attitude might be open to modification.

Our interests will not be prejudiced by any terms which my French colleague may desire to make on the financial questions, and I have therefore no intention of attempting to influence him, although, in my opinion, it is not prudent, while an unbending attitude is maintained by the Germans on the Police question, for the French to continue to give concessions on that of the Bank.

[7804] No. 304.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 61.)

Sir, *Berlin, February* 25, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of an article, which appears in the most prominent position in this day's "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," giving an account of views expressed by Señor Villanueva, the former Spanish Minister, in a conversation with a journalist on the subject of Morocco.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

Inclosure in No. 304.

Extract from the "North German Gazette" of February 25, 1906.

(Translation.)

REVIEW of foreign affairs.

In a conversation which the Madrid correspondent of the "Cologne Gazette" had with the former Minister, Villanueva, the latter expressed himself as follows: He was firmly convinced that Spain would find her interests seriously threatened were she to find herself alone with France in Morocco; the Pretender was merely a puppet of France. As soon as home affairs became of somewhat less moment, he (Villanueva) would call forth a debate in Parliament showing in a clear light how France wanted to possess herself of the whole of Morocco, leaving only a ridiculously small portion to Spain. Villanueva opposed the granting of special privileges to France in Morocco, and spoke in a manner deprecating the two Franco-Spanish Agreements.

Berlin, February 24, 1906.

[7811] No. 305.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 68. Confidential.)

Sir, *Berlin, March* 1, 1906.

WITH reference to my preceding despatch of this day's date, I have the honour to report that General Swaine consulted me as to the advisability of his seeking an interview with Baron von Holstein, with whom he was on friendly terms during his residence at Berlin as His Majesty's Military Attaché. I strongly recommended him to do so, and I have now the honour to inclose the copy of a Memorandum which General Swayne has drawn up of the conversation which he had with his Excellency this morning.

There is nothing very new in Herr von Holstein's remarks, but it is interesting to note that, in spite of the Emperor's remarks on Count Metternich's report of his conversation with Lord Rothschild that he would not give way on the question of police, his Excellency saw hopes of the Conference ending satisfactorily, and that, even if that should not be the case, he did not believe that war would be the result.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

Inclosure in No. 305.

Memorandum by General Swaine.

I WAS this morning received by Baron Holstein at the Foreign Office. He is a very old friend of mine, and delights in instructing me in the way in which our policy should run and our Foreign Office act.

His Excellency began by making some reference to His Majesty the King, and, by his manner, I feared it might be of a nature to which I would rather not listen, and

therefore arrested him by saying, "We are in England very proud of our King. He has greatly raised the prestige of our country, and his influence for good has been acknowledged everywhere." Baron Holstein at once replied, "Yes, I think you have every reason to be proud."

He then took the Conference at Algeciras in hand. He was violent against M. Delcassé and the senior French Plenipotentiary. It was the latter, he maintained, who directed not alone the Cabinet in Paris in this question, but also the French press, and he regretted that Sir A. Nicolson's instructions were to blindly support the French instead of forming, together with his American, Austrian, and Italian colleagues, a Court of Arbitration to try and find some means of satisfying both sides.

Baron Holstein showed me a despatch from Count Metternich, reporting a conversation his Excellency had had with Lord Rothschild, and in the margin of which the Emperor had made some pencil remarks to the purport that he was determined to hold out on the police question—"Darin stehe ich fest" were the German words.

The Baron thought he saw hopes of the Conference ending satisfactorily, but should it not, even if Germany found herself standing absolutely alone, this would not mean war. He was quite convinced that France would not attack Germany, and the latter Power would certainly not attack France. Germany was much pained at being treated, at the time of the settling of the Anglo-French Convention, as "une quantité négligeable," and no great Power would consent to be so treated.

During the whole conversation there was a vein of bitterness in the Baron's manner. It was like a microbe trying surreptitiously to sting. But this is Baron Holstein's way always.

He was much astonished when he heard that I had not been invited to the wedding festivities, especially as it came on the top of his having the moment before said, "It is very necessary that the two monarchs should be good friends, and should not say anything to irritate the other." I replied that the mistake was fully explained away, and that we were all on the best of terms, but I added that His Majesty the King had specially selected me to carry out this Mission, as he believed I was a *persona grata* at Court here. If therefore an olive branch was needed, I was that branch, and that the King had thereby shown that he was anxious to be on good terms with his nephew. I then left.

(Signed) L. V. SWAINE, *M.G.*

March 1, 1906.

[7693] No. 306.

Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 16.)

Sir, *Lisbon, February* 27, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt, this morning, of your telegrams Nos. 1, 2, and 3 of yesterday's date respecting the Algeciras Conference.

This being the last day of the carnival, the Foreign Office is closed, but the Minister for Foreign Affairs received me at his private residence.

I informed his Excellency of the communication made by Count Tovar to His Majesty's Ambassador, and, in accordance with your instructions, I expressed the great satisfaction of His Majesty's Government at the friendly and loyal support accorded to Sir Arthur Nicolson by his Portuguese colleague, which they earnestly trusted would be continued when the most important issues now in question will come before the Conference.

Senhor Villaça requested me to offer his thanks to His Majesty's Government for this message, and to say that he fully confirmed the instructions given to the Portuguese Representative.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. H. VILLIERS.

[7673] No. 307.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 154. Confidential.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February* 28, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to state that I attended Count Lamsdorff's diplomatic reception on the 21st instant. His Excellency informed me that the German Ambassador had communicated to him the refusal of his Government to accede to the last French proposals with regard to the Morocco police, explaining at the same time that Germany was acting in the interests of all the Powers, whose commerce would certainly suffer by any such exclusive concessions as were claimed by the French. Herr von Schoen added that M. Rouvier had promised that France would not ask for the control of the police, and had also given a pledge that it should be under international control.

Count Lamsdorff had stated, in reply, that No. 348 of the French Yellow Book contained an explicit statement, drawn up by M. Rouvier, that he had taken no pledge of any sort over and above the formula to be signed by the two Governments, and that No. 350 contained the formula in question, which pledged France to propose to the Sultan not a police under international control, but "organisation, par voie d'accord international, de la police hors la région frontière"—that is, France was merely pledged to propose a system of police to be approved of by the Powers assembled at the Conference.

With regard to the contention that Germany in opposing the French proposal was in reality acting in the interest of all the Powers, he had observed to Herr von Schoen that the Powers were surely the best judges of their own interests, and they had, in the persons of their Representatives at the Conference, declared that their interests were sufficiently safeguarded.

Count Lamsdorff then proceeded to speak with somewhat unwonted animation of the difficult position in which Europe was placed by the action of Germany. His impression was that German officials themselves were convinced that the Government was going too far, but that they were deterred by the fear of consequences from expressing their opinion. The fact was that the whole matter resolved itself into a question of the *amour propre* of the Emperor, who felt that his personal honour was engaged, and for this the whole world had to suffer. He hoped, however, that it would be possible for Europe to make its voice heard, and for this reason he was anxious that the case might be strongly represented at Berlin.

On the 23rd instant I called on the French Ambassador, who informed me, in the strictest confidence, that he had been received in audience by the Emperor on the day before. He stated that the language of the Emperor was most sympathetic and cordial, and that His Majesty had expressed his willingness to do everything in his power to facilitate a settlement. He then called on Count Lamsdorff, who, in the course of a long interview, had expressed the anxiety which he felt as to the turn which affairs might now take. The German Emperor had taken the matter into his own hands, and appeared to take an excited view of the situation, and to be unwilling to listen to any sort of remonstrance. He (Count Lamsdorff) thought that, as the Emperor's personal disposition was the turning point of the present situation, every effort should be made to induce His Majesty to moderate his demands. The Russian Ambassador had already been instructed to make urgent representations at Berlin. The remonstrances of England, whose attitude was well known and was governed by her conventional obligations, could hardly have much effect.

He hinted hesitatingly at the possibility of President Roosevelt's intervention, as it was well known that he carried on a personal correspondence with the Emperor, and as the United States had practically no direct interest in the question of Morocco. M. Bompard said to me that it was quite impossible for France to make such a suggestion, as she had already done all in her power to facilitate a settlement, but suggested that I might sound Count Lamsdorff on the subject in the interview which I was to have with his Excellency the next day.

On the 24th I saw Count Lamsdorff, and communicated to him a French paraphrase of your telegram No. 44 of the 23rd February. His Excellency said he quite understood that England's point of view was already sufficiently well known at Berlin, and that little would be gained by reiterating it. He added that he had received

an unsatisfactory telegram from the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, who reported that his efforts to modify the attitude of the German Government had not met with success.

He had not much hope of successful representations at Berlin, the Government appeared to be immovable. He had, however, more hopes in the united action of the Representatives at Algeciras. He thought that it would be difficult for Germauy to break up the Conference by a point blank refusal to agree to a proposal supported by the other Representatives. It was true the German attitude as to the police, and more recently as to the bank, was not such as to give much hope of a final agreement, but it still should be possible to find a formula which would enable the dissenting parties to come to an understanding, at least for a time. Should the Representatives agree to adopt a unanimous attitude with regard to the more important questions in dispute, Germany could adhere to such a unanimous recommendation without "losing face," especially if she reserved all her rights, and if the Conference agreed to a revision by the Powers after a term of years.

Should, however, the Conference break up owing to the refusal of Germany, under any conditions, to agree to the decision of the majority, it would be clear to the whole world who was responsible.

With regard to France, he expressed some apprehensions as to the coming elections. Of M. Rouvier, he said, he was sure, but he was not sure of the French people—they might yield to provocations, they might suddenly get out of hand, and war might be the result.

I asked him, in such a case, who would be regarded as the aggressor? He said that there could be no doubt whatever—not he who had struck the first blow, but he who had systematically provoked the other past endurance.

There was no doubt now as to the nature of the policy followed by Germany. She had pursued France from surrender to surrender, and it seemed as if there was no limit to the process. The initial fault had been the surrender of Delcassé; this had encouraged Germany to believe that there was nothing France would not submit to.

I mentioned the possibility of President Roosevelt's intervention, using the arguments suggested by M. Bompard. He observed, however, that it did not appear as if further steps at Berlin would be of much utility.

I asked him finally whether he had any proposal which I could report to you. He said he had no proposal to make, all he could say was that Germany had insisted on the Conference, and he could not believe that Germany would refuse to accept the unanimous recommendations of the Conference which she had herself originated.

In my speaking subsequently to M. Bompard of Count Lamsdorff's language, his Excellency remarked that he seemed to have changed his point of view as to the representations in Berlin.

I gather that he had good reasons for doing so.

The instructions to the Russian Ambassador at Berlin were to leave no doubts in Prince Bülow's mind that, if Germany broke up the Conference, Russia would regard her as the aggressor. The answer given was not of a nature to encourage further communications.

The Emperor of Austria or Count Goluchowski has also, as I understand, taken measures to recommend moderation, but with equally little success.

Under these circumstances the Russian Government is unwilling to recommend the Emperor to take himself any decisive step, although I understand from M. Bompard that His Majesty is prepared, as a last resource, to make a personal appeal to the German Emperor.

So far as I am informed the correspondence between the Emperors on the subject of Morocco has been limited to general expressions of a mutual desire for the maintenance of peace, but has contained no definite suggestions as to how that object is to be attained.

M. Bompard is adverse to any steps likely to relieve Germany of the obligation of taking the opinion of the Conference; any proposal for mediation, before the Conference had come to a decision, would, he thinks, only weaken the hands of France. Should the Conference show, as is probable, its general sympathy with the French policy, it could not fail to react on German public opinion, with the result of making an aggressive attack on France still more unpopular.

M. Hartwig, the Director of the First Department, stated to me to-day that the general impression seemed to be that the German Emperor after the rupture of the Conference would make a sort of *amende honorable*, and suddenly suggest an

arrangement *à deux*. Such a solution would not, he thought, be without its dangers for Europe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CECIL SPRING-RICE.

7823] No. 308.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 55. Conference.)
Sir, *Algeciras, February 28, 1906.*

AT a sitting of the Drafting Committee on the 26th instant a discussion arose on the question of effecting improvements at the several ports in Morocco, when El Mokri, one of the Moorish Delegates, announced that Casa Blanca and Saffi should be left out of the account, as the works at those two ports had already been conceded to a French Company, the "Compagnie Marocaine."

This statement occasioned some surprise, and many considered that a concession of such a nature was hardly in conformity with the principle of equality of treatment which had on more than one occasion been proclaimed by the French Delegate.

Being aware of the unfavourable impression which had been caused, I asked M. Révoil if he would give me full particulars of what had passed with regard to the alleged concessions, so that I might be in a position to explain the matter to my Government.

M. Révoil said that a long time ago—I understood so far back as two or three years—the "Compagnie Marocaine" had been urging the Moorish Government to allow them to undertake works of improvement at the three ports of Tangier, Casa Blanca, and Saffi. Early in March 1905 the Moorish Government delivered to the agent of the Company three letters to the local authorities at the three ports, instructing the latter to arrange with an engineer to be appointed by the said Company for the preparation of plans and estimates. The letter to the local authorities at Tangier is to be found at p. 311 of the Yellow Book.

The Company therefore sent out to Morocco a most experienced and competent engineer, who, on the 1st July, 1905, handed in to the Moorish Government the required plans, drawings, and estimates for the three ports.

On the signature, on the 8th July, of the Agreement between the French and German Governments, the French Minister at Fez abstained from taking any steps in the matter. When the German Company, or undertakers, who had obtained the concession to execute the works at Tangier, showed signs of commencing operations, the agent of the "Compagnie Marocaine" at Fez appears to have made some representations to the Moorish Government in regard to the other ports of Casa Blanca and Saffi, and to have succeeded in obtaining a verbal promise that, after the Conference had ended, his Company would be permitted to execute the works at the two above-mentioned ports. When the French authorities had cognizance of the steps taken by the agent, they informed him that he must not move in the matter, but remain quiescent until the Conference had terminated its labours. The "Compagnie Marocaine" acquiesced in this, but expressed the hope that their claims to execute the works at Casa Blanca and Saffi should not be overlooked or forgotten.

The above is a history of the question, and which, I venture to think, shows that the French Government have acted in conformity with their engagements and in perfect good faith.

Whether eventually the "Compagnie Marocaine" will be able to establish a prior right to undertake the works at Casa Blanca and Saffi, or will have to tender equally with others, is a point which will have to be decided by those to whom the Conference will intrust the duty of supervising the adjudication of public works, and who will, presumably, be the Diplomatic Body at Tangier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[7895] No. 309.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 28. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, March 5, 1906.*

ALGECIRAS Conference.

On learning this morning from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that President of the Council proposed to come to Madrid for the King of Portugal's visit, I took it on myself to point out the inadvisability of the absence of the Duke of Almodovar from Algeciras at the present moment. I pointed out that as Spain had been given the honour of providing the President of the Conference, it was her duty to retain him at his post at a time that might prove to be critical, and at which he could not with propriety delegate his functions to a subordinate. I added that, should he leave Algeciras, nothing could prevent German press from insinuating that he had done so as a protest against discussion of the police question before the bank question had been disposed of.

Señor Ojeda seemed disposed to agree, but asked urgently that His Majesty's Government should telegraph their views on the point, so that he might have time to refer them to the President of the Council. The latter is undecided whether the Duke hould be stopped leaving Algeciras. M. Cambon is strongly of my way of thinking.

[7897] No. 310.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 30. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, March 5, 1906.*

CONFERENCE at Algeciras.

I heard to-day from M. Cambon of a rumour that the Moorish Government had promised Germany that, if Conference failed, Germany should have the concession for the construction of a port at Mogador, and permission to organize sufficient police for its protection.

Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, in reply to my enquiry, disclaimed all knowledge of this.

[7640] No. 311.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March 5, 1906.*

ACTION reported in your telegram No. 79 of the 3rd instant entirely approved.

My opinion (subject, of course, to any change of situation which may unexpectedly occur) is that there can be no object in forcing a vote on the French proposals as regards the police if they are objected to. Their moderate and limited nature should, however, most certainly be pointed out to the Conference. Discussion, rather than vote, will probably show the opinion of the other Delegates as to the merits of the proposals.

Indefinite suspension of the Conference to enable the Delegates to go home to refer to their Governments may prove to be the best course, as, though it seems waste of time to prolong its sittings, it is desirable that the Conference should separate with as little appearance as possible of political rupture between any Powers.

[7534] No. 312.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March* 5, 1906.

HAS your French colleague told you that French Minister for Foreign Affairs is disposed to consider seriously a proposal emanating from Spain, that the police should be purely Moroccan without European officers and paid by the State Bank? M. Rouvier told Sir M. de Bunsen on the 1st instant that he was ready to consider above scheme, though he still hoped that France might obtain better conditions, and had therefore abstained from mentioning it to Spain.

[7995] No. 313.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 32.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, March* 6, 1906.

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs received me informally to-day. In discussing Conference I expressed the satisfaction of His Majesty's Government at the loyal attitude maintained there by Spain. He replied that the position of Spain at the Conference had been very difficult at times, and that there was no great sympathy for France felt in the country, but that Spanish Government would continue to act up to the spirit of her engagements with France so long as the latter country remained in cordial co-operation with England. It was England that had been mainly instrumental in leading Spain into a common policy with France on Moroccan affairs. He did not consider that if the Conference failed matters would return to their previous state. (See last paragraph of Mr. Cartwright's telegram No. 27 of the 2nd instant.)

[7996] No. 314.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, March* 6, 1906.

MOROCCO Conference.

I have been informed by Señor de Ojeda that Señor Moret, in view of the remarks which Mr. Cartwright made, and which he reported to you in his telegram No. 28, has written to the Duke of Almodovar, directing him to abandon his intention of coming to Madrid on the occasion of the visit of the King and Queen of Portugal.

[7990] No. 315.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 82.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 6, 1906.

A GENERAL Committee meeting of the Conference was held yesterday for the discussion of the organization of the police. A statement was read by the second Russian Delegate, in which he pointed out that it was necessary to afford security to Europeans in Morocco; that the Moorish Government were powerless to provide such security; that any international organization of the police was impracticable; and that it was a matter of urgency that France and Spain, who were alone qualified for the purpose, should be intrusted with the organization. M. de Bacheracht mentioned that the organization might be confined to the coast towns, subject to the authority of the Sultan and restricted to a limited period.

M. de Radowitz stated that due respect of the sovereign rights of the Sultan, and commercial liberty without any inequality, must form the basis of all reforms. He professed himself ready to examine any proposal based on the above principles, which required that all the Powers should offer their aid to the Sultan in conformity with the rights of all.

The Russian views were supported by the French Representative, who observed that it had always been the desire of France to respect the Sultan's rights. M. Révoil laid stress on the special interest which France and Spain possessed in the maintenance of order in the Moorish Empire, and explained the objections to an international organization. The Powers had been convoked to Algeciras on the initiative of Germany, and the matter must now be discussed in open Conference.

The above views were also developed by the second Spanish Delegate. He stated that, commercial equality being secured by other guarantees, it was not necessary for the police to be international to insure its preservation.

I and my Portuguese colleague stated that the only practical solution of the police question was contained in the views of the Russian, French, and Spanish Delegates, with which we were entirely in accord.

M. de Radowitz stated that he must examine the papers which had been read, especially the observations which the second Spanish Delegate had made. He would reply later.

The Italian Delegate pressed for a continuation of the discussion of the bank question. It was eventually decided that a meeting of the Conference should be held on the morning of the 8th instant, for the purpose of terminating that question. The meeting would then immediately resolve itself into Committee for the discussion of the police question.

The French will, I am inclined to think, make some further concessions on the bank question, and an Agreement on that subject may thus be reached.

It is desirable to expedite matters before the departure of the Duke of Almodovar, who has to leave Algeciras for a few days at the end of the week.

[7992] No. 316.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 83.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 6, 1906.

THE interpreter to the Spanish Delegation here, who declined to give his authority while asserting that it was trustworthy, mentioned to my interpreter the report contained in Mr. Cartwright's telegram No. 30 of the 5th instant, as to Germany having obtained a Concession for port works at Mogador. The French Representative, on the other hand, received an emphatic denial of the report from the Moorish Delegate.

I think that it is quite probable that, as similar Concessions at two other ports have been promised to France, Germany will, in the event of the failure of the Conference, press for a Concession of the sort.

[7994] No. 317.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 6, 1906.

I AM assured by the French Representative that he has heard absolutely nothing of M. Rouvier's idea to accept the Spanish proposal in regard to the police, as reported in your telegram No. 42 of yesterday's date. He seems to think that M. Rouvier would, in the first instance, have mentioned his intentions to His Majesty's Government, had he contemplated accepting the proposal. He says he would never have concealed a suggestion of such a nature from me. The proposal is evidently identical with the one reported in my telegram No. 63 of the 22nd ultimo, which the French Government refused at the time.

M. Révoil is now occupied in framing a project based on the organization of the police being intrusted to French and Spanish officers. It will be presented to the Conference on the 8th instant.

[7993] No. 318.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 85.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March 6, 1906.*

ALTHOUGH M. Révoil and I both consider the Duke of Almodovar's departure (mentioned in Mr. Cartwright's telegram No. 28 of yesterday's date) inopportune, we have not yet spoken to him about it. M. Révoil is of opinion that it is better to await the results of the meeting on the 8th instant. I will, however, speak to him again on the subject, as the course he suggests would give little time for us to receive instructions from our Governments before the President's departure.

[8039] No. 319.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received March 7.)

(Confidential.)
Admiralty, March 6, 1906.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd ultimo, forwarding copy of a telegraphic correspondence respecting a scheme for the establishment of wireless telegraph communication between Fez and Tangier viâ Alcazar, which is reported to have been submitted to the Sultan of Morocco by the German Consul at Fez.

2. In reply, I am to request you will inform Secretary Sir Edward Grey that a wireless telegraph station in the hands of a foreign Government at Tangier would, in their Lordships' opinion, be highly detrimental to British interests. Such a station would not only render Lloyd's station at Cape Spartel useless, but would in all probability seriously hamper naval signalling with the Admiralty station at Gibraltar; and I am to state that their Lordships consider it very desirable that all possible steps should be taken to prevent the scheme from being carried out.

I am, &c.
(Signed) C. I. THOMAS.

[8109] No. 320.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 86.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March 7, 1906.*

YESTERDAY M. Révoil read me a telegram, which he had received from M. Rouvier, stating that no negotiations were passing between Berlin and Paris on the Police question, and that the French Government maintained their attitude.

A project for the organization of the police has been prepared by the French Delegate. He will circulate it among his foreign colleagues before the meeting of the 8th instant. It is clear and concise, and suggests that the Sultan should be requested by the Conference to undertake the organization of a police force in eight ports. The force would be recruited from Moorish subjects and placed under the command of Moorish officers. France and Spain would furnish instructors, to whom the organization, discipline, and pay of the force would be intrusted. The State Bank would supply the necessary funds. A period of three years' trial would be afforded to the scheme. The maximum number of men for the whole of the eight ports would be 2,500, and the minimum 2,000. They would be distributed according to the importance of the several ports. The minimum number at each port would be 150, and the maximum 500. For the eight ports sixteen instructors and thirty-two foreign non-commissioned officers would be the maximum total.

My French colleague consulted me as to the reply he should make were the question raised as to the distribution of the ports between France and Spain. I suggested that his reply might be that, if the Conference accepted his project in principle, he would be prepared at a subsequent sitting, after consultation with Spain, to propose a scheme for distributing the ports between the two Powers.

[8108] No. 321.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 87.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March 7, 1906.*

NO result has been attained by the private negotiations for effecting an arrangement in regard to the bank question which have been carried on through intermediaries.

I am told by my French colleague that he will now leave the matter to the Conference and abandon private negotiations.

[7995] No. 322.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March 7, 1906.*

IN the event of the failure of the Conference, questions respecting the *status quo* in Morocco, alluded to by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in conversation reported in your telegram No. 32 of the 6th instant, will require careful consideration by France, Spain, and Great Britain. His Majesty's Government feel confident that Spanish Government will adhere strictly to their engagements towards France in regard to Morocco; there is no question of His Majesty's Government pursuing any other policy in this matter.

You should inform Spanish Government in this sense.

[8233] No. 323.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 88.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March 8, 1906.*

THE President of the Conference was informed yesterday by the German Delegate that he was prepared to agree to the police at seven ports being intrusted to French and Spanish officers, provided that the police at the eighth port were placed in charge of a superior officer, as Inspector, who would be selected from a minor Power.

I understand that the Duke of Almodovar told M. de Radowitz that he must submit to the Conference proposals of above nature. They will probably be found in a project for the organization of the police which it is the intention of the Moorish Delegates to present at to-day's meeting.

Yesterday morning the Russian Delegate spoke seriously to M. de Radowitz, urging the necessity of losing no further time in bringing the pending questions to a termination. He hinted that, if the German delegation preserved absolute silence, and continued to give no indication of the views they held in regard to the police question, the Conference might disperse.

The communication made by the German Delegate to the President of the Conference was probably prompted by this warning.

I am told by my French colleague that M. Rouvier has again been approached by the German Ambassador in Paris, who has urged that the discussion of the police question should be carried out between Berlin and Paris. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that the Conference, and the Conference alone, must examine the question.

[8237] No. 324.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 8.)

(No. 89.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 8, 1906.

THE Bank question was discussed by the Conference this morning in plenary sitting. The discussion on one or two disputed questions will be resumed on the 10th instant. An agreement will probably be reached on the point affecting jurisdiction as France has made some concessions. Certain amendments were proposed by the Moorish Delegates, some of which cannot be accepted.

After the plenary sitting we held a general Committee meeting on the Police question, and the French project was presented. Count Welsersheimb, the Austrian Delegate, explained that, with the object of reconciling conflicting views, he had also prepared a project which would be read by the President. By this scheme the organization of the police of Mogador, Laraiche, and Mazagan is left to Spain, and of Tangier, Saffi, Rabat, and Tetuan to France. The police at Casa Blanca is to be intrusted to a superior officer, to be chosen from Holland or Switzerland, who will discharge the duties of Inspector-General over the whole of the police force and report to the Corps Diplomatique at Tangier, in whom the control of the entire force will be vested. Five years is the period assigned for the trial of the above scheme.

M. Révoil and the Spanish Delegate stated that the matter required consideration. The latter expressed his reserves as to the scheme of distribution, which is not very happy.

M. de Radowitz reserved his opinion until he had been able to consult his Government. He said that he must study the project.

I believe that Germany is the real author of the scheme, and I fear that France will lose the sympathy of the Conference and place herself in a false position if she refuses to accept it, as general opinion of the members of the Conference is that Germany has made a great concession.

I think it fair to my French colleague that I should let him know the general opinion of the Conference, without recommending him to request the adhesion of his Government to the Austrian project.

[8106] No. 325.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 26.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 8, 1906.

I HAVE carefully considered, in communication with the Board of Trade, your Excellency's despatch No. 44 of the 17th ultimo, on the subject of the proposed increase in the duties on goods imported into Morocco.

2. I entirely agree that the consent of His Majesty's Government to any such increase must be clearly understood to be dependent upon the establishment of the special "Caisse" for the administration of the additional revenue. The Board of Trade desire, in this connection, to recall attention to the necessity of reform in the matter of lighterage, and the removal of wrecks to which they referred in their letter of the 15th ultimo (see my despatch No. 14 of the 15th February). The present unsatisfactory conditions specially affect British trade interests, and His Majesty's Government expect that in return for the assistance which the Powers are ready to give to the Moorish Government by agreeing to the proposed higher scale of import duties, guarantees will be obtained for securing that these grievances are effectively dealt with.

3. As regards the constitution of the Board, or Bureau, which is to adjudicate on tenders for the construction of works of which the cost is to be defrayed from the yield of the surtax—as provided in the 8th paragraph of the draft declaration inclosed in your despatch under acknowledgment—you should, in view of the important British interests involved, endeavour to arrange that one of three delegates of the diplomatic body at Tangier to sit on the Board should be British.

4. I am not, as at present advised, disposed to favour any further concessions in the matter of the rate of increase to be allowed in the customs duties. The increased burden will, as it is, fall more heavily on British trade than on that of all other nations,

[8370] No. 326*.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, March 9, 1906.*

THE Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs begged the French Ambassador yesterday to telegraph to Paris the proposals made by the Austrian Delegate at the Morocco Conference for the settlement of the police question, and to urge the French Government to consider them favourable, as Austria could make no further effort to effect a compromise. The French Ambassador gave me this information himself. During our conversation, his Excellency received a telegram to the effect that the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin had just had a conversation with Prince Bülow which convinced him that the Conference would have a perfectly satisfactory issue.

and I venture to hope that the other Powers represented at the Conference will see the justice of giving the increase uniformly at 2½ per cent. *ad valorem* on all goods, instead of further differentiating in favour of the produce of a few importing countries by making the increase a percentage on the existing unequal scales of duty.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[8249] No. 326.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 39. Very Confidential.)
Sir, *Madrid, March 5, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to report to you that M. Cambon confided to me very confidentially to-day that he had received a visit from a gentleman who had come from Algeciras, and who represented the interests of the holders of the French loan to Morocco of 1904. This gentleman had informed him that he had watched the discussion of the bank question with more or less indifference, and that on the whole he would prefer that no State Bank should be instituted. In that case, as soon as the Conference was over, the financial group he represented had made arrangements to start immediately a bank at Tangier, with branch agencies in other towns, and he expected that in a very short time this institution, being free from the tutelage of Moorish officials and the surveillance of the Diplomatic Corps, would absorb the whole banking business of the country. It was intended that the bank should be a French, English, Belgian, and Spanish one, but the Spanish element would be kept well in check.

Speaking of the Conference, this gentleman observed that he had been struck by the small rôle played at Algeciras by Herr von Radowitz, and that he gathered that Count Tattenbach was becoming convinced that Germany had made a mistake in summoning the Conference, and that she would have obtained more by settling the Morocco question directly with France. This rather confirms what Baron Stumm, the German Chargé d'Affaires, has told me—that M. Rouvier is willing to yield, but that he is held back by M. Révoil, who in his turn is restrained by Sir A. Nicolson; and that all this would not have occurred had the negotiations been carried on in Paris.

The financial gentleman also informed M. Cambon that he had noticed a change in the attitude of the Moorish Delegates since the Conference began, and that he believed that when they returned to Fez they would advise the Sultan to refuse to grant concessions to foreigners, so as to keep European influences out of Morocco as far as possible. In M. Cambon's opinion this would not be an unsatisfactory state of things for France.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[8352] No. 327.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 90.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March 9, 1906.*

I FIND that the members of the Conference are unanimously in favour of the Austrian scheme for the organization of the police with the exception of the French and Spanish Delegates.

M. Révoil thinks he could accept an Inspector who would be intrusted with inspection duties and with the right of reporting to the Powers, perhaps through the Doyen of the Corps Diplomatique, but he could not go further. He tells me that French public opinion would certainly not allow the establishment of Swiss or Dutch officers in a Moorish port. It is evidently his wish to insist that all the eight ports shall be alloted to France and Spain. I doubt if Germany would agree to such a solution, and it would, in my opinion, be most unfortunate if the British, French, and Spanish Delegates were left isolated from the rest, and if the Conference were to have to disperse under such conditions. I have pointed this out to the French Representative, and have suggested that he might devise some means of striking a bargain by which

France would make a concession on the bank question, the eighth port would be left to France and Spain.

My French colleague wishes to reflect on the matter, but thinks my suggestion might be adopted. The recent change of Government in France has, of course, hampered him considerably.

[8371] No. 328.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 9.)

(No. 91. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 9, 1906.

MY French colleague asked me to inquire of our United States and Italian colleagues if they would ascertain from M. de Radowitz whether he was disposed to agree to the appointment of an Inspector who would not have command of police at a port, but would be intrusted with simple inspection duties. I complied with M. Révoil's request, and the German Representative told me that the Austrian proposal represented the last concession which Germany was prepared to make, and that his instructions were to adhere to that proposal. M. de Radowitz added that, in the opinion of the German Government, the establishment of an Inspector in command of police at a port was an essential condition.

My French colleague has expressed the desire that at to-morrow's meeting in General Committee I should raise the question in a friendly and conversational manner, and I have agreed to do so.

He is also anxious that I should ask Mr. Henry White to sound M. de Radowitz as to the possibility of a bargain being struck between the questions of the police and the Bank. I will avail myself of the first opportunity that offers to do so.

I still think that it is unfortunate that my French colleague does not see his way to accept the Austrian proposal with some slight modifications. I am assisting him as much as I can.

[8352] No. 329.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March* 9, 1906.

IN a conversation I had to-day with M. Cambon, I told him that, in my opinion, the proposal of the Austrian Delegate with regard to the police question constituted a real concession on the part of Germany, and added that it would not do for the Conference to result in failure after an agreement had been so nearly reached. I mentioned to him the opinion expressed by Sir A. Nicolson, in his telegrams Nos. 89 and 90 of the 8th and 9th instant respectively. In speaking to M. Rouvier you should hold the same language.

[9007] No. 330.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March* 9, 1906.

WHEN the opportunity is afforded by the reopening of the discussion on the increase of import duties, you should suggest that measures be agreed upon for dealing with the liquor traffic. Article XCI of the Brussels Act of 1892 suggests the lines on which this might be done.

[8438] No. 331.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 10.)

(No. 33.)
Sir, *Tangier, February* 27, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a Memorandum I have forwarded to Sir Arthur Nicolson, at his Excellency's request, showing the state of insecurity of life and property at the coast towns during the year 1905. That year was perhaps not so bad in that respect as the two preceding years, but the record of disturbances and crimes would probably have been considerably more extensive were it not that the Consular officers, accustomed now to a state of insecurity become chronic, doubtless considered it unnecessary to report every untoward incident that occurred not directly affecting British subjects.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 331.

Memorandum on the State of Insecurity in the Ports of Morocco during 1905.

Tangier.

IN the month of January the British subjects residing at Tangier requested His Majesty's Minister to forward to the Secretary of State a Memorial, praying that "some measures may be taken to put an end to the state of insecurity of life and property in which for nearly two years we have been residing. . . . . The existing state of anarchy shows no signs of abating, to the peril of life, the spoliation of property, and the loss of trade."

Shortly a similar document was forwarded to Berlin by the German residents of Tangier. The German Government replied that the situation was happily improved, but, should there be danger, steps would be taken to protect lives and property.

Towards the end of January a M'halla arrived at Alcazar, which had been sent "to restore order in the Tangier district and insure the safety of roads," according to Sid Torres' circular of the 20th January. The arrival of this force at Alcazar was opportune, as that place was seriously threatened by the neighbouring tribes.

The M'halla subsequently moved on to the Tangier district, but its numbers have been much reduced by desertion, and it has done practically nothing since its arrival, except morally support Raisuli.

Throughout the year Mr. Harris has not been permitted by the authorities to return to his house, where they would not guarantee his safety, and on the 27th March an attempt was made to assassinate him in the town, a Moor having stabbed him. In September a shot was fired at him when he was returning from his house, the bullet striking the ground just in front of him.

Mr. Gummeré, American Minister, went to live on the hill during the hot weather, but had to return owing to the urgent representations of the Moorish authorities, who assured him he was not safe on the hill.

In June a shot was fired at Mr. Waller while walking on a road near Tangier.

In September a Frenchman, employed in the French telegraph office, who had been out to the cable house, was attacked on his way back, beaten, and robbed. Another was assaulted in the Soko, and two others were molested near the town.

In September fighting occurred within three miles of Tangier between Angera and Raisuli's adherents; villages were burnt, and a good deal of alarm caused in the town, shops and banks being closed. The foreign Representatives made representations to Sid Torres, urging that steps be taken to insure safety of Europeans in case the disturbances spread to the town. All through the year the telephone wire to the Spartel signal station was continually being cut, sometimes three times a week or oftener, and the Moorish authorities declared themselves powerless to prevent it. The whole demeanour of natives towards Europeans is entirely different to what it used to be; they have become insolent, arrogant, and frequently threatening.

Raisuli levies blackmail, and exercises jurisdiction over foreigners and protégés

and their property, and the Sultan's deputy declares that the Makhzen is unable to do anything to prevent it.

A Moorish Hadj was murdered by the very Askar placed at the town gates as guards, the sole object of the murder being robbery.

Houses and stores have been broken into and robbed.

Vessels near the coast have been attacked—*e.g.*, the "Jubile" when fishing off the Angera coast was fired on; an English torpedo-boat destroyer was fired on in the same neighbourhood; a Spanish fishing boat was attacked near Ceuta, the crew of a hundred being seized and the nets and tackle being carried off, the crew, however, being liberated at once; another Spanish falucca, the "Luisa," was attacked off the same coast.

The road to Tetuan has been unsafe all the year, and travellers are not allowed to go by it.

Tetuan.

The neighbourhood of Tetuan has also been declared unsafe, and the Moorish authorities requested that British naval officers shall not be permitted to land and shoot there.

Two British marine officers were captured by brigands near Ceuta in October, when returning on duty from His Majesty's ship "Assistance," stranded on the coast.

The Moorish authorities refuse permission to British naval officers to land and take observations in the neighbourhood of the Bay of Tetuan.

In August a courier going to Tetuan was stopped and robbed.

In the same month thirty-four oxen were robbed on their way to Ceuta. Small intertribal disputes took place during the autumn.

Early in September a farm near the road to Ceuta was attacked, and all the stock carried off. This created much alarm, and people recalled their employés from their gardens near the town.

In October, under pretence of capturing a man implicated in a murder, the Governor sent out to a village close to the town, took 8 prisoners and 150 head of cattle, goats, &c., and burned the village.

The impression at the time was that the Governor had done this to satisfy the soldiers, whom he had omitted to pay, and to put money into his pocket.

Laraiche.

Fishermen from the Beni Hassen and Zemur again raided the Gharb Province in which foreign subjects have large agricultural interests.

In September Mr. Forde's Semsar was murdered in the Soko of Sid Aisea.

Rabat.

The British Vice-Consul reported in August that the same unsatisfactory condition continued as had existed for the previous years. Europeans were practically prisoners within the walls of the town, and it was only due to precautions taken by them that grave cases of brigandage did not occur within a walk of the town. A tennis court close to the town was deserted, as it was frequented by Zair marauders, who declared their intention of carrying off a European.

All the Governor did was to issue warnings to Europeans and sell the rifles sent him for the protection of the town.

Famine, in a measure came as a relief, as many of the Arab tribesmen were compelled to sell their horses.

Dar-al-Baida.

In December 1904 Mr. Lepeen's farm, about 1 mile outside, was attacked by the Ulad Zian and looted, two men being killed, and others, including women and children, injured. This farm was again looted and buildings destroyed in April.

In April, a Moor having been found dead in the street, and a Jew being suspected

of causing his death, the Jews were stoned and otherwise maltreated in the town during some days.

Subsequently, demonstration was made against the town by some hundreds of armed tribesmen who are understood to demand:—

1. The lives of persons of certain Jews; and
2. The release of four of their fellow tribesmen in prison for murder.

The town walls were manned and cannon loaded, and preparations were made for a fight, but after negotiations between the Governor and the tribesmen terms were come to, the Governor agreeing, as was understood, to make a money payment and make other concessions.

On several occasions the Consul reported tribal disturbances and fighting, by which merchants suffered losses. Robberies were frequent on the roads leading to the town, and caravans were made to pay blackmail at each district before being allowed to pass. Blackmail was also levied on townspeople having property in the tribes under threat of burning or raiding. The road between Rabat and Dar-al-Baida was unsafe for a time owing to the unsettled state of the Zenata tribe.

Mazagan.

In February reports reached Tangier that thefts and robberies were so frequent that there was practically no security for merchants, warehouses, and offices. The Governor declared his intention of increasing the charge for guards, but declined to give any guarantees. The Governor wrote to the doyen of the Consular Body declining all responsibility for the lives and property of persons living outside the town; nearly all the British and foreign subjects were outside. An Englishman (Madden), who acted as Austrian Vice-Consul, was brutally murdered in his bed. The murderers were with difficulty discovered, and are now undergoing punishment, but the want of authority of the Governor became very apparent during the course of the investigation.

In October a warehouse belonging to a German was broken into and a horse and mule stolen. He was several times fired at. An attempt was also made to rob an English warehouse. The Governor receives a considerable sum for guards, but does not pay them.

A British subject and a Spanish Jew, camping just outside the walls of the town on the beach, was warned by the Governor to come into the town as it would be dangerous to remain there. They came in, and just after they had left their tents shots were fired at the tents, but the assailants were driven off by the guard.

A Spaniard was robbed on the road near the town.

In June the British subjects resident in the town addressed a letter to the Consul requesting that steps be taken for the protection of themselves and their property. They expressed their "alarm at the brutal murder of the late Mr. Madden, and the general state of insecurity of life and property in this town and neighbourhood," and add "the experience of some of the signatories extends back to considerably over twenty years in this town, and never before in their recollection, nor in that of those who preceded them, has there been such a state of semi-anarchy, involving danger to life and property. Murder succeeds murder, robbery is almost of nightly occurrence, the real culprit escaping punishment, innocent persons being often incarcerated as scapegoats."

Saffi.

There was considerable unrest amongst the tribes neighbouring Saffi, the people rising up against their Kaïds, who had had to come into the town for refuge, leaving their houses to be sacked and looted. In April Mr. Vice-Consul Hunot reports "the only Kaïd left in Dukala is Hadj Abdallah-bu-Azizi, and according to reports he will have to run very soon."

In October the road between Saffi and Mogador was unsafe for a time owing to tribal disturbances.

Mogador.

In February complaints were made regarding Kaïd Anflus, who, fearing to collect money from his own people, instituted the levying of blackmail on the outward and

inward trade of Mogador on the Sus and Marakesh road. In March it was reported that this system had been extended.

In August a fight took place between two Kaïds of Ait Zilten. Later on hostilities broke out between Shiedma and Haha.

On one day nine men were killed. The town gates were guarded and strangers compelled to deposit their arms. This caused some trouble, as the Arabs objected. Trade was seriously hindered, and prices went up.

In September Mr. Huckwell, on his way from Marakesh, was held up at a place about three hours from the latter town by people of Nazara and forced to pay 4½ dollars before being allowed to proceed.

In December the blackmailing system established by Kaïd Anflus was adopted by other Kaïds between Mogador and Morocco city, and commerce suffered considerably.

A complaint was addressed to the Court and promises were made that the system should be stopped. There has not been time to hear if the orders were obeyed.

Throughout the southern district, from the Sebu to the Sus, the tribes have been in a state of active or dormant rebellion, paying no taxes, and driving out any Governor who attempted to exercise any authority over them, intertribal fighting being frequent. The interests of merchants have naturally suffered greatly in consequence.

[8439] No. 332.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 10.)

(No. 34. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 1, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 24, Confidential, of the 10th ultimo, I have the honour to report that I have now received information from Fez regarding the alleged promises on the part of the late and present Sultans of Morocco that the "Bank of Morocco" was to become the State Bank.

His Majesty the Sultan has told my informant that there is no truth whatever in the statement as regards himself or, as far as he is aware, as regards his father, and that no concession was ever granted or promised by his father or himself to any bank.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to Sir Arthur Nicolson.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[8441 No. 333.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 10.)

(No. 36.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 2, 1906.

I LAST night had a long conversation with Kaïd Abdel Krim-ben-Bu Mahomed Shergui, the Commander of the Sultan's forces, camped some two hours from here. Asking him what he thought of the security of the neighbourhood, he replied that all was quiet, and he anticipated no trouble. He had now been sixteen months in the district, and although he would yield to none of His Majesty's Commanders in the matter of valour, he was tired of the occupation, and was anxious to return to Fez, and thought it only right that, after his arduous labours, he should be replaced by another. I inquired as to whether it was true that nothing could be done to remove Raisuli, as his attitude had become intolerable. He said it was a most difficult matter, as Raisuli was a very clever man, and much on the alert. He had been to see him several times, and he always appeared to be unguarded, but as a matter of fact he knew that he could rely upon 200 faithful followers, who were always at hand. Raisuli had latterly been seriously ill, and when he had offered him medicine he declined to take it, although Shergui offered to set him the example.

I suggested an attack upon his stronghold, to which the Commander replied that this would only have the effect of driving him to the mountains. Raisuli would not risk an engagement, but he would revenge himself by capturing foreigners if he were seriously attacked. To any suggestion that stratagem might, as is usual, be employed to capture the ex-brigand, Shergui answered that no one would care to risk such a venture, for afterwards, instead of being applauded, he would incur the disapproval of the Makhzen for having acted thus towards one of the Sultan's Governors. I asked the Commander how many Imperial troops he could dispose of, to which he replied that he had 900 infantry and 600 cavalry. From inquiries I have made, half this number would be a fair estimate.

I have recorded this conversation for what it may be worth, as the statements were made with apparent sincerity, but I am bound to state that they do not correspond with information that has reached me from other quarters—namely, that if the Sultan gave categorical directions that Raisuli was to be disposed of these could easily be carried out.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[8442] No. 334.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 10.)

(No. 37.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 2, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 28 of the 17th February, I have the honour to report that it appears that the Angera tribe has now received messages from the Sultan which, although not undertaking to guarantee the neutrality of his troops in any disturbances which may occur with Raisuli, are framed in sympathetic terms and enjoin quiet, pointing out to them that the moment would be very inopportune for any disturbance.

Under these circumstances it is thought that the Angera will not take any serious action, and will probably allow themselves to be conciliated by a money payment for the murder of their three emissaries.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[8443] No. 335.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 10.)

(No. 38.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 3, 1906.

MR. VICE-CONSUL MACLEOD informs me that at Fez there is great reticence shown on the part of the officials as to their feelings regarding the action of the Algeciras Conference.

In conversation with a prominent official, he had been informed that the view of the Makhzen was that it was not for the Conference to decide the question of police, that, indeed, all the decisions of the Conference would have to be examined by the Makhzen, who were, of course, perfectly free to modify or even to totally reject any of them. His informant had added that although the Sultan had admitted that reforms were essential, and had only opposed them on the grounds that they should be instituted after examination by all the Powers, yet it was the Makhzen alone who had the right to the sole decision ultimately, and he could not believe that they could be expected to institute changes of a kind, or in a manner, in the wisdom of which they did not believe.

Mr. Macleod believes that this expression represents the view generally taken by officials, whose idea is to get as much as they can out of the Powers, and give as little, or if possible nothing, in return, and to trust to fate and international jealousy to secure them against being coerced into swallowing anything distasteful.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[8444] No. 336.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 10.)

(No. 56. Conference.)

Algeciras, March 1, 1906.

Sir,

AS the Drafting Committee had practically concluded its labours, so far as it was possible to do so, in regard to combining the French and German projects respecting the Bank, my French colleague and myself requested, on the 27th ultimo, the Duke of Almodovar to convoke a meeting of the Conference for the 1st instant. His Excellency said that he had already had the intention of doing so, but, on mentioning the matter to M. de Radowitz, the latter had stated that neither he nor Count Tattenbach could possibly be ready by the 1st instant, and that they hoped to receive further instructions from Berlin which might possibly assist towards a solution of the disputed points in the Bank question. He had, therefore, urged that the meeting should be postponed till the 3rd instant. The Duke of Almodovar asked us what he could do in these circumstances.

I said that it seemed to me that we were wasting much time, and that I considered it most undesirable, especially at this juncture, to be continually postponing our meetings, but, if the German Delegates hoped that a delay of forty-eight hours might be of advantage towards a satisfactory solution, I should be the last to oppose it. At the same time, I could not but impress on his Excellency that more activity should be shown in our deliberations. I had no wish to precipitate matters, but we were now in our seventh week, and I was sure that we could not be accused of undue haste if we arranged for a plenary sitting on the Bank question on the 3rd instant and a General Committee meeting on the 5th instant for a discussion of the organization of the police.

My French colleague entirely concurred with my remarks, and the Duke of Almodovar agreed to arrange matters in accordance with our wishes.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[8445] No. 337.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 10.)

(No. 57. Conference. Confidential.)

Algeciras, March 1, 1906.

Sir,

I CALLED on Marquis Visconti-Venosta last evening, and inquired of him whether he could give me any information as to the likelihood of an agreement being arrived at between the French and German Delegates in regard to the bank and police questions.

His Excellency said that he feared, from the information which had reached him, that there was little probability of the two parties coming to terms with respect to the organization of the police. The German Government appeared determined to insist on the police being organized on a strictly international basis, and to this the French Government could never agree. Unless, therefore, some unexpected event occurred he considered that the Conference would have to disperse with the police question undecided. He had, he said, held the opinion, and he must add that he still held it, that if an agreement were come to on all questions with the exception of the police, it would be possible to sign a Protocol affirming such agreement, and thus enabling something stable to be established in Morocco. M. Révoil had, however, seen him in the morning, and had explained to him that the French Government could not close and dispose of the bank question until they had equally come to an agreement on the police question. It was clear, M. Révoil had remarked, that the two questions were very closely allied, and he feared to solve the one before the other. He would, indeed, be completely disarmed in discussing the police question if the concessions which he had made in financial matters had already passed and received the approval of the Conference. In view of these observations Marquis Visconti-Venosta told me that he had decided to abandon his intention of proposing that the police question should be left on one side, and that only part of the original programme be passed and adopted.

I said that I was glad to hear this statement, as it seemed to me useless to formulate measures which could not be put into execution until some semblance, at any rate, of security was introduced into those localities where the bank and its branches would operate, and where the European residents congregated. To my mind the organization of the police was the basis of any reforms, and without some means of affording security to Europeans it was idle to devise measures for supplying the Moorish Treasury with funds or for undertaking any enterprises which would be exposed to the lawless acts of rebellious tribes. Furthermore, I was of opinion that to institute establishments which would, at least in their initial stages, be viewed with extreme disfavour by the majority of the inhabitants, and at the same time to provide no means whatever for checking the existing anarchy and insecurity was illogical and, indeed, dangerous.

I asked Marquis Visconti-Venosta whether he had hopes that the discussions on the bank question would lead to a satisfactory result. He replied that he was not very sanguine either on this question. The German Delegates, evidently, were determined to render the bank as international as possible, and to give to France no special position whatever. In short it was to be equal rights to all.

I observed that I was greatly in favour of equality of treatment to all in commercial and industrial matters, and I thought that the French had given every indication, and I might say guarantee, that this principle should be introduced into financial matters also. But in these latter questions France had certain acquired privileges which could not be ignored; and I considered that it was unjust for Germany to endeavour in the general question of Morocco to place France on the same level as other Powers. It could not be denied that she held a special position apart from all others: and to ignore this fact was to shut one's eyes to what was indisputable.

Marquis Visconti-Venosta asked me whether it was intended to enter upon a discussion of the police question on Monday next, the 5th instant. I replied that this had, I believed been arranged, and I trusted that the arrangement would be carried out. We had allowed a whole week to elapse without any sitting; we were now in our seventh week; and it was essential that we should complete the programme without further delay.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[8449] No. 338.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 10.)

(No. 61. Conference.)

Algeciras, March 3, 1906.

Sir,

AT the close of the plenary sitting this morning, the President of the Conference said that he proposed that we should reassemble on Monday next, and on my inquiring what would be the order of the day, his Excellency replied that he must leave that to the Conference to decide. I thereupon observed that there were several questions still undecided in the bank project which we had been discussing, and that as probably some members would desire to be furnished with instructions on certain points, it would be better to sit in General Committee on Monday and examine the next subject on the programme, which was that of the police organization. I pointed out that we had already occupied considerable time in discussing the bank project, and that before Monday it was not likely that any fresh light would be thrown on the points at issue. In order not to suspend sittings, we could very well follow the precedents we had already established in other cases, and while leaving the bank project on one side for the moment, proceed to examine the police question.

The French Delegate remarked that we had devoted one plenary sitting and two or three Committee sittings, besides four sittings of the Drafting Committee, to the bank project, and that therefore he should vote for the police question being examined on Monday.

The German Delegates objected, and would have preferred to finish the discussion on the disputed questions in the bank project, apparently even if we had to suspend our sittings for some days. In these circumstances I asked the President to be good enough to take the sense of the Conference on my proposal. France, Spain, Italy,

Portugal, Russia, and Holland voted with me; the Delegates of the United States, Belgium, and Sweden said they would adopt the views of the majority; while Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Morocco desired to postpone the discussion on the police organization until that on the bank had finally terminated. My motion was accordingly declared carried.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[8478] No. 339.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 92.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March 10, 1906.*

I AM informed by my French colleague that very confidential information has reached him from an excellent source to the effect that in the last resort the German Government would be content with a simple Inspector of police, and would not insist on his having charge of a Moorish port. M. Révoil tells me that he has received confirmation of this from other sources. He consequently believes that the German Delegate will eventually give way, if he and the Spanish Delegate maintain their position in refusing to allot a port to the Inspector.

The Italian and United States' Delegates, on the other hand, believe that the instructions which have been furnished to the German Delegate are of so clear and precise a nature as to preclude all possibility of Germany making any further concession.

[8518] No. 340.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 93.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March 10, 1906.*

THIS morning the Conference first discussed the bank question in plenary session and then resolved itself into General Committee on the police question. By decision of the Committee, both the Austrian and French projects were referred to the Drafting Committee. At M. Révoil's request, I took the opportunity of raising the point for the Drafting Committee's consideration as to whether greater authority and greater liberty of action would not be possessed by the proposed Inspector, if he did not himself have a force of police under his immediate command, as it was conceivable that the organization of his own force might be inferior to that of the others, which it would be his duty to inspect. I explained that his authority might be diminished rather than enhanced if he were placed in command of a police force, and thus be put on a level with the other commanding officers. I added that it would increase his prestige with the Moorish authorities, and might also be preferable, if Tangier were chosen as his head-quarters, and if he made his tour of inspection with aides-de-camp and an escort. I remarked, in conclusion, that the above views were merely thrown out as a suggestion to be considered.

The tone of this morning's meeting was most friendly, and the desire is manifest that a speedy agreement may be reached. On its termination I told Count Tattenbach that I earnestly hoped that next week would see all outstanding difficulties set aside, and he expressed his cordial agreement.

I now feel sanguine that the issue will be favourable.

[8371] No. 341.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 48.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March 10, 1906.*

THE opinion expressed in your telegram No. 91 of yesterday is entirely in concordance with my views. We consider that no real sacrifice of principle is involved by the acceptance of the Austrian proposal with slight alterations of detail. The substance has been conceded by Germany, and for France to sacrifice it to the shadow would be most regrettable.

[8805] No. 342.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March 10, 1906.*

I SHOULD like to know, with reference to my despatch No. 4 of the 25th January, whether you have yet had occasion to bring to the notice of the Conference the question of slavery in Morocco, and whether you think any practical advantage would be obtained by a collective expression of opinion on the part of all the Treaty Powers, if such could be obtained?

There is a Parliamentary question on the subject down to be answered on Monday.

[8524] No. 343.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 13. Confidential)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, March 11, 1906.*

I HAVE been informed by M. Saint-René Taillandier that a report has reached the French Ambassador at Washington from what he considers a reliable source, that after visiting the King of Spain the German Emperor intends to pay another visit to Tangier.

[8519] No. 344.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 94.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March 11, 1906.*

I CALLED last evening on the First German Delegate in accordance with the wishes expressed by my French colleague, and I told him that I recognized fully the concession in regard to the police question which had been made by Germany, and considered that the prospects of an agreement had thereby been greatly advanced, a satisfactory termination of the Conference was earnestly desired by the French and British Governments; but there was one obstacle in the way, of which I was anxious to speak to him, namely, the difficulty experienced by my French colleague in accepting the proposal that at one port the Inspector should also discharge the duties of Instructor. I inquired whether he would be inclined to suggest to the Government at Berlin that they should make one more step and be content with the third Power being entrusted with the inspection alone, as I explained that French susceptibilities appeared to be most sensitive on the point in question.

In reply, M. de Radowitz gave me his word of honour that the instructions sent to him were perfectly precise and positive that it was made an indispensable condition that the Inspector should also carry out the duties of Instructor at one of the ports. He assured me that he had experienced the greatest difficulty in persuading his Government to go so far as they had gone, and that in perfect frankness and honesty he must impress on me that the last word had been spoken, so that it would therefore be quite useless for him to refer again to his Government.

I informed M. Révoil of M. de Radowitz's reply, and said that I was quite convinced that the latter's remarks had been made with all sincerity and truth. I also told him that it was impossible to allow the Conference to break down on that point just when a favourable issue was in view, and the situation must be faced as it stood.

My French colleague expressed great disappointment, and told me that such a solution could not be accepted by his Government. I replied that he must explain the facts to them clearly. He said, after reflection, that he could make the suggestion to his Government that the police of Tangier should be entrusted to the Swiss conjointly with the Spanish and French, while the Swiss officer would at the same time discharge the duties of Inspector. (The Dutch would be quite unacceptable to the French.) I told M. Révoil that, of course, I did not know if the Germans would accept such a compromise, though it might prove to be an acceptable one.

Curiously enough, the President of the Conference, to whom I communicated my interview with M. de Radowitz, made the same suggestion as my French colleague as to the police of Tangier. I informed both of them that, until replies had been received from their Governments, I would not refer again to M. de Radowitz, but that I should always be happy to act as their intermediary.

It is probable that M. Cambon may speak on the subject to you.

[8520] No. 345.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 11.)

(No. 95.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 11, 1906.

NO opportunity has as yet been afforded of bringing before the Conference the question of slavery in Morocco, which formed the subject of your telegram No. 49 of the 10th instant. After consultation with the principal Representatives, I would be quite prepared to broach the subject. I think the Sultan would undoubtedly be impressed by a collective expression of opinion from the Conference, and I will endeavour to bring this about.

[8641] No. 346.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 12.)

(No. 41. Confidential.)
Sir, *Madrid, March* 7, 1906.

I HAD a private conversation yesterday afternoon with M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador to this Court.

His Excellency said there was little hope of an understanding being reached at Algeciras. The prospect, however, of failure caused him no particular apprehension. The Moorish Delegates had come to Algeciras in reliance on German assurances that the majority of the Powers interested would follow the lead of Germany. They now see that the contrary is the fact, and that Germany is nearly isolated. This would be reported by them to the Sultan, who would be less likely in future to listen to German advice and to reject that of France. This view was strongly held by a representative of the Banque de Paris et des Pay-Bas, who had just passed through Madrid after a visit to Algeciras, and who had told M. Cambon that Count von Tattenbach himself had come round to think that Germany had made a mistake in insisting on a Conference instead of continuing the negotiations at Paris. The position of the bank in question was such a strong one in Morocco, owing to its hold on the customs, that the bank would have it in its power to thwart the operations of the proposed State Bank at every turn, and to prevent the necessary capital being subscribed in order to set the State Bank on its legs. The privileges, in short, which the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas enjoyed were such as to render superfluous the establishment of a State Bank at all. M. Cambon was of opinion, therefore, that France could look forward with equanimity to the rupture of the Conference.

I told his Excellency that I had found the French Prime Minister, who honoured me with a conversation in Paris a few days ago, disposed to take rather a more serious

view of the results which might ensue if the Delegates at Algeciras separated "en mauvaise humeur" with each other, and I said that M. Rouvier had strongly urged the necessity for Europe of a period of peace and quiet, with a view more especially to the financial rehabilitation of Russia, and to her restoration by this means to the place which is her due in the councils of Europe. M. Rouvier had considered that this end would be prejudiced if the Morocco question remained unsolved, and he had left me under the impression that he would be prepared to propose in the last resort an all-Moroccan police, without any European officers at all, and paid under arrangements made by the Powers, rather than see the Conference result in absolute failure.

M. Cambon was aware of M. Rouvier's estimate of the situation, but he was evidently more impressed by the opinions which the representative of the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas had brought with him from Algericas. In his Excellency's view, a rupture might be the best thing for France in the end, provided that steps were taken by France, England, and Spain to declare jointly to the world, on the separation of the Conference without an agreement, that the engagements of those Powers affecting Morocco would be maintained by them intact, and that no interference with the *status quo ante* would be tolerated by them.

Mr. Cartwright has already reported fully to you, in his despatch No. 39 of the 5th instant, on M. Cambon's opinions with reference to the above points.

As regards the attitude of Spain, his Excellency said that the Spanish Government had now taken a definite line, in adherence to the policy of England and France. This result had been brought about, after a period of hesitation, by the intervention of Señor Moret, to whom both his Excellency and Mr. Cartwright had made a strong appeal, and above all by the distinct orders of the King of Spain, who had told Señor Moret that he was determined to shape his policy on that of England. His Majesty, M. Cambon added, was not at all well disposed towards Germany.

I have, &c.
(Signed) M. De BUNSEN.

[8642] No. 347.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 12.)

(No. 42. Confidential.)
Sir, *Madrid, March* 7, 1906.

AS already reported in my telegram No. 32 of yesterday, I had a private conversation in the morning with Señor de Ojeda, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was good enough to give me a very friendly reception.

After expressing his regret that the absence of the King of Spain at San Sebastian and the approaching visit of the King and Queen of Portugal to Madrid, which will begin within a few hours of the King's return to his capital, will make it impossible for me to be officially received by His Majesty till the festivities connected with the royal visit are over, Señor de Ojeda turned the conversation to the subject of the Conference at Algeciras.

As verbally instructed by yourself, I at once expressed your sense of the correct attitude which had been adopted by the Spanish Government and by the Duke of Almodovar at the Conference. This had made plain to the world the important fact that Spain was true to her engagements with France and to the policy with regard to Morocco, which had been jointly adopted by the Powers most interested in the Mediterranean. I said that you attached the greatest importance to the hearty co-operation of Spain in this policy.

Señor de Ojeda said he was gratified to receive this message. It was not easy for Spain to work harmoniously with France, a Power which had always been unpopular in this country, and whose citizens were cordially disliked for their overbearing demeanour by the large Spanish Colony in Morocco. But the Spanish Government was resolved to be guided in this matter by England, and, so long as England and France pulled together, Spain would loyally act in concert with them. But for the lead given by England, she would never have been induced to accept the partnership of France in Morocco.

His Excellency feared the Conference would prove abortive. In that case, he asked, what would be the position of Spain. It was easy to say that the *status quo ante* would be resumed, but this would be impossible in practice, and, notwithstanding her

engagements, France would continue to make herself as objectionable as before to the Spaniards established in Morocco in such large numbers. These would be naturally tempted to turn to any third Power that might offer to emancipate them from French tutelage.

Señor de Ojeda's remarks confirmed very fully Mr. Cartwright's Report in his despatch No. 34 of the 21st ultimo, on his Excellency's personal antipathy to the French.

The Acting Minister proceeded to say that Mr. Cartwright's comments on the proposed abandonment of his post at the Conference by the Duke of Almodovar, in order to be present at Madrid for the coming festivities in honour of the King of Portugal, had been duly reported to Señor Moret, President of the Council, and that the latter had now written to the Duke desiring him to remain at Algeciras in view of the delicacy of the present situation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) M. DE BUNSEN.

[8639] No. 348.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 39.)
Sir, *Tangier, March 6, 1906.*

THE statement made recently by the Moorish Delegate Hadj Mohammed Mokri, in one of the Committee sittings of the Conference, to the effect that a promise had been given by the Sultan to the firm of Creuzot that they should carry out the harbour works at Casablanca and Saffi, caused considerable surprise here, as nothing of any such engagement was known.

I asked M. Saint-René Taillandier what his information on the subject was, and he said that he did not believe there was any truth in it.

Verbal promises might have been given, and indeed one of the Directors of the Compagnie Marocaine in January last in Paris told him that they had received such promises, but M. Saint-René did not attach any value to them.

After the arrangement with Germany of the 8th July he had, of course, not put forward any scheme of any kind, and, indeed, before that date, while at Fez, he did not think it part of his mission to obtain concessions, deeming that the question of public works should form a comprehensive scheme apart.

It was a fact that when the projected plan of general reforms had been submitted to His Majesty the Sultan, the French Minister had also laid before His Majesty a general plan of rules which should govern the adjudication of public works in the future. Of this M. Saint-René had informed Count Tattenbach, but the latter in his despatch to Berlin of the 25th September, 1905, marked No. 25 in the White Book, had purposely or accidentally misrepresented him, and made him say that he had submitted to the Moorish Government a scheme of public works. The French Government were still in communication with Berlin with the object of obtaining a rectification of Count Tattenbach's statement, but the German Government was very obstinate.

M. Saint-René could not explain the object of Mokri's statement, but thought it was possible that there was some connection between it and the incident above quoted. The agent of the Compagnie Marocaine, with which Creuzot were closely allied, was still at Fez, but it was unlikely that he would obtain any concession of importance unless such were supported by the French Legation.

The statement made by Mokri will no doubt be of more value to the Company than verbal promises made at Fez, though it is also possible that Mokri will be repudiated later on.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[8602] No. 349.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 23. Confidential.)
Sir, *Vienna, March 9, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to report that about a week ago an official of the German Foreign Office arrived in Vienna, and was presented to Count Goluchowski by the German Ambassador.

I am informed that the object of the visit was to impress upon the Austro-Hungarian Government the necessity of keeping in line with that of Germany at Algeciras, and generally to discuss the situation arising out of the difficulty of coming to any arrangement with regard to the question of police.

There can be little doubt that the proposals just submitted to the Conference by the Austro-Hungarian Representative were the outcome of the meetings between Count Goluchowski and the German official, even though Count Goluchowski informed me about that time that he had found the German Foreign Office so unreasonable with regard to the police question that he should make no further suggestions for compromise at Berlin, but address any proposals he might have to make direct to the Conference through the Austro-Hungarian Representative.

The Marquis de Reverseaux, with whom I discussed the matter to-day, was strongly of the opinion that Count Goluchowski's latest proposals were prompted from Berlin. He told me that he had not yet heard how the proposals were regarded in Paris, but that personally speaking he thought that his Government would be against the handing over of the General Inspectorship of the police to a German "habillé en Suisse."

While I was talking to M. de Reverseaux a telegram arrived from his Government informing him that M. Bihourd had reported that, on going to call upon Prince Bülow to-day, he had met the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, who told him that he had just had a long conversation with the Chancellor on the subject of the Conference, and that, judging from the tone of the Prince's remarks, he no longer felt any doubts as to the speedy and satisfactory solution of the questions in dispute.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. E. GOSCHEN.

[8510] No. 350.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, March 10, 1906.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs, whom I saw this evening, says that the French Government will adopt the Austrian police scheme mentioned in your telegram No. 31 of yesterday's date, subject to some modifications. His impression from what he has heard on good authority is that Germany will accept modifications, and the Conference will therefore not close without result.

The chief modifications which the French Government intend to propose are:—

1. The Instructors at Casa Blanca, as at the other seven ports, to be French or Spanish.

2. The distribution of ports to French or Spanish Instructors to form a matter for agreement between France and Spain.

3. The Inspector-General to be a subject of some neutral State, and to have powers of inspection at all eight ports, but no right of command nor of giving orders to the French and Spanish Instructors; he would make his reports to the Sultan and not to the Corps Diplomatique at Tangier.

M. Rouvier says that the distribution of ports in the Austrian scheme has been cleverly arranged by Germany in a manner to cause friction between France and Spain, and that a police force at Casa Blanca, organized by a subject of a neutral

State, such as Switzerland or Holland, would be incompetent to maintain order, as the Moors would have no respect for the subject of such a State.

For the post of Inspector-General M. Rouvier would accept a Swiss but would prefer a Dane. He objects to a Dutchman as likely to be too much under German influence.

[8769] No. 351.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 12.)

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, March* 12, 1906.

I LEARN that M. Jules Cambon has telegraphed to French Delegate deprecating the Austrian proposal as to Inspector-General, and pointing out that the principle of internationalization might be considered as in some sense admitted if such an official were appointed. He hopes, however, that it will be possible to reject this "equivocal proposition," but if the appointment is unavoidable he recommends that, in defining the functions of Inspector, the term "contrôle" should not be used on account of its different meanings in French and English. He also suggests that, if not of French or Spanish nationality, the Inspector should be Portuguese, and should report directly to the Sultan or to France and Spain, and not to the Diplomatic Body at Tangier.

[8759] No. 352.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 12.)

(No. 96.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 12, 1906.

FOLLOWING telegram is Confidential :—

Police : Austrian proposal.

M. Révoil, in a conversation which we had yesterday, explained to me that he considered that the above proposal, by which the Inspector would also have intrusted to his care one of the police contingents, would help to drive in the wedge of internationalization, and was illogical and unworkable in practice, but that his chief objection to it was that the understanding between France and Great Britain might be weakened by the outcry to which such a proposal would give rise in France. Our warnings as to allowing a minor point, as it appeared to us, to cause the break-down of the Conference would, he feared, be brought to light, and an understanding which had benefited Great Britain alone, and from which France had obtained nothing, might be attacked by Nationalists and others at the next elections. He did not wish to minimize in any way the support we had constantly given to his Government, or call into question for a moment our perfect loyalty, but he expressed the hope that I would communicate to you the above explunation.

This, I said, I was willing to do ; but I must again impress on him that, as I have already pointed out, the opinion of the majority of the Conference, including that of Russia, was now against us, and the consequences produced by the failure of the Conference would be most serious. He could always count on my support, but, as a friend, I had warned him, and my Government had done no more. He replied that he desired to reproach nobody, but only to point out the danger of French feeling becoming changed. He asked if the German Ambassador in London could not be approached on the subject.

He declares his conviction that his Government will not yield, and still believes that that of Germany will.

It would be more important, in my opinion, to ascertain the views of the French Ambassador in London and those of his Government, as M. Révoil is somewhat depressed and nervous.

[8760] No. 353.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 12.)

(No. 97.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 12, 1906.

I FEAR that the outlook is less hopeful since the two sittings held yesterday by the Drafting Committee to discuss the questions of the State Bank and police.

As regards the allotment of the bank's capital, I have been informed that both the French expert and the second German Delegate continue to maintain their widely divergent points of view with great persistency. The information which the first German Delegate imparted to me, that the French opposition as regards the bank was not seriously meant, which information he said he had received from Paris, may possibly account for the unyielding attitude of the second German Delegate.

I am doubtful whether any agreement will be reached on the projects for the police submitted to the Conference by the French and Austro-Hungarian delegations. They will be discussed by the Drafting Committee this morning.

During a visit I received from the Duc de Almodovar yesterday evening his Excellency said that he feared the situation was again becoming strained.

[8443] No. 354.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March* 12, 1906.

YOU should consult your French colleague as to the desirability of inserting in the final Act of the Conference a clause by which all the Treaty Powers would bind themselves to use their influence with the Sultan in order to obtain his acceptance of the scheme of reforms recommended by them. It would appear, from Mr. Lowther's reports, that the Sultan is likely to make serious difficulties in accepting reforms. Should one or other of the Powers directly or indirectly encourage him in this attitude, the danger incurred by his resistance would be increased. A stipulation made by the members of the Conference, as proposed above, would obviate this.

No. 355.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March* 12, 1906.

M. CAMBON has informed me that the French strongly object that any port should be given to a third Power ; they would prefer instead a Swiss Inspector at Tangier. I replied that, should this be put forward as an alternative, your French colleague would receive your support. In the contrary event, however, I thought that rather than the Conference should break up, the Swiss at Casa Blanca should be accepted by the French. Should the Swiss police fail at Casa Blanca, which was but a minor post, it would not matter in practice, but would illustrate the need of employing only French or Spanish police. Germany was considered, I was sure, by opinion here, and impartial opinion everywhere, to have given way on seven-eighths of the question ; this one small point had been reserved by her, that she might save a little prestige. In practice, French interests would not be endangered by it, for Germany, who apparently asks nothing for herself, would not be brought in.

[8798] No. 356.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 40.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 6, 1906.

ALTHOUGH the disagreement between Raisuli, the ex-brigand, and now Governor of this district, and the Anghera tribe is, for the moment, dormant, matters in the neighbourhood have not remained quiet.

On the 4th instant Raisuli organized a punitive expedition against a village named Ramla, about three hours from Tangier, as the village was supposed to harbour some persons whom the said Raisuli desired to punish.

News had reached the village that the attack was to be made, and it was deserted. The assault was consequently, to a certain point, a success, but the inhabitants had concealed themselves behind some rocks in the neighbourhood, and opened fire upon Raisuli's men, who imagined that all defence had been abandoned.

The result appears to have been that eight of Raisuli's men were killed, and seven wounded. The only success that the attacking party seem to have had was to kill two women who were too feeble to leave the village. The Government troops maintained a neutral attitude.

The Beni Mesowar tribe, in which the village is situated, sympathize with the Anghera tribe, and the feud between the latter and Raisuli will probably now be reopened. It is generally reported that Raisuli has called for a further force, and will attack again on the 8th instant. On the last occasion he is said to have had some 300 men with him.

Reports have reached me that a portion of the Anghera tribe who were partizans of Deylan, whose murder I reported in my despatch No. 17 of the 25th January last, desire to revenge themselves by capturing a European, in order eventually to secure the dismissal of Duas, the Kaïd of the Anghera.

I have warned the Moorish Commissioner of the reports that have reached me, in order that such precautions as are possible may be taken.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to Sir A. Nicolson.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[8853] No. 357.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 62. Conference.)

Sir, *Algeciras, March 7, 1906.*

THE Conference held a general Committee meeting on the 5th instant to discuss the question of organizing a police force in the coast towns of Morocco. M. de Bacheracht, the second Russian Delegate, who has been Russian Minister in Tangier during the past eight years, read a paper, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy. M. de Bacheracht examined the question simply from the point of view of affording the necessary security to foreigners resident in the ports of Morocco, and he disclaimed all idea of allowing political considerations to influence the treatment of the subject. He drew attention to the feebleness of the Moorish Government, and to the avowed powerlessness of the native authorities to guarantee the safety of Europeans; and he dwelt at some length on the inefficacy of any international and collective administration. His local experience enabled him to speak with authority on both of the above points, and I am of opinion that his arguments against entrusting the police organization either to the Moorish authorities or to an international body are unanswerable. His conclusions were to the effect that, in order to secure the establishment of an efficient police force, the duty should be entrusted to France and Spain.

M. de Radowitz read a short document, of which I also beg leave to transmit a copy, in which he laid down the principle that, as all the Powers were equally interested in the organization of the police, they should be called upon to take part in it.

M. Révoil gave a short exposition in support of his view that France and Spain were alone in a position to efficiently and promptly assist the Sultan in organizing a police force. He stated that it was an admitted fact that Morocco was incapable of undertaking the duty with her own resources, and he considered that the internationalization of the police would cause the greatest inconvenience in practice. A copy of M. Révoil's statement is inclosed herewith.

The second Spanish Delegate, M. Perez Caballero, also read a declaration, which was in general conformity with the views expressed by the French and Russian Representatives. I beg leave to forward a copy of his statement.

On the termination of these proceedings I expressed my entire concurrence with the views of the French, Russian, and Spanish Delegates, as they seemed to me to offer the only practical solution of the question.

The Portuguese Delegate said that he desired to associate himself with the remarks which I had made.

No opinion was expressed by any other Delegate.

Some conversation ensued as to what should be our procedure in connection with the police question, and I had hoped that we should have been able to continue our discussion to-day in a general Committee meeting; but Marquis Visconti Venosta expressed a desire that the discussion on the bank question should be resumed on the 8th instant, and this was eventually agreed to, on the understanding that, as soon as the bank discussion was concluded, the Conference should resolve itself into general Committee on the police question.

I regret that so long an adjournment was accepted by the Conference, as there is no reason why both to-day and yesterday should pass without any sitting at all, and I was suprised that a motion for the adjournment till the 8th instant was proposed and passed. As I have on more than one occasion endeavoured to expedite our business, without much success I must admit, I did not think it advisable to press the matter once more, especially as I observed a fairly general desire to allow a few more days to elapse before returning to the police question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 357.

Views of Russian Delegate respecting Organization of Police in Morocco.

SI les Nations représentées ici sont intéressées à la solution du problème Marocain à des degrés différents, selon l'importance et l'étendue de leurs intérêts dans cette partie de l'Afrique, il y a un point, cependant, qui doit les rallier toutes au même degré, c'est celui qui touche à la sécurité personnelle de nos nationaux, à la sauvegarde de leur vie, de leurs foyers, de leur liberté et de leurs biens. Cette sécurité, on le sait, a été fortement compromise ces dernières années, au fur et à mesure de l'affaiblissement graduel du pouvoir central, dont l'autorité, de son propre aveu, est désormais impuissante à la garantir.

A mon avis, cette question prime toutes les autres. Elle doit être placée au dessus et en dehors de toute arrière-pensée politique, et les mesures aptes à rétablir et à maintenir l'ordre doivent être discutées dans un esprit de concorde, uniquement préoccupé de trouver les moyens les plus efficaces d'arriver, sans aucun retard, à un résultat qui satisfasse les légitimes aspirations des étrangers domiciliés au Maroc.

Il est peut-être difficile de compter dans cette œuvre sur un concours spontané de la part des Marocains. Mais il est possible de tabler sur le bon vouloir du Sultan qui, s'il n'envisage pas le progrès tout-à-fait de la même façon que nous, est sans doute désireux de favoriser le développement et la sécurité du commerce par lesquels ses revenus peuvent s'augmenter et les moyens lui être fournis de consolider son autorité. Ce résultat, c'est uniquement par l'organisation d'une troupe de police qu'il peut l'obtenir.

Il s'agit donc d'examiner cette question sous le double point de vue des ressources financières à trouver pour l'entretien de cette troupe, et des éléments à employer pour son organisation sur les bases de la discipline et d'un bon commandement.

On avance aujourd'hui que l'instruction et l'organisation de ces troupes de police devraient être confiées, en vertu d'un mandat Européen collectif, à des officiers instructeurs choisis parmi des ressortissants des diverses Puissances et des États neutres. La stérilité des efforts tentés sous ce rapport par des officiers étrangers au service du Sultan est surabondamment prouvée par vingt années de travaux qui n'ont pas réussi à former une troupe tant soit peu utile et disciplinée à la manière Européenne. Si l'activité dans ce sens d'officiers distingués de toute nationalité n'a pas été couronnée de succès, c'est par la simple raison qu'ils étaient tenus à l'écart de tout contrôle et de tout moyen d'appliquer les principes de discipline les plus élémentaires. Comment voudrait-on, après cela, que des instructeurs agissant au nom d'un vague mandat collectif, ne connaissant ni la langue ni les coutumes du pays, réussissent à faire quelque chose là où tant d'autres, mieux placés, ont échoué?

La moindre connaissance du Maroc vous amènera à la conclusion que rien ne s'y obtient autrement que par une insistance énergique et persévérante dans des conditions d'unité qui assurent l'efficacité des efforts.

Dans le cas spécial qui nous occupe, avec une organisation faite d'éléments internationaux multiples et variés, qui interviendrait ? Qui insisterait sur l'exécution des engagements ? Qui, enfin, surveillerait—point essentiel—le fonctionnement régulier du recrutement, les châtiments en cas d'insubordination ou de désertion ?

Quelle action collective a jamais donné quelque résultat durable dans cet ordre d'idées ?

D'ailleurs, les Marocains n'ignorent pas ce que c'est que l'Europe collective. Elle ne leur inspire ni crainte ni respect, car ils ont sous les yeux l'image permanente de son impuissance sous la forme du Conseil Sanitaire, qui, composé des Représentants de toutes les nations accréditées à la Cour Chérifienne, siège en permanence à Tanger. Cette assemblée, je puis bien le constater, en faisant partie depuis bientôt huit ans, malgré l'utilité et la persévérance de ses conseils, ne parvient qu'à grande peine à obtenir du Maghzen les mesures nécessaires pour la préservation de ce pays du danger d'invasions épidémiques et elle a à lutter pied à pied chaque année avec le Gouvernement Marocain, même sous ce rapport. Quant à l'exercice des autres pouvoirs qui ont été conférés au Conseil Sanitaire en vertu de Firmans Chérifiens, tels par exemple que la surveillance de mesures d'hygiène dans l'intérieur des villes, les questions de l'adduction des eaux, des abattoires, des marchés, &c.; il se heurte à chaque pas à d'invincibles résistances de la part des autorités locales et à un mauvais vouloir érigé par elles, dirait-on, en système. C'est à un tel point vrai, que toutes ces questions de la dernière importance pour la ville de Tanger, dont la population a au moins doublé ces dernières dix années, n'approchent même pas, depuis ce temps, de leur solution, malgré tous nos incessants efforts ! L'Europe réunie en Conseil ne réussit même pas à obtenir le balayage du marché, dont l'état de saleté repoussant est le signe quotidien de l'impuissance du Conseil Sanitaire, impuissance émanant de son vice original : la collectivité. Et l'on voudrait confier à un tel régime, fondé sur ces mêmes principes, l'exécution de réformes bien autrement importantes et difficiles que le coup de balai que nous ne parvenons même pas à faire donner au marché de Tanger !

Une expérience de huit années du Conseil Sanitaire me met en mesure d'affirmer que l'internationalisation de la police au Maroc ne donnera jamais de résultats pratiques appréciables.

Il se peut que le Maghzen ait des préférences pour une solution semblable, mais c'est uniquement parce qu'une longue expérience lui a appris à connaître les hésitations et la faiblesse des efforts collectifs des Puissances.

S'il est admissible que des expériences soient encore tentées dans le domaine de l'Administration et des Finances, il ne saurait en être de même là, où sont engagées la vie et la sécurité de nos concitoyens. Ici il faut agir avec promptitude et à coup sûr. Il est à remarquer que si la Conférence ne réussissait pas à remédier à l'état de choses déplorable actuellement existant, il empirerait certes en proportion même de l'impunité qu'elle consacrerait par le fait de l'insouciance apparente, en face des Marocains, du monde civilisé pour les étrangers domiciliés au Maroc. A ce point de vue la Conférence assumerait une responsabilité que, pour ma part, je ne voudrais pas partager.

L'idée d'abandonner au Maghzen, après tout ce que nous en connaissons, et après son propre aveu d'impuissance, le soin des mesures à prendre pour veiller à la sécurité des Européens, ne peut être prise en considération sérieuse par quiconque est au fait des conditions locales durant les trois dernières années, et j'en appelle sous ce rapport à l'expérience de mes collègues de Tanger, ci-présents.

S'il est donc réellement question d'améliorer l'état des choses, là au moins où résident des colonies étrangères, cela ne se pourra jamais qu'en vertu d'un mandat confié par les Puissances à une autorité réelle. Dans le cas présent, cette autorité ne saurait, d'après mon avis, être représentée que par la France et l'Espagne, seules en mesure, par leur position géographique, de Puissances limitrophes, de par les moyens dont elles disposent, d'assumer sans aucun délai, pour une courte durée, tout en sauvegardant la souveraineté du Sultan par le maintien de son autorité effective, la tâche de concourir à l'organisation, dans certaines villes du littoral, de corps de troupes de police Marocains.

Pour présider et veiller à l'organisation de cette troupe la France dispose, comme l'Espagne aussi, d'un excellent instrument au moyen de cadres de sous-officiers Algériens ou Rifains, Musulmans de foi et de race. Des officiers Français et Espagnols seraient désignés pour inaugurer ce service d'instruction. Un officier Français, accompagné de plusieurs sous-officiers Algériens, a même déjà, sur l'ordre exprès du Sultan, commencé à l'organiser à Tanger. Pour arriver à un bon résultat il ne suffirait d'ailleurs circonscrire ces officiers dans le rôle stricte d'instructeurs, mais il serait essentiel de les investir d'une certaine autorité pratique, et avant tout d'un contrôle sur le paiement régulier de la solde, dont une grande partie, jusqu'ici, est détournée de son emploi légitime, ce qui réduit souvent les soldats à la nécessité, pour ne pas mourir de faim, soit de vendre leurs objets d'équipement et leurs armes, soit de déserter, ce à quoi nous assistons chaque jour. Il s'agirait ainsi, tout en laissant le commandement aux officiers Marocains, d'investir les instructeurs d'une autorité effective et d'un moyen de contrôle permanent.

Les corps de troupes ainsi constitués serviraient dans l'avenir de modèles au Gouvernement Chérifien pour en constituer de semblables avec ses propres sujets, sans éléments étrangers, et assurer graduellement, dans l'ensemble du pays, l'ordre et la sécurité, sans lesquels toutes les réformes, tous les droits acquis par les Européens, sont et resteront illusoires.

Une fois l'ordre rétabli dans ce pays qui peut être appelé à un avenir si prospère, toutes les nations du globe pourront y appliquer, sous l'égide d'une complète égalité de concurrence, leur activité économique, commerciale, et industrielle pour le plus grand bien du monde civilisé et du Maroc, entraîné lui-même à y participer.

Inclosure 2 in No. 357.

Declaration by the German Delegate respecting the Police Question.

L'UNE des bases pour les travaux de ce Congrès est le principe de la liberté économique dans le Maroc, sans aucune inégalité.

Or, cette liberté économique et le développement des intérêts commerciaux au Maroc dépendent, en premier lieu, du maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité dans l'Empire Chérifien.

Le Sultan du Maroc, dans l'exercice de sa souveraineté, aura à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour la garantie de la sécurité des personnes et des biens des étrangers. La nécessité s'impose aux Puissances Signataires de lui venir en aide par l'organisation d'une troupe de police suffisante, à établir dans les places déterminées.

Les Puissances Signataires, étant également intéressées à cette organisation, devront être appelées à y prendre part.

Inclosure 3 in No. 357.

Declaration by the French Delegate respecting the Police Question.

LA France n'a jamais conçu une organisation de la police qui ne respectât pas l'indépendance et la souveraineté du Sultan. Pour ne rappeler que les négociations qui ont eu lieu à l'occasion de la fixation du programme de la Conférence, nous avons posé spontanément le principe que les corps de police seraient placés sous l'autorité Chérifienne.

Il est reconnu toutefois que, quelle que soit sa bonne volonté, le Maghzen est actuellement hors d'état d'organiser lui-même et par ses seuls moyens ses corps de police et d'assurer leur entretien et leur fonctionnement régulier et utile.

Il faut donc que le Maroc y soit aidé. Si nous nous plaçons au point de vue pratique, on reconnaîtra que la France et avec elle l'Espagne sont seules aptes à fournir cette aide avec promptitude et efficacité. Elles seules peuvent mettre sans délai au service du Maghzen des instructeurs parlant la langue et connaissant les mœurs du pays, ayant déjà l'expérience des troupes indigènes semblables à celles qu'on veut créér. Elles seules sont en état de fournir, avec les officiers nécessaires, des sous-officiers Musulmans.

Il est bien entendu que la désignation de ces officiers doit être soumise à l'agrément du Sultan, que les corps de police resteront placés sous le commandement des autorités Chérifiennes, que le rôle des officiers se bornera à prêter à ces autorités les concours technique pour l'exercice du commandement et le maintien de la discipline. Ils pourvoieront à l'instruction des troupes, surveilleront leur bonne administration, et contrôleront le paiement régulier de la solde. On a fait très justement ressortir l'importance de ce dernier point.

L'expérience que la Conférence vient de prendre de la situation du Maroc démontre qu'il faut limiter l'organisation de cette police aux besoins les plus immédiats, au

premier rang desquels figure la sécurité dans les ports ouverts au commerce et dans leur banlieue.

Il suffira d'effectifs réduits et, à première vue, il semble que 400 ou 500 hommes dans un ou deux ports principaux, 150 à 200 dans les autres, peuvent suffire. On arriverait ainsi pour l'ensemble des huits ports à un total approximatif de 2,000 à 2,500 hommes, sous la direction de seize officiers environ, avec une moyenne de quatre sous-officiers par port

Cette organisation s'inspirerait d'ailleurs des principes déjà acceptés par le Maghzen quand la question a été traitée à Fez.

Dans ces proportions, avec ce mandat limité et pour une courte durée, il est impossible de découvir quelle atteinte une semblable organisation pourrait porter à l'indépendance du Sultan et à la libre concurrence économique des étrangers.

L'internationalisation de la police n'ajouterait aucune garantie et aurait les plus grands inconvénients pratiques.

D'ailleurs, les Gouvernements, d'une part, et, sur place, le Corps Diplomatique et les Consuls, si vigilants pour tout ce qui concerne leur colonies, ne seront-ils pas toujours en mesure de s'assurer que cette organisation n'est pas détournée de son but et ne lèse aucun des intérêts de leur nationaux ?

C'est dans cet esprit que nous acceptons la réforme ainsi conçue. Elle assurera le résultat pratique qu'on souhaite atteindre le plus promptement possible, et elle tient compte en même temps des légitimes intérêts de la France, en tant que Puissance Musulmane dans l'Afrique du Nord et de l'intérêt spécial qui s'ensuit pour elle à ce que l'ordre règne dans l'Empire Chérifien.

Le 5 Mars, 1906.

Inclosure 4 in No. 357.

Views of Spanish Delegate respecting the Organization of Police in Morocco.

Si j'ai bien compris, le point de vue de la Délégation Allemande consisterait à soutenir que, si un concours étranger est nécessaire pour la réorganisation de la police au Maroc, ce concours doit être international ; tout autre système étant d'abord contraire à l'égalité des Puissances, et pouvant être un risque pour l'application effective du principe de liberté économique au Maroc, auquel chacun des Délégués ici présents a donné son adhésion dès le moment même de l'ouverture de la Conférence.

Je tiens, en premier lieu, à faire observer que l'acceptation du programme de la Conférence par les différents Gouvernements n'a pas préjugé que les diverses questions soumises à notre examen seraient résolues dans un sens déterminé plutôt que dans un autre. Le fond des questions est resté, à ce moment, intact ; spécialement en ce qui concerne l'organisation de la police au Maroc, le fait d'avoir admis que l'affaire serait étudiée par l'ensemble des Puissances ne nous engageait pas, en aucune façon, à admettre plus tard que, si un concours étranger était à prêter au Maghzen à cet effet, ce concours devait être collectif.

A ce caractère collectif du concours la Délégation Espagnole opposera un argument dont la force n'échappera aux yeux de personne. L'importance du but, tant en lui-même que par le fait d'être devenu l'objet de cette Conférence, réclame que les efforts des Puissances pour y atteindre soient de nature à surmonter les obstacles éventuels. Et, nous le disons avec toute netteté, nous ne croyons pas que la cohésion, l'unité de direction indispensable, existeraient, si pour maintenir entre les Puissances une égalité artificielle l'on confiait à leur ensemble une tâche si délicate et si complexe ; surtout si on la leur confiait aujourd'hui, en présentant ce système comme destiné à assurer l'équilibre des influences politiques au Maroc.

Les Puissances ici représentées ont, sans doute, un intérêt commun à ce que l'ordre et la tranquillité règnent au Maroc, puisque telle est la condition du progrès économique du pays et du développement des relations commerciales. En faveur de l'avenir, on pourrait faire abstraction des chiffres actuelles du commerce et des entreprises des différentes Puissances au Maroc et en considérer les intérêts comme égaux à ce point de vue ; mais il ne faut pas oublier que l'Espagne et la France ont au Maroc d'autres intérêts en dehors de l'intérêt économique. Je ne parlerai pas du souci particulier que tout ce qui a trait à la sécurité des Colonies Européennes au Maroc doit inspirer au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Catholique, dont les ressortissants y sont les plus nombreux ; j'insisterai seulement sur les rapports de voisinage.

Les Délégués Allemands ont reconnu, à la première séance de Comité et à la troisième séance officielle, la parité des situations de l'Espagne et de la France à ce sujet ; mais, le droit de régler directement avec Sa Majesté Chérifienne les questions relatives à la police des régions frontières n'est qu'une garantie incomplète de cette situation. Lorsque nous avons pris l'intégrité des États Marocains comme base de nos délibérations, nous avons reconnu implicitement que, malgré des différences géographiques et ethniques et des liens administratifs relachés, les diverses parties de l'Empire Chérifien constituent une unité qui rende les unes solidaires des autres. Les événements politiques sur un point du Moghreb ont leur répercussion sur les autres ; et, de fait, par exemple, si les environs de Melilla sont depuis deux années dans un état de trouble qui oblige les autorités Espagnoles à une surveillance spéciale et continuelle et à donner asile à des centaines d'indigènes fugitifs, il y a là un effet de l'insurrection du Roghi, qui certainement n'est pas née dans les régions frontières Espagnoles.

Du reste, ce n'est pas sur le terrain des intérêts de telle ou telle puissance, mais sur celui de sa spéciale compétence pour la tâche à réaliser, que la Délégation Russe pose la question. Je ne vois, donc, comment le concours de l'Espagne et de la France à l'organisation de la police Marocain pourrait être un danger pour la liberté économique. Je ne comprends pas quelle espèce d'action nuisible à ce principe pourraient exercer ces Puissances dans un pays où il est établi que les tarifs et les formalités douanières seront les mêmes pour les marchandises de toute provenance et où l'on va prescrire qu'aucun service public ne sera aligné au profit des particuliers et que les travaux publics feront toujours l'objet d'adjudications, sans exception de nationalité.

En cette matière il ne faut pas perdre de vue la distinction qui existe entre l'organisation technique de la police et les dispositions de police, lesquelles, en effet, pourraient dans une certaine mesure avoir une influence sur le liberté du trafic. Mais, personne ne peut oublier qu'il ne s'est jamais agi de substituer à l'autorité et à l'administration Chérifienne une autre autorité et une autre administration. Ce que l'on propose d'organiser c'est un instrument auxiliaire ; un moyen efficace d'exécution pour les arrêts du Maghzen ; mais la volonté qui dictera ces arrêts et qui donnera le mouvement au dit instrument continuera toujours à être souveraine. De celle-ci, donc, toutes les Puissances pourront réciamer le respect pratique de l'égalité économique.

[8791] No. 358.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 44. Confidential.)

Sir, *Madrid, March* 9, 1906.

SEÑOR MORET, President of the Council of Ministers, who returned yesterday from San Sebastian, received me this morning.

His Excellency was good enough to say that he remembered me from twenty years ago, when I often had the honour of meeting him in this house, and he gave me a very cordial welcome.

After remarking on the unusually high pitch of popular enthusiasm which had been aroused at San Sebastian by the presence of the future Queen of Spain, and on the delicacy and tact displayed by Queen Christina in connection with the recent ceremony in the Chateau of Miramar, Señor Moret spoke of the general political situation. I expressed, as I had already done to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, the satisfaction of His Majesty's Government at the proofs which Spain had given at Algeciras of her desire to proceed in close co-operation with France and England. I added that you counted on her steady adherence to this policy, which was founded on the conception that the Powers most interested in the Mediterranean, who had made mutual engagements, satisfactory to each other, with regard to Mediterranean questions, should act together in upholding those engagements.

Señor Moret said that your confidence was not misplaced. He had felt no hesitation in following the policy of England, but he hoped that it did not exclude a return to more friendly relations with Germany.

I replied that, on the contrary, a better understanding with Germany was sincerely desired by His Majesty's Government, but that it must be preceded by some proof, as regards the present Morocco crisis, that Germany is prepared to recognise the validity of existing international arrangements, and that she does not intend to interfere with the friendly relations so happily established between England and France.

Señor Moret hoped that yesterday's proceedings at Algeciras might be taken as an indication that Germany is preparing to adopt a more conciliatory attitude.

Señor Moret expressed great gratification at the message which the King entrusted to me before my departure from England, conveying His Majesty's compliments to the Spanish Prime Minister.

I have, &c.
(Signed) M. DE BUNSEN.

[8889] No. 359.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 104. Confidential.)

Paris, March 11, 1906.

Sir,

I OBTAINED an appointment to see M. Rouvier yesterday evening in order to carry out the instructions which I had had the honour to receive from you in the morning (telegram No. 31, of the 9th instant).

His Excellency said that the Austrian scheme for the policing of the ports of Morocco was an acceptable basis, but there were some objectionable features in it which required to be eliminated. France had shown the greatest possible moderation and conciliation. It was now for Germany to display like qualities, for there had not been much of them on her part down to the present time. The Austrian scheme was, of course, a German project, and the distribution of seven of the ports between French and Spanish police instructors had been ably arranged in a manner to cause friction between France and Spain. The question of what ports should be policed with French instructors and which ones should have Spanish instructors was a matter which ought to be settled by arrangement between the French and Spanish Governments. The Austro-German scheme allotted Casa Blanca to a Dutch or Swiss inspector, who, in addition to exercising a supervision of the police at the seven other ports, was to organize the Casa Blanca police force. There was no reason why the police at Casa Blanca should be on a different footing to the police of the other ports. The French Government objected to the Inspector-General being a subject of one of the minor States, but as a concession to Germany they would consent; but they would not agree to a Dutchman holding the appointment. They would prefer a Dane to a Swiss, but they would waive their preference if absolutely necessary to bring about an agreement. They held that the Inspector should have powers of inspection at all the eight ports, but no authority of command or organization over the police or their instructors at any of them. The Inspector should be appointed by the Sultan of Morocco, and make his reports to His Majesty, and not to the Diplomatic Body at Tangier, which was not competent to decide questions of police organization.

M. Rouvier considers that a police force organized by the subjects of a minor State would be incompetent to maintain order at Casa Blanca, for the Moors forming the force would have no respect for instructors from a small State.

M. Rouvier's objection to a Dutchman as Inspector is that a person of that nationality would probably be under German influence, and his preference for a Dane is grounded on the belief that an Inspector of that nationality would be amenable to Russian and French and English influence. If, however, a great point were made by Germany of a Swiss holding the appointment, the French Government would consent.

I told M. Rouvier that Sir Arthur Nicolson had reported to you that he doubted Germany giving way further than concurrence in the Austrian scheme, and that having regard to the favourable view taken of it by the majority of the Representatives at Algeciras, it would be most unfortunate that the Conference should be broken up on such an issue as now separated the French and German Governments, and you had instructed me to inform his Excellency, as you had stated to M. Cambon, that, in your opinion, the Austrian proposal was a real concession on the part of Germany, and had brought an agreement so near, that it would not do to let the Conference come to an end without a settlement.

M. Rouvier expressed the opinion that the Conference would not close without result, for he had good reason to believe that Germany would end by accepting the modifications in the police scheme desired by France. His Excellency rather demurred to the supposition that the Conference was so favourably impressed by the Austrian scheme. He said that France still counted on her side Spain, England,

Russia, Portugal, and others had only been gained over by the German Delegates having persuaded them that Germany would make no further concessions.

As M. Rouvier will probably be out of office in a few days, it is natural that he should strongly object to make further concessions to Germany, and so incur reproaches in the Chamber from his successor and odium in the country.

The repetitions of Sir E. Goschen's telegram No. 4 of the 9th, of Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 91, without date, and of your telegram to him in reply thereto reached me after I had returned to the Embassy from my visit to M. Rouvier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[8890] No. 360.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 23.) *En clair.* *Paris, March 13, 1906.*

"TEMPS" of this evening states that the following instructions to the French Delegate at the Algeciras Conference were again confirmed by M. Rouvier yesterday:—

"1. Dans l'ensemble se prêter, comme par le passé, à toutes les transactions, mais à la condition formelle que l'intérêt spécial de la France en matière politique soit sauvegardé, et que ses droits contractuels en matière économique ne soient pas abandonnés sans une équitable compensation.

"2. Dans la question de la banque, admettre une réduction de nos demandes primitives; accepter, comme marque extrême de notre esprit de conciliation, une part pour la France, trois pour les établissements Français déjà créanciers du Maroc pour 65 millions, et bénéficiaires indiscutés d'un droit de contrôle et de préférence.

"3. Dans la question de la police, accepter, si cette police est Franco-Espagnole, la création d'une inspection; se prêter à ce que cette inspection soit aussi efficace et aussi forte que possible, mais, en revanche, n'admettre à aucun prix qu'elle se transforme en une collaboration, et refuser catégoriquement que l'Inspecteur ait le commandement direct d'un port."

[8882] No. 361.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 98.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March 13, 1906.*

IT has been considered advisable to suspend the sittings of the Conference for two or three days, as the members of the Drafting Committee have been unable to come to any agreement in regard to the principal points of the police and bank questions.

In the present delicate state of affairs here, matters might be precipitated by a single false step, and I told the Duke of Almodovar, who consulted me as to the advisability of postponing to-day's sitting, that, in my opinion, it would be the wisest course, as it was possible that at an official sitting the existing disagreement might be accentuated.

I received a visit yesterday from M. de Radowitz, who told me that he had suggested to the German Government, by telegraph, that the proposed Inspector should not act as instructor at a port, but should have his head-quarters at Tangier. They had replied that his proposal could not be accepted, nor his former instructions modified.

He gave me positive assurances that there was no intention of "bluffing," and he impressed on me that Germany had said her last word.

I begged M. de Radowitz to be quite unreserved and frank with me, and asked him if I were to understand that there was no possibility of any other compromise or combination being entertained, and if I must take his reply as the final word of Germany on the subject. He said that such was the case, and authorized me to convey this to M. Révoil.

He wished, he said, to tell me, but only for my own private information, that the fact of having gone so far in the way of concession had cost the German Emperor no small effort, and he trusted that the French Government would understand and

appreciate His Majesty's desire to render the settlement of the matter as acceptable as possible to them.

I understand that M. de Radowitz saw the Duke of Almodovar on the evening of the 11th instant, and hinted to him that there was a danger of the German Emperor withdrawing his Delegates from the Conference if the French persistently refused to agree to the point at issue.

The situation here presents itself to me as follows:—

1. M. Révoil and his Government appear to consider that the German Government will concede the point at issue. To my mind, no further concessions can be expected from Germany.

2. The German Government must insist on a third Power having charge of the police at one port, in order to introduce the principle of internationalization, but in as modified a form as possible. They are determined not to allow all the police to be under France and Spain.

3. France, on the other hand, says she will not accept, in any form whatever, the principle of internationalization.

4. The Conference must end in a failure if the two parties do not come to an agreement; and in the present circumstances, if a failure occurs, the responsibility will, in the opinion of the majority of the members of the Conference, rest less with Germany than with France.

5. I think it quite possible that France would, in the question of the State Bank, be able to obtain the concession she desires from Germany were she to concede the point at issue.

[8874] No. 362.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 99.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 13, 1906.

THE necessity of binding all the Powers to exert their influence to obtain the Sultan's consent to any reforms which the Conference may adopt has formed the subject of several conversations between M. Révoil and myself; and we proposed to submit a draft Article, which would meet the case, to our respective Governments, when the moment arrived. We also thought it advisable that the Sultan's adhesion to the decisions of the Conference should be obtained, in the name of the Powers, by the Doyen of the Diplomatic Body, M. Mulmusi (the Italian Minister), who could proceed to Fez for the purpose.

We intended to submit these proposals when there was a prospect of an agreement being reached by the Conference. I will again consult M. Révoil on the matter, as put forward in your telegram No. 51 of yesterday's date.

Yesterday M. de Radowitz, expressed to me his conviction that all reforms which the Conference might adopt would be accepted by the Sultan.

[8872] No. 363.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 100. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 13, 1906.

I HAVE just received a visit from M. Révoil. I was pleased to hear from him that, in reply to a request from his Government for his views on the position of affairs, he proposes to inform them that he considers it advisable to agree to the Austrian proposal that the Inspector should be stationed at Casa Blanca. He desires to see me again this evening, by which time his communication to Paris will be drafted, and I shall thus be enabled to report fully to you.

I think it advisable that nothing should be said on the subject before his Government have received this communication, and I propose to telegraph to you later on in further detail.

[8872] No. 364.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Lascelles.**

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March* 13, 1906.

ALGECIRAS Conference.

The German Ambassador has urged that the Austrian police proposal should be accepted, as it represents a great concession on the part of Germany. While cordially recognizing this advance, I have impressed upon him that matters should not be spoilt by making the question of having neutral police at Casa Blanca a vital one.

[8872] No. 365.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Lascelles.†

(No. 95.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 13, 1906.

COUNT METTERNICH read to me to-day the purport of a communication from his Government to the effect that the German Government had thought last Saturday that an agreement had been reached at Algeciras, owing to the great concession which they had made. But since then a change had taken place, and now, in spite of the fact that all the Delegates there, including Sir A. Nicolson, had expressed to Herr von Radowitz the opinion that the French ought to concede the small points still outstanding, it appeared that the French would not give way.

I said I did not think Sir A. Nicolson had said the French ought to accept the Austrian proposal unconditionally. But I recognized that the advance which Germany made had produced a very favourable impression, and, speaking for myself personally, I said I shared this impression, and had been convinced that Germany now desired an agreement at the Conference, and had taken a real step of her own to make such an agreement possible. There was, however, the difficulty about establishing Swiss police or police of a third Power at Casa Blanca, and I hoped that Germany, having gone so far as to concede that the police should be French or Spanish at seven of the ports, would not consider it vital that there should not be French or Spanish police at a small place like Casa Blanca, the more so as I understood that in principle the question of having a General Inspector of neutral nationality had been conceded.

Count Metternich said that unless the Inspector had some police of his own, as he would have at Casa Blanca, he would be too much in the air, and that it was necessary for him, in order to have influence, to have the knowledge and experience he would gain from having some police under his immediate control.

I said, on the contrary, it appeared to me that there was something worse than being in the air, and that was being in a hole. If the Inspector had police under his control at Casa Blanca, he would have to make his head-quarters in that small place, and he would be hampered in travelling about, as it was intended he should do, by his local responsibilities.

Count Metternich did not take this view, and I could only again urge that I hoped the German Government would not consider the question of Casa Blanca a vital point, in view of the fact that there were other questions such as that of the Bank and of the Inspector under discussion, and would not allow the point about Casa Blanca to prevent an agreement being reached.

Count Metternich said he might urge with equal force that, after the large concession the German Government had made, so small a point should not be held against them.

I told him that I thought these details could not be discussed at length here. The impression I wished to leave upon him was that we had been impressed by the desire of the German Government to reach an agreement, for the last few weeks there had been a dead-lock; now it was only a hitch, and I hoped the German Government would not make a vital matter of the small points still outstanding.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

---

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 38) and Sir A. Nicolson (No. 53).
† Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 159).

[9015] No. 366.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, March 14, 1906.*

IN consequence of your telegram No. 23 of yesterday, I went to-day to see the Political Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and I showed him the telegram which I sent you yesterday (No. 23) giving extracts from the "Temps."

M. Louis stated that the article in the "Temps" was by a writer who has access to good information. The general sense, but not the actual text, of the instructions to the French Delegate is given in the article.

These instructions were communicated to you by M. Cambon. They have not since then been altered in any respect.

The new Government have confirmed in their declaration before the Chambers the general foreign policy of their predecessors, but have not yet had the necessary time to study details. M. Bourgeois will probably not yet be in a position to decide what further instructions, if any, should be sent to the French Delegate at Algeciras.

M. Louis said that he would communicate the message contained in your telegram No. 40 of to-day, which I read to him, to M. Bourgeois, who would be very grateful for it.

[9019] No. 367.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 57.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, March 14, 1906.*

A COMPLAINT has been lodged at the Foreign Office by the German Ambassador against the extravagant demands which, in reply to recent concessions on the part of Germany, have been raised by the French Government.

[9008] No. 368.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 101.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March 14, 1906.*

LAST evening my French colleague sent his Government a telegram, which he read to me. In it he clearly explained that either the German terms must be accepted or the Conference must break up. He expressed his opinion that, on the following conditions, the terms should be accepted:—

1. The French and Spanish officers should not be under the control or command of the Swiss Inspector.

2. The Sultan, and not the Diplomatic Body, should receive the Inspector's reports. It might be agreed, if the matter is pressed, that the Swiss Government should also be furnished with reports by the Inspector for communication to the several Powers.

3. The Swiss Government should appoint the Inspector, and the Sultan should confirm his appointment.

4. The senior French and Spanish Instructors should alternately inspect the Swiss police contingent at Casablanca.

5. The French and Spanish Governments should settle in agreement with the Sultan the question of the distribution of the French and Spanish Instructors among the several ports.

6. France's agreement to Germany's terms should be made dependent on an agreement being reached on the bank question, and on the assent of Germany being obtained to the insertion, in the final Protocol of the Conference, of a clause to the effect that the present position of persons in the service of the Sultan should be respected.

The object of this latter condition is to preclude the dispatch to Fez of a German military mission.

In regard to the bank question the French would be prepared to make some reduction in their claims respecting the amount of capital to be allotted to them, but not to reduce them to such an extent as the Germans demand.

M. Révoil is of opinion that France can only agree to Germany's terms if his conditions are accepted.

He has suggested to his Government that they should consult you in the matter, and should they fall in with his views, his idea is that I should, on their behalf, enter into private negotiations with M. de Radowitz.

May I do so when the moment arrives?

I venture to think that our mediation might be of future benefit. I have already broken the ice with the German First Delegate.

[8890] No. 369.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March 14, 1906.*

YOU should inform M. Rouvier, and I shall tell M. Cambon to-day, that we shall continue to support the French Government, even if they think it impossible to concede the police at Casa Blanca, which, from the published instructions to M. Révoil, I gather to be the case.

[8889] No. 370.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 54)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March 14, 1906.*

IN the course of the conversation recorded in my telegram No. 53 of yesterday's date, the German Ambassador stated that the German Delegate had been told that France ought to concede the outstanding points by all his colleagues, including yourself. I told Count Metternich that the view that France ought unconditionally to accept the Austrian proposal as regards the police could not have been expressed by you.

We must support France's resistance to the proposal about the police at Casa Blanca, should she resent our pressing her on that point, of which there appears to be some danger.

[8890] No. 371.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 161.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 14, 1906.*

I ASKED M. Cambon to come to see me to-day, and told him that I had noticed in the papers that the instructions from M. Rouvier to M. Révoil had been published, and that they contained a very categorical instruction to resist the establishment of neutral police at any port whatever. I gathered from this that the French Government had made up their mind that under no circumstances could they agree to Casa Blanca being intrusted to the police of a third Power. If this was so, I wished to tell M. Cambon, in view of what I had said a day or two ago, and to prevent any misunderstanding, that we should of course continue our support at the Conference to the French attitude.

M. Cambon told me that he had reported me the other day to Paris as having expressed myself to the effect that, though I thought the Conference should not be allowed to break up on such a small point as that of Casa Blanca, and I hoped the French would be able to concede that point in the last resort rather than break up the Conference, yet I would support whatever solution they might put forward.

I said that was quite accurate, and I had only wished to see him to-day because these instructions to M. Révoil had appeared in the papers. I wished to make sure that there was no misunderstanding as to our continuing to give our support to the French at the Conference.

M. Cambon said he had no information as to these instructions, and he assumed that they were unauthorized, and gave only the purport or a summary, and not the text.

I am, &c,
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[9123] No. 372.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 15.)

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, March* 15, 1906.

I HAVE been privately informed that Count Witte has stated on high German authority (which is not, however, that of the German Ambassador) that Sir A. Nicolson has expressed approval of the proposal made at the Morocco Conference by Austria on the subject of the police.

I thought it well, in view of this statement, to address a note to Count Lamsdorff, giving the substance of your telegram No. 62 of yesterday, in which you state that, even if they cannot give way as regards the police at Casablanca, the French Government will continue to receive the support of His Majesty's Government.

[9115] No. 373.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 15.)

(No. 102.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 15, 1906.

IN conversation with the German First Delegate I have confined myself to what I have reported in my telegrams, and most certainly have not said nor implied that France ought to yield on any outstanding point.

I was asked by M. de Radowitz last evening whether M. Révoil's instructions had arrived, and I told him that as yet I believed they had not. The German Delegate also inquired if any fresh instructions had reached me. I said not, and added that I hardly expected any for the moment, as the wishes of the French Government would, of course, receive the support of His Majesty's Government.

M. de Radowitz repeated that he had spoken his last word. He believed, however, that the several Governments were interchanging views in regard to the police. He also complained that the French had raised all kinds of difficulties at the meeting of the drafting Committee yesterday morning, which he said had been a most unsatisfactory one.

I avoided a discussion of this question with M. de Radowitz. I am informed by my Secretary and Interpreter, who assisted at the meeting, as well as by others, that almost every point which was raised was met by an objection from the German Second Delegate, who displayed a most overbearing attitude.

[9122] No. 374.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 16.)

(No. 27.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, March* 15, 1906.

I HAD some conversation with M. Bourgeois at a party at the Elysée to-night on the subject of Morocco. He asked me to convey to you the most cordial thanks of himself and the French Government for the welcome message contained in your telegram No. 40 of the 14th instant, and he wished me to tell you that it was most opportune, as it reached him at a critical moment and had been made use of with excellent effect.

He promised to give me fuller explanations when there was a better opportunity for confidential conversation than was then possible.

[9123] No. 375.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Spring-Rice.

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March* 16, 1906.

GERMAN Ambassador made a statement similar to that reported in your telegram No. 58 of yesterday's date. Sir A. Nicolson has telegraphed, in reply, that he most certainly expressed no opinion to German Delegate that any outstanding point should be conceded by France.

French Government will, of course, continue to receive support from His Majesty's Government on all points.

[9352] No. 376.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 17.)

(No. 103.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 16, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Delegate of the United States has received a letter from the Grand Rabbi of Tangier, stating that the Jews in Morocco are well treated, and suggesting that a declaration at the Conference that the United States' Government noted with satisfaction the good treatment afforded to the Jewish subjects of the Sultan by His Majesty, and hoped that it would be continued.

Mr. White has inquired of his Government, by telegraph, what action he should take, and, with your approval, I would suggest adopting the course indicated to him. He has caused a careful examination to be made of the statement of complaints formulated by the Jews, and has found that there is no real foundation for most of them.

[9371] No. 377.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 17.)

(No. 104.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 17, 1906.

IT has been decided to postpone the meeting of the Conference, which it was intended to hold to-day, in the hope that delay may afford an opportunity for the exchange of views between the Governments of Berlin and of one or two other Powers leading to a possible solution of the questions still pending.

I was asked by M. de Radowitz again yesterday whether I was in a position to give him any information in regard to the question of the police. I told him that I had no news, but that the French firmly adhered to their refusal respecting the admittance of a third Power in the organization of the police, and that their refusal would be supported by Great Britain. M. de Radowitz thereupon remarked that he believed that the principle of the appointment of an Inspector invested with simple inspection duties was accepted by France, as, if not, the Conference must break down. I said that the appointment of an Inspector had been admitted in principle by France. M. de Radowitz then expressed the hope that I would counsel wisdom to my French colleague, and told me that he was unable to form the vaguest opinion as to what view would be taken in Berlin in regard to the appointment of an Inspector alone. I replied that I was not in a position to offer counsel to my French colleague, but only to support him, and this I should do.

M. de Radowitz by no means gave me to understand that his Government had said their last word. His tone was much modified since the last time I saw him.

United States' Delegate intends, I believe, to bring the following information to M. de Radowitz' notice. The establishment of a third Power with the charge of police at a port is objected to by the United States' Government on their own account, as, in their opinion, it implies, to a certain extent, the creation of spheres of influence and the partition of Morocco.

[9352] No. 378.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March* 17, 1906.

I APPROVE your suggestion to follow any course adopted by your United States' colleague in regard to the question of the Jews in Morocco. When you have obtained fuller particulars than those given in your telegram No. 103 of to-day's date, you can refer to me again, should you be in doubt on any point.

[9603] No. 379.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 171.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 17, 1906.

M. CAMBON called at the Foreign Office this morning and read to Sir C. Hardinge a telegram which he had received from M. Bourgeois, recounting a conversation which he had had with Count Khevenhüller, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, respecting the present position of the negotiations at Algeciras.

2. Count Khevenhüller asked whether the French Government had quite decided to reject that part of the recent Austrian proposal which related to the organization of a neutral police at Casablanca, and whether they entertained objections to the suggested appointment of an Inspector of a third nationality. Upon M. Bourgeois replying that the French Government could not possibly permit the installation in any Moorish port of a police force which was neither French nor Spanish, but that they would accept the appointment of an Inspector on certain conditions, such as that the Inspector should make his report to the Sultan and not to the Corps Diplomatique, Count Khevenhüller asked whether it would be possible, in order to prevent the failure of the Conference, for the French Government to make concessions on the bank question in order to satisfy the *amour-propre* of Germany.

3. M. Bourgeois replied that there was a difference between the questions of the police and the State Bank, in that the former was a political question which had been carefully considered by M. Rouvier, with whose views as to the impossibility of making any concession in the matter of the ports he entirely agreed; but that the organization of the bank was an economic question, which he had not yet had time to study, and upon which he did not wish to express any opinion. Count Khevenhüller asked whether, after M. Bourgeois had had time to consider the question, he would be ready to discuss it with him, and to this M. Bourgeois agreed. The Ambassador offered that the Austro-Hungarian Delegate at Algeciras might be authorized to put forward any proposal which might prove acceptable, presumably to Germany as well as to France.

4. M. Cambon considers that the important point in this conversation is the indication given that the German Government are ready not to press for the establishment of a neutral police force at Casablanca.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[9376] No. 380.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 106.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 18, 1906.

MR. HENRY WHITE and I were told yesterday by Count Welsersheimb that he had not yet received M. Révoil's reply to the Austrian proposal in regard to the police. We communicated these remarks to M. Révoil, who told us that the Austrian Ambassador in Paris had already received a reply from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he himself had no objection to repeating to Count Welsersheimb. Its substance was:

1. The French Government must adhere to their decision that the instructors at all the eight ports must be only French and Spanish.

2. It is not for the Conference to settle the distribution of the officers among the various ports. The question must be settled between the Governments of France and Spain and the Sultan.

3. The French Government were ready to discuss the proposal to appoint an Inspector, and also the question of his attributions.

Count Welsersheimb has telegraphed the above to his Government, but it will only confirm the information which will have already reached them from the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. Count Welsersheimb told me that he doubted if Germany would accept the above conditions, as she would then have practically ceded everything.

[9377] No. 381.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 107.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 18, 1906.

I WAS informed by Count Tattenbach this morning that the German Government might not be indisposed to concede a further point by allowing the establishment at the eighth port of French or Spanish instructors, instead of those belonging to a neutral Power. In return for this concession some compensation would be required.

I consulted with M. Révoil, and subsequently paid a visit to M. de Radowitz, in order to elicit if possible the nature of the compensation required by Germany. He told me that I might inform M. Révoil that his Government were in a conciliatory mood. He said that he was awaiting instructions from Berlin as to the compensation required. As soon as he received them he would let me know.

I think that the compensation must refer to the allotment of the bank's capital.

M. de Radowitz told me that he was still waiting for M. Révoil's reply to a proposal which he had made with a view to effecting a compromise in regard to the question of the bank. I said I did not think the French would close negotiations on the bank question until an understanding had been arrived at about the police. I would, however, mention what he had said to my French colleague.

In spite of the extreme caution of both parties, I have hopes that they are gradually moving towards each other.

[9474] No. 382.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 43.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 9, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 32 of the 23rd ultimo, I have the honour to report that I hear from two sources at Fez that the Viziers deny that any permission to establish wireless telegraphy between Fez and Tangier has been granted to or even asked for by a German firm.

They admit that an English firm has asked for such a concession, but state that the Sultan has refused to grant it for the present.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[9475] No. 383.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 44.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 10, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 30 of the 19th February, I have the honour to report that the Moorish vessel, the "Turki," has returned here from Mar Chica.

I understand that her boilers are in want of repairs, and the Moorish Government have been endeavouring to charter a steamer, but this is obviously impossible if she is to be employed in again bombarding Mar Chica.

The Captain of the "Turki" reports that the officer in command of the guns on board insisted on approaching within 2,500 metres of the factory, and that a shell fired therefrom fell within 100 metres of the "Turki."

My French colleague tells me that he has no news from Mar Chica recently, and that the French cruiser "Lalande" is now at Oran.

It is consequently to be anticipated that the smuggling to the factory of Mar Chica will now recommence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[9477] No. 384.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 46.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 10, 1906.

AS anticipated in my despatch No. 40 of the 6th instant, Raisuli's forces made a further attack upon the village of Ramlah on the 8th instant, but found it completely deserted, and then satisfied themselves by burning the houses that had remained standing after the first assault.

I have been informed that the Moorish authorities, in view of the reports that a portion of the Angera propose to carry off a European, had called in to patrol the town some fifty horsemen of the neighbouring M'halla (Government camp). It is not a very effective measure, but it is as much as can be expected for the moment.

The feeling amongst the Angera against Raisuli becomes daily more incensed, and the tribe has been told to hold itself in readiness for a possible attack on Raisuli's quarters. Raisuli's lieutenants in this neighbourhood do not move without a considerable escort. I have sent a copy of this despatch to Sir Arthur Nicolson.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[9478] No. 385.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 47.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 10, 1906.

THE French Minister has been somewhat struck by the change of attitude of the Moorish Government and officials towards him during the last few days. He is unwilling to attach too much importance to it, but thinks that it is worthy of remark.

During the sittings of the Conference at Algeciras he has not attempted to obtain the settlement of any claims, nor has he pressed any local matters before the consideration of the Makhzen.

Latterly not only has a claim been spontaneously settled without any pressure, but the Makhzen have intimated to him that they recognize the son of Bu Amama as a French citizen. This matter formed the subject of my despatch No. 4, Confidential, of the 4th January last.

Further, Hadj Hamed Torres, the Acting Commissioner, to-day called on his Excellency and expressed to him in very cordial terms the thanks of the Makhzen for all the measures that had recently been taken by the French Government with a view to putting a stop to the contraband trade at Mar Chica.

I would not presume to fathom the ideas of the Sultan and his advisers in adopting this attitude, and this action may be prompted merely by the idea of producing a better effect at the Conference, but I should state that I received a few days ago an intimation from Fez that the Sultan had stated that he understood that it was to his advantage to be on friendly terms with his immediate neighbour, and that he would gladly reciprocate any disposition of this kind on the part of the French Government if it became apparent.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[9465] No. 386.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 65. Conference.)

Sir, *Algeciras, March* 9, 1906.

AT the general Committee meeting on the 8th instant the question of organizing a police force for the Moorish ports was again brought forward for discussion.

I have the honour to transmit, in duplicate, copies of the documents and declarations which were laid before the Conference in connection with the above subject. They are:—

1. The French project for the organization of a police force.
2. The Austro-Hungarian project for the organization of a police force.
3. The "exposé des vues" of the Austro-Hungarian Delegation.
4. A declaration read by Herr von Radowitz.

These several documents and declarations mark undoubtedly a considerable advance towards an agreement; and I trust that at the sitting which is to be held to-morrow it will be possible to find some common ground for an understanding.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 386.

French Project for Police Organization in Morocco.

LA Conférence appelée par Sa Majesté le Sultan à se prononcer sur les mesures nécessaires pour garantir la sécurité des personnes et des biens des étrangers déclare que les dispositions à prendre sont les suivantes:—

Une troupe de police chérifienne, dont les effectifs et les cadres inférieurs seront recrutés parmi les Musulmans Marocains et placés sous l'autorité de commandants Marocains, sera organisée dans les huit ports ouverts au commerce.

Pour venir en aide au Sultan dans l'organisation de cette police, des officiers et sous-officiers instructeurs seront mis à sa disposition par les Gouvernements Français et Espagnol, qui soumettront leur désignation et leur affectation à son agrément.

Ces instructeurs seront chargés, pour une durée de trois années, d'assurer l'instruction et la discipline des Corps de Police Marocaine et devront, en particulier, surveiller leur bonne administration et contrôler le paiement régulier de la solde. Ils prêteront aux autorités investies du commandement de ces Corps de Police leur concours technique pour l'exercice de ce commandement.

L'effectif total des troupes de police ne devra pas dépasser 2,500 hommes, ni être inférieur à 2,000. Il sera réparti, suivant l'importance des ports, par groupes variant de 150 à 500 hommes. Le nombre des officiers instructeurs sera de 16 au maximum; celui des sous-officiers de 32.

Les fonds nécessaires à l'entretien et au paiement de la solde des troupes de police et de leurs instructeurs seront avancés au Trésor Chérifien par la Banque d'État.

Le 7 Mars, 1906.

Inclosure 2 in No. 386.

The "Exposé des Vues" of the Austro-Hungarian Delegation respecting Police Organization in Morocco.

En soumettant ce projet à l'appréciation de la Conférence, je demande la permission d'exposer en quelques mots les points de vue qui m'ont guidé dans la recherche d'une formule qui pût servir de base à nos délibérations.

Au début, la question que nous occupe se présentait sous cette forme :

La France, si je suis bien renseigné, réclamait pour elle seule le mandat de l'organisation de la police au Maroc.

L'Allemagne s'opposait à cette demande ; elle insistait sur la nécessité de donner à l'organisation de la police un caractère international, c'est-à-dire elle demandait que toutes les Puissances représentées à la Conférence eussent le droit d'y participer.

Aujourd'hui, la situation n'est plus la même.

Des concessions ont été faites de part et d'autre. La France s'est déclarée prête à associer l'Espagne à l'œuvre dont il s'agit.

L'Allemagne paraît vouloir consentir à restreindre, dans une certaine mesure, le nombre des nationalités qui seraient appelées à fournir les instructeurs.

On peut donc constater qu'un certain rapprochement s'est déjà produit.

Cependant, ces concessions mutuelles n'ont pas suffi pour établir un accord.

Faut-il pour cela abandonner l'espoir de pouvoir y arriver ? Je ne le crois pas, et voici sur quoi cet espoir est fondé :—

Je crois pouvoir entrevoir la possibilité que l'Allemagne, sans être obligée à sacrifier aucun des principes fondementaux dont la Conférence doit s'inspirer, pourrait accepter une réduction ultérieure du nombre des nationalités qui auraient à participer à l'organisation de la police. Nous avons entendu à la dernière séance de Comité la déclaration de M. le Premier Délégué d'Allemagne qui terminait en disant que son Gouvernement était prêt à discuter toute combinaison qui rentrait dans le cadre des principes généraux qui formaient la base des travaux de la Conférence. Ces paroles me semblent indiquer clairement que la possibilité d'un rapprochement ultérieur du côté de l'Allemagne n'est pas complètement exclue, à la condition, toutefois, que, d'autre part, les garanties nécessaires soient données pour la sauvegarde des intérêts communs à tous les pays représentés à la Conférence.

En ce qui concerne le point de vue de la France, nous savons par la réponse qu'elle a donnée à la dernière proposition Allemande que, au point de vue du principe de l'égalité de traitement en matière économique, antérieurement reconnu par elle, si la Conférence reconnaît l'utilité de nouvelles garanties, elle ne se refusera pas à les examiner.

Dans la séance du 5, son Excellence M. Révoil a ajouté que, d'ailleurs, les Gouvernements, d'une part, et, sur place, le Corps Diplomatique et les Consuls, si vigilants pour tout ce qui concerne leurs Colonies, seraient toujours en mesure de s'assurer que cette organisation n'est pas détournée de son but et ne lèse aucun des intérêts de leurs nationaux.

Tant la réponse du Gouvernement Français que les paroles de M. le Délégué de France semblent prouver que la France serait prête à accepter un contrôle destiné à surveiller le fonctionnement de l'organisation policière.

C'est donc sur ce terrain que je crois qu'il sera possible d'arriver à un accord et c'est dans cet ordre d'idées que j'ai tâché de faire entrer dans mon projet les éléments qui me paraissent indispensables pour trouver la solution à laquelle nous désirons aboutir.

Inclosure 3 in No. 386.

Austro-Hungarian Project for Police Organization in Morocco.

1. LE Sultan aura le commandement suprême de la troupe de police.
2. Le Sultan chargera des officiers Français de l'organisation de la troupe de police à Tanger, Saffi, Rabat, et Tétouan.
3. Le Sultan chargera des officiers Espagnols de l'organisation de la troupe de police à Mogador, Larache, et Mazagan.
4. Le Sultan nommera, en outre, un officier supérieur en rang, qui sera chargé de l'organisation de la troupe de police à Casablanca, et qui, en même temps, fera fonction d'Inspecteur-Général de toutes les troupes de police. Le Sultan le choisira librement parmi les officiers que lui présentera, au nombre de trois, et avec l'assentiment des Puissances Signataires, ou le Gouvernement de la Suisse ou celui des Pays-Bas.
5. Les cadres de la troupe de police seront Marocains.
6. L'administration, et notamment la paie de la troupe, s'effectueront par les

employés Européens, moyennant des fonds qui seront mis à leur disposition par la Banque d'État.

7. L'Inspecteur-Général rendra compte de ses fonctions au Corps Diplomatique à Tanger, qui aura à contrôler l'exécution de l'organisation policière.
8. Cette organisation sera instituée, à titre d'essai, pour la durée de cinq ans.

Le 8 Mars, 1906.

Inclosure 4 in No. 386.

Declaration read by Herr von Radowitz.

NOUS sommes d'accord avec les opinions énoncées dans la dernière séance du Comité et prouvant la nécessité de l'organisation, au Maroc, d'une police placée sous l'autorité souveraine de Sa Majesté Chérifienne. Nous apprécions les raisons qui recommandent d'avoir recours, pour une participation efficace dans cette organisation, à des officiers choisis en France et en Espagne. Mais nous ne saurions admettre qu'une pareille co-opération fût limitée à ces deux nations, sans autre contrôle ni garantie de surveillance internationale.

Il est évident que dans un pays dans l'état de culture du Maroc, l'exercice de la seule force réelle capable de maintenir l'ordre et de garantir la sécurité publique donnerait aux deux Puissances qui en auraient le privilège exclusif une position exceptionnelle, laquelle se ferait sentir sur le terrain des intérêts matériels et porterait atteinte au principe de la liberté économique pour tous. Il serait, en effet, à prévoir que le Maroc tomberait dans une dépendance de ces deux États dont résulterait une inégalité de situation inacceptable pour les autres nations.

Les intérêts de l'Europe au Maroc demandent des garanties plus fortes. Protéger et développer ces intérêts communs par une action commune, tel est le principe pratiqué avec succès en d'autres circonstances internationales. Il suffit de rappeler les résultats obtenus en Macédoine et en Chine par les efforts collectifs des Puissances.

Nous demandons donc pour l'organisation de la police Marocaine une co-opération étrangère qui assure à toutes les nations intéressées l'égalité du traitement économique et la politique de la porte ouverte.

Nous examinerons chaque proposition faite dans ce sens, avec le plus vif désir de voir la Conférence aboutir à une entente en cette importante matière.

[9467] No. 387.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 67. Conference.)

Sir, *Algeciras, March 10, 1906.*

AT the meeting of the Conference this morning, in general Committee, the Austro-Hungarian project for the police organization was brought forward. My French colleague had asked me whether I would be willing to say a few words, pointing out the inconvenience which would result if the proposed Inspector were at the same time to be himself intrusted with the command of a police force at one of the ports. I told M. Révoil that I should be quite ready to do so, but that I should couch my remarks in a friendly and conversational tone, as I was most unwilling to formulate a distinct proposal or to take any step which might in any way disturb the harmony which was at last exhibiting itself among the members of the Conference.

I, therefore, at this morning's sitting said that I should be grateful for some enlightenment as to one point in the Austro-Hungarian project which related to the position of the Inspector. I observed that I merely wished to lay before my Austro-Hungarian colleague one or two considerations which might perhaps be worthy of some attention by the Drafting Committee, to whom I understood both the French and Austro-Hungarian projects were to be referred on the termination of our sitting. It appeared to me that the proposed Inspector would enjoy greater authority and more liberty of action, and at the same time be placed in a better position towards the Moorish authorities, if he were independent of, and above all connection with, the

working-out of the details. An Inspector-General was, I believed, usually reserved for the sole duties of inspection, as, for instance, a Cavalry Inspector-General would not be given the command of a cavalry brigade. It seemed to me that the Inspector could have his head-quarters at Tangier, and make his official inspection tours from time to time with his aides-de-camp and escort, and thus enhance his prestige and authority in the eyes of the Moorish authorities. On the other hand, were he to be placed on the same level as the other commandants, and were, as was quite possible, his own contingent of police found to be not so efficient nor so well organized as others, his authority would thereby suffer. Moreover, he would be unable to inspect his own contingent, and this might cause an inconvenient exception. It was in view of my desire to strengthen the position of the Inspector that I ventured to make the above suggestions, which I again repeated were merely suggestions thrown out for the consideration of the Drafting Committee.

Count Welsersheimb and the Conference took my remarks in very good part, the former stating that he had feared the Inspector would be too idle were he to merely have inspection duties to perform. No decision was arrived at, and, indeed, I did not wish that the matter should go further, and the question was consequently dropped, my French colleague remarking that he thought my observations should be considered, and that the proposal to accord the command of a contingent to the Inspector was not viewed favourably by him. He added that he appreciated highly the conciliatory disposition shown by the Austro-Hungarian Delegate in his proposal, and also the desire for an agreement satisfactory to all parties which had been manifested by M. de Radowitz at an earlier part of the sitting, when the latter had expressed the adherence of his Government to the proposal of Count Welsersheimb.

The police question was then referred to the Drafting Committee.

The Moorish Delegates at this sitting presented replies from the Sultan as to the increase of customs duties, the right of acquisition of real property by foreigners, and also some remarks on the police question. I will forward copies of these replies as soon as I receive translations.

The sitting was particularly friendly and harmonious, and there were clear signs of a disposition on the part of the German Delegates and of others to come to an amicable arrangement with as little delay as possible.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[9468] No. 388.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 68. Conference. Confidential.)

Sir, *Algeciras, March* 10, 1906.

WITH the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian project in regard to the police organization in the coast towns of Morocco the situation is completely changed here. Up to the 8th instant there was undoubtedly a general feeling in the Conference that Germany had adopted an unyielding, and, if I may be permitted to say so, a sullen attitude in regard to the claims and wishes of France, who had won all sympathies by her conciliatory, frank, and open demeanour.

It was then a cause for surprise and for great relief when Count Welsersheimb proposed that the police at seven out of the eight ports should be entrusted to France and Spain, and that the force at the eighth port should be placed under a Swiss or Dutch Instructor, who should also act as Inspector of the whole organization. It was known that Count Welsersheimb would not make a proposal which would be unwelcome to Germany, and it was recognised on all sides that the latter had made a great concession, which all expected would doubtless be accepted by France and Spain.

It was clear to me that if the two latter countries were to regard with coldness or disfavour the Austro-Hungarian proposal, they would meet with no sympathy from the other members of the Conference; and I found that even so staunch an ally and friend as Count Cassini was of opinion that terms should be made on the basis of the new proposal.

On the other hand, I found that M. Révoil and the Duc de Almodovar, while recognising that a great advance towards an agreement had been made, felt that their respective Governments and public opinion would not permit them to accept a proposal

to place the police organization of one port in the hands of officers of a third Power. They considered that on this point they could not yield.

I pointed out to M. Révoil, and on another occasion to the Duc de Almodovar, that practically the whole of the Conference was of one mind that the proposal of Count Welsersheimb was a satisfactory settlement of the difficulty. I did not, I remarked, wish in any way to influence him in what he might think proper to recommend to his Government; but I considered that I ought to lay frankly before him the fact that while a few days ago he had the majority of the Conference with him, the feeling would undoubtedly now be in a contrary sense, were he to make no concessions on his part. I would, I said, support him to the best of my ability in whatever course he might take; but I must tell him that in the event of the Conference ending in failure, we should be placed in an exceedingly false position, with all the public feeling of Europe against us.

M. Révoil said that he had received telegrams which gave him to believe that Germany had not said her last word, and he asked me to see Marquis Visconti Venosta and Mr. White and request them to sound M. de Radowitz whether his Government would not give way a little more. I undertook the mission, and Marquis Visconti Venosta willingly agreed to speak to M. de Radowitz, though he was quite sure that the latter had received instructions which admitted of no further concessions. Marquis Visconti Venosta later informed me that, as he had anticipated, M. de Radowitz had stated that his instructions were clear and precise, to the effect that the German Government had gone to the extremest limit of concession.

I conveyed the reply to M. Révoil; but I found him still indisposed to believe that M. de Radowitz might not yet be induced to consent to an inspector being appointed who should be entrusted solely with Inspection duties, and that the police at the eighth port should be left to France, or France and Spain conjointly. I suggested that possibly he might make a compromise by ceding something in the way of the allotment of the capital of the bank if the German delegates would yield in regard to the eighth port; and he told me after reflection that he would be ready to make a bargain of the above description, and that perhaps I might suggest it to Mr. White. I carried out M. Révoil's wishes, and Mr. White was good enough to speak to Count Tattenbach on the subject, but with no result.

The above is a short summary of several conversations and negotiations which have been passing during the past two days, and which will doubtless continue for some little time longer.

At M. Révoil's request, I am to see M. de Radowitz this evening, and I will report as to the results of my interview in a subsequent despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

9469] No. 389.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 69. Conference. Confidential.)

Sir, *Algeciras, March* 11, 1906.

AT the request of M. Révoil I called on M. de Radowitz last evening, and said that I had come on an errand, and I hoped that he would let me speak frankly and as an old friend of over thirty years' standing.

I said that, in the first place, I cordially recognized the extent and nature of the concessions which his Government had made in adhering to the Austro-Hungarian proposal as to the police, and that I was convinced that these concessions had been made with a sincere desire to come to a satisfactory agreement.

It was indisputable that a very great step had been taken towards enabling the Conference to end happily, and that with these preliminary remarks I must now fulfil my errand.

He was as well aware as I was of the difficult position in which M. Révoil and indeed the French Government were placed in the question of the police organization. I did not wish to go into details, but he would doubtless take into consideration the extreme sensitiveness of French public opinion, and the importance which was attached in France to matters affecting the *amour propre* of the nation. M. Révoil, as he would have remarked, was not opposed to much which was contained in the Austro-Hungarian proposal, and he had openly acknowledged the conciliatory and

friendly disposition which had dictated the proposal, as well as the courteous and amicable manner in which the German delegation had expressed their adherence to the project. M. Révoil felt, however, that there was one obstacle in the way of his subscribing to the proposal of Count Welsersheimb, and that was the establishment of the inspector in an Atlantic port as an instructor of a police contingent. I was authorized to inquire whether he would be disposed to recommend to his Government to take one more step towards a complete settlement of the question, and consent to the third Power being entrusted with inspection duties only, leaving to France and Spain the executive functions at all the eight ports.

M. de Radowitz said that he could assure me that he had had the greatest difficulty in persuading his Government to go so far as they had gone, and that he had indeed personally risked much by his pertinacity. He begged me to believe that there was no wish to "bluff," and that his Government were sincerely anxious to reach an agreement which should be honourable and satisfactory to all parties. But he could give me his word of honour as a gentleman that the instructions which he had received were emphatic and positive, and that they represented the very last concession which his Government were able to make. He had a great esteem for M. Révoil and he fully recognized his difficult position, but it would be unfair to M. Révoil if he did not state with all possible frankness that it would be absolutely useless for him to endeavour to modify in any way the decision of his Government. He did not mean to say that some slight modification might not be introduced into the details of the proposal of Count Welsersheimb, but the German Government would never depart from the standpoint that the inspector should, beyond his duties of inspection, have under his instruction the police force at one of the ports.

I conveyed to M. Révoil the reply which I had received from M. de Radowitz, and I added that I was convinced that the latter had spoken in all sincerity and that it would be useless to endeavour to induce the German Government to reconsider their decision. I again impressed on M. Révoil that we must face the facts, and, however disagreeable they might seem to him, he should weigh well and seriously the very grave consequences which would ensue were his Government to reject the Austro-Hungarian project and thereby cause the failure of the Conference.

M. Révoil was much dejected by the reply which I brought to him, and for some time remained silent. I told him that I would be ready to assist him in any way that I could, and I placed my services entirely at his disposal; but it would be well if he were to lay the situation squarely before his Government and await their instructions.

He said that his Government would not, and could not, accept the proposal of placing a port under the charge of a third Power, it was illogical and impracticable, and was introducing the wedge of internationalization. He said with much bitterness that the Germans had internationalized the finances, and they now intended to introduce the principle throughout Morocco. France would leave the Conference having yielded everything and gained nothing.

After some cogitation he said that an idea had occurred to him. He would propose to his Government, but with not much hope of success, that the Swiss inspector with an officer or two should, in co-operation with French and Spanish officers, organize a police force at Tangier to be composed of foot and horsemen and some gunners. Each nation could undertake the instruction of one branch, and the Swiss superior officer could undertake the inspection of the other coast towns. At Casa Blanca French and Spanish instructors could be placed together.

He asked me to telegraph the above suggestion to my Government, and he would lose no time in submitting it to Paris. I replied that the idea might offer the basis for a compromise, but that I did not know if M. de Radowitz could accept it.

With M. Révoil's consent I then called on the Duc de Almodovar, and communicated to him the substance of what had passed. He said that he was not at all surprised at the reply which I had received from M. de Radowitz, as he was aware that Germany had said her last word. He had thought over the question as to whether a compromise was possible, and to my surprise mentioned what was practically the same solution as that which M. Révoil had just suggested.

I said that perhaps he would consult with his Government on the subject, and whenever he or M. Révoil desired to utilize me as an intermediary with M. de Radowitz I should be at their service.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[9561] No. 390.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 46.)

Sir, *Madrid, March* 14, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Madrid press, published yesterday, contained the account of another incident at Mar Chica, the port in the neighbourhood of Melilla held in the interests of the Pretender Rogui by certain French adventurers.

A small Spanish sailing-vessel, the "Joven Dolores," approaching near the bay of Mar Chica early in the afternoon of the 12th instant, was stopped and taken in under the factory by an armed boat flying the Pretender's flag, on the pretext that she was a smuggler. The crew were kept in confinement for the night and allowed to re-embark and sail for Melilla the following day. On arrival they lodged a complaint of piracy, alleging that they had been robbed of a small sum. A Spanish Commission of Inquiry was about to embark, when an envoy arrived from "El Rogui" to explain that the Pretender was in no way responsible for the insult to the Spanish flag, which was entirely the work of the Frenchmen in charge of the factory. The Spanish Commandant accepted these explanations on condition that the money was restored in three days and additional assurances given that nothing of the kind should again occur. On the following day a deputation of Kaïds visited the Commandant, repeating these explanations and assurances, and the incident is considered closed.

It appears to me to be not impossible that the "Joven Dolores" may have been engaged in running a cargo for the Pretender, and that her piratical seizure was by arrangement with the factory, in order to clear her with the Spanish authorities of Melilla.

I have, &c.
(Signed) M. DE BUNSEN.

[9406] No. 391.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 83.)

Sir, *Berlin, March* 15, 1906.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 92 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to report that Herr von Tschirschky, who was dining with me to-night, authorized me to inform you in the most positive manner that there was absolutely no truth in the report which had reached you that the Emperor intended to visit Tangier again this year. His Excellency added that he supposed the report must have been invented by some enemy of Germany, and was absolutely without foundation.

Count Eulenburg, whom I met later in the evening, confirmed what Herr von Tschirschky had told me, and said that the Emperor had certainly no intention of revisiting Tangier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

[9513] No. 392.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 194.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, March* 15, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to state that, according to the information which has reached me, Count Lamsdorff, as soon as he had become convinced that further representations at Berlin on the subject of the Morocco Conference would be useless, directed the Russian Delegates to take a more active part in the discussions, with a view to bringing the question before the Representatives of Europe *in corpore*. As I have already had the honour to explain, this point of view was that it would be difficult for Germany to refuse to abide by the decisions of the Conference, on which she had herself insisted.

He subsequently stated in confidence to the French Ambassador that he was convinced that the German Emperor would not insist on his uncompromising attitude, but that he must be given time, and not unduly pressed. It appeared as if these tactics had been successful, and the news of the Austrian proposal as to the organization of the police was regarded here at first as a sign that Germany intended to yield. When it appeared that the proposal contained a provision which France was unable to accept, the St. Petersburgh Telegraph Agency, which receives its inspiration from Berlin, stated that France had advanced a new proposal, which was condemned by the public opinion of Europe, and that, by doing so, she had shown her unwillingness to accept the friendly overtures made by Germany. The Director of the First Department in the Foreign Office, M. Hartwig, told me yesterday that the German Ambassador had called at the Ministry and made a representation in this sense, complaining of the "intransigeant" attitude taken up by France in the matter. M. Hartwig added that there was a tone of disappointment in the Ambassador's remarks, which he attributed to the fact that M. Bourgeois was regarded at Berlin as a great improvement on M. Rouvier, owing to his supposed sympathies with Germany.

I subsequently heard from a very confidential but sure source that the President of the Council had stated that he had been informed by a very high German authority (though not the Ambassador) that Sir Arthur Nicolson had openly expressed his sympathy with the Austrian proposal, which he regarded as a satisfactory solution.

On receiving your telegram No. 62* of yesterday's date I called on M. Bompard, and told him of the instructions which you had sent to Paris. He showed me the telegram in which M. Louis had informed him of Sir F. Bertie's communication, who had added that the German Ambassador in London had made to you the same statement as to Sir A. Nicolson's attitude which had been made to Count Witte. Acting on M. Bompard's advice and at his request, I addressed at once the private letter to Count Lamsdorff, copy of which is inclosed herewith, informing him of the intention of His Majesty's Government to support the French contention. I considered that it was the more necessary to take this step, as it is most important that Russia should have no room for doubt as to the attitude of Great Britain. No efforts are being spared in order to spread the belief that we are not acting in perfect loyalty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CECIL SPRING-RICE.

Inclosure in No. 392.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Count Lamsdorff.

M. le Comte, *Saint-Pétersbourg, le* 2 (15) *Mars*, 1906.

JE m'empresse d'informer votre Excellence que je viens de recevoir un télégramme de Sir Edward Grey me prévenant que Sir Arthur Nicolson soutiendra la France à Algésiras dans son refus de concéder la police de Casablanca à une tierce Puissance. Il ne me paraît pas inutile de vous en informer, le bruit contraire ayant été répandu je ne sais sur quel fondement.

Je profite, &c.
(Signé) CECIL SPRING-RICE.

[9706] No. 393.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 108. Most Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 19, 1906.

I HAVE been shown a telegram which the United States' Representative has received from his Government. It gives the full text of a note communicated by them to the German Ambassador in Washington. This note states that the Austrian proposal does not meet with the approval of the United States' Government. They consider that no such control should be acquired over the territory of Morocco by any one Power as would give ground for the belief that that territory might ultimately be regarded and

* Repeating No. 369.

treated by one Power as her own, to the exclusion of other Powers. The original claim of France was to organize a police force through the agency of her own officers alone, and the views expressed by the United States' Government are in accordance with international right and opposed to the course desired by the French Government. The latter had, however, abandoned their claim, and were willing to act as mandatories of Europe and police the ports conjointly with Spain. On the other hand the Austrian proposal gave four ports to France, three to Spain, and one to a third Power. The United States' Government did not approve of it, as it foreshadowed the partition of Morocco by creating spheres of influence. The note also remarked that an officer should be selected from a third Power to act in behalf of all the Powers, and exercise a general inspection with a view to informing the Powers whether the Agents of Europe, viz., France and Spain, were performing the duties of their agency and observing the prescribed limits. To the United States' Government this arrangement seems to accomplish the desired purpose. The proposal to distribute ports to separate single Powers appears to them to be destructive of the declared purpose both of Germany and of the United States, and to be wrong in principle. They will accept whatever arrangement the European Powers who are represented at Algeciras may agree upon; but if American interests in Morocco were of greater importance they would seriously object to the above-mentioned proposal as to the distribution of the ports. Should the Conference agree to accept the Austrian proposal, or any modification of it which includes the principle of the distribution of the ports, the United States' Government would regret the failure of what they deem to be the true principle to which they have given their adherence.

I took down the above extracts from a lengthy note in haste. Although I find some difficulty in following the reasoning, the United States' Government seem to desire that France and Spain should act as Agents for Europe, and, so far as I can gather, conjointly at each port, and under a very strict inspection.

I think that France would object to an inspection which, if carried out as suggested, would practically place the French and Spanish officers under the control of a third Power. I believe that the French desire an inspection exercised over the Moorish authorities, in order to insure that the work of the French and Spanish instructors is not hampered by them. I am sure that a dual organization at the ports would not be a success.

Unless the United States' Government communicate a copy of the German note to the other Powers through their Representatives, Mr. Henry White has begged that nothing be said at present to M. Paul Cambon nor to any one else.

[9722] No. 394.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 109. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 19, 1906.

I AM sending you a copy of the American note, which has been kindly given me by Mr. Henry White. Careful perusal makes the reasoning of the note quite clear, and it is, I think, evident that the United States' Government desire that French and Spanish Instructors should be placed conjointly at each of the ports, and that a strict surveillance should be exercised over them.

I fear that this proposal, which will probably be accepted by Germany, would not prove successful in practice. I doubt if France will agree to it.

[9731] No. 395.

Sir E. Egerton to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 20.)

(No. 40.)
Sir, *Rome, March* 17, 1906.

IN accordance with instructions, I informed Count Guicciardini on the 15th instant that His Majesty's Government would not fail to support at Algeciras the French Government's view respecting the police at Casablanca, and I further told him, to-day, that various reports which had been circulated of that support being wanting

were entirely false; thus Sir Arthur Nicolson neither said nor implied in conversation with the German Delegate at Algeciras that France should give way on any outstanding point; neither was it true, either, that the King, my Master, had proposed mediation, a report which had reached Rome.

I could not believe, either, that it was true, as reported to me, that the Marquis Visconti Venosta was of opinion that the outstanding points should be left for arrangement between Berlin and Paris, outside the Conference.

These studied inventions appeared very poor expedients.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. H. EGERTON.

[9712] No. 396.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 37. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, March 19, 1906.*

ALGECIRAS Conference.

Spanish Ambassador at Paris has informed Señor Moret that an arrangement, on the basis of French concessions on the bank question and German concessions on that of the police, has been reached at Vienna through the intervention of the Emperor of Austria. By this arrangement there would be an Inspector-General, but without separate command.

Señor Moret thinks this Inspector-General is sure to act according to German interests, and will cause the new arrangements to break down. His personal feeling is one of regret that Spain should be involved in the hopeless endeavour of making the new police force a success. He believes the deliberations of Conference will now end in an understanding being arrived at, and regards the whole result as a triumph for Germany.

I pointed out to the President of the Council that such a contingency would demonstrate all the more clearly the necessity for continuance of co-operation between Spain, France, and England.

[9795] No. 397.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 110.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March 20, 1906.*

WITH reference to my telegrams of yesterday No. 108 and No. 109 respecting the police question.

My American colleague has received instructions from his Government authorizing him to communicate their note to M. Révoil and me for our information.

This morning Mr. White was informed by M. de Radowitz that the views expressed by the United States' Government would be embodied in a fresh police scheme, as they met with the entire concurrence of the German Government, and that the Austrian Delegate would present the new scheme to the Conference.

The project of a dual organization at each port is considered quite unworkable by my French and Spanish colleagues. In the opinion of both, however, it will be difficult to reject the new scheme, as a perfectly impartial Government have evolved it; and they consider that the United States have unwittingly dealt some excellent cards into Germany's hands. My Spanish colleague especially and very strenuously objects to the establishment in Tetuan of a French officer in conjunction with a Spanish officer.

I fear the present scheme will be fruitful in much friction between France and Spain, and I think that France would have done more wisely to have accepted the original proposal of Austria, by which seven ports would have been allotted to her and Spain.

9722] No. 398.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March 20, 1906.*

AT the present moment, when Austria is trying to make modifications acceptable to both Germany and France in her original proposal about the police, the introduction of the United States' proposals, given in your telegrams Nos. 108 and 109 of yesterday's date, would probably cause most undesirable complications.

[9819] No. 399.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 119. Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, March 17, 1906.*

BY my despatch No. 104, Confidential, of the 11th instant, I had the honour to report to you the conversation which I had had on the previous day with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the Austrian scheme for the policing of the ports of Morocco.

In the course of my interview with M. Rouvier, he read to me a letter from the French Ambassador in London which represented you to concur in his idea that the compromise to be offered to Germany should be an Inspector-General from one of the minor States for the police of all the ports, including Casa Blanca, which would be policed like the other seven ports by a force under French or Spanish instructors.

From the condition of public opinion in France in regard to the differences with Germany in the Algeciras conferences, it was obvious that if His Majesty's Government pressed the French Government to give way to the demands of Germany as to Casa Blanca a very unfortunate impression would be caused in this country.

On the 13th instant I telegraphed to you some extracts from the "Temps" newspaper stated to be the instructions to the French Delegate confirmed by M. Rouvier before quitting office. As to the police, those instructions were stated to be to accept an inspectorate provided the police were Franco-Spanish, but on no account to admit that such Inspectorate should become a co-operation, and to refuse categorically to agree that the Inspectors should have the direct command at a port.

On the afternoon of the 14th instant I had the honour to receive your telegram No. 40, stating that, in view of those published instructions, you gathered that the French Government thought it impossible to make the concession as to the Casa Blanca police required by Germany, and, if so, His Majesty's Government would, of course, support them, that I was to so inform the French Government, and that you would make a communication to that effect to M. Cambon.

I went at once to the Quai d'Orsay and saw M. Louis, the Political Director. He told me that the writer of the article in the "Temps" had access to good information, and that the extracts to which I had drawn his attention gave the general sense but not the text of the instructions to the French Delegate. Those instructions had not, he said, been altered in any way since they were communicated to you a few days ago.

The Government of M. Sarrien, which had just been formed, had in the Ministerial declaration made to Parliament that (14th) afternoon, confirmed the general foreign policy of M. Rouvier's Government, but had not yet had sufficient time to study the details of it as regarded Morocco, and M. Bourgeois, who had that very day taken over from M. Rouvier the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, would probably require some twenty-four or forty-eight hours' time before coming to a decision as to what further instructions, if any, should be sent to the French Delegate at Algeciras. He would be very grateful for the message from you which I had just read, and which would be communicated without loss of time to M. Bourgeois.

At a party at the German Embassy that (14th) evening I met the Minister of War. He told me that matters were going badly at Algeciras, as it appeared that England was not going to continue her support to France.

I replied that if the French Government were resolved not to accept the Austrian

proposal about Casa Blanca His Majesty's Government would continue to support French views in the Conference as heretofore.

M. Étienne observed that he was glad to hear it, for he had been given to understand that such was not the case. To this I answered that, by your direction, I had given such an assurance to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

In the middle of the day of the 15th instant M. Crozier. French Minister at Copenhagen, who is an intimate friend of M. Bourgeois, came to see Mr. Lister, whom he knew at Copenhagen. Mr. Crozier said that he had had a long interview with M. Bourgeois on the 14th instant, and, from what I gathered from the Minister for Foreign Affairs the next evening (15th), he had commissioned M. Crozier to see Mr. Lister. The purport of what M. Crozier said was that several influential and competent members of the French Parliament had, when the Government was being constituted, endeavoured to persuade M. Bourgeois that the policy of England under the Government of His Majesty's present advisers, in view of the change of Government in France, would be to withdraw from any active part in continental politics and to adopt a policy of isolation. They maintained that the advice given to the French Delegate at Algeciras by Sir A. Nicolson as to the Austrian police scheme was a first indication of their intention to withdraw as soon as possible from supporting French policy.

M. Crozier stated that M. Bourgeois, not being acquainted with the details of recent events, was in a very anxious state, and could not make up his mind whether to believe or to discredit the representations which had been made to him. When M. Bourgeois commissioned M. Crozier to make this communication to Mr. Lister he had not received your message of the 14th, for which, as I informed you by my telegram No. 27 of the 15th instant, he requested me, when I met him that evening at the Elysée, to thank you most cordially, and to say that it had arrived at a critical moment, was most opportune, and had been made use of with excellent effect. I suppose, from what M. Clémenceau, the new Minister of the Interior, had said to me, which I am about to relate, that M. Bourgeois had in mind some doubting colleagues. M. Clémenceau, with whom I have been acquainted for some time, had paid me a visit late in the afternoon. He professes Anglophil tendences, and has in his paper, the "Aurore," been a strong advocate of a policy of intimate relations between France and England.

M. Clémenceau, who was accompanied by the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior, said that at the Cabinet Council on the 14th instant doubts had been raised as to the fidelity of England to France. She had been suspected of making some arrangement with Germany behind France's back, and Sir A. Nicolson's advice to the French Delegate about Casa Blanca had been quoted as a proof of it. M. Clémenceau had, he asserted, been the only one at first to combat the supposition. He had said that he was sure that the advice as to Casa Blanca had been given under a misapprehension. He was glad to find from your message, which had reached M. Bourgeois after the Ministerial Council, that his conviction that England was not going to desert France had been proved to be true.

On the receipt of your telegram of the 16th instant, I called on M. Bourgeois, M. Clémenceau, and M. Étienne. I told them that you had authorized me to say that cordial co-operation with France in all parts of the world is a cardinal point of British policy, and that there had never been any question on the part of His Majesty's Government of discontinuing their support of France in the questions under discussion at Algeciras. That support had been given throughout the Conference and in every capital of Europe where requisite, and the same course would be continued if the French Government desired it and would place reliance in His Majesty's Government.

Sir Arthur Nicolson had given advice freely to M. Révoil in the confident expectation that his French colleague would well understand that the British Delegate would continue to support him in the Conference; that in the observations made by you in conversation with the French Ambassador you had spoken in the same expectation, and you had no doubt that M. Cambon so understood and reported them.

M. Bourgeois, M. Clémenceau, and M. Étienne said that they were quite reassured.

M. Bourgeois told me in the strictest confidence that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had called on him on the 15th instant and asked him unofficially, but no doubt under instructions from his Government, sent with the concurrence of the German Government, whether some means might not be devised to get out of the *impasse* about Casa Blanca.

M. Bourgeois had, he said, told Count Khevenhüller that France could not accept the Austrian scheme on that point.

The Ambassador had then inquired whether some compromise might not be come to by which Germany would be compensated for a concession in regard to the Casa Blanca police question by some stipulation in regard to the bank.

M. Bourgeois had, he stated, replied that if the Austro-Hungarian Government would suggest at the Conference a scheme for a compromise the French Government would be happy to consider it and M. Bourgeois is hopeful that some proposal will be made by the Austro-Hungarian Government which may be found acceptable by the French Government.

I have good reason to know that what alarmed the new French Cabinet was that when M. Révoil telegraphed the opinion of Sir Arthur Nicolson in regard to Casa Blanca he said that he supposed that it represented the views of His Majesty's Government, and denoted a change of policy on their part. The reports from the French Ambassador in London were also considered as indicating a tendency on the part of His Majesty's Government to regard the Austro-German proposals as being great concessions on the part of the German Government and such as ought to be accepted by the French Government rather than allow the Conference to close without a settlement.

At the same time reports were being spread in Parliamentary circles here that England was likely to come to some arrangement with Germany, or perhaps had already done so. I know that some members of the new Government were disposed to think that there might be truth in this insinuation, and for the following reason: On the 25th April last I had, by direction of the Secretary of State, spoken to M. Delcassé on the subject of a desire attributed to Germany to obtain a port on the coast of Morocco (see my despatch No. 156, Confidential, of the 25th April), and I had said that if the German Government asked for a port His Majesty's Government would be prepared to join the French Government in offering strong opposition to such a proposal ("pour s'opposer fortement à une telle proposition"), and they begged that if the question were raised M. Delcassé would give full opportunity to His Majesty's Government to concert with the French Government as to the measures which might be taken to meet it ("les mesures qui pourraient être prises pour aller à l'encontre de cette demande").

The advice given to the French Government that they should in the last resort accept the Austro-German proposal for the police of Casa Blanca rather than break up the Conference was regarded as inconsistent with the communication to M. Delcassé which I have quoted, for it is thought here that Casa Blanca might be converted into a useful port, and in German hands would be a danger to France, and the establishment at that port of a police force under a Swiss Inspector and Swiss instructors would be a step towards its occupation in some form by Germany at the first convenient opportunity, and that it is with such a view that the German Government have persisted in the stipulation that it should not be policed by a force under French or Spanish instructors.

It is unfortunate that Frenchmen of education and position should be found ready to believe imputations against England of bad faith, but the hereditary distrust of our country, which has for so long been a characteristic of the French race, has been ably worked on by persons acting in the interests of Germany in order to create discord between France and England.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[9835] No. 400.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 21.)

(No. 197.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, March* 17, 1906.

ON receipt of your telegram No. 64 of yesterday's date on the subject of the assertion made to you that Sir Arthur Nicolson had expressed an opinion to the effect that France ought to yield on the question of the Moroccan police, I communicated with the French Ambassador, who had informed me of the rumour which was current here to that effect and which has reached the ears of the President of the Council.

I also addressed a private and confidential letter to Count Lamsdorff, copy of which I have the honour to inclose herewith.

In an interview which I had yesterday with M. Hartwig, he told me that my previous communication to Count Lamsdorff on this subject, informing him that His

Majesty's Government would support France in her objections to surrendering the Casablanca police to a third Power, had given his Excellency much satisfaction, as rumours to the contrary had been spread in St. Petersburgh.

I thought it better to add a paragraph to the effect that England, like Russia, within the limits laid down, would do all in their power to promote an agreement, in view of your instructions to Sir Charles Hardinge contained in your telegram No. 7 of the 10th January.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CECIL SPRING-RICE.

Inclosure in No. 400.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Count Lamsdorff.

(Personnelle et Confidentielle.)
M. le Comte, *Saint-Pétersbourg, le* 4 (17) *Mars*, 1906.

JE tiens à faire part à votre Excellence des faits suivants :—

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Londres, en appuyant auprès de Sir Edward Grey la dernière proposition Allemande au sujet du Maroc, avait dit que même Sir A. Nicolson, en conversation avec son collègue Allemand avait exprimé l'opinion que la France devrait céder. Sir Edward Grey a tout de suite télégraphié cette information à Sir A. Nicolson, qui a répondu : "Je n'ai dit au Délégué Allemand ni directement ni indirectement que la France devrait céder sur quelque point que ce soit des questions encore en discussion."

En me faisant part de la réponse de Sir A. Nicolson, Sir Edward Grey a ajouté textuellement : "Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique continuera certainement à appuyer la France à la Conférence du Maroc."

J'espère qu'il n'y a pas besoin d'ajouter que l'Angleterre, comme la Russie, fera tout son possible, dans les limites indiquées, pour faciliter une solution.

J'ai cru utile de communiquer à votre Excellence, à titre privé, le télégramme de Sir Edward Grey, en vue des bruits qui seraient en cours ici au sujet de l'attitude de Sir A. Nicolson à la Conférence, qui ressemblent beaucoup à l'assertion ci-dessus mentionnée.

[9919] No. 401.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 21.)

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, March* 21, 1906.

A RUMOUR, similar to that mentioned in your telegram No. 64 of the 16th instant, was spread with regard to the attitude of Russia. At the Conference Count Lamsdorff has issued a circular notice to the press that France has received and will continue to receive Russian support.

[9905] No. 402.

Sir. A Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 21.)

(No. 111.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 21, 1906.

ALGECIRAS Conference, police question: your telegram No. 59 of yesterday.

I think that the original Austrian proposal had already been abandoned before the arrival of any information in regard to the United States' Government's views. I am told that a new proposal was in contemplation by the Austrians by which four ports were to be left to the Sultan to organize, and four were to be given to France and Spain. As soon, however, as the views of the United States' Government were made known to the German Government, the latter adressed a communication to the Austrian Government suggesting that the lines advocated by the United States should be followed in the new Austrian proposal.

Count Welsersheimb has stated that he will be prepared to present the fresh proposal of the Austrian Government in a day or two.

[9904] No. 403.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 21.)

(No. 112. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 21, 1906.

INFORMATION of the Secret Agreement concluded at San Sebastian last summer between France and Spain has reached the United States' Delegate. He has a good general idea of its terms, although he is not acquainted with the details. I am unaware of the source from which he derived his information, but he has reported the matter to Washington. I preserved silence when he mentioned the subject to me, and he did not press me.

[9909] No. 404.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 21.)

(No. 113.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 21, 1906.

I HAVE been informed by the Russian Delegate that it is the intention of the Russian Government to support the French views in connection with the proposed establishment of a third Power at an Atlantic port in the same manner as on other questions, and that he has received instructions to deny to M. Révoil and others that the Russian Government contemplated severing themselves from France in regard to that point.

The same report was circulated by the German Delegate in regard to the opinion held by Count Cassini on the subject of the scheme proposed by Austria as that he had previously circulated in regard to the opinion held by me.

[9912] No. 405.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 21.)

(No. 114. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 21, 1906.

AT the next sitting of the Conference the Austrian Delegate will probably present a fresh police scheme, which my French colleague and I hear is to be based on the views expressed in the note of the United States' Government. M. Révoil has been in consultation with me in regard to it. He is somewhat at a loss as to what course to suggest to his Government, and the new situation causes him very great embarrassment, a feeling which I fully share.

In a telegram to his Government he has explained that the execution of the scheme will entail much difficulty and friction, and the advisability suggests itself to him of a possible modification being proposed to the effect that the introduction of the dual organization should be confined to ports where, as would be the case at Tangier and Casa Blanca, the police contingent would number 500 men or more. Neither France nor Spain, nor, he argues, Germany, wish that a mandate should be given to the two former countries, and he considers that the United States' Government are under a misapprehension in employing that term. It was understood hitherto that the foreign officers should be selected by the Sultan from France and Spain and be employed by His Majesty for the sole purpose of instructing and not of commanding the police contingents. No question or fear of their proving instrumental in promoting "spheres of influence" could therefore arise.

These arguments will not, in my opinion, prove convincing. France may be suspected of ulterior designs if she raises objections to what may be termed the American scheme, and the suspicion will derive colour from her strong objections to the original proposal submitted by Austria that one port should be intrusted to a third Power. It seems to me, moreover, that if the dual organization is admitted at two

ports it would be difficult to refuse its introduction at others, and, if we argue that the scheme is impracticable, we shall be met with the rejoinder that, until the experiment is tried, this cannot be asserted. My own impression is that the wisest course to follow would be to accept the scheme with a good grace and leave it to time and experience to bring its defects to light.

It is unfortunate that this new element should be introduced into a question which is already sufficiently complicated.

[9902] No. 406.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March 21, 1906.*

A TELEGRAM sent by the German Emperor to the United States' Government has been shown me by the United States' Delegate.

The telegram states that "the immediate removal of all misunderstanding is of far more importance to Germany than the whole Morocco question."

The Emperor, however, declares that a proposal on the subject of the police having a mixed system as a basis and providing for the appointment of an Inspector-General would meet with the approval of the German Government, and he expresses his approval of the fundamental principle contained in the American proposal that at each of the ports there should be approximately an equal number of French and Spanish officers acting in co-operation.

[9795] No. 407.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March 21, 1906.*

ALGECIRAS Conference: Police question.

The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires called on me to-day for the purpose of intimating the strong objections entertained by his Government to the American proposals referred to in Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 110 of the 20th instant.

I stated, in reply, that, in my opinion, these proposals involved serious complications, and were likely to prove quite unworkable. I said that I assumed the Spanish Government would put themselves into communication with the French Government, and that, if the latter held the same views, we should, of course, lend them our support. I added that I had seen Count Mensdorff to-day, and that, bearing in mind the United States' proposals, I had told him that I hoped no fresh project would be put forward by the Austro-Hungarian Government unless they had satisfied themselves beforehand that it would be acceptable to France and Spain.

I should be glad if you would take an opportunity of ascertaining what views are held by the French Government.

[9795] No. 408.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 24.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 21, 1906.*

COUNT MENSDORFF asked me to-day whether I had any news from Algeciras.

I said I was afraid there were too many peacemakers at work. The United States now made a new suggestion about which I did not yet know the views of any other Government, but it seemed to me to be an unworkable proposal which introduced an unfortunate complication. I had hoped that the Austrian Government were going to propose some modification of their original proposal, and I hoped now that they would not put anything forward without having ascertained whether it would be acceptable to France and Spain.

Count Mensdorff sounded me as to whether there was no hope of neutral police being accepted at Casa Blanca, and I said that there was no hope whatever of that, and if that particular point was insisted on it would break up the Conference.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[9795] No. 409.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 39.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 21, 1906.*

THE Spanish Chargé d'Affaires came on purpose to tell me to-day that his Government objected strongly to the proposal of the United States, which would mean French police and French instructors at Tetuan.

I said that I regarded the proposal of the United States as having introduced a most unfortunate complication and as being in itself quite unworkable. I did not yet know the views of the French Government, but I had assumed that the proposal would be unacceptable both to France and to Spain, and if this were so we would of course continue to support them. I said, however, that we must all three continue to act together as we had been doing. My view had been that the allocation of ports between France and Spain should be settled by themselves, and this was why I assumed the United States' proposal would be unacceptable to them.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[9915] No. 410.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, March 21, 1906.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had told him that his Government had abstained from proposing a compromise in consequence of an intended American proposal in regard to the policing of the Moroccan ports.

M. Bourgeois stated that the Spanish Delegate at the Conference had informed his French colleague of the American proposal, and that the Spanish Ambassador had to-day been to the Quai d'Orsay to discuss the matter, representing that the proposal appeared to the Spanish Government to be unworkable, and calculated to cause friction between Spain and France.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs shares this opinion, and says that French Government adhere to the view that the Instructors at each port should be either French or Spanish, and that it should be left to the French and Spanish Governments to come to an arrangement as to the distribution of the ports between the two countries.

According to the American proposal, as he understands it, the police at each of the eight ports are to be under French and Spanish Instructors, and an Inspector from a minor Power is to be charged with the inspection of the police forces at all the ports.

M. Bourgeois further stated that the American Government were understood to fear that spheres of influence might be created by an arrangement to place Instructors of one nationality, viz., Spanish or French, at each port. It would be the duty of the Inspector to guard against this, and the French Government would be ready to consent that his powers as Inspector should for this very object be made as large and efficacious as possible.

[10097] No. 411.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 116.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March 22, 1906.*

THE President of the Conference is opposed to the police scheme involving mixed system, and my French colleague this morning received instructions from his Government to object to it should it be put forward.

I think that the Austrian Delegate will make no proposal based on a mixed system, as M. Révoil and I have told him that both of us and also Spain are strongly opposed to such a system. He has telegraphed to Vienna accordingly.

He had prepared a project which would have been, I think, accepted by France. The German Government, however, gave no indication that it would receive their support, and contented themselves with thanking the Austrian Government for the efforts they had made. By this project all the ports were left to French and Spanish officers, and the manner of their distribution was to be settled between the two Governments and the Moorish Government. At the same time a strict inspection by a third Power was to be established, and the Inspector was to be the organ of the Corps Diplomatique at Tangier.

It appears to me, so far as I have the means of forming an opinion, that the German Government will either present a proposal based on the mixed system or will accept the above Austrian proposal, but on condition that the ports are distributed by the Conference, a point to which the French Government are much opposed.

I think it would be well to thrash out matters in the Conference, and a sitting is to be held on the 24th instant to discuss the police question. Confusion is being caused by the long delay, and open discussion is now desirable.

I have no fear of the Conference breaking down, and if there seems any risk of this occurring it will not be difficult to avoid it.

[10159] No. 412.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. Durand.

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March* 22, 1906.

THE United States' Government ask our influence in favour of a scheme, said to be acceptable to Germany, by which France and Spain would be jointly intrusted with the control of the police at the ports with an Inspector-General of another nationality. We entirely sympathize with the United States' Government in their desire to see the Conference end in an agreement, and we trust that the President will be able to use his influence, so beneficially exercised hitherto, to arrange matters satisfactorily. You should, however, explain to Mr. Root that everything depends on the true signification of his Government's scheme. If it signifies that French and Spanish police must be mixed in dual organization at each port, I fear this would be quite unworkable and unacceptable; if, on the contrary, it means that France and Spain are to arrange with each other how the police are to be distributed, it might provide a basis for a settlement.

You should keep your French colleague informed on the subject.

[10098] No. 413

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 32.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, March* 22, 1906.

SEE your telegram No. 43 and my telegram No. 30, both of the 21st instant, on the subject of Morocco.

I have seen M. Bourgeois again this evening.

He gave me the following information :—

When the Russian Ambassador at Berlin informed the German Government, under instructions from St. Petersburgh, that his Government supported and would continue to support France in the Algeciras Conference, the German Imperial Chancellor told his Excellency, and authorized him to so inform his Government, that Germany would abandon the proposal contained in the Austrian project for policing Casa Blanca, but she expected to obtain compensation for this on the question of the allotment of the bank capital.

The Russian Ambassador at Paris communicated this information to the French Government.

It appeared, however, that the German Emperor had entered into communication with President Roosevelt independently of Prince Bülow, and had persuaded the

President to undertake to propose that at all the eight ports the Instructors should be of mixed nationality, viz., French and Spanish.

The French Ambassador in London has been instructed by M. Bourgeois to ask you to send instructions to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington to join his French colleague in representing to President Roosevelt that such a scheme would not be acceptable to France and Spain, and would cause friction and be unworkable, and in requesting the President, for those reasons, not to put it forward at the Conference. In the event of its being too late to prevent the proposal being made, M. Bourgeois is of opinion that the French Ambassador—and he hopes also the British Ambassador—should ask the President of the United States to refrain from pressing the consideration of the Project by the Conference until there has been time for the Governments of France, Spain, England, and Russia to examine it and devise a compromise. The instructions sent to the French Delegate at Algeciras are that he is to adhere, for the present, to the last proposals made by him under instructions from Paris.

The French Delegate has submitted a compromise to the French Government, who are considering it.

It is as follows :—

"The strength of the police force at the ports of Casa Blanca and Tangier to be 500 men at each, whilst at the other six it would be less. At these latter six ports the Instructors to be French or Spanish, according as may be arranged between the French and Spanish Governments. At each of the ports where the police force numbers 500 men or over, the Instructors to be of mixed nationality, viz., French and Spanish, probably each nationality taking in hand one-half of the force."

A communication to the above effect will probably have been made to you by M. Cambon to-day.

M. Bourgeois hopes that you will consent to make representations at Washington in the sense which he has suggested.

[10207] No. 414.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, March* 23, 1906.

THE following has been sent to Sir A. Nicolson :—

"I am informed by Señor Moret that he hears from Paris that the Austro-Hungarian Government will put forward in another form the American proposal for a dual Franco-Spanish police in each port. Under the Austrian scheme six Western ports would be policed either by France or Spain, but not jointly, while Tangier and one other Western port would be policed as the United States' Government proposes.

"Both the President of the Council and the Spanish Ambassador at Paris are terrified at the idea of Spain incurring the responsibility of policing Tangier by herself, and the former hopes that this modification of the American plan will be accepted.

"I informed Señor Moret that I thought it unlikely you would raise any objection, provided France approved."

[10185] No. 415.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 117.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 23, 1906.

I INQUIRED of Count Tattenbach, who called on me yesterday, how matters stood in regard to the question of police organization. He said that the Austrian Delegate was preparing a project which had hitherto been held over owing to suggestions of another nature having been made in a communication from Washington. These suggestions were approved by the German Emperor.

I told him that the mixed system would be unworkable in practice, if that was what he referred to. Count Tattenbach said he would not hesitate to accept it if he were the French Delegate. He then asked me if any views had been expressed by His Majesty's Government. I replied that we should certainly support France and Spain in their attitude towards the mixed system, to which they were opposed, and I remarked, in conclusion, that I hoped the Conference would have no proposal of the character he indicated to consider.

[10098] No. 416.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. Durand.

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March* 23, 1906.

MOROCCO Conference.

With reference to my immediately preceding telegram, in any action which your French colleague wishes to take, you may support him.

[10203] No. 417.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie (Paris) and Sir A. Nicolson (Algeciras), No. 64.

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March* 23, 1906.

THE Austrian Ambassador tells me, confidentially, that Count Goluchowski has given instructions to modify the Austrian proposal by eliminating the part about Casa Blanca, but proposing, in return for this, that the French should make some concession with regard to the proportion of shares in the bank. The Corps Diplomatique at Tangier would have supervision over the police, but they would act only through an Executive officer, who would be the inspector, and would be chosen from a minor Power. Count Goluchowski expressed the hope that this proposal would be accepted by France.

I asked whether it would be accepted by Germany, but Count Mensdorff could not tell me whether Germany had yet accepted it. He said, however, that the proposal of the United States with regard to a mixed police at each port would, in the view of the Austrian Government, only cause further delay, and would not form part of their new proposal.

I said that I could not say whether the French Government could accept the amended Austrian proposal or not, but that, as the special provision about Casa Blanca had been the insuperable difficulty, I thought that the fact of its being eliminated would enable the new proposal to form a basis for discussion.

[10203] No. 418.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 25.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 23, 1906.

THE Austrian Ambassador tells me confidentially that Count Goluchowski has given instructions to modify the Austrian proposal by eliminating the part about Casa Blanca, but proposing in return for this that the French should make some concession with regard to the proportion of shares in the bank. The Corps Diplomatique at Tangier would have supervision over the police, but they would act only through an executive officer, who would be the Inspector and would be chosen from a minor Power. Count Goluchowski expressed the hope that this proposal would be accepted by France.

I asked whether it would be accepted by Germany, but Count Mensdorff could not tell me whether Germany had yet accepted it. He said, however, that the proposal of the United States with regard to a mixed police at each port would, in the view of the Austrian Government, only cause further delay and would not form part of their new proposal.

I said that I could not say whether the French Government could accept the amended Austrian proposal or not, but that as the special provision about Casa Blanca had been the insuperable difficulty, I thought that the fact of its being eliminated would enable the new proposal to form a basis for discussion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[10337] No. 419.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 72. Conference. Confidential.)
Sir, *Algeciras, March* 14, 1906.

THE Duke of Almodovar came to see me on the evening of the 11th instant and said that he feared that the two sittings of the Drafting Committee which had taken place on that day had unfortunately emphasized the divergence of views on the disputed points in the question of the State Bank, and that, in these circumstances, it might be wiser to postpone the meeting of the Conference which had been fixed for the 13th instant. I told his Excellency that I would like to consult with some of the other Representatives, and also to await the results of another meeting of the above-mentioned Committee.

On the 12th instant I called on the Duke of Almodovar and informed him that I feared that the third sitting of the Drafting Committee, which had been held that morning, had led to no reconciliation of the conflicting views, and I therefore was of opinion that it would be wiser to suspend our sittings for a few days. It seemed to me that if we met and the disagreement was publicly manifested we might find ourselves face to face with a rupture of the Conference, which would be most unfortunate.

His Excellency agreed with me, and added that M. de Radowitz had hinted to him on the previous evening that unless some agreement was arrived at shortly it was useless to continue the Conference.

M. de Radowitz called on me on the afternoon of the 12th instant, ostensibly to tell me that he agreed that the meeting of the Conference which had been fixed for the 13th instant should be adjourned for two or three days. He remarked that it would be well to await the formation of the French Government, so that M. Révoil could receive his instructions from the new Minister for Foreign Affairs.

He then told me that he had telegraphed to Berlin, after my interview with him on the 10th instant, and put before his Government the suggestion that the Inspector should have his head-quarters at Tangier, and should not take charge of a police force at Casa Blanca. He had received a reply that morning, the 12th instant, stating that the proposal was unacceptable ("unannehmbar"), and that the former instructions held good.

I asked M. de Radowitz to tell me quite frankly and without any diplomatic reserve whether no compromise was possible, and whether what he had communicated to me was in fact the final word of his Government. He assured me that, beyond some possible slight modification in details, his Government had said their last word; and, in reply to an inquiry from me, he authorized me to so inform M. Révoil. He added, for my private information, that it had cost the German Emperor no little effort to make the concessions which he had done, and that he trusted that the French Government would take this into account.

I have seen M. Révoil on several occasions since my interview with M. de Radowitz, and I think that he realizes that it would be difficult to induce the German Government to modify their attitude. At the same time he is of opinion that in present circumstances a word from His Majesty's Government would have more weight at Berlin than from any other quarter; and he told me that he was suggesting to his Government to communicate with M. Paul Cambon, and to inquire whether you would be disposed to speak to Count Metternich on the subject. He begged me also to mention the above to you, which I promised to do.

Yesterday morning, the 13th instant, M. Révoil paid me a visit, and communicated to me a telegram from his Government, which gave the substance of a conversation between you and M. Paul Cambon, and which also expressed a desire to ascertain his views as to what course should be pursued. He informed me that he saw now there were but two alternatives—either to accept, with some modifications, the establishment of a third Power at Casa Blanca in charge of the police, or to break up the Conference. He said

he was perfectly aware of the great responsibility he would take in recommending the former course. He did not know whether his Government, and especially a Government who had just assumed office, would approve of it or not; but he was well aware that it would be most unwelcome and most unpopular throughout France. It was useless to disguise the fact that by admitting the co-operation of a third Power in the organization of the police France would recognize the principle of internationalization, and would greatly weaken the special interests which even Germany had acknowledged were possessed by France and Spain. At the same time it was clear that the opinion of the majority of the Conference was at present in favour of a settlement on the basis of the Austrian proposal, and he would take that fact into consideration. He said that he would prepare a telegram to his Government, setting forth the situation here, in unambiguous language, and making certain suggestions. He would show me his telegram later in the day, so that I should be in a position to inform my Government of its contents.

M. Révoil came again to my house in the evening and read me his telegram, with which I propose to deal in a subsequent despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[10338] No. 420.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 24.)

(No. 73. Conference. Confidential.)

Sir, *Algeciras, March* 14, 1906.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 72, I have the honour to report that M. Révoil read to me yesterday evening a telegram which he had sent that afternoon to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris.

M. Révoil explained to his Government in full detail the situation as it appeared to him to exist at Algeciras, and his views were practically in accord with those which I have had the honour to submit to you in my despatch No. 68 of the 10th instant.

He frankly stated to his Government that, after careful consideration and cousultations with me, he was of opinion that there were only two courses open—either to accept the Austro-Hungarian proposal, with some modifications and under certain specified conditions, or to break up the Conference. It seemed to him that it would be preferable to adopt the former course.

He submitted to his Government that the proposal to establish an Inspector at Casa Blanca in charge of a police contingent might be accepted under certain conditions. He assumed, as a preliminary condition, that the Inspector and any officers who might be attached to him should be of Swiss nationality, and the conditions which he suggested were the following:—

1. The Swiss Inspector should not have any control or command over the French and Spanish Instructors at the seven ports; and that his duties should be limited to ascertaining whether the police organization worked well and smoothly, that the men were regularly paid, and that the Moorish authorities and Moorish officers performed their services punctually and efficiently.

2. The Swiss Inspector should make his reports to the Sultan. M. Révoil is opposed to the suggestion that the Inspector should report to the Diplomatic Body at Tangier, as he does not desire—and, I venture to think, with great reason—that that Corporation should have control over the police organization. In the event of the German Government making a great point of the Inspector reporting to some foreign authority, he saw no objection to his sending in reports to the Helvetic Government, who might transmit them to the several Powers.

3. The Inspector should be appointed by the Swiss Government, and his appointment confirmed by the Sultan.

4. The police contingent at Casa Blanca, which would have Swiss officers as Instructors, should be inspected by the senior French or Spanish Instructor alternately. M. Révoil thinks that this condition is a most necessary one. There seems to be no reason why the force at Casa Blanca, which, with Tangier, is the principal port in Morocco, should alone remain without inspection; and the acceptance of this condition would materially assist in moderating the objections which both the French and Spanish Instructors will undoubtedly have to a Swiss inspection over their contingents.

5. The French and Spanish Governments should arrange, in agreement with the Moorish Government, which ports should be respectively allotted to the French and Spanish Instructors. This is an important condition, and one on which, I submit, M. Révoil very rightly insists. The distribution of the ports as laid down in the Austrian scheme would inevitably cause friction between the French and Spanish Governments. It is sufficient to point to the Austrian proposal to place Tetuan under a French Instructor to indicate the objections to the proposed distribution.

M. Révoil further considers that an agreement with the Austrian scheme should, beyond the above conditions, be also subject to an agreement being arrived at on the bank question. This is a perfectly logical and natural request. He would also desire to obtain the consent of the German Delegate to the insertion of some clause in the Final Protocol of the Conference which would insure the maintenance of the existing position of all Europeans at present in the service of the Sultan. M. Révoil fears that the German Government may desire to dispatch a German Military Mission to Fez, in order to organize an army for the Sultan, and thereby render the position both of the French Military Mission and of the British officers at the Court untenable. It would be a prudent and advantageous provision if some engagement could be obtained in the sense suggested by M. Révoil.

I would submit that the conditions suggested by my French colleague are reasonable ones. It must be borne in mind that the introduction of a third Power, even of one so detached as Switzerland from an interest in Moorish affairs, is significant evidence both to the Moorish Government and the world in general that Germany has succeeded in attenuating the special position which France and Spain hold in the Shereefian Empire. There can be no doubt that such an intervention will be exceedingly distasteful both to French and Spanish public opinion; and that unless it is confined within defined limits it cannot be expected that the French public especially would be disposed to accept it. I presume that even the authors of the Austrian scheme do not pretend that the installation of Swiss officers in Morocco, either as Inspectors or as Instructors, is likely to insure that the police forces would be more efficiently organized than if they were left to the sole care of competent and well-qualified French and Spanish officers.

M. Révoil told me that he had telegraphed the above suggestions to his Government. He was, of course, unaware in what light they would be regarded, and he had submitted them with the sole view of doing what was possible towards a satisfactory arrangement being concluded, and thus saving the Conference from ending in failure. If his Government were to agree to his proposals, he thought that the best mode of procedure would be that I should act as intermediary with M. de Radowitz. He had suggested this course to his Government, as he considered that, for various reasons, I should be in a better position than others to do so. He had also suggested that M. Paul Cambon should speak with you on the whole question.

I told M. Révoil that, of course, I should have in the first place to ask your permission to act as intermediary. Personally, I should be quite happy to do so, as I was most desirous to be of any possible service to him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[10340] No. 421.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 24.)

(No. 75. Conference.)

Sir, *Algeciras, March* 15, 1906.

I INQUIRED of Mr. White, the United States' Delegate, what steps he proposed to take in regard to bringing before the Conference the question of the treatment of Jews in Morocco, and he told me that he was in communication with his Government on the subject. He communicated to me a letter which he had received from the Chief Rabbi at Tangier, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy, which stated that the Jews suffered no ill-treatment in Morocco; and he had also caused the statement of complaints with which he had been furnished, and which, I understand, was similar to that inclosed in your despatch No. 145 of the 8th November, 1905, to be carefully

examined by competent authorities, and that many of the grievances were found to be exaggerated. He has now supplied his Government with full information on the subject, and has requested them to furnish him with instructions as to how he should act in the circumstances.

If you concur, I would propose to follow the line which Mr. White may be instructed to adopt, so that our action may be identic.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 421.

Mardochée Bengio (Grand Rabbi at Tangier) to Mr. Einstein.

Sir, *January* 31, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Mr. A. Pimienta, correspondent of the "Temps" of Paris in Morocco, has been good enough to communicate to me the substance of the conversation you had with him respecting the intervention of the United States of America on behalf of the Jews in Morocco.

Apparently, the American Government is under the impression that Moroccan Jews are badly treated and oppressed, but this is not the case at all. In justice to the Moorish Government, I declare that the Jews in Morocco are well treated since the beginning of the reign of His late Majesty Moulcy Hassan, and we have absolutely no reason of complaint.

We would rather like a declaration by the American Ambassador at the Conference that the United States, as friends of Morocco and constant supporters of the interests of humanity, see with satisfaction that His Majesty the Sultan Abd-el-Aziz, following the good traditions of his father, treats his Jewish subjects with justice and kindness, hoping that he will persevere in his good course, and that the Makhzen should have great care to avoid acts of injustice or violence by their subordinates against the Jews.

I avail myself of this opportunity to request you to ask his Excellency Mr. White, the American Ambassador, to be good enough to convey to his Excellency President Roosevelt my most heartfelt thanks in my own name and on behalf of the Jews of Morocco for the humanitarian interest he takes in them.

I pray the Almighty God to bestow His blessings on President Roosevelt and the great liberal American nation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MARDOCHÉE BENGIO.

[10343] No. 422.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 24.)

(No. 78. Conference. Confidential.)

Sir, *Algeciras, March* 17, 1906.

IT had been intended that the Conference should meet to-day in plenary sitting, but yesterday it was considered advisable to postpone the meeting in the hope that before the next convocation some understanding might be found on the conflicting views in regard to the police question.

Renewed efforts are being made by one or two disinterested Powers to induce the German Government to abandon their desire to establish a third Power in charge of the police at one of the eight ports, and from information which has reached the Representatives of those Powers it would seem that their endeavours may be attended with success. In these circumstances it is well to have patience, and to defer the convocation of the Conference until the results of the mediation to which I have referred above are known.

I met M. de Radowitz yesterday afternoon, and he inquired of me whether I had any news to give him as to fresh developments in the question affecting the police. I told him that none had reached me, but that I was sure that the French would remain firm in their refusal to admit a third Power at Casa Blanca, and that my Government would support them in their refusal. M. de Radowitz said that he perfectly understood

[10206] No. 422 A.

Sir M. Durand to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 24.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Washington, March* 23, 1906.

MOROCCO: Your telegrams Nos. 23 and 24.

The French Ambassador, whom I saw this afternoon, does not wish for any action on my part. He told me that he had seen the President and the Secretary of State. He was satisfied that all was going well, and thought that pressure from us might arouse opposition. I confined myself, therefore, to asking the Secretary of State what was the precise meaning of the proposal on the police question made by the United States' Government. Mr. Root told me that there had never been any intention of interfering with the details of any arrangements which France and Spain might make, so long as the two Powers accepted a joint mandate and consented that an official of another country, who should be responsible to the Powers in general, should inspect the work of the police.

[10441] No. 422 B.

Sir M. Durand to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 24.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Washington, March* 24, 1906.

MOROCCO.

I am informed by the Secretary of State that he sent the following telegram last night to the American Delegate at Algeciras:—

"Your No. 31. We care nothing whether the actual administrative exigencies necessitate in some ports, as they doubtless will—in Tangier, for instance—the employment of both French and Spanish officers, while at other ports either French or Spanish officers may be employed, or at one time French and at another Spanish, provided that both countries accept a joint responsibility for every port.

"All this distribution of officers can and should be settled as a matter of detail between the two mandatory Powers which undertake to preserve order, provided it is understood that the mandate is joint and not several, and the responsibility is universal and not local or distributive. The inspector, who, on behalf of all the Powers, inquires into the execution of the mandate, will be wholly unaffected in the performance of his duty by any consideration as to which particular Power at any particular time happens to have its officers at a particular point."

[10374] No. 422 C.

Sir M. Durand to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 24.)

(No. 17. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Washington, March* 24, 1906.

MY telegram No. 15.

My interviews of yesterday with the Secretary of State and the French Ambassador have left me with the impression that the United States' Government regard us as opponents of Germany, and possibly inclined to push France on to extremes. Until yesterday neither the President nor the Secretary of State had discussed the Morocco Conference with me, nor had I asked them any questions on the subject. But I know that the President used to think us, if not unduly hostile to Germany, at any rate unduly suspicious of her.

---

the attitude of Great Britain, but that if the French Government refused to accept an Inspector-General the breakdown of the Conference was inevitable. He hoped that he was right in assuming that no objection would be raised to the appointment of an Inspector. I replied that if I remembered rightly the French Delegate had already expressed his adherence in principle to the appointment of that functionary. M. de Radowitz said that he had not the vaguest idea as to what his Government might decide upon with respect to the establishment of a third Power at a Moorish port. He presumed that they would let him know shortly. In the meantime, he trusted that I would give my French colleague "des conseils de sagesse." I replied that it was hardly my place to give him "conseils," but that I was always prepared to accord him support.

This conversation with M. de Radowitz gave me the impression that he was now aware that his Government were not immovable on the question of placing a third Power in a Moorish port. He has also spoken to the Marquis Visconti-Venosta in a similar tone, and the latter is also of opinion that the way is being prepared for a further concession on the part of Germany, a concession which, as my Italian colleague remarked, is as unexpected as it is welcome.

I should like, in fairness to M. de Radowitz, to repeat that when he conversed with me on the 10th and again on the 12th instant I am convinced that he was then speaking in all sincerity when he asserted that his Government had no further concessions to make. His Government have apparently, since those dates, considered it desirable and opportune to take the further step which, I sincerely trust, may lead to a complete agreement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[10378] No. 423.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 24.)

(No. 34.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, March* 24, 1906.

ALGECIRAS Conference.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I have seen to-day, tells me that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has privately and verbally given him the same information in regard to the intended fresh Austrian project as contained in your telegram No. 46 of the 23rd instant.

Count Khevenhüller sounded him as to the manner in which the proposal in question would be regarded by the French Government.

M. Bourgeois replied that the question at issue must be discussed at the Conference, and that he could not carry on negotiations in Paris parallel with those at Algeciras. He would, however, make some observations on the subject, but on condition that they should be considered as private as the communication just made to him by Count Khevenhüller.

He then pointed out that the Inspector could have no responsibility towards the Diplomatic Body at Tangier, inasmuch as the French Government had rejected the proposal for him to have the right of command or control over either the Instructors or the police; and that the idea that the Inspector should report to that body instead of to the Sultan of Morocco would seem to involve a principle which would conflict with the desire expressed by the German Government that His Majesty's independence and sovereignty should be respected.

M. Bourgeois further observed to the Ambassador that he considered that the discussions at Algeciras would, unquestionably, be facilitated if the special arrangement in regard to Casa Blanca were to be eliminated from the previous Austrian project.

M. Bourgeois received a communication from Washington while I was with him, on the subject of which I shall address you a further telegram.

[10379] No. 424.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 24.)

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, March* 24, 1906.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs wishes me to convey to you his thanks for the instructions telegraphed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington, of which you informed me in your telegrams Nos. 44 and 45 of the 22nd and 23rd March respectively, and which I communicated to M. Bourgeois yesterday.

Whilst I was with his Excellency to-day he received a telegram from the French Ambassador at Washington, reporting, as the result of his representations to the United States Government, that instructions will be sent to the American Delegate at Algeciras to the effect that the President can quite understand that it will be necessary, for administrative reasons, to have at some ports, such as Tangier, police Instructors of two nationalities; and that, provided that it is well understood by France and Spain, and agreed to by them, that the mandate to be given to them for the police at the ports imposes on them joint and not several responsibility for every port with police under French or Spanish Instructors, President Roosevelt considers that it is immaterial whether the Instructors at the several ports are either French or Spanish, or are drawn from both countries. He also considers that the French and Spanish Governments may well be left to arrange between them the distribution of the ports.

[10362] No. 425.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 24.)

(No. 119.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 24, 1906.

I AM forwarding by the bag leaving on the 26th instant a copy of a paper given me by Count Tattenbach, which deals with the question of public works in Morocco and their adjudication. It covers a very large range, from telephones to mines, railways, &c., embracing every possible kind of work.

Count Tattenbach asked me what I thought of it, and I told him that without consulting you I could express no opinion. I asked if I might speak to my French colleague, and he eventually agreed to my doing so. M. Révoil will refer the matter to his Government for their opinion.

He thinks the scheme goes a little beyond the programme of the Conference, but from p. 259 of the Yellow Book it appears to me that the former French President of the Council admitted the question of the adjudication of public works.

The scheme provides that all concessions, &c., should be settled between the Sultan and the Corps Diplomatique at Tangier, by whom regulations prescribing the form and general conditions of the adjudications are to be drawn up. Previous to the acceptance of any tender, a Commission, whose members will consist of three representatives of the Corps Diplomatique, assisted by experts, must be consulted by the Moorish Government on the question of what railways are to be constructed.

I pointed out to my French colleague that Germany's hands would in a measure be tied in obtaining concessions for herself by some arrangement of the nature proposed, but M. Révoil does not consider that the Sultan will be very lavish to Germany in respect of concessions.

I have informed Count Tattenbach that both my French colleague and myself are consulting our Governments in regard to the matter.

[10527] No. 426.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 26.)

(No. 48.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 15, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 201 of the 26th July, I regret to have to report that the discussions with the Minister for Foreign Affairs with regard to the refusal of the Moorish Government to carry out the arrangement concluded with Sir Arthur Nicolson under which Sid-el-Menebhi was to leave the country, continued

throughout the whole summer and until my departure from Fez, but without any satisfactory result.

I did not report on this matter on my return, in the hopes that the Moorish Government might, on further consideration, have some offer to make; but four months have now passed since my return and the Makhzen has remained silent on the subject.

With regard to the detention of Sid-el-Menebhi's wife at Fez, the Makhzen maintained their attitude that they could not compel her to leave Fez, and that she had no desire to rejoin her husband.

As to the accuracy of the Makhzen, from the point of view of Shraa, it seems almost impossible to obtain a reliable opinion, and the desire of Menebhi's wife to remain at Fez I am obviously not able to verify.

The other points mentioned in my despatch No. 204 the Makhzen met with a flat denial, although Sid-el-Menebhi was eventually able to produce, by comparison with his inventory, a list of the articles missing, the value of which he estimates at 478,000 fr., besides 86,000 dollars in cash, and from this estimate Sid-el-Menebhi states that he has omitted such articles as china, tents, furniture, beds, &c.

This loss is, of course, very difficult to prove absolutely, and the evidence rests mainly upon Sid-el-Menebhi's declaration, the truth of which the Makhzen absolutely deny. It is clear that all this property has now been divided up amongst those who were in a position to acquire it, and would be almost impossible to recover, and the condition of the Moorish Exchequer is not such as to be able to liquidate a claim of this kind without a sev ere strain.

I made it quite clear to Ben Sliman that until these points, all of which were comprised in the arrangement made with Sir Arthur Nicolson, were disposed of to our satisfaction I could not, and would not, advise Menebhi to leave the country.

I feel convinced that the Makhzen, in the face of such a large claim and in view of the fact that Sid-el-Menebhi is now living quietly at Tangier, will probably not raise the question again; but in the interests of Menebhi himself, who incurs such a heavy loss by the want of good faith on the part of the Makhzen, it is clear that the claim cannot be altogether abandoned.

As Sid-el-Menebhi is so completely out of favour with His Majesty the Sultan and has no friend of any influence about the Court, I concluded that it would be better to avoid speaking directly to His Majesty with regard to the case, as it might produce the opposite effect to that desired.

It is clear that the Makhzen is endeavouring to avoid its responsibility in the matter; and El-Menebhi himself, fully aware, no doubt, of the hopelessness of obtaining the settlement of claims, has not specially urged the matter upon me recently.

Under these circumstances, and as long as Menebhi is allowed to remain living here in peace, it seems useless to raise the matter again with the Makhzen; and I would propose, unless otherwise instructed, to drop it for the present, without, however, allowing the Makhzen to think that the claims of El-Menebhi, under the arrangement made by Sir Arthur Nicolson, have been abandoned.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[10528] No. 427.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 26.)

(No. 50. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 16, 1906.

WITH reference to the last paragraph of Sir Nicolas O'Conor's Confidential despatch No. 86 of the 12th February on the subject of the letter that the Sultan of Turkey is reported to have written to the Ruler of this country advising him to follow the counsel and advice of the German Emperor as the true friend of Islam, I have the honour to report that for some time past indefinite rumours to this effect have been in the air.

But little importance is, however, attached to it here, as the view of Abdul Aziz that the Ruler of the Ottoman Empire is not a worthy follower of Islam is well known here; and, as I pointed out in my telegram of the 7th June of last year, the Sultan and his people are very jealous of any interference on the part of Turkey or its Sovereign in the affairs of Morocco.

I understand that a polite reply has been sent by Abdul Aziz, but it is said that he has not condescended to reply direct, but through the intermediary of the Sheikh-el-Senoussi.

The influence of Germany at Court is now so pronounced that, if the action of the Sultan of Turkey in addressing the letter in question was taken at the instigation of the German Government, it would seem to have been somewhat ill-advised, and likely to produce rather the contrary effect to that desired.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[10526] No. 428.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 79. Conference. Confidential.)

Sir, *Algeciras, March 19, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the note which Mr. Secretary Root has addressed to the German Ambassador at Washington, in regard to the police organization in Morocco, and which Mr. Henry White has been good enough to give me for my confidential information.

On the first hasty perusal of the document, I was not very clear as to whether the United States' Government desired or not to distribute the police charge of the ports between France and Spain, but a second reading makes it, I think, evident that the purpose of the note is that France and Spain conjointly should be established at each port. I very much doubt if such an arrangement would be workable in practice, and I fear that it would lead to constant friction and confusion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 428.

Note communicated by Mr. Root to German Ambassador.

IT may be useful for me to restate, in writing, the answer of the United States, already given to you orally, to the questions which you have asked regarding our course upon the proposal made by Austria on the 8th instant, in the Algeciras Conference:—

We do not approve that proposal. We regard it as an essential departure from the principle declared by Germany, and adhered to by the United States, that all commercial Powers entitled to have the door of equal commercial opportunity in Morocco kept open, and the corollary to that principle, that no one Power ought to acquire such a control over the territory of Morocco as to justify the belief that she might ultimately come to regard and treat that territory as her own to the exclusion of others. This view of international right was interposed against the claim of France to organize the police in Morocco ports through the agency of her officers alone. France has yielded to this view of international right to the extent of offering to become, jointly with Spain, the mandatory of all the Powers, for the purpose of at once maintaining order and preserving equal commercial opportunities for all of them. It was further proposed that an officer of a third Power, acting in behalf of all the Powers, should have secured general inspection for the purpose of keeping the Powers advised whether their Agents, France and Spain, were observing the limits and performing the duties of their agency. This arrangement seemed to us to accomplish the desired purpose. It seemed, with two mandatories jointly charged, no individual claim of possession or control was likely to grow up; that, with the constant reminder of the general litigants involved in the inspectorship, the duties of the agency were not likely to be forgotten; and it seemed that the proximity of France and Spain to Morocco, and their special interests in having order maintained in that territory, made it reasonable that they should be selected as the mandatories rather than any other Powers.

The Austrian proposal offers an alternative to the arrangement which I have described. It is that the eight Morocco ports shall be distributed. That in four the police shall be organized by the French, in three the police shall be organized by the Spanish, and that in the eighth port the police shall be organized by the Swiss or Dutch. This seems to us to provide for a potential partition of the territory in violation of the principle upon which we have agreed with Germany. From our point of view, all the reasons which existed against leaving to France the control of all the ports, exist against leaving to France the control of some, to Spain the control of some, and to Switzerland, either in its own interest or in the interest of any other Power, the control of one. The very fact of division of the ports implies existence of a special right on the part of the three countries in the ports assigned to them respectively. The immediate effect can only be the creation of three separate spheres of influence with inferior right and opportunity on the part of all other Powers, and that nations to whom these spheres are assigned may expect, in the ordinary course of events, to enter complete control.

We do not care whether the inspector, if there shall be one, is Italian or Swiss. We do not care whether he reports to his own Government or to the Diplomatic Corps in Tangier, or communicates the information obtained to the Powers in any other way. We consider that the distribution of ports to separate single Powers is wrong in principle and destructive of the declared purpose of both Germany and the United States. If we had sufficient interest in Morocco to make it worth our while we should seriously object, on our own account, to the adoption of any such arrangement. We have not, however, any such substantial interest in Morocco as to lead us to take that course. Our chief wish is to be of service in promoting a peaceable settlement of the controversy which brought the Conference together. Under the guidance of that wish we shall accept whatever arrangement the European Powers represented at Algeciras agree upon. If the agreement is upon Austrian proposal, or upon any modification of it which includes the principle of distribution of ports, we shall regret what we deem to be the failure of the true principle to which we have given our adherence. We still hope that there may be no such result.

Washington, March 17, 1906.

[10596] No. 429.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 120.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March 26, 1906.*

A PLENARY sitting of the Conference on the police question was held this morning to deal with a project prepared by the Drafting Committee.

The following were the chief points in our discussion:—

1. It was formally announced by the German Delegate that the German Government agreed that the Instructors at all the eight ports should be French and Spanish.

2. An amendment was presented by the Austrian Delegate to the effect that the distribution among the ports of the respective French and Spanish Instructors should be left to the Conference to decide. The French, however, still adhere to their opinion that the distribution should be left for settlement between the French and Spanish Governments and the Government of the Sultan.

3. A proposal was made by the Austrian Delegate that the police organization should be under the control of the Diplomatic Body at Tangier. The German First Delegate stated that his Government held this to be an indispensable condition, and he intimated that he himself and his colleague would withdraw from the Conference unless it were conceded.

The French Delegate, on the other hand, has strict instructions from his Government not to give way, but at my suggestion he has agreed to refer it to his Government once more.

M. de Radowitz impressed on me that the settlement of the above point would determine the success or failure of the Conference.

This evening M. Révoil and I are to meet the United States', Italian, Russian, and Spanish Delegates privately, to try and decide on a formula by which the difficulty may be bridged over, and I am hopeful that this may prove possible.

[10647] No. 430.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 27.)

(No. 121.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 26, 1906.

IN the statement made by M. de Radowitz in regard to the control of the Corps Diplomatique over the working of the police at the meeting of the Conference to-day, which I reported in my immediately preceding telegram, the exact words used were that such a control was considered as the cardinal and principal point by the German Government, and that, unless satisfactory guarantees in regard to it were forthcoming, the German Delegates would find great difficulty in continuing the discussion of any project of which it did not form part.

[10681] No. 431.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 27.)

(No. 122. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 27, 190 .

AT the private meeting of Delegates, to which I alluded in my telegram No. 120, we succeeded in drawing up a formula which we considered would meet the desire expressed by M. de Radowitz in regard to police control. The United States' Delegate communicated this formula to him privately as being the outcome of conversations he had held with some of the other Delegates. It was not represented as in any way emanating from M. Révoil, who said that he feared he would experience considerable difficulty in obtaining the French Government's consent to its acceptance.

In M. de Radowitz' opinion the formula was not sufficiently precise, but Mr. White gave it to him so that he might discuss it with Count Tattenbach and endeavour, in consultation with the latter, to recast it in a form which both parties might find acceptable. I am hopeful that we shall be able to come to a satisfactory arrangement on this point.

Although the statement which M. de Radowitz made yesterday morning was disquieting, and its sense somewhat ominous in regard to the immediate future, I hope the consequences foreshadowed by him will not come about.

I think that we shall be able to arrange, in regard to the distribution of ports, that it should be sufficient for the French and Spanish Delegates simply to make a communication to the Conference as to the manner in which they propose that the ports should be allotted.

[10784] No. 432.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 28.)

(No. 123.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 28, 1906.

CENSORS for State Bank. My despatch No. 66 of the 10th March.

A discussion took place at a plenary meeting of the Conference yesterday in regard to the number of Censors to be appointed. Application was made by the Italian Delegate for the appointment by the State Bank of Italy of a fifth Censor. The Austrian Delegate asked that a sixth might be appointed, and the Portuguese Second Delegate reserved the right to ask for the appointment of a seventh. It is clear that such a number would be excessive, but the Delegates of Italy and Austria adhered to their demand. I stated that I had informed His Majesty's Government of the suggestion which Count Tattenbach had courteously made that the fourth Censor should be named by the Bank of England, and had added that a plenary meeting of the Conference had practically approved this suggestion, but I was unable to say how the question was viewed by His Majesty's Government. I said that the appointment of a British Censor had not been solicited by me, and I would request your instructions by telegraph as to whether I should insist on the fourth Censor being appointed by the Bank of England.

The others would withdraw their applications if His Majesty's Government do not desire a Representative on the Board of Censors, and the number of the Censors who would be named by the State Banks of France, Spain, and Germany would consequently stand at three.

Would you wish me to state that, while thanking the German Delegates for having made the suggestion, His Majesty's Government do not hold to having a British Censor?

[10785] No. 433.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 28.)

(No. 124.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 28, 1906.

M. RÉVOIL having requested me to propose to the Conference that the officer to be selected as Inspector-General of the Police should be a Swiss and not a Dutch officer, I did so at to-day's sitting. Previous to the sitting I had spoken to the Netherland Delegate.

I should have preferred not to take the initiative in making the proposal, which was an embarrassing one, but I did so in as friendly and courteous terms as I could, laying stress on the detachment of Switzerland from the affairs of Morocco, &c. The Netherland Delegate expressed his acknowledgments for the manner in which I had submitted my proposal to the Conference.

A counter-proposal was made by the German Delegates that the choice should be left to the Sultan, but I explained that such a course would cause His Majesty considerable embarrassment. The question will be referred to the German Government by M. de Radowitz.

I do not think that this question will give rise to any serious difficulty, but the German Delegate told me after the sitting that his Government attached much importance to the selection of a Dutch officer; while the French are strenuously opposed to such an appointment.

[10791] No. 434.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 28.)

(No. 125.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March* 28, 1906.

THE difficulty as to the control of the police by the Corps Diplomatique has been surmounted by an Article the terms of which is as follows:—

"Les rapports et communications faits au Makhzen par l'Inspecteur au sujet de sa mission seront en même temps remis en copie au doyen du Corps Diplomatique afin que le Corps Diplomatique soit mis à même de constater que la Police Chérifienne fonctionne conformément aux décisions prises par la Conférence et de surveiller si elle garantit d'une manière efficace et conforme aux Traités la sécurité des personnes et des biens des ressortissants, ainsi que celle des transactions commerciales."

There is little doubt that France and Germany will accept the above Article, which was examined at a meeting of the Conference yesterday, when both the French and German Delegates stated that they would submit it to their respective Governments.

The Conference is now making rapid progress.

[10784] No. 435.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March* 28, 1906.

I CANNOT concur in the suggestion, made in your telegram No. 123 of to-day's date, that we should waive our claim as regards the censors of the bank. We have naturally expected that one censor would be British, in view of our large and important trade interests in Morocco.

[11022] No. 436.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 127.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March 30, 1906.*

I INFORMED the Conference yesterday that His Majesty's Government desired that one of the representatives on the Board of Bank Censors should be British. As the Italian and Austrian Delegates both declared that they had no desire to insist on their request for a Censor, the Board will therefore consist of four, who will be selected by the State Banks of France, Spain, and Germany, and by the Bank of England.

I was informed by the Portuguese Delegate that if I would write a private letter to him saying that I should be pleased if he would withdraw his claim for a Censor he would be willing to do so. I have met his wishes in this respect.

[11023] No. 437.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 128.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March 30, 1906.*

MY proposal that the "surtaxe" on import duties should be fixed at 2½ per cent. *ad valorem* has been accepted by the Conference. In accordance with the agreement arrived at, a special fund will be formed by the revenues accruing from the "surtaxe," and this fund will be devoted to meeting the expenditure on public works, by which navigation and commerce generally will be developed in Morocco. The Moorish Government and the Corps Diplomatique are to decide the order of priority in the execution of such works. The State Bank will have the custody of the special fund. Regulations are to be framed by the Corps Diplomatique in concert with the Moorish authorities to govern the adjudication of the works; and the Bureau of Adjudication will consist of a Representative of the Moorish Government, the engineer, and three Delegates from the Corps Diplomatique.

Do you authorize me to intimate the acceptance by His Majesty's Government of the increase of import duties on the above conditions?

[11024] No. 438.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 129.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March 30 1906.*

AT yesterday's sitting of the Conference the Duke of Almodovar read a letter I had written to him, in which I drew attention to the increasing evil of the traffic in alcoholic drinks. In my letter I suggested that measures should be adopted to limit the import to spirits destined for the consumption of the European population by the manufacture of distilled drinks being prohibited by the Makhzen.

The Conference, at my suggestion, referred the question to the Diplomatic Body at Tangier, accompanying this reference with an expression of its adherence to my views and a request that the matter might be considered.

[11025] No. 439.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 130.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March 30, 1906.*

MOORISH customs control.

At yesterday's sitting of the Conference I put forward a proposal that a representative Committee should be appointed to exercise some control over the administration of the customs. The Conference referred the matter to the Drafting Committee, which I hope will accept its main principles.

[11026] No. 440.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 131.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Algeciras, March 30, 1906.*

MOROCCO police.

I was informed yesterday by the Netherlands Delegate that he had received instructions from his Government to make a statement, when the desirable moment arrived, that the appointment of a Dutch officer as Inspector-General of the Police would only have been agreed to by his Government in the event of the Conference expressing an unanimous wish to that effect, but as the Conference was apparently not unanimous on the point they desired to let the matter drop.

In answer to the hope I expressed that my proposal had not in any way offended his Government, he assured me that my mind might be quite at ease on that point.

11053] No. 441.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 51.)
Sir, *Tangier, March 20, 1906.*

HIS Majesty's Consul at Daralbaida informs me that reports have reached him of fresh disturbances in the southern districts. The principal Governors, who have gradually acquired considerable power, are jealous of each other, and some of them are inciting the tribes against their rivals. Thus it is said that the powerful Kaïd of Gundafi has been attacked by the combined forces of the Kaïds of M'tuga, Ureeka, and Sektana, who have destroyed his houses at Gurgur and Amzmiz, and are now marching on his house in the mountains. On the other hand, the Kaïd of M'tuga is himself about to be attacked by Kaïd Aisa-ben-Omar of Abda and Kaïd Anflus of Haha. These movements are believed to be encouraged by the Makhzen as a means of reducing the power of the great Governors, who are becoming practically independent, and the Viceroy of Marrakesh, Mouley Hafid, the Sultan's brother, is encouraging the attack upon Kaïd Gundafi.

The unpopular Governor of Rahmna is on his way back to his tribe from Fez with a fresh mandate, and it is expected that an attempt will be made to catch him on the way.

The people themselves, who, by the failure of the crops through drought and locusts are reduced to great straits, are reported to be utterly disgusted with the present régime, and would readily join any insurrectionary movement which would have prospects of success. It is not known whether there is any foundation for the report that the Pretender has received an invitation from Marrakesh, but there can be little doubt that if he appeared in those districts with a good force and with ample promises of improvements he would be received with open arms.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[11054] No. 442.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 52. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, March 21, 1906.*

I HAVE caused some inquiries to be made at Fez in regard to the statement made by the Moorish Delegate Hadj Mohammed Mokri at Algeciras to the effect that the Moorish Government had undertaken to give to a French Company the privilege of undertaking the harbour works of Casa Blanca and Saffi. This question formed the subject of my despatch No. 39 of 4th March.

His Majesty the Sultan, when asked about the matter, replied that it was not true that he had granted these harbour works to the French, that although there had been some talk about the matter nothing had been settled.

The Representative of the Compagnie Marocaine, in which Creuzot are large shareholders and which is credited with having obtained the concession, however states

that last summer when he failed to obtain the harbour works at Tangier, the Viziers, while excusing themselves for not being able to fulfil the promises they had given him, assured him that it would be made up to him in other ways. He does not pretend to have received anything but verbal promises, but is sanguine that the Makhzen will not endeavour to evade them.

The agent of the Company in question states further that the French Legation and French Government have had nothing to do with this matter and no knowledge of the negotiations which have been carried on directly between himself and the Makhzen.

The German Consul at Fez has declared that his Government would not oppose these projects which were quite legitimate, and, indeed, to oppose them, he said, would be doing what the Germans had objected to the French Government doing, namely, interfering with the Makhzen's liberty of action in such matters.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[11055] No. 443.

Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 53.)
Sir, *Tangier, March 22, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 44 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to report that the Moorish vessel "Turki," after effecting the necessary repairs, left again yesterday for Melilla.

I understand that it is not the intention of the Moorish Government that she should carry out a fresh bombardment of the factory at Mar Chica, but merely exercise a rigid observation and prevent goods being smuggled.

But on this occasion she has taken with her the fuses for the shells which were forgotten the last time she made her famous expedition to Melilla.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[11044] No. 444.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 80. Conference. Confidential.)
Sir, *Algeciras, March 21, 1906.*

I CALLED on the Duke of Almodovar yesterday morning, and, as I was aware that he had been made generally acquainted with the views of the United States' Government as to the mode in which the Police question should be solved, I inquired of him in what light he regarded a dual organization at each Moorish port. His Excellency said that he was convinced that it would be impossible to work the system, and that there would be continued difficulties and differences between the officers. His main objection to the proposed scheme lay, I ascertained, in the fact that Tetuan would also be comprised in the mixed system. It would be impossible, his Excellency remarked, to reconcile Spanish public opinion to such a measure, and it might be difficult for a foreigner to appreciate the almost passionate interest which every Spaniard took in what concerned that portion of Moorish territory which was situated in such close proximity to the Spanish mainland, and in which were established the Spanish North African possessions. The Duke of Almodovar spoke with much feeling and warmth on this point, and I am personally convinced that it would be difficult to devise any measure which could be more mortifying to the patriotic Spaniard than to instal, within 20 miles of Ceuta, a French officer, who, in co-operation with a Spanish officer, should organize the police at a town formerly in Spanish occupation, and which has relations almost exclusively with the Spanish "presidios" and the Spanish mainland. I trust that it will be found possible to satisfy Spanish opinion and feelings on this point, and that Tetuan will be allowed to form an exception to the general scheme.

I have had several consultations with M. Révoil in regard to the note of the United States' Government. From what M. de Radowitz said to Marquis Visconti Venosta and to Mr. White, it is evident that the German Government will cordially adopt the

American views; and at the time of writing I have reason to believe that the above views will be embodied in, and form the ground plan of, a fresh proposal to be submitted to the Conference by Count Welsersheimb.

The day before the reception by Mr. White of the terms of Mr. Root's note to the German Ambassador at Washington, it was generally understood that the Austrian Government, in view of French opposition to what may be termed "the Casa Blanca point," had determined to allow their original proposal to lapse, and were contemplating another scheme by which the organization of the police at four ports should be intrusted to French and Spanish instructors, while the remaining four ports should be left under the exclusive charge of the Moorish authorities. The selection of four ports alone was probably dictated by the project which M. Saint-René Taillandier had presented to the Moorish Government at Fez, and which is to be found on p. 226 of the Yellow Book.

This Austrian scheme has not been communicated to M. Révoil, as telegrams arrived from Berlin recommending, I understand, that no further steps should be taken for the present with respect to it.

M. Révoil is much embarrassed by the new situation created by the note of the United States' Government to the German Ambassador, and is also perplexed as to how his Government will deal with any scheme based on the principles formulated in that note. The American view doubtless disposes of the "Casa Blanca" difficulty, but the mixed system which it recommends would not be agreeable, he fears, to his Government, and would most certainly be impracticable in execution. M. Révoil considers that the United States' Government have not quite rightly appreciated the position in which would be placed the French and Spanish instructors according to the French project. There was, he insists, no question of asking for a mandate: the instructors were to be selected by the Sultan from officers of French and Spanish nationalities; these instructors were to hold no command, but simply to assist the Moorish commanders in the technical details of the organization and instruction of the police contingents; and they were to be practically in the service of the Sultan. There could, therefore, be no fear of officers with these limited and subordinate functions becoming instruments for the acquisition of spheres of influence.

It is, moreover, M. Révoil contends, ridiculous to place a contingent of 150 or 200 men under the charge of officers of different nationalities. It might be practicable at ports, such as Tangier and Casa Blanca, where the contingents would be of 500 men or more, but in the minor ports the scheme could not possibly be worked.

The observations of M. Révoil are, I venture to submit, reasonable and worthy of consideration. But we have to deal with the views expressed by an impartial and powerful Government, and which, if embodied in a proposal, would probably be supported by the majority of the Delegates. It will, I think, be said that forebodings as to the manner in which such a scheme would work in practice are a little premature, and that in any case time and experience can alone finally demonstrate the defects of the mixed system.

The other arguments propounded by M. Révoil, though in themselves of weight, will carry but little conviction, I fear, in the Conference; and it must be remembered that the Delegates are wearied of the protracted duration of the Conference, and would gladly welcome any solution. Moreover, opposition on the part of the French Government would be viewed with some suspicion. Their strong objections to the installation of a third Power at a port fostered the misgivings that the aims of France were, perhaps, a little more far-reaching than she openly acknowledged; and, were she now to object to a mixed system and insist on independent distribution between her and Spain, these misgivings might be deepened.

My own opinion is that it would be well for France to accept a scheme under the mixed system, leaving to time, and the duration of the experiment would be but short, to testify to the defects of the project, and thus enable France to re-establish the police organization on a more efficient footing and in a manner more consonant with her desires. I have not given expression to this opinion, and I hold it simply with a view of hastening a solution of the difficulty, and preventing the possibility of the delay being utilized by the German Government to put forward some other project still more unpalatable and impracticable. The question, however, rests with the French Government; and we are not yet in possession of the new Austrian project.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[11045] No. 445.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 81. Conference.)

Sir, *Algeciras, March 23, 1906.*

COUNT TATTENBACH came to see me yesterday and handed to me a paper, of which I have the honour to transmit a copy, relating to the manner in which contracts for public works should be adjudicated, and on which he said he desired to have my opinion. After reading the paper, I told Count Tattenbach that I must have time to look into the matter, but that I might mention that, in regard to the question of telegraph submarine cables, I thought that the Eastern Telegraph Company claimed a right of priority in future concessions of that nature in Morocco. I could not accurately remember exactly what had passed on the subject, and I should have to apply for full information to refresh my memory. I asked if he wished me to communicate the paper to M. Révoil; but he said that he particularly desired me not to do so. I promised to give him a reply this morning.

I saw Count Tattenbach to-day, and said that I could express no opinion on his paper without having consulted with my Government, and that probably they would desire to discuss the subject with the French Government. I added that, besides consulting with my Government, I might also converse with M. Révoil, if he withdrew the injunction he had placed on my doing so. He said that he left it to me to take whatever course I desired, but inquired whether I could not give him my personal opinion. I told him that my personal opinion was of no value, and that I would prefer to give none.

I have since seen M. Révoil and have shown him the paper which Count Tattenbach left with me. He consideres that railways and mines hardly come within the category of "public works," especially as regards their "exploitation;" and he was at first disposed to dispute that the Conference should concern itself with these matters; but the declarations made by M. Rouvier to Prince Radolin on the 1st August, 1905, and which are to be found on p. 259 of the Yellow Book, third paragraph, testify, I think, to the fact that the question of adjudication of public works can be brought before the Conference. Eventually M. Révoil agreed to refer the matter to his Government.

I told M. Révoil that it might be desirable that the Conference should come to some arrangement similar to that proposed by Count Tattenbach, as otherwise Germany might fill her pockets with Concessions owing to the influence she possesses at Fez. M. Révoil did not appear to consider that there was much danger to be apprehended in that respect, as he gathered that the position of Germany at the Moorish capital was not so assured as was generally believed.

I should be glad if you would kindly let me have your views at an early date, as I presume the question will shortly be brought before the Conference.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 445.

Scheme for Adjudicating Public Works, drawn up by Count Tattenbach.

I. *Services Publics.*

LE Gouvernement Marocain s'engage à n'aliéner aucun des services publics au profit d'intérêts particuliers.

II. *Travaux Publics.*

1. La construction et l'exploitation de chemins de fer de toute espèce, de tramways, de chaussées publiques, de canaux, de ponts, de cables, de lignes télégraphiques, de télégraphes sans fils, de téléphones, de travaux de ports, phares, entreprises d'éclairage dans les villes, soit au gaz, soit à la lumière électrique, la construction

d'edifices publics, l'exploitation de mines, minières et carrières, l'exploitation des forêts de chênes lièges, de même que tous autres travaux et fournitures pour les autorités publiques au Maroc, en tant que ces travaux et fournitures ne tombent pas sous les dispositions de section 8 de la déclaration concernant les impôts, seront conférés par voie d'adjudication publique sans acception de nationalité.

2. Les adjudications publiques seront passées dans les formes et suivant les conditions générales prescrites par un Règlement que le Gouvernement Chérifien arrêtera avec l'assistance du Corps Diplomatique.

3. L'adjudication sera prononcée par le Gouvernement Chérifien en faveur du soumissionnaire qui, en se conformant aux prescriptions du cahier des charges, présentera l'offre remplissant les conditions générales les plus avantageuses.

4. Avant de prononcer une adjudication, le Gouvernement Chérifien demandera l'avis d'une Commission du Corps Diplomatique. Cette Commission consistera de trois membres du Corps Diplomatique, élus par ce dernier pour la durée d'un an. Un substitut sera élu de la même manière pour chaque membre de la Commission. Les mêmes membres et les mêmes substituts pourront être réélus. La Commission pourra se servir des conseils d'experts, dont elle aura le choix libre.

5. Avant de commencer la construction de chemins de fer, le Gouvernement Chérifien délibérera avec le Corps Diplomatique sur le meilleur plan à suivre pour établir au Maroc un réseau de chemins de fer, afin que ce réseau presente les plus grands avantages pour les intérêts tant du Maroc que du commerce étranger. Ces délibérations se porteront aussi sur la question de l'ordre dans lequel les différentes lignes, prises en vue, seraient mises en exécution. En aucun cas le Gouvernement Chérifien n'accordera en faveur d'un État ou de ses ressortissants des droits préférenciels, soit quant à la construction, soit quant à l'exploitation des chemins de fer, soit quant aux tarifs du transport.

[11046] No. 446.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 82. Conference.)

Sir, *Algeciras, March 23, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translations of two letters which have reached me from the Moorish Pretender. Similar letters have, I hear, been addressed by him to the other foreign Delegates here.

No importance is, I consider, to be attached to these communications, in which the Pretender lays claim to far more power than he really exercises, and which are in the main confined to malicious attacks on the present Sultan and his Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 446.

The Moorish Pretender to Sir A. Nicolson.

(Translation.)

Praise to God alone.

(Seal of Moulai Mehemmed.)

To the honoured English Ambassador at Tangier. May you continue in health and be favoured with increased grace, &c.

WE have heard that a meeting of the Delegates of the Powers is being held at Algeciras to discuss questions concerning the Powers, and to deliberate upon matters which will redound to the advantage of humanity, now and in the future. Possibly some of the Delegates may have conferred with some members of the Colonel's party,* under the idea that it still forms a Government, that its Sultan is sane and has

* The term "Colonel's party" is applied to the Sultan's party, and originates in the term having been applied to the Sultan's troops, who had been commanded by Colonel Kaid Maclean, and were commonly known as the Colonel's troops.

sovereignty, and that his Government still has power to exercise authority, &c. But those who are endowed with the smallest intelligence know that Abd-el-Aziz, the idiot, lacks intelligence and sense. They also know that, from of old, the appointment of idiots as Heads of States has not been accepted by any religion, people, or State, and that compacts entered into with them, or with those who follow their advice, have no effect. We have not heard of an idiot ruling over an intelligent people. You have also heard of the profligacy, falsehood, and oppression of his officials in the past, and you know that they still continue their evil practices.

Authority cannot be exercised properly by the profligate, the oppressor, or the hypocrite, as it is well known that a just authority is the mainstay of the world and of religion, and is conducive to the welfare of mankind.

God—may He be blessed and exalted—said with reference to His prophet David—may peace be upon him—O David, We have appointed you our Caliph upon earth, therefore judge between the people with justice, and do not follow evil, for it will lead thee from God's path. God—may he be praised and exalted—also said in the chapter of "the Kings," revealed for the guidance of Rulers, that God will give the victory to whomsoever He pleases, and He made manifest the conditions of victory (*i.e.*, power). God also said, of those to whom we have given power on earth who have fulfilled the ordained prayers, given arms, incited to good deeds, and prohibited that which is forbidden, not one of them has had his kingdom scattered unless he were wanting in the whole or part of those virtues.

God also said those who do not govern according to God's revelations are oppressors, &c. Therefore God will scatter the Colonel's Government and disperse its kingdom. It will be seen that they are all cowards, dead or fleeing for their lives in the most remote countries, as soon as they see our victorious forces. And those who will wish to face our forces will flee and disperse. You will see that not a fraction of the Moors, nor a single tribe, will remain loyal to them. Those who remain seek to incite to rebellion with a dirham or a dinar (small Arabic coins). What think you of a Government which seeks to buy authority with a dirham? which seeks to protect itself, without method or basis, by means of a few tribes and by cajoling certain Powers? This has frequently been done, but neither benefit nor help have resulted. Thus he, the Sultan, has obtained loans, though in financial difficulties, and those who have made the loans will not be pleased with the results. How many merchants have been reduced to poverty by those corrupt officials, and how many wealthy persons have lost their money through having dealings with them?

We therefore warn you to permit no one to have monetary dealings with the Colonel's party, and do not enter into any compact with them, either for a short or extended term, as Abd-el-Aziz, the idiot, has no authority over Morocco, nor does any one obey him there. They depose such Rulers, and direct their steps to us, tendering their allegiance, and the country and townspeople and the tribesmen of every degree approve their action.

It is hoped you will prevent some of those who so desire from helping him, making him loans or giving him their protection, as Morocco is from of old a place of trade for all countries without distinction, as you will know from history and Treaties.

Matters will thus continue under our rule, and the attention we will give to security and safety will give satisfaction. We will obstruct all those who desire to harm commerce, and we will pursue the same course as that followed by our ancestors—may God sanctify their souls in the Abode of Peace.

(Pencil-mark of Sultan.)

20*th Hejja*, 1323 (*February* 15, 1906).

Inclosure 2 in No. 446.

The Moorish Pretender to Sir A. Nicolson.

(Translation.)

Praise to God alone.

To the esteemed Ambassador of the British Government:

(After compliments.)

YOU have knowledge of the past and present corruption of Abd-el-Aziz and his foolish actions, of his neglect of his country, and the debilitated state of his authority. You know that he has handed over the people to his corrupt and tyrannous officials,

who have become emboldened in their acts of tyranny and increased in numbers. This has interrupted trade, increased disorder and danger, and cost many lives and much treasure. Meanwhile, he slumbers and is neglectful, as though dead and without life.

All this has made it necessary to appoint an Iman (leader) to put a stop to the injustice of the oppressors and improve the condition of the people. Men without a leader are useless, and they have no true leader when the ignorant become Chiefs.

We therefore promise allegiance to our Sultan and Prince, our Lord Moulai Mehemmed, the son of Moulai Hassan, the son of Moulai Mohammed, the son of Moulai Abderrahman (may God sanctify their souls in Paradise), as he has the qualities of wisdom and energy, bounty and justice, strength and courage, bravery and perfection. God has united the country and improved the condition of the people through his agency; all harm has ceased, and by his justice trade has been facilitated, the roads opened, and the whole Gharb, villages and towns, have proclaimed him and deposed Abd-el-Aziz for the reasons above stated, and for his profligacy, corruption, and stupidity.

We therefore send you this letter in order that you may have further proof.

It is our desire and request that you will not give heed to the remaining members of the Colonel's corrupt party who follow Abd-el-Aziz, the foolish. They have no longer any power to exercise authority, nor any upright party or leader; and in obedience to orders from our Commander and Lord, who has taken over his kingdom and has ordered us to obey him and give him our allegiance, we avoid all that is blameworthy, especially oppression, injustice, and rebellion. It is a duty to prevent injustice and to act honestly, as it is a duty to give security and safety to foreigners, merchants, or others, and to their trade.

We inform you of this in order that you may know that the members of the Colonel's party have no stability.

As witness to the above we hereto affix our seals.

May God improve the present state of affairs, and grant that our hopes may be attained.

(96 seals of officials.)

20*th Hejja*, 1323 (*February* 15, 1906).

Marginal Attestation of Notaries and Kadi to the foregoing.

Praise to God alone.

Blessing and peace be upon the Prophet, after whom there has been no other.

Know all men, by the document written on the left side of this sheet, that all Moorish citizens of consideration and of intelligence and discernment have tendered their allegiance to our Lord Mehemmed, son of Moulai Hassan, son of Moulai Mohammed, son of Moulai Abderrahman, the Commander of the Faithful, defender of the faith and the religious doctrine. Those who are present in camp have affixed their seals thereto, but the numbers of the Governors and Deputy Governors who are absent are beyond computation; whereas the partisans of Abd-el-Aziz are a mere refuse, of whom God will take no account. They seek to extinguish the light of God with their mouths, but God refuses to have His light extinguished. To the above effect he appends his signature.

Written this 13th Moharrem, 1324 (9th March, 1906.)

(Rubrics of two notaries.)

(Attestation of Shereefian Kadi.)

[11048] No. 447.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 31.)

(No. 84. Conference. Confidential.)

Sir, *Algeciras, March* 23, 1906.

COUNT WELSERSHEIMB, the Austro-Hungarian Delegate, spoke to me yesterday in regard to the Police question, and I inquired of him if he could tell me how matters stood with respect to his project. He said that the desire of his Government was to find some solution to the existing difficulties which would be agreeable to

all parties, and that, as it was clear that France would not agree to the establishment of a third Power at Casa Blanca, and as it was believed that Germany would not insist on that point, a project had been prepared by his Government which would leave the policing of all the ports to France and Spain, but which would also provide for the appointment of an Inspector-General invested with considerable powers and with sufficient authority to exercise a close and effective superintendence.

This project had been communicated to Berlin; but the German Government had not hitherto explicitly declared that they would accept it, but had contented themselves with conveying their thanks for the endeavours which the Austro-Hungarian Government were making to further a settlement.

Count Welsersheimb further explained that Count Goluchowski considered that as Germany had made such large concessions on the Police question, it was fair that she should receive some satisfaction on that of the bank; and he was, therefore, to link the two questions together, and to endeavour to procure from M. Révoil some substantial abatement in the demands of France in respect to the allotment of the Bank capital.

The views or suggestions reported from Washington had, he said, introduced some confusion into the above plan, and he was unaware what effect they might produce on the intentions of his Government. He would, however, until otherwise instructed, continue to prosecute the programme which he had to fulfil. He would at the same time be glad to know whether the American suggestions found favour with France and Spain, and also with ourselves.

Both M. Révoil and myself were anxious that Count Welsersheimb should not be induced to present a project based on the mixed system and duel organization, and as I was afraid that instructions to do so might arrive at any moment, and as I also was aware that you had informed Count Mensdorff in London that it would be unfortunate if a new project were presented which would be unacceptable to France and Spain, I took the opportunity of telling Count Welsersheimb that I knew that Spain, and I had every reason to believe that France also, objected strongly to the dual organization, and that, of course, we should support France in her objections. I said I would prefer if he heard from M. Révoil's own lips the views of the French Government on the subject, and I therefore brought the two Delegates together at my house.

M. Révoil stated to the Austrian Delegate the reasons which prevented his Government from accepting the dual organization, and Count Welsersheimb thereupon said that he would at once telegraph to his Government that Great Britain, France, and Spain would be unable to agree to a proposal based on the mixed system.

Count Welsersheimb and M. Révoil then discussed the question of the concessions which France might be prepared to make upon the Bank question, but, as their views were divergent, it is hardly necessary that I should report them in detail.

There were two points which Count Welsersheimb wished to impress on M. Révoil and myself. The first was that his Government considered that the most important feature of the Police scheme should be the investment of the Inspector-General with large powers and efficient authority; while the German Government attached chief importance to the distribution of the ports among the French and Spanish officers being decided by the Conference, and not left to the Sultan and the two directly interested Governments to arrange among themselves.

At the time of writing this despatch I do not know what project Count Welsersheimb will eventually present; but I think that the situation, as it presents itself to-day, may be summed up as follows. I leave aside the American views, as it is by no means evident in what form they may be presented, or whether they will be embodied in a project, Austrian, German, or other:—

1. The German Delegates have not really officially abandoned the Casa Blanca scheme. They have let it be understood that they have allowed it to lapse, but no more than that. It seems to me that they are awaiting what may emerge from Washington, and in the meantime are allowing the Austro-Hungarian Government to discuss projects and compromises without expressing any definite opinion in regard to them.

2. The Austro-Hungarian Government are keenly desirous of finding a common ground of understanding, but are hampered by the reserve of Berlin, and by the difficulty of obtaining from France such concessions on the Bank as may satisfy Germany.

3. The French are willing to make certain concessions, or, more correctly, are disposed to make certain abatements in their demands, on the Bank question, but not to the extent which Count Welsersheimb desires. They are willing to agree that the Inspector-General should be invested with considerable powers and authority, but are unwilling that he should be an organ of the Diplomatic Body, or that the latter should

have the faculty of interfering in the details of the Police organization. They are also opposed to the Conference deciding as to how the ports are to be distributed, as they consider that such distribution would be effected in a sense contrary to the secret Agreements between France and Spain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[11023] No. 448.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 69.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March* 31, 1906.

I HAVE received your telegram No. 128 on the subject of proposed surtax on import duties and the scheme for public works. You are authorized to accept both proposals provided one of the three Diplomatic Delegates be British, as it is important and equitable that this country should be properly represented on the Board of Adjudicators. If you cannot insure the fulfilment of this condition, you should try to induce the Conference to add to the number of Delegates.

---

o